Reviewed by: Isabel Campbell, Directorate of History and Heritage, National Defence HeadquartersThis review represents reviewer's personal views and not those of department.Peter Kasurak's history has garnered national attention, with Literary Review of Canada calling his portrayal of Canadian ground forces army astray.[1] Few would quarrel with that assessment for 1990s; however, Kasurak uses persuasion rather than solid analysis to support his refreshing, but one-dimensional argument that reliance on British Army ... left Canadian Army without a staff that could focus on national military strategy or development of an 'army of future' (16). While Canadian Army had a limited capacity ... for thinking about problems ... [outside] army's assignment and was even myopic, reasons for this shortcoming different from and more complex than he suggests (67). The American influence on Canadian military thinking and Canadian attempts to use United Nations and North Atlantic alliance to create an independent strategy are well known, but he too often overlooks this context and diverse challenges facing Canadian Army officer corps during period.David French's Army, Empire, and Cold War proffers a more balanced approach to British Army's history, while demonstrating that Kasurak's statements about British doctrine are dated and inaccurate.[2] British, Canadian, American, and other officers developed concepts for manoeuvre warfare, mobile forces, and air-portable forces for nuclear and conventional battlefields, but could not implement their ideas due to low threat levels, tight budgets, and other factors. Under these circumstances, West Germans and other NATO members insisted on a North American presence on European Central Front. Was an inadequate, dependent officer corps really responsible for eventual outcomes of Trudeau reassessment of Canadian foreign and defence policy, as Kasurak claims?Kasurak condemns army's commitment to Central role in defiance of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's direction as one of most under-reported incidences of insubordination in Canadian civil-military relations (285). Pursuing this preference led Leo Cadieux [the minister of national defence from 1967 to 1970] and senior armed forces and departmental officials to thumb their noses at direction to move army from Central Front (285). A few years later, Trudeau and Cadieux's successor, Donald Macdonald, were greatly upset to find that direction had not been followed (285). Yet Trudeau could have accepted Cadieux's resignation and pushed for a complete withdrawal of troops from alliance, though Mitchell Sharp, secretary of state for external affairs, likely would have resigned. Sharp regarded presence of Canadian troops in Europe as beneficial to Canadian interests and considered Trudeau a remarkably effective chairman of Cabinet who genuinely sought consensus.[3] Trudeau was no autocrat.A look at allegations against Cadieux demonstrates work's major flaws. Quoting briefly from a key record of 13 August 1969, Kasurak ignores conflicting evidence it contains. On this day, because he could not implement original directive, Cadieux sought guidance, presenting Trudeau and his colleagues with a compromise plan. Charles Drury, president of Treasury Board, astutely observed that the proposal looked to be just reducing, not required change in roles. Cadieux explained that to implement a new mobile role, Lyman Lemnitzer (the Supreme Allied Commander Europe) had requested larger numbers and new equipment, which Canada could not afford within authorized budget of $1.815 billion. After discussions to eliminate Canada's nuclear commitment to alliance, Trudeau and his authorized Cadieux to negotiate an interim land force reduction by June 1970, which would continue with its present equipment until new light equipment was available within three years. …
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Sep 24, 2016
Judith Daar + 14
Open Access
