Euskadi Ta Askatasuna Research Articles

Terrorism as Formal Organization, Network, and Social Movement

Terrorism can be difficult to conceptualize as an organizational phenomenon. We argue that an organizational understanding of terrorism is enhanced if we understand that the collectivities that conduct terrorism can adopt any or all of the three forms of organizing: formal organization, network, and social movement. In short, organizational studies can contribute to the study of terrorism by articulating this polymorphic framework of forms. Using four illustrative cases drawn from a variety of geographic and ideological contexts (the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam [LTTE], Hezbollah, and Al-Qaeda), we demonstrate the value of the polymorphic framework to avoid problems with traditional definitions of terrorism. In addition, the polymorphic framework can inspire further research about why and how terrorist groups shift from more or less fragmented networks, more or less formal organizations, and more or less embedded in social movements.

Basque Regional Elections 2012: The Return of Nationalism under the Influence of the Economic Crisis

The 2012 Basque regional election, held on 25 March, resulted in a new government of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). The incumbent Socialist Party suffered a dramatic reduction in electoral support, obtaining just 19% of the vote, far below the 30% they had attained in 2009. This was the first election held in the Basque Country without the looming shadow of ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna; “Basque Homeland and Freedom”). However, the influence of the economy was stronger than the nationalism issue in this election, as we show in this electoral report.

Why ban Batasuna? Terrorism, political parties and democracy

This article addresses the question: under what conditions do democracies ban political parties? It does so by testing three hypotheses generated by a disparate literature on party bans in a ‘most likely case’, namely, the proscription of radical Basque nationalist parties Herri Batasuna, Euskal Herritarrok and Batasuna in 2003. These parties were banned for their integration in a terrorist network led by Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). The hypotheses are that democracies ban anti-system parties if (i) anti-system parties do not unambiguously eschew violence; (ii) alternatives to proscription are not effective; and (iii) relevant office holders have reason to believe they will not be disadvantaged in their pursuit of office or votes for supporting the ban. Case study findings confirm the hypotheses other than that on violence, given that ETA’s political wing escaped proscription for around two decades before it was banned. Explaining this finding – or addressing the question of why the parties were not banned until 2003 – the article develops two further hypotheses, namely, that democracies ban anti-system parties if (iv) the parties have been ‘securitized’ as an existential threat to the state or democratic community and (v) proscription is the preference of all veto players.

UNTANGLING ETA’S FINANCE: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE BASQUE TERRORIST'S ECONOMIC NETWORK AND THE MONEY IT HANDLES

This article aims to analyse the sources of terrorist financing of the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). It takes into account the network of entities that, under the leadership and oversight of ETA, have developed the political, economic, cultural, support and propaganda agenda of their terrorist project. This study focuses, in particular, on the periods 1993–2002 and 2003–2010, to observe the changes in the financing of terrorism after the outlawing of Batasuna, ETA's political wing. The results show the significant role of public subsidies in finance the terrorist network. It also proves that the outlawing of Batasuna caused a major change in that funding.

Organizing for Resistance: How Group Structure Impacts the Character of Violence

How does the way in which a group organizes change the lethality of the group's attacks? In this article, we argue that groups organized vertically as hierarchies are likely to conduct more lethal attacks. We build our argument around three advantages inherent to centralized structures: functional differentiation, clear command and control structures, and accountability. We argue that each of these characteristics positively impacts an organization's ability to deliver an effective lethal blow. To test our argument, we use a mixed method approach, drawing on empirical evidence and support from a time-series case study. Our large-N analysis examines the trends in more than 19,000 attacks. In this test we develop a novel proxy measure for hierarchy based on a group's bases of operation and non-violent activities. To complement the empirical work, we examine the history of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), the Basque separatist group. Over several decades of violent operations, this group's structure has changed dramatically. We analyze how these shifts impacted ETA's ability to maximize the effectiveness and damage of their attacks. In both the case study and large-N analysis, the more hierarchically organized the group, the more easily the group can orchestrate lethal attacks.

We and them rhetoric in a left-wing secessionist newspaper: a comparative analysis of Basque and Spanish language editorials

The in-depth comparative analysis of political rhetoric in a Basque newspaper's editorials, published on 17/18 October 1997, and reporting similar events in Basque or Spanish, suggests that the use of these languages involved different constructions of the readership and strategies to express writer/reader communality. The Basque language editorial eventually conveyed an assertive we Basques, stressing the search of unity, differentiation and sovereignty. Conflict/differences between the Basques were omitted, backgrounded or ironised, while differences with the Spanish were foregrounded. The Spanish editorial avoided using the rhetoric of we and blamed specific Basques for the repression of Basque secessionism. Subtle criticism against Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) served to include it among the human victims. The implications of such fine-detailed differences are discussed as those linked to the struggle to strengthen a representative democracy patterned on Western models, which presuppose that since conflicting proposals can co-exist, the use of violence is unnecessary for the communities/political institutions’ implementation.

