Theology has historically drawn upon various analogies to articulate the mystery of the Triune God. This study continues along that path, proposing new analogies inspired by contemporary developments in science. It specifically explores the role of the Divine Persons in the constitution of reality, in light of the profound interrelation between matter, energy, and information as foundational structures of the cosmos. Building on this framework, the article establishes a correspondence between each Person of the Trinity and one of the Aristotelian causes, thereby offering an integrated ontological perspective on divine action. Finally, it examines how each Person contributes uniquely to the ultimate purpose of all creation, revealing the teleological orientation of the universe toward full communion with the God who is Love.

This article outlines an epistemological perspective to understand the organism as a temporally changing whole. To analyze the mental faculties involved, the organism’s development and persisting existence is differentiated into four interdependent aspects: descent, future existence, persistent species, and environmentally adapted physical appearance. It is outlined that these aspects are recognized by comparative memory, concept-guided anticipation, conceptual thinking, and sensory perception, respectively. Furthermore, it is pointed out that these aspects correspond to the famous four Aristotelian “causes” or principles of explanation. The descent of an organism corresponds to Aristotle’s efficient principle (“where does it come from?”), its future existence to the final principle (“what is if for?”), its physical structure to the material principle (“out of what is it?”) and its persistent species to the formal principle (“what is it?”). Aristotle regarded the unity of the efficient, formal and final principle as the ontological cause of the organism and called it the “soul” (psyche), while the material principle can be understood to represent its “body” (soma). I suggest that Aristotle’s “soul” corresponds to three of the four mental faculties required for cognition of a self-maintaining organism. I argue that in a Kantian perspective, the Aristotelian “soul” represents the condition of the possibility of recognizing an organism at all. Therefore, the Aristotelian principle of life becomes intelligible and even empirically observable through the inner sense. In summary, I suggest that the four aspects of the organism described here can be viewed as the general, epistemological and ontological principle of the organism, the Bio-Logos.

One recurrent criticism of the Madhyamaka doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā) is its equation with a potential axiological nihilism that undermines, inter alia, the telos of Buddhist practice. Here, I speculate that Madhyamaka non-foundationalism could be compatible with the naturalized teleology of C.S. Peirce. In brief, Peirce argues on pragmatic grounds that the ‘final cause’ of events does not refer to a predetermined finis ultimis or summum bonum with any ‘intrinsic nature’ (‘svabhāva’). Rather, a final cause is a general continuum of lawfulness (‘Third’/future) that mediates between indeterminate possibility (‘First’/present) and determinate actuality (‘Second’/past). Therefore, while a continuum of ‘purposiveness’ is a rational precondition for all temporal events, its futural significance means it can only ever be asymptotically realized; indeed, the constitutively general form of each ‘final’ cause is, practically speaking, fundamentally vague and open-ended to some degree. Finally, I show that the so-called strange attractors of dynamical systems theory provide an imperfect model for this naturalized ‘groundless teleology’.

This paper deals with a new interpretation of the passage 1013a16–17 in Aristo­tle’s Metaphysics Δ.1, proposed by Richard Bodéüs and Annick Stevens in their recent edition of a French translation and commentary of Δ. In section 1 I de­scribe the problems with the traditional reading of this passage that implies that all principles are causes: given it, first, Aristotle makes a serious logical error in his reasoning and, second, it is impossible to match most of the senses and examples of ‘principle’ in this chapter to one of four Aristotelian causes. Then, in section 2 I give an overview the interpretation of Bodéüs and Stevens, show the validity of their reading, and explain how it solves all the aforementioned problems. Section 3 explores some additional advantages of this interpretation that are not mentioned by its authors in their edition: it justifies the presence of the second chapter of Δ in this book and helps to offer a plausible reconstruc­tion of an overall line of thought in Δ.1. Finally, in section 4 I look into the ques­tion of to which extent this interpretation is compatible with the understanding of relationship between the notions of ‘principle’ and ‘cause’ that is characteri­stic for Aristotle elsewhere in Corpus Aristotelicum

