Fixed-rate Mortgages Research Articles

Unconventional monetary policy and household debt: The role of cash-flow effects

We study the transmission of conventional and unconventional monetary policy shocks via the loan market, distinguishing between adjustable- and fixed-rate mortgages (ARMs and FRMs, respectively) and focusing on the relative importance of the income channel. Under ARMs, a conventional monetary policy shock implies a temporary cash-flow effect leading to a redistribution between savers and borrowers, a feature that is weaker, but more persistent, under FRMs. Also, an easing via unconventional operations – modelled as a shift in households’ preferences that reduces the term premium on long-term loan rates – has an expansionary effect on output and inflation, although more muted than the one recorded via a conventional monetary policy shock. In the former case, we find a modest contribution of cash-flow effect to the dynamics of consumption.

Housing Wealth or Collateral: How Home Value Shocks Drive Home Equity Extraction and Spending

Abstract We examine whether unanticipated changes in home values drive spending and mortgage-based equity extraction. To do this, we use longitudinal survey data with subjective information about current and expected future home values to calculate unanticipated home value changes. We link this information at the individual level to high quality administrative records containing information about mortgage borrowing as well as savings in various financial instruments. We find that the marginal propensity to increase mortgage debt is 3%–5% of unanticipated home value gains. We find no adjustment to other components of the portfolio, and we find that mortgage extraction leads to an increase in spending. The effect is driven by young households with high loan-to-value ratios, which is consistent with the effect being driven by collateral constraints. Further, we find that the effect is driven by home owners who actively take out a new mortgage. The price effect is magnified among fixed rate mortgage (FRM) borrowers who have an incentive to refinance their loans to lock in a lower market rate. These results point to the importance of the mortgage market in transforming price increases into spending and suggest that monetary policy can play an important role in transforming housing wealth gains into spending by affecting interest rates on mortgage loans.

Mortgage Pricing Implications of Prepayment: Separating Pecuniary and Non-pecuniary Prepayment

In the study of mortgage loan pricing, prepayment and default hazards are considered. While default results in loss of initial capital, prepayment is the more frequent termination event. This study makes a distinction between pecuniary and non-pecuniary prepayments in the mortgage pricing model. Pecuniary/non-pecuniary prepayments are distinguished from each other based on whether the market interest rate at prepayment is below/above the rate at origination, and thus whether mortgage lenders/investors can reinvest the proceeds at a lower/higher interest rate using the proceeds from a prepaid loan. Using a sample of 30-year fixed-rate mortgage loans for home purchase, this study finds that pecuniary and non-pecuniary prepayments are affected differently by certain overlapping factors and are driven by some unique factors. The results also show that combining these two types of prepayments into a single prepayment measure may yield inaccurate predictions of loan termination probabilities. The results from the mortgage pricing model indicate that pecuniary and non-pecuniary prepayment risks, together with default risk, contribute separately to the pricing of a loan.

Improving Risk Sharing and Borrower Incentives in Mortgage Design

In a traditional fixed rate mortgage, the borrower pays a fixed amount each period regardless of the value of the mortgaged property. One problem with this contract is that the borrower is less willing to pay when the house value falls. This was clearly seen in the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath when mortgage default rates and foreclosures skyrocketed as the housing market crashed. A more efficient contract design should link payments to house prices so that the borrower’s incentive to pay is not undermined by a decline in property value. In addition, this design can save the lender the deadweight foreclosure costs. In this article, we examine two proposed index linked mortgages that have this risk sharing feature. We analyze the effect of both designs on borrower incentives in a multiperiod setting.

Valuation of mortgage interest deductibility under uncertainty: An option pricing approach

Abstract We propose a dynamic option pricing model to quantify the tax shield value of US mortgage interest deduction (MID) under uncertainty. We identify non-linear forms, both convex and concave regions, in the pay-off of MID, and discuss the implications for the valuation of MID. The model provides insights regarding the relationship between the effective MID and a set of underlying variables, including income level, house price, mortgage size, and state and local tax rates. We also show how the tax shield value of mortgage loans changes with the volatility of underlying processes. We apply the model to the case of the optimal choice of adjustable versus fixed-rate mortgages and prove that under a mean-preserving interest rate, an adjustable mortgage always offers a bigger tax saving. We use the framework to study how the tax reforms of 2017 have affected the MID benefits of different households, and find that no household is expected to receive a larger mortgage deduction under the new law. Finally, we find that, by putting a cap on deductible state and local taxes, the 2017 reform has significantly reduced the quantitative impact of income and house price volatility on the expected MID value.

