ABSTRACT This paper analyses backlash against diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives in higher education through employing the concept of intersectionality to demonstrate the post-truth foundations and political logic of such backlash. Its research design is that of a quantitative case study based on two sources of data: statistics from the 2021 Canadian Census showing median incomes and educational attainment among intersectional sub-populations; and electoral results from the 2021 federal Canadian election. This distinctive methodological approach was selected to overcome gaps in existing scholarship and because quantitative analysis helps demonstrate the erroneous assumptions underpinning backlash discourse and the political interests being fostered by those who mobilise such discourse. The paper finds that sexism, racism, and nativism are significant features of Canadian labour markets, that White non-immigrant men are substantially less likely to obtain university degrees than most other sub-populations, and that electoral outcomes correlate strongly with the intersectional characteristics of the population in each electoral district. In the 2021 federal election, conservative parties won electoral districts primarily in places where proportionally few immigrant, racialised, or highly educated Canadians lived. This paper concludes that intersectional analysis is an important component of anti-sexist, anti-racist, and anti-nativist forms of analysis and activism in lifelong education.

ABSTRACT As support for Australia’s major parties has declined, preferences play an increased role in deciding who wins each electoral contest. Small shifts in vote shares can produce significant changes in results, and a candidate’s chance of winning can depend more on the split of opposing candidate s’ vote shares rather than their own vote share. There have been an increasing number of examples from the 2022 and 2025 federal elections, along with state and territory elections, of single-member contests where the order of exclusion of candidates can decide who wins, rather than a simple tallying up of which of the top two candidates poll a higher vote after the distribution of preferences.

ABSTRACT Foreign electoral interference poses a critical challenge to democratic states, and Canada is no exception. The growing scale and sophistication of such interference have increasingly undermined public confidence in the democratic process. Recent election-related controversies have prompted the Canadian government to reassess the nature and extent of foreign electoral interference, as well as its implications for public trust in democratic institutions and the preservation of national sovereignty. Drawing on diverse bodies of literature, this paper examines how the Canadian government has addressed foreign electoral interference and sought to protect and advance its national interests. It focuses on the experiences of the Chinese Canadian community in federal elections, primarily from 2019 to the present, and considers the lessons that may be drawn for other democratic states. Policy recommendations are also discussed.

Candidate confirmation timing and voter preferences in Canadian federal elections

ABSTRACT Misinformation poses an important challenge for democracy, yet political debates appear to have polarized citizens’ perceptions and responses to misinformation. In a first experiment administered during the 2021 Canadian federal election, respondents were asked how acceptable it is for politicians to spread false information on climate change and COVID-19 for randomly assigned purposes. While most citizens considered misinformation unacceptable, opposing government action on these issues and having a right-wing ideology were associated with greater tolerance. I investigate these ideological differences further using observational and experimental data collected during the 2022 Quebec provincial election. I demonstrate that right-wing citizens are less likely to believe in the existence of an impartial truth, more indifferent to misinformation, and less supportive of measures to combat it than left-wing citizens. These patterns may partly reflect perceptions on the right that public discourses about misinformation are biased against them. The findings suggest that combatting misinformation has become a negatively valenced concept on the right and highlight how the politicization of misinformation debates can influence our ability to respond to it.