PROVIDENCE AND SCIENCE IN A WORLD OF CONTINGENCY: Thomas Aquinas' Metaphysics of Divine Action by Ignacio Silva. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2022. 170 pages. Paperback; $52.95. ISBN: 9781032002781. *Ignacio Silva (DPhil, Oxford) is an Argentinian theologian who specializes in the dialogue between science and theology. This book is a proposal for fellow scholars and others to reconsider the contribution of Thomas Aquinas's metaphysics as a means of resolving the question of divine action in the light of science. Although Aquinas is the thirteenth century's most famous friar and Catholicism's most renowned theological authority alongside Augustine, he is often viewed today as contributing few insights as regards an allegedly "modern" argument. *Silva argues that Aquinas supplies a way of getting beyond two mistaken views held by people today: (1) on the one hand, that God needs the natural world to be fundamentally open to outside influence; and (2) on the other hand, that God causes things to exist in a way that is similar to the way other natural causes cause things to occur. *Silva's goal is to get beyond the current situation in which "many today find it necessary to search for a lack of natural causation so as to find a space for God to act" (p. 139). According to this way of thinking, God's actions are only localized occasions, hence the school of thought known as occasionalism. Conversely, another tendency is for believers to argue that God's powers are self-restricted in order to account for natural powers. The latter point of view is sometimes stipulated in terms of the biblical concept of kenosis ("Christ ... emptied himself," Phil. 2:7). *Silva's main point concerns a correct notion of causation such that we not restrict divine providence to an inadequate understanding of causation: "the idea of requiring insufficient causation for God to act depends on a deterministic notion of causation that, ultimately, renders God to act as a cause among causes" (p. 49). Silva holds that much causation is subject to chance contingencies. Thus, Silva's strategy is to think of causation in the context of potency and act. This allows a fresh and fuller way of dealing with the four parameters of divine providence: God's omnipotence, God's involvement with nature, nature's autonomy, and the success of science. The scope of the inquiry is enormous and Silva's handling of the thought of Thomas Aquinas is, unsurprisingly, difficult, yet hugely beneficial. *On the one hand, readers must be prepared for a dense tutorial in accounts of causality, powers, natures, and other metaphysical categories in order to appreciate the argument of this book. On the other hand, the argument over the relationship between God as the creating cause of the world and the secondary causes that act to create other effects in the world, is startlingly simple. It is best understood as a form of instrumental causality according to Silva. It is analogized (as so much of Aquinas's theology is) as follows: "The knife is moved by the man to cut, and to do it in such a manner. Without the man's power, the knife could not cut, but without the edge of the knife, the man could not cut in this manner ... the effect is both produced completely by God and by the natural agent ... (p. 129)." *Thus, without God, nature would not have the necessary powers to cause the effects it possesses. Without those natural efficient causes, God's power could not be effective. There is no split between divine and natural causation in any given effect; both are completely causal of any given effect. It is analogically helpful, although Silva does not discuss this idea, to invoke here the Incarnation of Jesus Christ: he is both fully divine and fully human, not half of each. *God acts in three ways: through creation itself, through natural (secondary) causes, and through three types of miracles--although, sadly, the latter do not receive much attention in this book. But the threefold action of God is intended to counter, on the one hand, the view that causality is always deterministic and, on the other hand, that God's action in the universe endangers nature's autonomy. *For some readers, the most difficult aspect of the argument will be the presentation of natural entities' powers of operation in terms of the four Aristotelian causes. The key is to think of causation in context. From Aristotle, change is a key feature of contingency. Change is organized into potency and act, essence and accident. These categories explain how causation results in real life. Moreover, theologically speaking, for Aquinas, "affirming that natural things do not operate, and that