Formal Accountability Mechanisms Research Articles

Accountability and Extra-Role Behavior

Accountability is a foundational element of every organization, and it exists at multiple of levels. Every organization, regardless of size, has accountability mechanisms. However, the formal accountability mechanisms adopted by an organization are subject to the interpretations of individual organizational actors. As such, individuals facing ostensibly similar formal organizational accountability systems may feel or experience different levels of accountability. This distinction is critical because it is the perception of reality (i.e., as opposed to reality itself) that drives individual behavior. In this paper, we examined the relationship between accountability and a key organizational outcome—extra-role behaviors. Our results partially support the notion that some level of accountability is essential, but that the relationship between accountability and extra-role behaviors is non linear in nature, assuming a U-shaped form. Implications of these results are discussed.

Accountability, narrative reporting and legitimation

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to show how a major public benefit entity in New Zealand uses formal accountability mechanisms and informal reporting to justify its existence. The paper is premised on the view that the accountability relationship for public benefit entities is broader and more complex than the traditional shareholder‐manager relationship in the private sector.Design/methodology/approachThis longitudinal single case study of the Department of Conservation (DOC) spans the period from its establishment in 1987 to June 2006. It involves the detailed examination of the narrative disclosures contained in the annual reports, including the Statement of Service Performance, over the period of the study. A number of controversial items that appeared in the printed media between 1 April 1987 and 30 June 2006 were traced through the annual reports to establish whether DOC used impression management techniques in its annual reports to gain, maintain and repair its organisational legitimacy.FindingsThe analysis found that the annual report of a public benefit entity could play an important legitimising role. Using legitimacy theory, it is argued that assertive and defensive impression management techniques were used by DOC to gain, maintain and repair its organisational legitimacy in the light of extensive negative media publicity.Originality/valueThis is one of the first studies to examine the relationship between narrative disclosures in annual reports and legitimacy in the public sector. The paper provides a valuable contribution to researchers and practitioners as it extends the understanding of how public benefit entities can make use of the narrative portions of the annual report when pursuing organisational legitimacy.

Rude Accountability in the Unreformed State: Informal Pressures on Frontline Bureaucrats in Bangladesh

Summary‘Rude’ forms of accountability are central to how poor people negotiate their entitlements on the frontline of service delivery in Bangladesh. This paper documents the unorganised, informal pressures that poor citizens exert on officials in a context where effective formal systems for accountability are absent, and the state remains unreformed in key respects. The paper explores the impact of ‘rude accountability’ on services, as well as their limitations and the consequences for formal accountability systems. Based on extensive research into how poor people experience safety nets, schools and health services, the paper argues that strong social and local political pressures go some way towards supplying a rough responsiveness to demands for service. These work through shame and embarrassment, pressures to maintain reputation and status, and the threat of violence. Poor people have good reasons to use these methods in preference to formal accountability mechanisms. And poor women may have a particularly strong comparative advantage in doing so – not because they are so much better than men or rich people at complaining and shaming, but because it is comparatively less difficult for them to do so than to engage in more formally structured means of complaint or feedback. The idea of rude accountability is seductive: when formal governance systems fail, the idea that there are informal mechanisms that are better suited to context and culture is intrinsically attractive. Yet the paper concludes that the gains from rude accountability are often short‐lived and may backfire, as public officials fear and resist efforts to enable citizen participation in holding them to account. There are features of contemporary Bangladeshi state‐society relations that lend themselves to informal means of accountability, the analysis here of informal accountability mechanisms has wider implications for the move towards citizen involvement in performance‐based accountability in other contexts.