Advocacy in health policy involves a broad coalition of medical professionals, including physicians, advanced practice providers, and patient advocacy stakeholders. These advocacy efforts shape federal policies that directly influence urology practice, including procedural reimbursement, prior authorization, telehealth access, and surgical liability. Medical societies are key intermediaries between physicians and policymakers, yet the extent of alignment in advocacy priorities across organizations remains unclear. We evaluated convergence in legislative priorities, lobbying activities, and political engagement among major medical societies to contextualize urology advocacy within the broader health policy landscape. This cross-sectional study analyzed advocacy efforts, legislative priorities, and political action committee (PAC) contributions of 10 US medical and specialty societies from 2020 to 2024 using publicly available data from OpenSecrets, the Federal Election Commission, and organizational websites. Societies included the American Urological Association and 9 other national medical societies selected based on national presence, advocacy activity, and clinical scope. Legislative priorities of each society were grouped into 13 policy categories. Lobbying and PAC data were analyzed by agency targets, legislation, expenditures, and campaign recipients. All 10 societies prioritized reducing administrative burdens, expanding telemedicine, supporting physician well-being, and advancing health equity. Most lobbied the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services and the Department of Health and Human Services in 2024. The American Medical Association reported the highest lobbying expenditures. PAC contributions across societies targeted legislators on the House Energy and Commerce, Appropriations, and Ways and Means Committees. Medical society advocacy agendas have substantial overlap, suggesting opportunities for coordinated efforts to shape health policies affecting payment structures, coverage decisions, and workforce sustainability in urology.

ABSTRACT Objective This research investigates the salience of Donald Trump as a political issue and determinant of vote choice in the 2025 Canadian and Australian federal elections. Both countries held federal contests within 5 days of each other, and multiple news outlets and experts labeled them “anti‐Trump” elections. While center‐left incumbents secured upset re‐election wins in both countries, the actual importance of Donald Trump in shaping these outcomes warrants empirical examination. Methods We use original survey data collected in the aftermath of the two elections ( N = 1008) to assess how the salience of Donald Trump is related to vote choice in each country. Results We find that the salience of Donald Trump was linked to vote choice in both Canada and Australia, but the association was stronger in Canada. Conclusion Although both elections were widely framed as “anti‐Trump” contests, the role of Trump as a factor in vote choice varied across the two cases, suggesting that this characterization applies more readily to Canada than to Australia.

In late 2024, a series of anti-abortion political interventions disrupted Australia’s two-decade trajectory of abortion law liberalisation. A South Australian bill proposed live delivery and adoption for abortions after 28 weeks; a Queensland politician pledged to repeal abortion decriminalisation; and a federal shadow minister called for a debate on abortion to feature in the upcoming federal election. These events were linked by shared actors, notably a prominent South Australian anti-abortion influencer, and occurred amid intensified media and political focus on abortion, both locally and globally. This article situates these developments within transnational far-right movements that increasingly mobilise around gender and sexuality. We argue that these incidents represent a strategic counter-mobilisation against abortion reform, reflecting the global convergence of anti-abortion and anti-gender ideologies. By tracing these connections, we show how far-right rhetoric and tactics are seeping into Australia’s political mainstream, reshaping the terrain of reproductive politics.