Failure to Launch: Housing, Debt Overhang, and the Inflation Option

Can inflating away nominal mortgage liabilities effectively combat recessions? I address this question using a model of illiquid housing, endogenous credit supply, and equilibrium default. I show that, in an ordinary recession, temporarily raising the inflation target has only modest or even counterproductive effects. However, during episodes like the Great Recession, inflation effectively boosts house prices, consumption, and dramatically cuts foreclosures, but only when fixed-rate mortgages are the dominant instrument. The quantitative implications of inflation also vary if other nominal rigidities or demand externalities are present. In the cross section, inflation delivers especially large gains to highly leveraged homeowners. (JEL D14, E31, E32, E52, G21, R31)

Evaluating Borrower's Net Yield in Long-Term Fixed Rate Mortgage Loans in Korea

The Korean government has tried to change the structure of residential mortgages in Korea from the short-term variable-rate non-amorting loans to the long-term fixed-rate amorting loans since the early 2000’s. This study examines he borrower’s net yield from that new type of loans, which is defined as the difference between the lender’s yield out of the borrower’s repayment and the borrower’s yield from the expected gain on the portion of housing equity funded by cosnumer. The main hypothesis tested is that the borrower’s net yield will be affected by the time of loan origination and the level of mortgage interest rate charged because the future fluctuations of housing values and that of market interest rates are expected to be key determinants. The results confirm the hypothesis in that borrower’s net yields show positive or negative values according to the time of loan start, the level of fixed loan rates, or home regions. The results documented can offer a useful information as to the financial consumers’decision on loan amount and the timing of loan application considering the housing and mortgage market condition, which in turn can provide policy implication to regulating the maximum loan-to-value (LTV) ratio regulations.

Mortgage Selection: Interactive Effects of House Price Appreciation and Mortgage Pricing Components

Research has shown evidence of a link between house price appreciation and the selection of mortgage financing options: Higher appreciation is associated with higher take-up rates for adjustable-rate mortgages relative to fixed-rate mortgages. Research also finds that mortgage interest rates and their underlying components are important determinants of take-up rates among mortgage financing options. In this paper we show that house price appreciation can have important interactive effects with those other determinants of mortgage financing outcomes. We focus on the period from 2000 to 2007, an episode marked by rapid house price appreciation along with a persistent and notable increase in the use of adjustable-rate mortgage financing, including alternative mortgage products. Empirical analysis indicates that higher house price appreciation dampened the estimated effect of the mortgage pricing components on the probabilities of mortgage financing outcomes. The results, which are especially robust for fixed-rate and adjustable-rate mortgages that are fully amortized, are not driven solely by markets with especially high rates of house price appreciation. Moreover, after taking into account the interactive effects with mortgage pricing components, house price appreciation has relatively little additional effect on take-up rates among mortgage financing options.

Financing affordable and sustainable homeownership with Fixed-COFI mortgages

The 30-year fixed-rate fully amortizing mortgage (or “traditional fixed-rate mortgage”) was a substantial innovation when first developed during the Great Depression; however, it has three major flaws. First, homeowner equity accumulates slowly during the first decade. Many lenders require large down payments because of slow equity accumulation. Second, in each monthly mortgage payment, homeowners substantially compensate capital markets investors for the ability to prepay. The homeowners might have better uses for this money. Third, refinancing mortgages is often very costly. Expensive refinancing may prevent homeowners from taking advantage of falling rates.To resolve these three flaws, we propose a new fixed-rate mortgage, called the Fixed-Payment-COFI mortgage (or “Fixed-COFI mortgage”). This mortgage has fixed monthly payments equal to payments for traditional fixed-rate mortgages and does not require a down payment. Also, unlike traditional fixed-rate mortgages, Fixed-COFI mortgages do not bundle mortgage financing with compensation paid to capital markets investors for bearing prepayment risks; instead, this money is directed toward lower monthly payments or toward purchasing the home. The Fixed-COFI mortgage exploits the often-present prepayment-risk “wedges” between the fixed-rate mortgage rate and the estimated cost of funds index (COFI) mortgage rate. In addition, the Fixed-COFI mortgage is a highly profitable asset for many mortgage lenders.We discuss two variations of the Fixed-COFI mortgage. In the first variation, homeowners with “Affordable” Fixed-COFI mortgages are rebated the “wedges” between the traditional fixed-rate mortgage payments and the COFI mortgage payments. After the “wedges” are rebated, these homeowners may pay substantially less to purchase their homes in 30 years than homeowners with traditional fixed-rate mortgages. This mortgage design may help alleviate housing affordability pressures in many areas of the United States.The other variation of Fixed-COFI mortgage is the “Homeownership” Fixed-COFI mortgage. With the “homeownership” Fixed-COFI mortgage, the homeowner commits to a savings program based on the difference between fixed-rate mortgage payments and payments based on COFI plus a margin. The homeowner uses this “wedge” to accumulate home equity quickly. The Homeownership Fixed-COFI mortgage may help some renters gain access to homeownership. For example, these renters may be paying rents as high as comparable mortgage payments in high-cost metropolitan areas but may not have enough savings for a down payment. With less need for a down payment, the Fixed-COFI mortgage may help such renters with stable income—but no savings—purchase homes.