Why Do Terrorists Stop? Analyzing Why ETA Members Abandon or Continue with Terrorism

This article analyzes the factors that have motivated members of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) to abandon terrorism and the factors that have motivated other members of the terrorist organization to maintain their activism. The article examines the process of disengagement of an important faction of ETA and that of other terrorists throughout the group's protracted campaign in order to explain the reasons behind the decision to give up violence. The article concludes with an analysis of the variables that should be considered in order to encourage the collective disengagement of the group that has become the most enduring terrorist organization in Europe.

The legitimization of political violence: A case study of ETA in the Basque country.

Political violence can be legitimized by offering the public justifications for harm doing. This study of the legitimation of political violence is situated in the Basque region in northern Spain. It focuses on ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna; Basque Homeland and Freedom), the last separatist and nationalist group in Western Europe using terrorist violence as a tactic to achieve independence. In its 50 years of existence, ETA has evolved in its target selection and the forms of violence it utilizes to achieve political independence for the Basque Country. Utilizing two theories as analytic tools, Faces of Legitimization Theory (Van den Broek, 2004) and Moral Exclusion Theory (Opotow, 1990a, 1990b, 1995), this article describes how ETA's victims experience threatened or actual harm and its aftermath, how ETA describes its own actions, and the relation between ETA and Spanish governments. The article concludes with a discussion of results, limitations, and implications of the research findings.

Silêncio e reação popular: reflexões sobre a gênese e evolução do E.T.A.

One of the first consequences of the Franco Dictatorship after 1939, was the attempt to homogenise beliefs and behavioural patterns throughout the state. In Euskal Herria, The Basque Country, the generation consisting of the children of those who lost the war, who have gone through a form of deaf resistance at home and have sifted the terrors of war, giving them an air of heroism, stand up to the imposed silence in an absolute manner. It is they who found the new organisation which reinterpret Basque history and propose specific solutions to the present wrongs. E.T.A (Euskadi ta Askatasuna, Basque Homeland and Freedom) is the name of this organisation, a symbolic and referential universe for many Basques.

From Invisibility to Power: Spanish Victims and the Manipulation of their Symbolic Capital

This paper will explore the historical construction and negotiation of Spanish political victimhood, particularly the victims of the Francoist repression framed by the Spanish Civil War of 1936–9, the victims of the Basque terrorist organisation ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) and those who died in the attacks perpetrated by Islamic terrorists on 11 March 2004 in Madrid. At the time of their victimisation, personal and social ‘logics’ were constructed to explain the events that culminated in the death of members of the social body, as the logic of the everyday was subverted by acts of extreme violence. Today, the victims, whose voices were silenced by death, have acquired the capacity to speak from a privileged space of integration and national ‘reconciliation’ premised on their inclusion, after having been ‘othered’ by extreme fanaticisms of religious and/or political creed. As the relatives of the deceased — themselves victims — and diverse political organisations vie for the representation of the victims and of the meanings that they embody, they engage in an exercise in memory and power amid a society still divided along lines reminiscent of those that led to the eruption of the civil war 70 years ago.

Commentary: Basque Avenues toward Peace: Building the New Road to a New Dawn, a New Beginning

With the declaration of a permanent ceasefire by "Basque Homeland and Freedom" (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, ETA) on the 22nd of March to begin on the 24th of March of this year, a new dawn breaks in Basque history and Basque politics. There may be those who doubt this peace but I remain hopeful that the Basques will be able to reconcile their internal differences and begin this journey anew. The Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero has agreed to begin talks on the Basque ceasefire beginning this summer 2006 and many in the Basque region are expectant of the promise of change after forty years of conflict. To date, progress on the peace talks has been slow without any discernable results and with many expressed frustrations of waiting Basques for the peace process to begin in earnest.

Terrorism, Human Rights and Law Enforcement in Spain

ABSTRACT Terrorism systematically violates human rights and disrupts basic political processes common to liberal democracies. Combating terrorism is thus necessary in order to protect these fundamental rights and maintain the well functioning of tolerant polities. However, state initiatives put in place to cope with terrorism may also damage human rights, even when these measures are formulated by elected accountable authorities and implemented in the context of open societies. Spain has precisely been among those European countries most affected by the wave of terrorism initiated more than three decades ago across western industrial societies, and thus where violations of fundamental rights as well as obstacles to the exercise of civil liberties as a consequence of such violence became particularly severe. Also, a case where effective rule of law was temporarily damaged in the fight against the ethnonationalist terrorism perpetrated by ETA (an acronym for Euskadi ta Askatasuna, meaning Basque Homeland and Freedom) but successfully restored by efforts from both state institutions, as a result of an effective division of power, and civil society. It is therefore an experience providing substantive knowledge and valuable insights on how to counter terrorism in accordance with the principles and procedures of democracy. Accordingly, this paper aims at a better understanding on the interrelated issues of terrorism, human rights and law enforcement in a context of political change.

