History Of Foreign Policy Research Articles

Why Would a Political Scientist Write a Biography?

Why would a political scientist write a biography of a U.S. national security advisor? Biography focuses on a single individual and has no guidelines on where or how to collect evidence or on how to organize that evidence. Nonetheless, a biography of General Brent Scowcroft, national security advisor to Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush, allowed me to provide a broad overview of forty years of U.S. foreign policy history, to conduct an in-depth study of the personnel and organization involved in the national security decision-making, and to narrate the life of an extremely influential and interesting public figure. Biography fulfills many of political science’s disciplinary objectives, in fact: it speaks to important issues of political science, it offers thick description and facilitates the drawing of causal inferences, it addresses agency and structure, it is falsifiable, and it is able to communicate with a larger public.

The present situation and future direction of the study on the history of the early Joseon Dynasty

In 2013 and 2014, the amount of result of the study on the history of the early Joseon Dynasty was 266; 37 books, 18 doctorate theses, and 211 journal papers. The reseaches on institutional history, history of foreign policy, measurable figures, and Japanese Invasion of Korea in 1592 were done actively. Whereas the studies on political and economic history were not progressing relatively.BR In my opinion, the future direction of the study on the history of the early Joseon Dynasty need to be as follows. First, comprehensive and macroscopic research should be done to explain the characteristics and historical meaning of 15SUPth/SUP and 16SUPth/SUP century. For this, we have to analyze the materials and interpret the meaning with considering the historical and social context. Second, it must be necessary to propose an alternative to the conventional views on the politics, society and thought of the early Joseon Dynasty; for example, the conflict structure between Hun-gu(勳舊) and Sarim(士林) and the awareness of Junghwa(中華).

Zwei Imperien und ihr geheimes Wissen voneinander. Überlegungen zu einer Geschichte der militärischen Nachrichtendienste in Österreich-Ungarn und in Russland in den Jahren vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg

The article emphasizes the importance of studying intelligence when examining the history of foreign policy and international relations. Furthermore, the text addresses widespread scepticism among historians in dealing with intelligence because of either doubts about sources or about the topic as a whole. Nonetheless, several sensational spy cases affected the relationship between Austro-Hungary and the Tsarist Empire in the era before the First World War. Yet Russia and Austria-Hungary were not the only countries that monitored the development of espionage with increasing interest and fear. The age before 1914 in Europe saw a culmination of so-called spy mania or spy fever. Simultaneously, the relevance of military intelligence increased. Moreover, questions about what the headquarters knew about each other in Vienna and St. Petersburg influenced not only military affairs but also the relationship between the two empires. For instance spy cases were vividly discussed in the press and therefore had an influence on the development of public opinion towards Russia in the Habsburg Empire and conversely towards Austria-Hungary in the Tsarist Empire.

‘The Women's Movement Took the Wrong Turning’: British feminists, pacifism and the politics of appeasement

The history of foreign policy and especially the Munich Crisis of 1938–1939 have been viewed from various angles but never from the points of view of gender and feminism. This has been a significant oversight in the scholarship, especially as there were many prominent women politicians who were heavily invested in the appeasement debate, and because the majority of feminist organisations became increasingly preoccupied with foreign affairs and the specific effect of dictatorship on women. This article explores how British feminists responded to the policy and the fallout of appeasement in the late 1930s; how the British branch of the most prominent transnational feminist pacifist organisation, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) made the transition from peace, to Crisis, to war; before focusing on two intertwined biographical case studies of Kathleen Courtney and Maude Royden. There were various responses and dramatic fluctuations in positioning in the years leading to the world war, with many feminists struggling to come to terms with the intellectual, emotional and psychological shift from feminist-informed internationalism and pacifism to a rejection of appeasement and support for the war effort. Both Courtney and Royden had spent the two preceding decades in the forefront of the feminist pacifist movement, and the rise of Nazi Germany, the international crisis and then the Second World War itself forced each to resituate herself and make psychologically and ideologically wrenching decisions.