Trends in Global Protected Area Governance,1992–2002

Governance refers to the interactions among structures, processes, and traditions that determine direction, how power is exercised, and how the views of citizens or stakeholders are incorporated into decision-making. Governance is now recognized as a critical aspect of effective conservation and is a prominent part of the Convention on Biological Diversity's work program on protected areas. This study reports on a global survey to assess changes in governance of protected area systems between 1992 and 2002 based on responses from 41 countries. Results indicate that substantial changes have taken place with overall trends towards increased participation of more stakeholders, greater use of formal accountability mechanisms, and a wider range of participatory techniques. Many of these changes are supported by legislative and policy requirements and 75% of respondents reported changes in legislation over the past decade. Protected areas are becoming more influenced by global forces. A majority of respondents reported increased involvement of the private sector. Funding is coming from a broader range of sources, with a smaller proportion of income coming from government sources in 2002. Absolute funding amounts have increased, but almost two-thirds report that budgets fall short of requirements. Almost 90% of respondents felt that protected area governance had improved over the last decade; 67% felt that this had also led to improved management effectiveness. Respondents felt that secure funding, capacity building, and increased community involvement were the main governance needs for the future.

Leader reputation and accountability in organizations: Implications for dysfunctional leader behavior

We argue that leader accountability is more of an informal, sociopolitical process, than it is a formal one, and a central component of this informal accountability is leader reputation. We propose that leaders' reputations (which includes human and social capital, political skill and style, etc.) influence how much stakeholders trust them. This, in turn, affects the extent to which formal accountability mechanisms are imposed upon leaders. In this paper, we concentrate on the potential for dysfunctional leader behavior. However, how stakeholders interpret actual leader behavior, whether functional or dysfunctional, is moderated by the motives or intentions that those stakeholders attribute to the behavior. The result is a perception of leader performance and effectiveness that redefines or reinforces leader reputation, and also serves to modify or reinforce leader style. Therefore, a sociopolitical perspective of accountability and reputation asserts that the risk of a diminished reputation is a form of accountability that is effective to the extent that attributions of leader intentions are accurate. Implications for this conceptualization are discussed, as are directions for future research.

The Accountability of Transnational Policing Institutions: The Strange Case of Interpol

RésuméInterpol est la «griffe» la plus reconnue en matière de policing transnational, mais à qui, ou à quoi, cette organisation rend-elle des comptes? Dans les démocraties occidentales, les débats sur la responsabilité [accountability] des agences policières portent habituellement sur des institutions dont le domaine de compétence et les pouvoirs sont définis et strictement limités par un cadre juridique précis: c'est ce que nous nommons ici le «paradigme standard» de responsabilité de la police. La littérature est toutefois lacunaire en ce qui concerne les quelques institutions opérant au niveau transnational et qui, par certains aspects importants mais mal compris, ne sont soumises que partiellement à la juridiction des États-nations souverains. Cet article analyse le cadre de responsabilité d'Interpol, notamment par référence à son statut historiquement discutable d'organisation intergouvernementale (OIG). Examinant le modus operandi d'Interpol, nous montrons que son fonctionnement pourrait devenir l'objet d'ardentes controverses politiques. Considérant certains des articles parmi les plus importants de la constitution d'Interpol, nous nous interrogeons sur la transformation du rôle de cette agence dans le policing du monde post-11 septembre 2001. Nous caractérisons la responsabilité d'Interpol à la lumière d'une typologie des mécanismes de reddition de comptes internes, externes, formels et informels. Notre thèse veut que l'établissement et le maintien des principes de responsabilité démocratique fondateurs de légitimité constituent un défi essentiel pour les institutions transnationales.

Civil Society and Democratically Accountable Global Governance

AbstractThis article explores the ways and extents that civil society associations can bring greater public accountability to global governance. The analysis first reviews the growth of civil society engagement of global governance. Second, the article elaborates four general ways that civil society associations have promoted increased accountability in global governance: by increasing the public transparency of global governance operations; by monitoring and reviewing global policies; by seeking redress for mistakes and harms attributable to global regulatory bodies; and by advancing the creation of formal accountability mechanisms for global governance. Third, the article identifies six broad circumstances that have affected (and often limited) the extent of civil society achievements with respect to accountability in global governance.