Experimental Asset Market Research Articles

The Effect of Earned Versus House Money on Price Bubble Formation in Experimental Asset Markets*

Does house money exacerbate price bubbles? We compare house money asset market experiments with an earned money treatment where initial portfolios are constructed from a real effort task. Bubbles occur; however, trading volumes and earnings dispersion are significantly higher with house money. We investigate the role of cognitive ability in accounting for the differences in earnings distribution across treatments by using the cognitive reflection test (CRT). Low CRT subjects earned less than high CRT subjects. Low CRT subjects were net purchasers (sellers) of shares when the price was above (below) fundamental value. The opposite was true for high CRT subjects.

Anchoring in Experimental Asset Markets

We investigate the relationship between anchoring and the emergence of bubbles in experimental asset markets. We show that setting a visual anchor at the fundamental value (FV) in the first period only is sufficient to eliminate or to significantly reduce bubbles in laboratory asset markets. If no FV-anchor is set, bubble-crash patterns emerge. Our results indicate that bubbles in laboratory environments are primarily sparked in the first period. If prices are initiated around the FV, they stay close to the FV over the entire trading horizon. Our insights can be related to initial public offerings and the interaction between prices set on pre-opening markets and subsequent intra-day price dynamics.

Information mirages and financial contagion in an asset market experiment

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to consider whether asymmetric information about correlations between assets can induce financial contagion. Contagion, unjustified by fundamentals, would arise if participants react in one market to uninformative trades in the other market that actually convey no relevant information. The authors also consider whether the market accurately disseminates insider information about fundamental value correlations when such information is indeed present. Design/methodology/approach – The authors employ experimental asset markets to answer the research questions. The experimental markets allow participants to simultaneously trade two assets for multiple rounds. In each round, a shock occurs, which either have an idiosyncratic effect on the shocked asset, or a systematic effect on both assets. Half of the time, there exist insiders who know the true nature of the shock and how it affects the value of the other asset. The other half of the time, no agent knows whether there is a correlation between the assets. In such cases, there is the potential for the appearance of information mirages. Uninformed traders, in either condition, do not know whether or not there exist insiders, but can try to infer this from the market activity they observe. Findings – The results of the experiment show that when inside information about the nature of the correlation between assets does exist, it is readily disseminated in the form of market prices. However, when there is no private information (PI), mirages are common, demonstrating that financial contagion can arise in the absence of any fundamental relationship between assets. An analysis of individual behavior suggests that some unprofitable decisions appear to be related to an aversion to complex distributions of lottery payoffs. Originality/value – The study focusses on one of the triggers of unjustified financial contagion, namely, asymmetric information. The authors have studied financial contagion in a controlled experimental setting where the authors can carefully control information, and specify the fundamental interdependence between assets traded in different markets.

How do experienced traders respond to inflows of inexperienced traders? An experimental analysis

We conducted asset market experiments where one experienced subject interacts with five inexperienced subjects to investigate how experienced subjects change their price forecasts and trading behavior when faced with strategic uncertainty caused by inflows of inexperienced subjects. Only half the experienced subjects initially forecasted prices deviating more from the fundamental values in the market with five inexperienced subjects than in the final round of the experiment in which they had previously participated. Furthermore, the majority of our experienced subjects did not change their trading behavior. Many experienced subjects act as price stabilizers when the inflow of inexperienced subjects is not associated with other changes in market conditions.

The takeover game

The takeover game is an experimental asset market characterized by three important features: (1) manager-determined dividend payments to shareholders, (2) a takeover offer to shareholders, and (3) a double auction market in which shareholders trade shares. This market mechanism essentially allows shareholders to price their trust in management. Despite the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in which no takeover offer is ever rejected and no dividends are ever paid out, we find that the market often survives takeover offers. Managers pay positive dividends and appear to do so strategically to signal trustworthiness to shareholders, especially in periods in which takeover is to be made. While prices are not directly responsive to dividends, we find that market price is a good predictor of shareholder’s intent to accept takeover offers.

New Insights into Old Discoveries: Two Kinds of Markets

The first supply and demand experiments in the 1950s converged more strongly and quickly than people thought likely. Equally surprising, the first asset market experiments in the 1980s converged far less strongly and rapidly than expected. The economic crisis in 2008 brought a re-thinking of these old discoveries, motivated new experimental exercises and led to new insights.