A Diplomatic Counter-Revolution

In a July 2011 wide-ranging interview with Madean's magazine, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, still glowing from his majority election victory, offered a stark confession. Since becoming prime minister [in 2006], he said, thing that's probably struck me most in terms of my previous expectations - I don't even know what my expectations were - is not just how important foreign affairs/foreign relations is, but in fact that it's become almost everything.1 Six weeks later, a report in the National Post revealed that the government planned act on Harper's new understanding of the significance of world affairs: Once considered an afterthought by a prime minister preoccupied with winning a majority, wrote Tobi Cohen, relations have moved centre for the Conservatives, who have undertaken a quiet but sweeping re-examination of federal foreign policy.2This essay addresses two questions that should be central Ottawa's review: first, what might have motivated the government's actions on the international stage between 2006 and2on? And, second, was this motivation consistent with Canadian national interests? To date, analysts have offered three answers question one. The first two are consistent with the content of a debate over the possibility of a distinct Conservative foreign policy that was published in a volume of Canada Among Nations shortly after Harper's first election victory in 2006. Conservative partisans argued that there was indeed a distinctly Conservative approach international relations - characterized by a combination of compassion, realism, engagement, focus, and global leadership. Opposing them were those who maintained that the strategic constraints imposed upon Ottawa both domestically and internationally limited the flexibility of any ruling party effect significant change in foreign policy, no matter its partisan leanings. The only real difference that a new government could make was at the rhetorical level.3Both suggestions are profoundly conservative: neither anticipates, nor allows for, broad divergences from the authors' general understandings of Canada's foreign policy history. And while analysts from both camps might point specific rhetoric and decisions from the last five years that support their interpretations, considering the activist nature of the Harper regime (not mention the prime minister's comments in Maclean's), neither theory is ultimately satisfying. Kim Richard Nossal, a professor of political studies at Queen's University, has offered a more plausible assessment. To him, Canadian foreign policy between 2006 and 2011 was driven more by a partisan desire to make the Conservatives the dominant political party in Canada, than it was by dear thinking about world affairs.11 But if the government of Stephen Harper's approach international relations was designed primarily erase any memory of Canada's allegedly Liberal (internationalist) past, why did Ottawa not reject the national security policy of 2004? Why did it not distance itself from the never-popular Afghanistan mission, or Paul Martin's efforts increase the focus of Canada's development assistance program? Further examination will demonstrate that Nossal's explanation is yet more compelling if one defines Liberal foreign policy as the practices manifested most clearly during an exceptional period of Canadian conduct in world affairs, when the national diplomatic personality was shaped primarily by a single Liberal member of parliament - Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy. Conservative foreign policy between 2006 and 2OII might therefore be most effectively characterized as an effort eradicate one individual's, as opposed one party's, legacy.To determine whether such an approach world affairs was consistent with Canada's national interests, an issue that has yet be dealt with by scholarly analysts in significant detail, one must take into consideration what the Harper government's global outlook attempted replace. …

THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED FORCES AND THEIR LINK WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM AND COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS 1910-1961

The Point of Departure: The Military Transfer Concept A cursory examination of the literature now available on the South African Defence Force would suggest that such literature contains an embarrassment of riches. A more careful scrutiny, however, suggests that. in terms of nominal measurement. it can be grouped into fairly discrete categories covering the first (1880-1881) and second (1899-1902) Anglo-Boer Wars, World Wars I and II, the Korean conflict. and the growth of the South African Defence Force as a natural complement to the world isolation engendered by the pursuit of the policy of apartheid. The last category is more appropriately considered as part of the civil-military and foreign policy history of the Republic of South Africa because of the severance of the Commonwealth tie in 1961 and the declaration of the arms embargo against the Republic in 1963.

Between Rehovot and Tehran——Gideon Hadary's Secret Diplomacy

The young State of Israel had been greatly assisted by non-Israeli Jews. However, for obvious reasons this aspect of its foreign policy history has been shrouded with secrecy and most of these individuals have remained unrecognized. The article sheds light on the activities of one of them, Gideon Hadary, who was born in Chicago, raised in Rehovot, educated in the United States, became an OSS and later a State Department intelligence officer, and who at the same time secretly rendered invaluable diplomatic help to the Jewish Agency and the State of Israel. More research is badly needed to uncover the full range of this aspect of the country's "statecraft in the dark".

From British Colony to American Satellite? Australia and the USA during the Cold War

This article challenges the widely‐accepted view that Australia's strategic relationship with the USA during the period 1945–69 thwarted the full development of Australian nationhood and, in so doing, formed an obstacle to Australia's accommodation with its region. It argues that the most influential perspectives on the subject place too much emphasis on the 1940s as a watershed in Australian foreign policy history, exaggerate differences between Labor and conservative policies, fail to appreciate that the pursuit of Australian interests was central to Australian policy during this period, and exaggerate the limitations that ANZUS imposed upon Australian freedom of action. Not a thwarted nationalism but flawed understanding of the limitations and possibilities of the US alliance as a vehicle for Australian interests shaped Australian government policies during this period.