The Wealth Building Home Loan

The Wealth Building Home Loan (WBHL) represents a class of shorter-maturity mortgages that provide a low-risk path to homeownership and wealth accumulation while maximizing buying power. WBHLs are easy-to-understand loans that combine standard mortgage features in a novel way. Importantly, they require little or no downpayment. The WBHLs in the market today are 15- and 20-year loans, some with fixed rates and others structured as adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs). We show that a 20-year WBHL can be structured to have monthly payments for many borrowers that are only slightly higher than for the typical FHA 30-year fixed rate mortgage (FRM), due in part to the use of an ARM structure with a low initial rate. Shorter-maturity ARMs carry much less risk of payment shock, and hence are a safer choice, than 30-year ARMs. We also show that the use of 15- and 20-year loans would have markedly reduced the incidence of negative equity during the financial crisis and that the actual default rates on these loans during that period were much lower than for observably equivalent 30-year FRMs. These results highlight that widespread use of WHBLs would have substantial benefits for borrowers, lenders, and the financial system as a whole.

Fixed-Rate Mortgages, Labor Markets, and Efficiency

The paper studies the effects of mortgage choices between fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) and adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) on labor market efficiency. FRMs provide insurance for risk-averse borrowers in the sense that they pay the same rate over time and are not subject to uncertain spot market rates. FRMs, however, discourage borrowers from moving to other regions despite better employment opportunities, as they terminate the FRM contracts in order to move and their new loan interests may be higher. As FRM-borrowers do not move to other regions due to the interest lock-ins, entrepreneurs in other regions lose the potential surpluses from productive matches that would have occurred between borrowers-workers and entrepreneurs. Borrowers ignore this negative externality they impose on the entrepreneurs when choosing their mortgages, and too many borrowers choose FRMs relative to the efficient level. If FRMs are eliminated and ARM-insurance (that protects ARM-borrowers against uncertain adjustable interest rates) is created, it will improve efficiency. The paper also assesses quantitatively the welfare effects of eliminating FRMs and providing ARM-insurance.

A Farewell to ARMs or Ever Changing Market Segments?

The mortgage market has given rise to a changing and diverse set of borrowers actively using ARMs. Data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for 2007 and 2013–2015 are used to study borrowing decisions. One view is that an ARM should be offered and taken by those better able to respond to an upward reset. Yet favorable economic conditions induce a demand for mortgages, including by higher risk borrowers, and for these households transactions occur at higher rates, often as ARMs, especially as of 2007. Panel analysis confirms some response to the spread but also to changing demand for mortgages in the shorter run. During the boom, the use of ARMs as a tool for ‘affordability’ led to actual transaction rates exceeding those for fixed rate mortgages. Analysis confirms substantial payment difficulties. Yet, analysis of mortgage transitions, 2007–13, establishes that the ‘affordability’ component to ARM, though less significant, still was present. ARMs were often taken by minorities and those with less education and with family income under $60,000 per year.