Information Mirages and Financial Contagion in Asset Market Experiment

We study financial contagion in an experimental market. There are two assets and an exogenous shock reduces the value of one of the two assets. Whether and how the other asset is affected depends on the correlation between the underlying values of the two assets. In some trials, the correlational relationship between the assets is unknown to all agents. In other trials, 50% of the traders are insiders who know the nature of the relationship between the assets. In periods with insiders, prices typically reveal private information. In periods without insiders, information mirages frequently occur, and can readily be interpreted as financial contagion that is unjustified by any underlying fundamental relationship. Our results suggest that under asymmetric information, traders may overreact to data from one market with their behavior in other markets.

Fundamental Value Trajectories and Trader Characteristics in an Asset Market Experiment

Abstract: We report results from an asset market experiment, in which we investigate how the time path of the fundamental value trajectory affects the level of adherence to fundamentals. In contrast to previous experiments with long-lived assets, there is a phase in which fundamental values are constant before the onset of a trend. The trend is either increasing or decreasing, depending on the treatment. We compare the level of mispricing between the decreasing and increasing fundamental value trajectories. Before the market begins, risk aversion, loss aversion, and cognitive reflection protocols are administered to traders. We find evidence for closer adherence to fundamental values when the trajectory follows a decreasing, than when it has an increasing, trend. Greater average risk aversion on the part of traders in the market predicts lower market prices. The greater the level of loss aversion of the trader cohort, the lower the quantity traded. The greater the average cognitive reflection test score, the smaller the differences between market prices and fundamental values. The variation between groups in risk aversion, loss aversion, and CRT score, explains an additional 44% and 18% of the cohort-level variation in price level and mispricing, respectively, compared to a model including only treatment, experience level, and subject pool.

To see is to believe: Common expectations in experimental asset markets

We experimentally manipulate agents' information regarding the rationality of others in a setting in which previous studies have found irrationality to be present, namely the asset market experiments introduced by Smith et al. (1988). Recent studies suggest that mispricing in such markets may be an artefact of confusion, which can be reduced by training subjects to understand the diminishing fundamental value. We reconsider this view, and propose that when it is made public knowledge that training has occurred, this may also reduce uncertainty over the behavior of others and facilitate the formation of common expectations. Our design disentangles the direct effect of training from the indirect effect of its public knowledge, and our results demonstrate a distinct and statistically significant effect of public knowledge over and above that of training alone.

Thar 'She' Blows? Gender, Competition, and Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets

Do women and men behave differently in financial asset markets? Our results from an asset market experiment using the Smith, Suchaneck, and Williams (1988) framework show marked gender difference in producing speculative price bubbles. Using 35 markets from different studies, a meta-analysis confirms the inverse relationship between the magnitude of price bubbles and the frequency of female traders in the market. Women’s price forecasts also are much lower, even in the first period. Additional analysis shows the results are not due to differences in risk aversion, personality, or math skills. Implications for financial markets and experimental methodology are discussed.

The Impact of Asset Repurchases and Issues in an Experimental Market

We create an experimental asset market in which the value of the shares is independent of the quantity outstanding, and find that (i) repurchases increase, whereas share issues decrease, the price of the asset. These effects are consistent with downward-sloping demand for the asset. (ii) This behavior is consistent with three trader types—fundamental, speculator, and momentum—interacting in the market. (iii) Share issues drive prices down toward, but not beyond, fundamental values. This downward resistance at the fundamental value is predicted by the impact of an intervention on the proportion of units and cash held by each trader type.

Vividness and Trading Behavior in an Experimental Asset Market

We investigate the impact of vividness on trading behavior in an experimental asset market, by contrasting vivid with pallid presentation of information. Vivid information is characterized as emotionally engaging and proximate, while pallid information is purely factual. Our design enables us to isolate the effect of vividness by controlling the content of the information irrespective of the presentation. We find that vividness elevates investor attention, as measured through order-book composition and market variables. Interestingly, vividness can both distract as well as focus investors’ attention depending on the nature of the underlying information. We also find evidence that vividness has a catalyzing effect on existing behavioral biases. Independent of information content, vividness exacerbates difference of opinion amongst investors with heterogeneous priors. In addition, we find that strong market sentiment develops when a large proportion of overconfident investors receive prior-confirming information in a vivid manner. This results in the concurrence of high sentiment, returns and turnover.

A REVIEW OF BUBBLES AND CRASHES IN EXPERIMENTAL ASSET MARKETS

AbstractThis paper discusses the literature on bubbles and crashes in the most commonly used experimental asset market design, introduced by Smith et al. It documents the main findings based on the results from 41 published papers, 3 book chapters and 20 working papers.