A Moveable Feast: On the History of Norwegian Foreign Policy

Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie (‘The History of Norwegian Foreign Policy’), 6 vols. (Universitetsforlaget, 1995–7), NOK 298 – per volume ISBN 8–200–22639–5.Volume I: Narve Bjørgo, Øystein Rian and Alf Kaardtvedt: Selvstendighet og union. Fra middelalderen til 1905 (1995), 416 pp., ISBN 8–200–22393–0.Volume II: Roald Berg: Norge på egen hånd 1905–1920 (1995), 401 pp., ISBN 8–200–22394–9.Volume III: Odd-Bjørn Fure: Mellomkrigstid 1920–1940 (1996), 434 pp., ISBN 2–200–22534–8.Volume IV: Jakob Sverdrup: Inn i storpolitiken 1940–1949 (1996), 389 pp., ISBN 8–200–22531–3.Volume V: Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge Ø. Pharo: Kald krig og internasjonalisering 1949–1965 (1997), 505 pp., ISBN 8–200–22894–0.Volume VI: Rolf Tamnes: Oljealder 1965–1995 (1997), 568 pp., ISBN 8–200–22893–2.It is a tempting thought that there is a contrast between, on the one hand, this voluminous, painstakingly thorough and admirably documented publication and, on the other hand, the size of its subject. A foreign policy history is a prestigious project that is traditionally associated with the great and powerful states of Europe. The Norwegian Foreign Ministry has approached the project with no less austere a mind than the authorities of more populous European states. Well financed, well led and with stunningly generous access to even contemporary archive materials – up till 1995 – this particular foreign policy history might even be the one with the best official backing to date. Moreover, of the Scandinavian countries Norway is the one with the strongest tradition of international history, and most of the best minds in the field have been members of the team of authors. But why then, some would cry, throw this impressive weight into a history of one of Europe's smallest states, 4.5 million souls, placed at the outskirts of the European continent, not a member of the European Union and with fewer than 100 years of independent foreign policy at that?

Canadian Foreign Policy

CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY HAS BEEN TRANSFORMED since the end of the cold war. Foreign aid and defence budgets have been cut to the bone, leaving Canada with limited means to project an international profile. To be sure, Canada is still a frontline member of the United Nations, capable of initiatives in global affairs, such as Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy's successful campaign for a treaty banning land-mines and similar efforts concerning child soldiers, small arms, and the agreement in the summer of 1998 on an international criminal court.(f.1) Nonetheless, the level of Canada's activities and the quality of its contributions in the international sphere have diminished under the Liberal government of Jean Chretien, despite Axworthy's activist and wellmeaning efforts. The 1995 foreign policy white paper notwithstanding, Canadian foreign policy has become much more selective and conditional and less internationalist than it was ten years ago.Canada is, de facto, practising 'selective internationalism,' an approach to foreign policy that has been encouraged by several influential commentators who insist that since the end of the cold war the promotion of Canadian interests no longer requires broad international commitments and initiatives. Prosperity and security can be ensured without devoting inordinate resources to foreign affairs, or so the reasoning goes. The argument usually begins with the assumption that the fiscal situation in Canada is the major impediment to broad engagement in foreign affairs. Canada, 'typically,' only follows the direction of the United States, which is beginning to question its own international commitments. In sum, domestic circumstances and ideologies combine with international constraints to reduce the appeal of internationalism.Internationalism is not dead in Canada, but there are strong pressures to dilute it and to shift to a more selective approach to international commitments. The selection criteria, moreover, are almost entirely economic, designed to promote immediate self-interest. Will this lead to the kind of neo-isolationist foreign policy that to some extent characterized Canada's approach to world affairs in the years between the two World Wars?ISOLATIONISM IN PERSPECTIVEIsolationism is perhaps most closely identified with the history of foreign policy in the United States, though it is also strongly associated with Britain's preference in the turbulent 19th century for 'splendid isolation.' Isolationism, to be sure, spans nearly the entire history of the United States: in 1796, in his farewell address to Congress, George Washington warned against entanglement in European affairs. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 reaffirmed that tendency, which was only briefly interrupted when the United States entered the First World War, a flirtation with internationalism firmly repudiated by Congress when it blocked Woodrow Wilson's attempts to involve the United States in the League of Nations. Isolationism was not definitively abandoned until the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941. Even so, with its roots firmly planted in notions of Manifest Destiny, conservative fears of a too-powerful government, and continuing objections to involvement overseas, American isolationism is never far from the surface.The Canadian experience of isolationism is less stark. From 1867 until the end of the First World War, Canada's foreign policy was carried out in the context of membership in a closely knit British Empire. Only in the interwar years did Canada actively begin to disengage its external policies from those of Britain. This approach, rooted firmly in the domestic imperative, had its isolationist face. Canada's enthusiasm for the League of Nations, for instance, was lukewarm. It was in a speech before that body that Senator Raoul Dandurand coined the phrase, 'fireproof house,' to describe Canada's fortunate strategic position.(f.2) Although Canadian isolationism did not contain much ideological content, it had in common with American isolationism an indifference to the quarrels and armed conflicts that were growing in Europe and a reluctance to prepare militarily to assist its European cousins against the Nazis. …