it is only God who does, diminishes the divine power" (p. 98, quoting the Summa contra Gentiles III, c 69). This is the counterintuitive power of the Thomist position. It opposes the view that attributes all natural causes to God's intervention. Holding that view would mean, in the end, that God actually does not create anything apart from God. But for God to create a world means to distinguish something apart from God and to allow contingency to exist in the spatio-temporal realm. The key point about the distinction between the eternal and the temporal realms is to ask why God creates in this way. Silva casually mentions that "God acts through natural causes because of the immensity of his goodness ..." (p. 101). So, it is not a matter of metaphysical necessity that lies behind the Thomist view, it is God's goodness that is the key. *The position that created natural things are themselves creative needs to be exactingly well laid out; otherwise this position will be perceived as a way of extracting God from the world altogether. Here, Silva stipulates that "God's causality penetrates most intimately the causality of created natural things," while God upholds the creation "in its being" (p. 99). This is uncontroversial, but the provision for miracles is bound to raise questions about why God would act in this way. What Silva could have used are some examples of why some philosophers dissent from Aquinas on miracles, with responses to those dissents. *Silva covers an enormous amount of reflection on the notion of causality, including some original and highly potent insights. He claims that final causality is the "cause of the efficient cause in terms of its causality" (p. 71). This relationship, as well as the relationship between the material and formal cause, as first demarcated by Aristotle, is laid out in dense, logical prose. The book ends with some subtle yet significant comments on the differences between Aquinas's views and those of twentieth-century thinkers such as Austin Farrer, who referred to Aquinas in proposing a double agency account of creation while resorting to fideism. Farrer refused to suggest any explanation for the causal joint between God's creation and the world's operation. This analysis is original and should have been given more prominence. There is, indeed, a great deal of difference between fulsome and evasive double agency accounts of created causality; however, Silva ignores almost completely the medieval development of the theorem of the "supernatural," which came about because of the theoretical stance taken by Philip the Chancellor (d. 1236). This lapse is not critical, but it does exemplify the lack of a historical dimension to the book's argument. *Another quandary concerns the book's form of exposition. It is largely descriptive. While its argument details Aquinas's metaphysics of causal relations and the universe's created dependency on God, it lacks a dialectical edge. Although the argument is sufficiently sound, it is in need of an engagement with the open theists and others who would contest the account of divine power that Thomas Aquinas developed. There are quite a few references to other contemporary positions on providence and causality, especially in the final chapter. The names of William Carroll, Robert Russell, and Michael Dodds appear, but there could have been a more probing engagement of these contemporary voices. The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics is treated in the light of the proposed view of moderate determinism in contrast to the non-interventionist, objective (NIODA) view of divine action in Robert Russell. Here, I'm unsure whether NIODA has been properly interpreted. Although I think Silva's position is correct, is Russell's understanding of God's causality really reducible to natural causality as Silva contends? The textual citations for this allegation are not convincing. *Finally, despite what I take to be a largely satisfying account of God's creative action, the issue of evil and theodicy are not dealt with in this book. Aquinas makes contingency (and accidents in general) central for the notion of creation. Silva sees contingency as a sign of the perfection of divine providence, but this contradiction (between created contingency and the fact of natural "evil") is a real difficulty for God's involvement with evil or deficient effects in creation. Regardless, altogether this is a provocative, dense volume that could easily have been double the length if key problems had received more comprehensive treatment. *Reviewed by Paul Allen, Academic Dean, Corpus Christi College, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1J7.

