FTAs have dominated Thai trade policy recently, reflecting the general trend in east Asia. But they also reflect domestic political changes, especially the decision‐making style of the Thaksin government. Thai FTAs have become very politicised. In particular, the US‐Thai FTA negotiations have run into a storm of domestic protest. The first section of the paper surveys the national trade‐policy framework. It highlights the slowdown of unilateral trade and FDI liberalisation after the Asian crisis, though a descent back into protectionism was successfully resisted. Thailand punches well below its weight in the WTO, and not very forcefully in ASEAN, because political attention and negotiating resources have switched to FTAs. The second section identifies the main actors in Thai trade policy, and briefly describes the trade‐policy decision‐making process as well as recent developments during the Thaksin administration. The following central section deals with Thailand's FTAs. These have been driven by vague foreign‐policy goals, while credible economic strategy has been lacking. The residual commercial logic is narrowly mercantilist and ‘trade‐light’, seeking an exchange of concessions in a narrow range of sectors rather than comprehensive, trade‐creating FTAs. Weak and partial FTAs are the result. The sole exception has been the Thailand‐USA FTA negotiations, as the USA wants a strong, deep‐integration FTA. However, negotiations were suspended in 2006 in the wake of the Thai political crisis. Overall, Thai trade policy post‐Asian crisis is highly unbalanced. It stands on a shaky FTA leg, while the other WTO leg has gone to sleep and the ASEAN arm is limp. Above all, core unilateral liberalisation and related regulatory reform are lacking.
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