ON JUNE 8, 1896, GOVERNOR JOHN PETER ALTGELD of Illinois responded to an inquiry from James S. Hogg, the populist governor of Texas, on the subject of Altgeld's possible candidacy for president of the United States in the upcoming federal election. “I feel highly flattered by your inquiry,” he wrote, “but am glad to be able to say that I am not eligible to the Presidency. I was born in Germany and came to this country when I was three months old.” He hastened to add: “I am an enthusiastic American and almost a crank on the subject of republican institutions and of government by the people.”1Perhaps nothing so clearly underscores the distinction between naturalized and birthright citizenship as the qualifications for president outlined in the US Constitution. It has long been an article of faith that Altgeld was born on December 30, 1847, and that his parents arrived in the United States the following spring.2 Recent research, however, has uncovered a substantially different story. According to contemporary records, Johann and Maria Altgeld—ages twenty-nine and twenty-four, respectively—landed in New York on June 1, 1848, on board the Burgundy. Directly below their entries in the passenger list is the notation, “Peter [Altgeld],” age “1/4 [months].”3 The future Illinois governor was born a mere week before landing, almost certainly well outside US territorial waters. He was far closer to obtaining birthright citizenship—and therefore qualifying for the presidency—than he realized.Altgeld's case raises the question of how one defines a citizen in the first place. At what point does one transform from an immigrant to a wholly integrated, fully assimilated citizen? These are questions that troubled our forebears since well before the Revolution. The power of integrating and assimilating newly arrived immigrants into the British colonies was at the heart of one of the grievances set forth in the Declaration of Independence: “[The king] has endeavoured to prevent the population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations hither, and raising the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands.” Parliament had long disdained liberal immigration policies due to “traditional xenophobia, jealousy of English commercial privileges, religious prejudices, and a fear of alien political views.” By contrast, the colonies’ more generous practices were motivated by practical concerns—“survival, population growth, and economic expansion”4—tempered by a disdain for centralized control of the process. The federal constitution as originally ratified was completely silent on citizenship except for the passages discussing qualifications for the presidency. One contemporary observer remarked—with uncomfortable echoes of rhetoric from our own time—“Though most of the states may be willing for certain reasons to receive foreigners as citizens, yet reasons of equal weight may induce other states, differently circumstanced, to keep their blood pure.”5 It was not until the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 that national citizenship was clearly defined.But defining citizenship as a legal matter and describing it in patriotic terms are two different things. During John Peter Altgeld's 1892 gubernatorial campaign, the Chicago Tribune had sneered, “The Anarchists and Socialists will rally around this rich man who professes to be an anti-capitalist.”6 But it was after Altgeld's pardon of Samuel Fielden, Michael Schwab, and Oscar Neebe, who had been convicted in the 1886 bombing of Haymarket Square—and Altgeld's denunciation of the presiding judge in the case—that a firestorm of xenophobia truly erupted. The Washington Post sputtered: “An alien himself . . . Governor Altgeld has outraged the country of his refuge and adoption. . . . The Supreme Court of the United States had passed upon the cases, but this Altgeld, a mysterious fragment of jetsam from the Lord knows where, sees fit to impeach and overrule its verdict!”7 And the Hutchinson (Kansas) News roared, “He has apparently not a drop of true American blood in his veins.”8 His service in the Union Army, his record of entrepreneurship and public service—all sank into insignificance in light of his foreign origins. One wonders: Had Altgeld been born a week later—on American soil—would he have been attacked with the same vitriol?Altgeld's case illustrates that the question of citizenship extends beyond mere legalities. In uncertain times such as Altgeld's—and our own—it has the potential to polarize a population, to offer an excuse for dividing Americans between “patriots” and “the other.” One can hope that the 250th anniversary of the Declaration—with its assertion that “All men are created equal”—enables our nation to recommit itself to an understanding of citizenship not as a matter of birth, but as a matter of personal commitment to the principle that America is not a place, but an idea.

A gendered and racialised electoral franchise was established following Federation, from the passage of the Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902 to the federal elections held on 16 December 1903, the first conducted by an electorate of all white adult male and female voters. The argument traces the social imaginary of disenfranchising the indigenous, enfranchising women while limiting the terms of inclusion, performing participation in the election campaign, and following electors through the experience of the polling station. The social imaginary ‘accounts for the orientation of social institutions, for the constitution of motives and needs, for the existence of symbolism, tradition and myth’. The social imaginary of post-Federation nation-building was expressed through visual representations and spatialised ceremonials; the press was a key instrument in constituting the social imaginary of enfranchisement. In the election campaign women’s enfranchisement focused the contested terms of gendered post-Federation governance.

Abstract Research shows that (1) political candidates active on social media perform better in elections, (2) candidates who are more attractive than others enjoy a vote premium in elections, and (3) individuals and politicians who are more attractive than others are generally more successful on social media. This study investigates whether the electoral advantage of beauty is moderated by candidates’ social media use. Theoretically, mechanisms commonly used to explain the electoral benefits of attractiveness (i.e., cognitive biases, favorable media coverage, and better campaign performance) may also account for differences in social media visibility between more and less attractive candidates, alongside platform-specific dynamics. Empirical analysis draws on candidate data covering all 2021 German federal election constituency candidates of major parties ( N = 1785), supplemented with independent physical attractiveness ratings. The analyses hint at a larger electoral return to physical attractiveness among candidates active on social media than among nonusers. This amplification effect is particularly pronounced for Facebook, suggesting that platform-specific environments shape how appearance translates into electoral advantage.