Providence and Science in a World of Contingency: Thomas Aquinas’ Metaphysics of Divine Action

Abstract For many areas of philosophy, we lack an understanding of their developments between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries. One such area is the development of the notion of final causation. The rejection of final causation is often described as one of the distinguishing hallmarks of so called Early Modern philosophy in relation to the Scholastic philosophical tradition. Our lack of understanding of the development of this notion in philosophy therefore impedes our ability to write an adequate history of philosophy spanning these centuries. In this article, the notion of final causation as treated in the works of Chrysostom Javellus (1472–1538) and Francis Silvestri (of Ferrara) (1474–1526) is presented. It is argued that the treatment of final causation in these thinkers is already shaped by concerns regarding finality that we find in Early Modern philosophy.

Though it’s often said that St. Thomas Aquinas was important to Flannery O’Connor’s theology, few have noted his relevance to her craft approach. By joining Thomas’s action theory to his psychology, O’Connor developed notions of character and plot which are at their most mature in her final novel, The Violent Bear It Away. In it, O’Connor structured her characters by dramatizing Thomas’s doctrine of final causation, a metaphysical explanation of desire, to create dramatic mystagogy. Understanding her creative process this way gives insight into her novel, making sense of opaque moments in the text. Moreover, by understanding final causation, classic criticisms of the novel are put into context. Some have claimed her characters’ actions are overdetermined by her theology. However, understanding O’Connor’s project allows her to respond, making intelligible her craft choices against this criticism. Therefore, it’s by understanding O’Connor’s adaptation of Thomas for literary ends that fresh interpretations of The Violent Bear It Away are made available.

This paper considers how a classification of causal effects as comprising efficient, formal, material, and final causation can provide a useful understanding of how emergence takes place in biology and technology, with formal, material, and final causation all including cases of downward causation; they each occur in both synchronic and diachronic forms. Taken together, they underlie why all emergent levels in the hierarchy of emergence have causal powers (which is Noble's principle of biological relativity) and so why causal closure only occurs when the upwards and downwards interactions between all emergent levels are taken into account, contra to claims that some underlying physics level is by itself causality complete. A key feature is that stochasticity at the molecular level plays an important role in enabling agency to emerge, underlying the possibility of final causation occurring in these contexts.

In semiotics, final causation can be related to the process of determination (PAPE, 1993). From Peirce’s point of view, determination is not a causal determinism, but a delimitation of a range of possibilities. One starts from objects towards interpretants, in a process mediated by the sign, in which the dynamic object works as a force that constrains interpretants to correspond to their objects. The correspondence between object and interpretant is important because it is through a generated interpretant that the object of a sign can be known. Even though this process of determination coincides with the idea of final causation, there is a certain indeterminacy in it. For Peirce (EP 2:353, 1905), vagueness and generality are two types of indeterminacy. In the terms of the phenomenological categories, vagueness is an indeterminacy of the order of firstness, generality an indeterminacy of the order of thirdness, and both, to some extent, are opposed to that which is defined, which belongs to secondness. Each aspect of the sign may vary according to the three phenomenological categories. Consequently, degrees of imprecision are added to the semiotic process, which is a determination process. Peirce asserts that the perfect precision of thought is theoretically unattainable (SS 11, 1903). Every sign is vague or general at least to some degree. In this paper, we seek to perceive degrees of indetermination and causality from an analysis of the kinds of objects and interpretants proposed by Peirce in the system of 28 sign classes.

Abstract In this article we demonstrate that and why Aristotle's four causes are essential for a scientific articulation of designerly knowledge. We show that properly understood, Aristotle's notion of a cause, including the final cause, is not in conflict with modern science. Rather, when it comes to understanding living beings as such, all of the four Aristotelian causes are still crucial. We argue that this implies that design research, too, must appeal to the four causes, because artifacts must be understood in terms of the role they play in the life of living beings.

