In his Neo-Meadian article, Collins has offered a number of highly tenable and even testable notions that extend central Meadian concepts. He proposes, for instance, that in theorizing thought we should “take seriously the conception of internalized conversation’’ and, further, that “what we think about is a reflection of what we talk about with other people (or what we communicate with them on paper).” I should basically like to applaud such a stance and offer two simple extensions, both intended to elaborate the main discussion on the microsociology of language and cognition. One proposal is to suggest that if we think about what we talk about, the reverse may well also be true; namely that talk can reasonably be assumed to give some direct handle on the hidden process of thought itself. That is to say that while we may not say aLl we think nor even have consciously thought out all we say, what we say and, more specifically, how the micromoments of talk’s production unfold in interaction may, in distinctly observable ways, locate certain thought processes in action. My second proposal is more speculative. It will be best explored later in this short article but, briefly, I shall want to suggest that thought processes are themselves part of interactive and real-time realization. Whether in external or internal dialogue, my thoughts on a particular subject, person, decision, or even fantasy are not now what they were a day or week or year ago. Fundamental aspects of sociation have changed them and continue to do so. My thoughts, in Meadian terms, are social. I may hold the same opinion, plan the same activity, or wish certain events might or might not happen, but my views on themin Garfinkel’s world of indexicality and reflexivity-are forever changing relative to each other along a distinctly forward-moving trajectory. Moreover, my internal sense of what I believe, plan, or wish has emerged in just that Meadian process of internal conversation and rehearsal that Collins has highlighted. Let me return to these points shortly. First, it will be useful to examine and critique a set of issues basic both to Collins’ discussion and to the traditions on which he has chosen to build. My focus here will be on what I see as the perils of ritual or, more precisely, the analytic if convenient cul de sac that overdependence on ritual or routine behavior can create.
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