Interest rate changes, mortgages, and consumption: evidence from Italy

SUMMARY Using the Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth, we study whether the drop in interest rates following the Great Recession was associated with an increase in consumption for households with Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARM) relative to those with Fixed Rate Mortgages (FRM). After the reduction in mortgage payments, consumption of ARM holders increases relative to FRM but the implied marginal propensity to consume is not statistically different from zero. We suggest three explanations for the weak consumption response to the income shock. First, cash-on-hand and debt heterogeneity may attenuate the consumption response. Second, borrowers believe that the income shock was short-lasting, and that interest rates would likely increase in the future, implying a small effect on consumption. Third, the shock is offset partly by a reduction in income from financial assets owned by mortgagors. The findings have implications for the conduct of monetary policy interventions and the credibility of the future path of interest rates, pass-through of monetary policy, and design of the mortgage market.

Financing Affordable and Sustainable Homeownership with Fixed-COFI Mortgages

The 30-year fixed-rate fully amortizing mortgage (or “traditional fixed-rate mortgage”) was a substantial innovation when first developed during the Great Depression. However, it has three major flaws. First, because homeowner equity accumulates slowly during the first decade, homeowners are essentially renting their homes from lenders. With this sluggish equity accumulation, many lenders require large down payments. Second, in each monthly mortgage payment, homeowners substantially compensate capital markets investors for the ability to prepay. The homeowners might have better uses for this money. Third, refinancing mortgages is often very costly. Expensive refinancing may prevent homeowners from taking advantage of falling rates. To resolve these three flaws, we propose a new fixed-rate mortgage, called the Fixed-Payment-COFI mortgage (or “Fixed-COFI mortgage”). This mortgage has fixed monthly payments equal to payments for traditional fixed-rate mortgages and does not require a down payment. Also, unlike traditional fixed-rate mortgages, Fixed-COFI mortgages do not bundle mortgage financing with compensation paid to capital markets investors for bearing prepayment risks; instead, this money is directed toward lower monthly payments or toward purchasing the home. The Fixed-COFI mortgage exploits the often-present prepayment-risk “wedges” between the fixed-rate mortgage rate and the estimated cost of funds index (COFI) mortgage rate. In addition, the Fixed-COFI mortgage is a highly profitable asset for many mortgage lenders. We discuss two variations of the Fixed-COFI mortgage. Homeowners with “affordable” Fixed-COFI mortgages are rebated the “wedges” between the traditional fixed-rate mortgage payments and the COFI mortgage payment. After the “wedges” are rebated, these homeowners may pay substantially less to purchase their homes in 30 years than homeowners with traditional fixed-rate mortgages. This mortgage design may help alleviate housing affordability pressures in many areas of the United States. The other variation of Fixed-COFI mortgage is the “homeownership” Fixed-COFI mortgage. With the “homeownership” Fixed-COFI mortgage, the homeowner commits to a savings program based on the difference between fixed-rate mortgage

Monetary Policy Transmission to Mortgages in a Negative Interest Rate Environment

Do negative policy rates hinder banks’ transmission of monetary policy? To answer this question, we examine the behaviour of Italian mortgage lenders using a novel loan-level dataset. When policy rates turn negative, banks with higher ratios of retail overnight deposits to total assets charge more on new fixed rate mortgages. This suggests that the funding structure of banks may matter for the transmission of negative policy rates, especially for long-maturity illiquid assets. Nevertheless, the aggregate economic implications for households are small, suggesting that concerns about inefficient monetary policy transmission to households under modestly negative rates are likely overstated.

GSE Guarantees, Financial Stability, and Home Equity Accumulation

Before 2008, the government’s “implicit guarantee” of the securities issued by the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac led to practices by these institutions that threatened financial stability. In 2008, the Federal Housing Finance Agency placed these GSEs into conservatorship. Conservatorship was intended to be temporary but has now reached its tenth year, and policymakers continue to weigh options for reform. In this article, the authors assess both implicit and explicit government guarantees for the GSEs. They argue that adopting a legislatively defined “explicit guarantee,” as advocated by some, may be problematic for a variety of reasons, including the difficulty of pricing such a guarantee and the potential high cost for mortgage holders or the government. In addition to the creation of an explicit guarantee, they recommend that steps be taken to limit systemic risk in housing markets. To that end, they advocate the wider adoption of mortgages—such as the “Fixed-COFI” mortgage—that build homeowner equity faster than the thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage favored by the GSEs. With such mortgages, homeowners are better able to weather economic downturns.

