Flashbulb Memories Research Articles

Clarifying flashbulb memory concept: Comment on McCloskey, Wible, and Cohen (1988).

A primary purpose of studies of flashbulb memories has been to explain to explain tha considerable variation in memory quality. Because the flashbulb metaphor is potentially misleading, the more mundane term memory of personal circumstances may be preferable.

Flashbulb memories: special, but not so special.

This study deals with flashbulb memories associated with the assassination of the Swedish prime minister Olof Palme. A major goal of this research was to explore the consistency of such memories through comparison of the subjects' recollections on two different occasions, one year apart. The results obtained indicated that flashbulb events are accurately recalled in terms of a narrative conception of the concomitant circumstances of the event, but that the event descriptions are not consistent with respect to the specific details of these circumstances. It was concluded that the loss of information during one year contradicts the notion that flashbulb memories persist in absolute accuracy over time, as has been claimed in previous studies. Rather, these memories appear to be reconstructions based on residuals of the circumstances concomitant with the specific event (i.e., that of first hearing of the shocking news), and these memories follow the same pattern of recollection as does recollection of other autobiographical and laboratory-induced emotional events.

Conference on Flashbulb Memories and the Shuttle Explosion Atlanta, Georgia February 2–3, 1990

Conference on Flashbulb Memories and the Shuttle Explosion Atlanta, Georgia February 2–3, 1990

Flashbulb memories for the space shuttle disaster: A tale of two theories

Flashbulb memories are distinctly vivid recollections of the real-world details surroundings people's discovery of shocking news (e.g., the explosion of the space shuttle, Challenger). Two theories, one depending upon emotional response and the other relying on rehearsal, were compared. The current study focused upon people who heard the news from another person as opposed to the media. Two hundred and seventy-nine subjects were tested 2 weeks, and 142 subjects were tested 8 months following the shuttle explosion on four memory measures: a free and probed recall test of their flashbulb discovery, a confidence estimate of their answers to the discovery probe questions, and a proved recall test of the facts concerning the shuttle explosion itself. The subjects were grouped according to their self-estimated emotional reaction to the discovery of the event (calm vs. upset) and the number of times they rehearsed the shuttle story by recounting the story to others (few vs. many). The results indicated that flashbulb memories of people's discovery of shocking news are different from their memories about the event itself. Further, emotion and rehearsal interact over time such that either factor is sufficient to generate flashbulb discovery memories if measured within a short time after the event. In contrast, both strong emotions and many rehearsals are necessary to maintain flashbulb details over a long period of time.

There is still no case for a flashbulb-memory mechanism: Reply to Schmidt and Bohannon.

There is still no case for a flashbulb-memory mechanism: Reply to Schmidt and Bohannon.

There is still no case for a flashbulb-memory mechanism: Reply to Schmidt and Bohannon.

There is still no case for a flashbulb-memory mechanism: Reply to Schmidt and Bohannon.

In defense of the flashbulb-memory hypothesis: A comment on McCloskey, Wible, and Cohen (1988).

In defense of the flashbulb-memory hypothesis: A comment on McCloskey, Wible, and Cohen (1988).

In defense of the flashbulb-memory hypothesis: A comment on McCloskey, Wible, and Cohen (1988).

In defense of the flashbulb-memory hypothesis: A comment on McCloskey, Wible, and Cohen (1988).

Flashbulb memories: A nicer interpretation of a Neisser recollection

Flashbulb memories: A nicer interpretation of a Neisser recollection

Flashbulb memories of the assassination attempt on President Reagan

People often have vivid recollections of their own personal circumstances when first learning about attacks on major public figures. Brown and Kulik (1977) propose that these ‘flashbulb memories’ are triggered both by surprise and perceived consequentiality of the event, and are elaborated through retellings. In this study, memories of the 1981 assassination attempt on President Reagan were obtained on questionnaires completed one and seven months after the shooting. Subjects responded either at one or both time periods. Most respondents reported flashbulb memories, despite a low incidence of reported rehearsal and low consequentiality ratings. Stronger initial emotional reactions are associated with greater memory elaboration seven months after the event, while frequency of rehearsal is influential at this time only for subjects who completed an earlier questionnaire. Neither affective reactions nor rehearsal predicts memory elaboration after one month. People reacting strongly to the attack are more likely to have visual and nonvisual sensory memories at both time periods. Memories of subjects who responded to both questionnaires are highly consistent over the six-month interval. Stronger emotional reactions to the event, and not rehearsal, are associated with greater consistency of narrative and visual memories. The results suggest that intensity of initial affective reactions, rather than perceived consequentiality or rehearsal, is a primary determinant of flashback memories. A flashback mechanism is proposed to account for affectively cued recall of episodic memories.