Effect of Uncertainty About Others' Rationality in Experimental Asset Markets: An Experimental Analysis

We investigate the extent to which price deviations from fundamental values in an experimental asset market are due to the uncertainty of subjects regarding others' rationality. We do so by comparing the price forecasts submitted by subjects in two market environments: (a) all six traders are human subjects (6H), and (b) one human subject interacts with five profit-maximizing computer traders who assume all the traders are also maximizing profit (1H5C). The subjects are told explicitly about the behavioral assumption of the computer traders (in both 6H and 1H5C) as well as which environment they are in. Results from our experiments show that there is no significant difference between the distributions of the initial deviations of the forecast prices from the fundamental values in the two markets. However, as subjects learn by observing the realized prices, the magnitude of deviations becomes significantly smaller in 1H5C than in 6H markets. We also conduct additional experiments where subjects who have experienced the 1H5C market interact with five inexperienced subjects. The price forecasts initially submitted by the experienced subjects follow the fundamental value despite the fact that the subjects are explicitly told that the five other traders in the market are inexperienced subjects. These findings do not support the hypothesis that uncertainty about others' rationality plays a major role in causing substantial deviation of forecast prices from the fundamental values in these asset market experiments.

It is Not Just Confusion! Strategic Uncertainty in an Experimental Asset Market

To what extent is the observed mis-pricing in experimental asset markets caused by strategic uncertainty (SU) and by individual bounded rationality (IBR)? We address this question by comparing subjects’ initial price forecasts in two market environments -- one with six human traders, and the other with one human and five computer traders. We find that both SU and IBR account equally for the median initial forecasts’ deviation from the fundamental values. The effect of SU is greater for subjects with a perfect score in the Cognitive Reflection Test, and it is not significant for those with low scores.

Correlation Neglect in Belief Formation

Many information structures generate correlated rather than mutually independent signals, the news media being a prime example. This paper shows experimentally that in such contexts many people neglect these correlations in the updating process and treat correlated information as independent. In consequence, people’s beliefs are excessively sensitive to well-connected information sources, implying a pattern of “overshooting” beliefs. Additionally, in an experimental asset market, correlation neglect not only drives overoptimism and overpessimism at the individual level, but also affects aggregate outcomes in a systematic manner. In particular, the excessive confidence swings caused by correlated signals give rise to predictable price bubbles and crashes. These findings are reminiscent of popular narratives according to which aggregate booms and busts might be driven by the spread of “stories”. Our results also lend direct support to recent models of boundedly rational social learning.

House-Money Effects in Experimental Asset Markets

We investigate whether prices in experimental asset markets behave differently when participants are required to trade over earned wealth compared to unearned wealth. The latter describes the standard practice of endowing participants with cash/assets in experimental asset market studies of bubbles, which may elicit greater-than-normal risk-seeking behaviour, thereby confounding attempts to understand their drivers or mitigators. We take a new methodological approach in the vein of Cherry et al (2002) in seeking to answer this question by requiring participants in one treatment to earn their initial market allocation. We find that bubbles/mispricing occurs with similar frequency, severity, and duration whether trade occurs with earned or unearned wealth. Our results indicate that any confounding effect(s) caused by endowed money in past studies of bubbles is minimal. Consequently, existing methodology in the study of bubbles does not require modification.

How Do Experienced Traders Respond to Inflows of Inexperienced Traders? An Experimental Analysis

We conducted asset market experiments where one experienced subject (EH) interacts with five inexperienced subjects (1EH5H) to investigate how EHs change their price forecasts and trading strategies when faced with strategic uncertainty caused by inflows of inexperienced subjects. Only half the EHs initially forecasted prices deviating more from the fundamental values in 1EH5H than in the final round of the experiment in which they had previously participated. Furthermore, the majority of our EHs did not change their trading behaviour. Many EHs act as price stabilisers when the inflow of inexperienced subjects is not associated with other changes in market conditions.

Thar She Bursts: Reducing Confusion Reduces Bubbles

To explore why bubbles frequently emerge in the experimental asset market model of Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988), we vary the fundamental value process (constant or declining) and the cash– to–asset value ratio (constant or increasing). We observe high mispricing in treatments with a declining fundamental value, while overvaluation emerges when coupled with an increasing C/A ratio. A questionnaire reveals that the declining fundamental value process confuses subjects, as they expect the fundamental value to stay constant. Running the experiment with a different context (“stocks of a depletable gold mine” instead of “stocks”) significantly reduces mispricing and overvaluation as it reduces confusion. (JEL C91, D14, G11, G12)

To See is to Believe: Common Expectations in Experimental Asset Markets

To See is to Believe: Common Expectations in Experimental Asset Markets