Reviewed by: Peirce on the Uses of History by Tullio Viola Giovanni Maddalena Tullio Viola Peirce on the Uses of History Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2020. 261 pp. (incl. name and subject index) It is difficult to devise a new approach to any topic in Peirce scholarship, and it is also difficult to convincingly bring one to life. Tullio Viola's book, Peirce on the Uses of History, elegantly accomplishes this second trick, making it well worth reading. Viola is one of the many representatives of a new generation of Italian Peirce scholars (wherever based) who are connecting a solid philological and historical work about Peirce's writings with a vivid theoretical depth. Similar works by Chiara Ambrosio, Francesco Bellucci, Maria Regina Brioschi, Claudia Cristalli, Gabriele Gava, Maria Luisi, and Marco Stango on various aspects of Peirce's thought testify to the vitality of studies inspired by this profound connection. Peirce on the Uses of History deepens the various paths that relate the American philosopher's ideas to history, paths that discuss (a) Peirce's own studies of history, (b) his philosophical conception of history, and (c) his methodology for treating history. One of the few problems of the book is that Viola does not discuss each of these themes separately in its three parts, but rather, these topics are inextricably bound together due to the characteristic entanglement of Peirce's writings. However, Viola's reasoning and writing are absolutely clear, making it easy to follow these themes in the course of reading the seven chapters of the book. As for the first theme, Peirce's studies of history (a), the book's discussion in the two first chapters is splendid and worth reading for any Peirce scholar. Viola underlines the debt of Peirce to Whewell's metaphysical and logical views, which considered any observation as necessarily entailing conceptual elements, making history more the unfolding of vague, initial and real ideas than a sum of particular [End Page 288] accidents. As is well known, this approach would lead Peirce to a devotion to Duns Scotus's realism and then, at the beginning of the 1880s, in the Baltimore period, to research in a number of different fields of the history of science: the work on the Epistula de Magnete by Petrus Peregrinus, the biographies of great men, and the lexicography created in the long collaboration with the Century Dictionary. This growing interest would eventually lead to his two attempts to sketch a complete history of science in the Lowell Lectures of 1892—93 (that will be published in volume 9 of the Writings, cited by Viola) and the so-called "Putnam History" (never published) of the years 1896—98, in which Peirce's interests as a historian became intertwined with, and sometimes came into conflict with, Peirce's inquiry in both the philosophy and logic of history. The gist of this first part of Viola's book (chapter 1 and part of chapter 2), that has a short follow up in chapter 6, involves his description of the chronology of Peirce's studies of history and his argument that portions of these studies that have traditionally been seen as disjointed actually fit together seamlessly if one understands Peirce's attitude towards history. The reader will understand better the connections between Peirce's studies of Egyptian pyramids, the pronunciation of Shakespeare, and Mach's mechanics. If there is any quibble with this section of the book, it is that it does not satisfy the reader wanting to know more about some of the topics discussed, including the results of some of Peirce's research that apparently fell short of a proper conclusion and the historical studies that Peirce carried out in the later part of his life, after 1908. Viola treats the second theme, Peirce's philosophy of history (b), at the end of chapter 2, focusing on his classification of sciences. Here, Viola engages in his most effective philology, both in his comparison of the different versions of the classification and by putting to work the crucial notion of teleology and final causation that informs the process by which Peirce generated his classification. This notion is also at...

O objetivo do artigo é entender o conceito de “causa”, sua efetividade como posicionamento de marcas e os efeitos gerados para o cidadão-consumidor. Buscou-se a teoria da causalidade em C. Peirce, em que o autor traz sua visão triádica sobre o conceito: o acaso, a causação eficiente e a causação final, também chamada de propósito. Aproximando esta concepção teórica das possibilidades de interpretantes gerados, objetivo das campanhas de causa, chegamos aos efeitos de sentido de sensibilização, engajamento e consciência. Por meio da análise de campanhas publicitárias de causa, compreendemos que a semiose genuína não é possível, mas que os efeitos de sentido se dão no nível das sensibilidades e da viabilização para o engajamento social dos consumidores.

En el presente texto se analiza el concepto de bien común desde las cuatro causas aristotélicas (material, formal, eficiente y final) a fin de conocer las implicaciones de este concepto en una sociedad, especialmente en un Estado. En un primer momento, se analiza cuáles son los elementos que constituyen el bien común; en un segundo momento, cuál es la esencia del bien común; en un tercero, quiénes y cómo generan el bien común; y, por último, cuál es el fin del bien común.

ABSTRACT Argentina has a rich history of social movements, of which the transgender is one of the most notorious and resilient. In this work, I present South American Transvestite Theory, its latest theoretical development, in the light of Deleuzian thought. Although Deleuze is not an actual source for this current, both can be productively connected as sharing several themes and concerns, such as the tight relation between creative thought and political practice, the ontological and practical consequences of the concepts of identity and becoming, and the rejection of binary models as an underlying structure of hierarchical thought and social oppression. The potentiality of the encounter between Deleuze and South American Transvestite Theory will be explored via four heuristic questions, reminiscent of the Aristotelian causes, which respectively ask about their concrete intersections, their formal connections, the effects they could trigger and the reasons to read them together.