The Role of the Armed Forces of the United Kingdom in Securing the State Against Terrorism

The horror of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 led to worldwide condemnation. All parts of the world mourned the victims of the attacks with a sense of shared loss that was heightened by the fact that many of the victims were of nationalities other than American. Allies rushed to the support of the United States, and NATO promptly declared that the attack on the U.S. could be considered an attack on the entire nineteen-nation alliance. But while the U.S. chose to hike defense spending and intensify its efforts on homeland security, the effect on European countries was somewhat different. The terrorist attacks constituted a watershed in threat perceptions in the U.S., but to a large number of European countries the threat seemed less novel. Terrorist activities within national borders are not new to many states in Europe. Indeed, the continent’s history is scarred by a relatively large number of terrorist activities and groups, including the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Basque separatist organization Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), the Greek far-left group November 17 Organization, the Red Army Faction in Germany, and the Red Brigades in Italy, to name but a few. Europeans did recognize that the “new terrorists”—that is, transnational Islamist terrorists—posed the threat of mass casualties, and were generally uninterested in bargaining or other modes of formal conflict resolution. But European governments also had more experience than the U.S. with terrorism, and they tended to see the new terrorism more as a continuation of old forms of terrorism than did the U.S. At least initially, for instance, European officials were less inclined to think that terrorists would use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Furthermore, the U.S. was perceived—justifiably—as the prime target of Al Qaeda and the transnational Islamist terrorist movement over which it loosely presides. Therefore, threat perceptions did not change as dramatically in Europe, and the sense of an urgent need to boost homeland security was not as strong as that prevailing in the United States. For most European governments, existing counter-terrorism measures were seen as basically adequate, although some adjustments were made to deal with the perceived threat of terrorism from WMD. Yet because the proportion of Muslims in European populations—especially in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom— is far higher than it is in the U.S., and Muslim populations are generally less integrated, the challenges in terms of technical counter-terrorism (intelligence collection through surveillance and penetration, pursuit by police and/or special operations forces) in Europe are in some ways greater than they are in the U.S. However, falling military

On the Interpretation of Terrorist Violence: ETA and the Basque Political Process

Political violence, labeled loosely as “terrorism,” is a seemingly ubiquitous factor in twentieth-century world politics. Coping with it has become a major preoccupation of governments and is the object of considerable international cooperation among them. The purpose of this paper is to examine the case of ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna or Basque Country and Freedom) within the Basque nationalist movement in order to underscore several of the conceptual weaknesses in the literature on terrorism while also suggesting avenues for future research.

Ethnic Protest and Social Planning: A Look at Basque Language Revival

In last 25 years cultural landscape of Europe has been undergoing radical reconstruction. At same time that possibility of a federated Europe seems closer than ever, mobilization of ethnic minorities has brought about an increasing visibility and acknowledgment of internal cultural diversity. At issue for regional minorities is not simply political and economic autonomy. They, as much as anyone else, perceive illusory nature of autonomy in today's world of global politics and multinational corporations. What is perhaps all too often underexamined is battle that minorities are waging for cultural sovereigntycontrol over mechanisms of cultural reproduction. In many instances, though not all, language has been at center of these battles for cultural rights. This is especially true in Spanish Basque Country' where sense of urgency accompanying language revival is very pronounced. In 1963, shortly before they began their campaign of armed struggle against state, radical Basque nationalist organization, E.T.A. (Euskadi ta Askatasuna, Basqueland and Freedom), declared that the day that Basque ceases to be a spoken language, Basque nation will have died, and in a few years, descendants of today's Basques will be simply Spanish or French (Jauregui 1981:160). In somewhat less dramatic terms, first official political program of newly formed, autonomous Basque government proclaimed in 1980 that recuperation of Basque was necessary to avoid cultural extinction, and therefore of primary importance to Basque political agenda. While Basques remain bitterly divided over most political issues, there is an overwhelming consensus that preservation of their language, spoken by about 30% of population, is absolutely essential for continuity of their identity as Basques. Linguistic minorities in Spain, and in many other parts of Europe, have made substantial gains in their attempts to protect their languages. After death of Franco in 1975, national languages of Galicians, Basques, and Catalans were declared co-official with Spanish.2 Nevertheless, activists have continued to protest, arguing that official recognition is not enough: they demand language planning, by which they mean deliberate regulation and promotion of minority language use through legislation, educational programs, and media campaigns. Ethnographic research3 and recent opinion surveys4 show overwhelming support