Abstract Short-form video platforms like TikTok reshape how politicians communicate and have become important tools for electoral campaigning. Yet it remains unclear what kinds of political messages gain traction in these fast-paced, algorithmically curated environments, which are particularly popular among younger audiences. In this study, we use computational content analysis to analyze a comprehensive dataset of N = 25,292 TikTok videos posted by German politicians in the run-up to the 2025 German federal election. Our empirical analysis shows that videos expressing negative emotions (e.g., anger, disgust) and outgroup animosity were significantly more likely to generate engagement than those emphasizing positive emotion, relatability, or identity. Furthermore, ideologically extreme parties (on both sides of the political spectrum) were both more likely to post this type of content and more successful in generating engagement than centrist parties. Taken together, these findings suggest that divisive political communication tends to receive higher engagement than unifying messages on TikTok, thereby potentially benefiting extreme actors who are more inclined to capitalize on this logic.

Abstract This article examines the Alternative for Germany's (AfD) position following the 2025 federal election, considering whether the party is entering a stage of decline, sustaining its previous support, or moving toward greater ascendancy. The analysis assesses changes in voter demographics, regional dynamics, and issue salience to identify patterns of continuity or transformation in the party's base. We also define potential future issues, including continued dissatisfaction with the previous Ampel coalition and the grand coalition that replaced it, backlash against the end of the debt brake, and the perceived weakness of Friedrich Merz as a leader. In light of recent efforts to classify the AfD as an extremist party, the article evaluates how the party's evolving strategy and public perception may influence its capacity to shape party competition and national policymaking. Finally, it explores whether the AfD's post-2025 trajectory signals a tipping point in the normalization of far-right politics in Germany or a plateau in its influence, with broader implications for democratic stability in advanced democracies.

Abstract In all likelihood, Germany's 2025 federal election has driven a final nail in the coffin of a party system marked by two traditional catch-all parties and several small parties. The fdp , Greens, AfD, Left Party, and bsw together received a record vote share. However, not all of them were electoral winners. Led by the AfD, smaller opposition parties on the ideological extremes surged, while hinge parties in government lost ground. A clear pole position offered an edge in a polarized and fragmented field. This article examines pre-election developments, manifestos, candidates, results, and outlooks of five parties that have emerged as key players in a party system that shows signs of polarized pluralism.

Comprehensive evidence on affective polarization stems from bipartisan political systems with well-defined partisan identities and unidimensional measures of ingroup favoritism and outgroup dislike, while neglecting shared emotions and intergroup emotional dynamics. This study addresses these gaps. Before the 2021 German federal elections, we surveyed individuals in Germany concerned about climate change (n = 2,477) or asylum policies (n = 3,177) using a large, innovative social media sample. We assessed positive and negative feelings toward supporters and opponents of progressive policies on these issues and the perceived emotional alignment with these opinion-based groups. Cluster analyses reveal two affectively polarized groups, a group of resenters characterized by negative affect and emotional misalignment, and three groups showing affective differentiation but lacking emotional identification. Compared with the other groups, the two polarized opinion-based groups perceive themselves as being more emotionally similar to like-minded citizens and more dissimilar from those with opposing views. They also experience consistent, yet distinct patterns of emotions toward like-minded and dissenting others regarding anger, disgust, contempt, and joy. The two groups are sociodemographically distinct and have less contact with people holding opposite views. These structural divisions are reflected in behavioral patterns. Polarized groups engage in more political discussions, especially with strong ties. However, only polarized conservatives tend to engage in political discussions with weak ties, such as colleagues or acquaintances. Polarized progressives are more likely to engage in collective forms of political mobilization. In essence, this work underscores the interplay among the emotional, structural, and interactional components of issue-based affective polarization.