A ribonucleoside analog MK-4482/EIDD-2801 blocks SARS-CoV-2 transmission in ferrets and might be able to diminish transmission until vaccineinduced or naturally acquired protective herd immunity is reached [1]. As skinner pointed out, behavioral problems have to be solved through behavioral engineering [2]. Cybernetics has full application in the present condition. As in alcohol consumption, smoking, drugs, gun crimes, wars, and sexually acquired diseases, the teleological Aristotelian causes are not tobacco, drugs, and any other issue, but the aberrant behavior. The situation is not trivial and involves non-classic logic and other mathematical logics [3,4]. The neural topography corresponds to the nucleus accumbens. The latter is the battlefield, and the subject’s obsession is the rise of the neurotransmitter dopamine [3,4]. In general, people are very demanding from their governments; nevertheless, at the same time, they are deeply tolerant with their aberrant behavior promoting the dissemination of the SARSCoV-2 [4,5]. This paper examines how to deal with this problem from a scientific perspective, considering probability methods and classical and doxastic logic, using the Parsimony Principle aiming to reach immunity by minimizing the inoculum.

Reviewed by: Living Mirrors: Infinity, Unity, and Life in Leibniz’s Philosophy by Ohad Nachtomy Christian Leduc Ohad Nachtomy. Living Mirrors: Infinity, Unity, and Life in Leibniz’s Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. xi + 219. Cloth, $85.00. The concept of life and the importance of the life sciences in Leibniz have recently become objects of much interest. The question concerning the status of life in Leibnizian metaphysics is one of the motivating factors. On many occasions, Leibniz affirms that matter is full of life and that compound substances are actually living beings with a soul and an organic body. Nachtomy’s book touches on these themes, but its originality lies in its contribution to understanding the relationship between life and the infinite. The first chapters analyze the different meanings that the concept of infinity assumes in Leibniz. This step is crucial, since living beings have a structure extending into infinity. Nachtomy identifies three types of infinity: the absolute and actual infinity that expresses the divine nature, the potential and divisible infinity characteristic of mathematical quantities, and finally, a third infinity that concerns creatures and constitutes a maximum of its kind. The last type refers to machines of nature that contain an infinite but limited structure. A main feature of Nachtomy’s approach is the use of several analogies to highlight the similarities between the concepts at play here. For instance, if one compares the impossibility of infinite number with the necessary existence of the divine infinite, one might draw an analogy between the units that make up a number and the attributes that comprise the idea of God. Elsewhere, a comparison is drawn between arithmetic unity on the one hand, and substantial unity per se on the other, his justification being that both are the basis of a complex structure. Nachtomy is aware of the differences between these concepts, but the usefulness of these analogies, especially those with mathematical quantities, remains questionable. In the texts where Leibniz treats infinite number and the divine infinite jointly, it is not obvious that he means to compare the two rather than to oppose them. In fact, these concepts belong to distinct domains: God and creatures are actual realities, while numbers are only ideal. For Leibniz, depending on whether it is the former or the latter, the relationship between unity and totality is also conceived of differently. The second part of the book links the infinity of substances with certain metaphysical aspects of life. At the heart of the Leibnizian doctrine lies the distinction between natural and artificial machines. Unlike Descartes, Leibniz wishes to differentiate nature from artifice qualitatively, rather than by degrees. Two characteristics seem particularly important in Nachtomy’s interpretation. On the one hand, the infinity of the machine of nature is not understood by the number of organs it comprises, but rather by its structure. In light of this, he draws a comparison between this structure and the law of series, which determines the individuality and activity of each substance. On the other hand, because God creates the machine of nature and determines its function, Nachtomy argues that we should understand it as an end, which also extends in its being infinitely. However, even if some of Leibniz’s texts could be interpreted in this way, it is not always clear that final causation is central to Leibniz’s concept of divine machines. One of the most innovative features of Nachtomy’s analysis is his insistence on the role played by monads in living beings. Most commentators emphasize their bottom-up relationship, according to which monads are the building blocks of corporeal beings. In so doing, they forget that the dominant monad or soul must, to the extent that it gives structure to the organic body, be understood in terms of a top-down relationship. The animated monad is thus the foundation of the machine of nature, providing it with infinite unity, activity, and organization. Nachtomy draws a general conclusion from these considerations: Leibniz’s concept of the divine machine is an element in his metaphysics, not a theoretical framework for the empirical life sciences. It is true that Leibniz often claims that metaphysical explanations must be...