German Foreign Trade Policy Towards the East in the Light of Recent Research

Robert Mark Spaulding, Osthandel und Ostpolitik. German Foreign Trade Policies in Eastern Europe from Bismarck to Adenauer (Oxford and Providence: Berghahn, 1997), 546 pp., £60, ISBN 1–57181–039–0.Volker R. Berghahn, ed., Quest for Economic Empire. European Strategies of German Big Business in the Twentieth Century (Oxford and Providence: Berghahn, 1996), 224 pp., £35:00 (hb), £16.50 (pb), ISBN 1–57181–027–7.Meung-Hoan Hoh, Westintegration versus Osthandel. Politik und Wirtschaft in den Ost-West-Beziehungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1949–1958, (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1995), ISBN 3–631–49003–8.Friedrich von Heyl, Der innerdeutsche Handel um Eisen- und Stahl, 1945–1972. Deutsch-deutsche Beziehungen im Kalten Krieg. (Cologne: Böhlau, 1997), DM 64, ISBN 3–412–03897–0.Research into the history of foreign trade relations languishes in a grey area between the history of foreign policy and economic history. This is particularly true of German trade relations with eastern Europe during the Cold War, even though this was precisely the time when the topic was the focal point of public interest. Before Chancellor Willy Brandt and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel introduced their New Ostpolitik, the Federal Republic's trade with the East (Osthandel) was one of the most controversial issues in foreign policy. The reasons for this were, in no small measure, historical, closely tied up with the ‘ghost of Rapallo’ and the myth of red trade. The treaty concluded between the German empire and Soviet Russia at the economic conference of Genoa in 1922 created the fatal impression that this was a case of two underdogs in the international community getting together to undermine the status quo established by the Treaty of Versailles. From then on, whenever the ‘ghost of Rapallo’ was invoked what was meant was that Germany could be sure of Soviet support for the implementation of its revisionist claims in the East, and thus have greater room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis the West.

The papers on foreign and international policy in the Russian archives [The Stalin years

Silvio Tons. The papers on foreign and international policy in the Russian archives: The Stalin years. This article reports a research experience in the Russian archives on several aspects of Stalin's foreign policy in the 1930s and 1940s. The opening of the Russian archives has been particularly selective in the field of foreign policy. Though an impressive process of declassification of archival materials has been undertaken, this not always results in the availability of documents and in the possibility to use finding aids. In particular, the Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii, which is the main archive for the analysis of Soviet foreign policy , does not offer, on very relevant topics, the chance to carry out a complete research. The situation in the CPSU archives and the archives of Communist international organizations was more favourable for some time, but it has been increasingly worsening over the last two- three years. Quite probably, in the opening of archival documentation on Soviet Foreign Policy an extremely favourable cycle has developed and exhausted itself approximately in the years 1992-1996. However, the impact of archives on foreign policy history should not be underestimated. Though the documentation available does not always shed enough light onto the decision-making processes, the complexity and subtlety of our views become greater. The new materials greatly enrich our understanding of the connection between the Cold War and pre-war Soviet foreign policy, thus challenging the division traced by pre-1991 historical analysis. They also lead us to a more balanced picture of the external dimension of Stalinism in the post-war years. While the predominant image of Stalin's firm control of the political process is by and large confirmed, a complex and even contradictory character of Soviet politics can be seen. For example, the archival documents on the Cominform provide us with evidence of a deceptive political process, which shows a significant degree of ambiguity in policy-making.