Background Long queues at polling stations reduce voter satisfaction and raise the cost of running elections. In Australian federal elections, unpredictable arrival patterns and early-voting behaviour make traditional staffing estimates unreliable, often resulting in either under-utilised staff or wait times that exceed an hour. Objectives (1) Build a framework that couples an agent-based simulation of a polling station with a multi objective optimisation engine to reveal trade-offs between operational resources and voter wait times. (2) Generate Pareto-optimal solutions that balance the number of ballot issuing officers with queue waiting duration. (3) Identify which evolutionary multi-objective algorithm provides the best performance for this problem. Methods An agent-based model of a polling station was created in AnyLogic using arrival profiles and processing times collected from the 2017 Bennelong by-election. Six integer decision variables describe the numbers of ordinary and declaration issuing points, screens and lookup methods. The model was linked to the jMetal library and evaluated with three evolutionary algorithms: NSGA II, SPEA2 and IBEA. Experiments covered voter turnouts from 600 to 2000 in steps of 100, using a population of 50 and 30 generations per run. Solutions were assessed with the hypervolume indicator and a hard constraint that average waiting time must not exceed 25 minutes. Results and Conclusion The optimisation produced sets of trade-off solutions for each turnout level. NSGA II and SPEA2 consistently achieved higher hypervolume values than IBEA, indicating better convergence and diversity. The Pareto-fronts show that adding issuing points shortens peak-time queues but increases staffing costs, while fewer points lengthen waits. The proposed framework delivers scalable, evidence-based staffing recommendations that improve voter experience and control election costs.

Abstract This paper examines strategic candidate voting against radical-right parties, focusing on the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Germany’s 2025 federal election. Germany has long been considered “hard ground” for radical-right parties, yet the AfD has expanded rapidly over the past decade and, in 2025, fielded numerous highly competitive district candidates, raising concerns about potential AfD direct mandates. Against this backdrop, we investigate whether mainstream voters coordinated their candidate choices to prevent these candidates from winning. In a first study, we analyze district-level election results to assess how the strength of AfD candidates shapes patterns of candidate-vote competition. Stronger AfD contenders are associated with a lower number of effective candidates and with notable overperformance of the leading non-AfD candidate, especially in closely contested districts. In a second study, we combine district results with survey data from the German Longitudinal Election Study and estimate multilevel models to test whether voters cross partisan lines under competitive threat. The analysis confirms that voters are willing to support the most viable non-AfD candidate in districts where the AfD is particularly strong, thus providing direct evidence of strategic candidate voting at the individual level. Overall, our findings show how variation in the local strength of AfD candidates shapes strategic coordination among voters, with more competitive districts generating stronger support for the leading non-AfD alternative.

Pacific Northwest advanced practice registered nurse health policy and legislative advocacy participation.

ABSTRACT Over the past two decades, Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) have become widely used tools that provide personalized political information to help voters make informed choices and strengthen democratic processes. However, little research has examined their potential unintended effects. This article analyzes data from a follow‐up survey of the VAA Voteswiper during the 2025 German federal election campaign to assess whether VAA results align with users' prior voting intentions and how they correlate with subsequent short‐term voting intentions. We find that users intending to vote for fringe parties are most likely to receive a VAA match consistent with their initial preferences. In contrast, those initially favoring more centrist parties are less likely to receive a match with their preferred party and more often match with populist or fringe parties—particularly the far‐right Alternative for Germany. Moreover, we identify substantial differences across social groups in both the alignment between VAA results and prior preferences and the extent to which VAA results influence intended short‐term vote choices. These findings suggest that VAAs may disproportionately benefit populist parties, especially on the radical right, potentially shifting user preferences and challenging the widely held view of VAAs as neutral tools of political education.

Evaluating Campaign Finance Oversight: An Assessment of the Federal Election Commission <i>by Karen Denice Sebold</i>