The purpose of this work is to provide evidence to the scientific community that there is solid scientific knowledge available to tame the pandemic, which is mainly a behavioral problem that requires cybernetics through behavioral engineering. Scientifically it is clear that the problem of the pandemic originates in human behavior and misinformation. Behavioral problems are addressed by cybernetics through behavioral engineering. Aristotelian causes of the pandemic are aberrant behavior. This is the field of battle and the obsession of the subject is the rise of the neurotransmitter dopamine. The question is not what is the probability that a patient with COVID-19 has a certain symptom or sign? Rather it is to calculate the probability that a patient with a certain sign or symptom has COVID-19. Without grasping the differential equations modeled by Kermack and McKendrick, it is impossible to have an idea of what is happening in the pandemic. Our straightforward theoretical approach is to use the wild unmodified SARS-CoV-2 to produce immunity by the simple expedient of diminishing the amount of the inoculum to the minimum minimorum. The problem with allowing people, deliberately attempting herd immunity, is that it has the dire effect that a high percentage will necessarily die. It is a matter of competence between two exponential functions. On one hand the exponential reproduction of the virus, and on the other hand, the exponential production of antibodies and activation of T cells. The aim is to diminish the amount of the inoculum to the minimum minimorum capable of infecting the minimum susceptible cell subpopulation. In this manner, herd immunity could be reached, which would allow a parsimonical response in the viral exponential growth that would not overwhelm the exponential immune response. It is expected that susceptible subjects could be infected in a variolation modality through the universal use of masks, maximizing the distance, rather than in a noregulated exposure of a putative low-risk segment of the population. In the logic of the decision, we must distinguish a desideratum from what is physically, economically, legally, and politically implementable. It is a matter of policy-making supported by science and law instead of doxastic logic based on misinformation and bigotry. It is a matter of policy enforcement by cybernetics, by behavior engineering, not of a recommendation. The guidelines, if they are to be implemented, depend on the application of cybernetics, and behavioral engineering. The apodictic inference from fallacies, in a doxastic and desiderative logic, is the origin of disinformation. Keywords: COVID-19 Inoculum; Bayes Theorem; Cybernetics; Variolation; Herd immunity

Abstract The present paper has a negative aim and a positive aim, both limited in the present context to a sketch or outline. The negative aim, today less controversial, is to show that Aristotle’s theory of final causality has little or nothing to do with the teleology rejected by modern science and that, therefore, far from having been rendered obsolete, it has yet to be fully understood. This aim will be met through the identification and brief discussion of some key points on which Aristotle’s theory differs from teleology as still commonly understood. The positive aim is more controversial as it proposes that we take an ontology of life as the proper context for understanding the significance and nature of final causation in Aristotle. The argument for final causation, in other words, is that, without it, we would lose the phenomenon of life and, indeed, of nature altogether, reducing nature to the inanimate and mechanical.

Abstract This commentary argues that, in contrast to the view of Professor Gonzalez, Aristotle’s account of final causation is not very helpful for addressing contemporary concerns. Aristotle presents it as a type of cause, but, when one considers Aristotle’s distinction between facts and explanations, a final cause is better viewed as simply a fact. It is true that organisms show an internal directedness towards an end, but one can still ask why this is the case. Because of its limitations, Aristotle’s account of final causes is not a third ontological region between materialism and intelligent design, but its lack of explanation leaves it open to attack from either side.