Vivid memories

Fifty-eight undergraduates each recorded their three clearest autobiographical memories and answered questions about them. The resulting 174 memories were almost all rated to be of high personal importance, but low national importance. In contrast to published results of flashbulb memories cued by events which were specific, nationally important, surprising, and consequential, the ratings collected here covered the scales of surprise and consequentiality in a fairly uniform manner. The subjects also answered questions about memories cued by 20 events. For each subject, some of these memories were of ‘flashbulb’ clarity and some were not. The clearer memories were more surprising, consequential, and emotional, indicating that these factors are associated with, though not necessary for, vivid memories.

Relating age at encoding in early childhood to adult recall: Development of flashbulb memories.

Three hundred thirty-eight informants who were between 1 and 7 years of age in 1963 were asked about their personal memories surrounding assassination of President Kennedy and six other significant public events. The probability and degree of elaboration of recall showed a gradual growth function with increasing age at time of event for assassinations of John F. Kennedy and Robert F. Kennedy but not for other events. Self-reports of amount of rehearsal showed a low correlation with recall. Recall was high for resignation of President Nixon in 1974, suggesting that surprise is not necessary for formation of enduring memories of significant events. Methodological advantages and disadvantages of studying early memories for public events are discussed. This study presents a new look at a very old problem in psychology, namely, relationship between age during early childhood when an event occurs and likelihood of its recall in adulthood. The study of early memories is often associated with an interest in psychoanalyti c theory. Indeed, common notion of psychoanalysis as a set of techniques for making repressed memories of childhood accessible to conscious recall attests to this linkage. Freud's statement of problem is quite clear. In his discussion of infantile sexuality, he noted the peculiar amnesia which, in case of most people, though by no means all, hides earliest beginnings of their childhood up to their sixth or eigth year (1905/1953, p. 174). The termchildhood amnesia (or infantile amnesia) remains as a description of this phenomenon. Still, it is necessary to point out that a number of 19th-century genetic psychologists predate Freud in their concern with probing early memories. Priority seems to belong to Gallon (1879), who at age 57 used method of word associations to activate his

Relating age at encoding in early childhood to adult recall: Development of flashbulb memories.

Relating age at encoding in early childhood to adult recall: Development of flashbulb memories.

Flashbulb memories

Flashbulb Memories are memories for the circumstances in which one first learned of a very surprising and consequential (or emotionally arousing) event. Hearing the news that President John Kennedy had been shot is the prototype case. Almost everyone can remember, with an almost perceptual clarity, where he was when he heard, what he was doing at the time, who told him, what was the immediate aftermath, how he felt about it, and also one or more totally idiosyncratic and often trivial concomitants. The present paper reports a questionnaire inquiry into the determinants of such memories by asking about other assassinations, highly newsworthy events, and personally significant events. It is shown that while the Kennedy assassination created an extraordinarily powerful and widely shared flashbulb memory, it is not the only event that has created such memories. The principal two determinants appear to be a high level of surprise, a high level of consequentiality, or perhaps emotional arousal (assessed by both rating scales and ethnic group membership). If these two variables do not attain sufficiently high levels, no flashbulb memory occurs. If they do attain high levels, they seem, most directly, to affect the frequency of rehearsal, covert and overt, which, in turn, affects the degree of elaboration in the narrative of the memory that can be elicited experimentally. Parallels are made explicit between the behavioral theory and a less elaborated, speculative neuro-physiological theory of which R. B. Livingston (1967) is the proponent Finally, an argument is made that a permanent memory for incidental concomitants of a surprising and consequential (in the sense of biologically significant) event would have high selection value and so could account for the evolution of an innate base for such a memory mechanism.