State Versus Private Ownership: The Conservative Governments and British Civil Aviation 1951–62

Studies of post-1945 Britain have often concentrated upon political and foreign policy history and are only just now beginning to address the question of the restructuring of the British economy and domestic policy. Civil aviation, a subject of considerable interest to historians of interwar Britain, has not been given a similar degree of attention in the post-1945 era. Civil aviation policy was, however, given a very high priority by both the 1945-51 Labour government and its Conservative successors. Civil aviation represented part of the effort to return Britain to a peacetime economy by transferring resources from the military into the civil aircraft industry, while at the same time holding for Britain a position of pre-eminence in the postwar expansion of civil flying. As such, aviation was a matter of great interest to reconstruction planners during World War Two, and was an important part of the Attlee government's plans for nationalization.Civil aviation was expected to grow rapidly into a major global economic force, which accounted for the great attention paid it in the 1940s and 1950s. Its importance to Britain in the postwar era lay in the value of air connections to North America, Europe, and the Empire and Commonwealth, and also in the economic importance of Britain's aircraft industry. In a period when the United States was by far the largest producer of commercial aircraft, the task of Labour and Conservative governments was to maintain a viable British position against strong American competition. What is particularly interesting is the wide degree of consensus that existed in both parties on the role the state should play in the maintenance and enhancement of this position.

State Versus Private Ownership: The Conservative Governments and British Civil Aviation 1951–62

Studies of post-1945 Britain have often concentrated upon political and foreign policy history and are only just now beginning to address the question of the restructuring of the British economy and domestic policy. Civil aviation, a subject of considerable interest to historians of interwar Britain, has not been given a similar degree of attention in the post-1945 era. Civil aviation policy was, however, given a very high priority by both the 1945-51 Labour government and its Conservative successors. Civil aviation represented part of the effort to return Britain to a peacetime economy by transferring resources from the military into the civil aircraft industry, while at the same time holding for Britain a position of pre-eminence in the postwar expansion of civil flying. As such, aviation was a matter of great interest to reconstruction planners during World War Two, and was an important part of the Attlee government's plans for nationalization. Civil aviation was expected to grow rapidly into a major global economic force, which accounted for the great attention paid it in the 1940s and 1950s. Its importance to Britain in the postwar era lay in the value of air connections to North America, Europe, and the Empire and Commonwealth, and also in the economic importance of Britain's aircraft industry. In a period when the United States was by far the largest producer of commercial aircraft, the task of Labour and Conservative governments was to maintain a viable British position against strong American competition. What is particularly interesting is the wide degree of consensus that existed in both parties on the role the state should play in the maintenance and enhancement of this position.

Kaunda and Southern Africa: image and reality in foreign policy

Introduction in search of Kaunda a brief history of South African regional policy Zambian foreign policy response four images of Kaunda - towards and intellectual history of foreign policy the fifth image - Kaunda as mediator the comparative dimension - Kaunda and Mugabe morality, power and the twisting path a postscript - the end of it all. Appendices: a research note the Lusaka manifesto (April 1969) address by the President Comrade Dr Kenneth David Kaunda at the opening of the 25th National Council of the United Nations Independence Party at Mulungushi International Conference Centre, September 24-29 1990.

Defining and Doing the History of American Foreign Relations: A Primer

The charges are now legion. The field of American foreign relations history, we have been told again and again by discerning specialists and superficial nonspecialists alike, is mired in ethnocentrism, parochialism, narrowness, and staleness. Historians of American foreign relations, reads the familiar indictment, are adrift in the backwater of historical inquiry and desperately in need of new directions. There is allegedly too much detailed description from an ever-expanding supply of archival documents and too little analysis and synthesis. American foreign relations historians fail to learn foreign languages and fail to exploit foreign archives. They cannot even agree upon what to call the field—diplomatic history, the history of foreign policy, foreign relations history, or international history? This tale of woe reminds me of the story about the taciturn Maine farmer who was asked if the previous night's hurricane had damaged his barn. “Don't know,” he answered. “Haven't found it yet.” Not all is afoul, of course. In fact, much is positive, and this symposium and others signal the field's vitality and diversity. My purpose here is not to rehash the debate, but rather to build upon it in the form of a primer. I propose to define the field of the history of American foreign relations (what are we trying to do?), identify some of the well-explored topics in the field (what are we doing successfully?), suggest two subjects in the field that receive inadequate attention (what might we be doing that we are not?), and recommend some practical steps for improving performance (what can we do?).1

The study of appeasement: methodological crossroads or meeting-place?

The study of modern international relations is carried on, essentially, by two main types of scholars: diplomatic historians, and political scientists. There may be other types, like economists and sociologists, who recognize and take account of the importance of international politics in their own fields of study; but foreign affairs, and the processes that take place within the global system of relations, are not of central concern to them. By contrast, diplomatic historians (by which is meant here, not merely those who research into the rather narrow past actions of diplomats alone, but also those interested in the history of foreign policy and_what has affected it) would simply not exist if there was no perception and acceptance of international relations as a field of study; and this would be equally true of that well-defined sub-division of political science which has as its essential concern the analysis of relations between nation-states and of other ‘actors’ in the world system.