The Case for Longer Mortgages: Addressing the Mismatch between Term and Amortization

The practice of offering maximum residential mortgage maturity terms of five years, even though amortization periods generally range from 25 to 40 years, is predominant in Canada. This mismatch between mortgage term and amortization creates a need to re-finance or renew the outstanding balloon payments at each maturity of five years or less. It also creates a twofold risk: first, that the lender would choose not to renew the loan if the fair market value of the mortgaged property is less than the principal amount and accrued interest of the loan (or that the lender is unable to renew the loan if it is insolvent), and, second, that the borrower might not find a new lender. At that point, mortgage enforcement might be necessary, and investors would suffer losses. This mismatch, therefore, impedes the development of a market for Residential Mortgage-backed Securities for uninsured mortgages – often referred to as “private label RMBS.” With private label RMBS, the investor – typically an institutional investor such as a pension fund, investment fund, mutual fund and insurance company – would invest directly in a pool of uninsured mortgages without any government backing for repayment. The development of such a market would provide a funding alternative that might enable the federal government to tighten further the requirements for government support of residential mortgages through the CMHC’s securitization programs. Furthermore, it could also lead to further competition in the mortgage market by providing a funding source for mortgages that do not conform with CMHC requirements for insurance or those of the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) applicable to federally regulated financial institutions. This Commentary argues that the best way to address the refinancing risk arising from the term and amortization mismatch would be to facilitate the introduction of a residential mortgage product that does not mature every five years, but matures when it is fully amortized. This product could include an interest rate reset and penalty-free right of redemption at least every five years. Under the current state of the law this can be achieved only by amendment to Section 10(1) of the Interest Act. If Parliament decides to amend Section 10(1), it should also consider lengthening the five-year penalty free redemption right to up to 10 years, thus making it easier for lenders to offer longer-term fixed-rate mortgages to borrowers who would prefer a longer interest rate lock-in period – a move that would also encourage the development of the private label RMBS market in Canada.

Continuous Workout Mortgages: Efficient pricing and systemic implications

This paper studies the Continuous Workout Mortgage (CWM), a two in one product: a fixed rate home loan coupled with negative equity insurance, to advocate its viability in mitigating financial fragility. In order to tackle the many issues that CWMs embrace, we perform a range of tasks. We optimally price CWMs and take a systemic market-based approach, stipulating that mortgage values and payments should be linked to housing prices and adjusted downward to prevent negative equity. We illustrate that amortizing CWMs can be the efficient home financing choice for many households. We price CWMs as American option style, defaulting debt in conjunction with prepayment within a continuous time, analytic framework. We introduce random prepayments via the intensity approach of Jarrow and Turnbull (1995). We also model the optimal embedded option to default whose exercise is motivated by decreasing random house prices. We adapt the Barone-Adesi and Whaley (1987) (BAW) approach to work within amortizing mortgage context. We derive new closed-form and new analytical approximation methodologies which apply both for pricing CWMs, as well as for pricing the standard US 30-year Fixed Rate Mortgage (FRM).

Mortgage Loan Flow Networks and Financial Norms

We develop a theoretical model of a network of intermediaries whose optimal behavior is jointly determined, leading to heterogeneous financial norms and systemic vulnerabilities. We apply the model to the network of U.S. mortgage intermediaries from 2005 to 2007, using a data set containing all private-label, fixed-rate mortgages, with loan flows defining links. Default risk was closely related to network position, evolving predictably among linked nodes, and loan quality estimated from the model was related to independent quality measures, altogether pointing to the vital importance of network effects in this market. Received April 20, 2016; editorial decision July 11, 2017 by Editor Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh.

Fair valuation of mortgage insurance under stochastic default and interest rates

Unlike most studies in the literature, in this study, we incorporate three main factors into the pricing method of mortgage insurance: interest rate, housing price, and hazard rate (default risks). The empirical analysis highlighted that the interest rate and housing price are positively correlated during July 2004 to November 2016 because of the monetary policy over this period. Subsequently, in the risk-neutral pricing framework, mortgage insurance of the fixed-rate mortgage is priced using a Monte Carlo simulation approach. The sensitivity analysis indicated that interest rate, housing price, and default rate are important factors for mortgage insurance. Moreover, because our model can measure the risks of the interest rate and hazard rate, insurance companies can use this model to price mortgage insurance to avoid a condition in which the insurance company does not have sufficient reserves to support compensation.