European Union Security Research Articles

Local ownership, inclusivity and civil-military synergy in EU external action: The case of EU support to security sector reforms in Mali

The evolution of the European Union (EU) as a security and peacebuilding actor raises questions as to its identity as a largely civilian power alongside the development of its military capabilities. Specifically, a key challenge lies in how its civilian and military capabilities relate to each other as they develop, with increasing expectations from the EU to act effectively across its peacebuilding and conflict prevention interventions. The EU aims to do more to link top-down and bottom-up approaches, but there is currently a lack of focus on the latter. In exploring the challenges and opportunities for the EU to enhance its potential for civil-military synergies in crisis management, the paper takes a holistic whole-of-society perspective, asking questions about the level of inclusivity and local ownership in its approaches. The paper takes a closer look at the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) and European Union Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) as a specific case. Based on the findings, this paper argues the EU could be more effective, especially at the operational level, by taking a more bottom-up approach in the areas of designing, planning, monitoring and evaluating interventions. The EU will need to find ways to better embed its interventions in local realities, for instance by working with local civil society in the EU's security sector reform efforts, and offering platforms for more civilian oversight and feedback mechanisms. Only then, with a stronger focus on the inclusivity and local ownership aspects of civil and military action of the EU, will it be able to better address the 'intangible aspects' of security sector reform.

EU security sector reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reform or resist?

ABSTRACTAttempts to explain the failure to reform the security sectors in post-conflict countries have often resorted to two sets of explanatory factors: international and local factors. This article seeks to move from that unhelpful dichotomy to an explanation linking both factors. Drawing on a Foucauldian approach and the concept of “counter-conduct,” it examines the rationality and practices of European Union (EU) governmentality and how governing technologies are resisted and reversed by local elites involved in security sector reform (SSR). Instead of understanding power and resistance as binary opposites, this article argues that counter-conduct can be conceived as implicated in the very relations of power that it seeks to resist. To tease out these relations, the article analyzes the EU's efforts in SSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where it identifies four forms of counter-conduct: upholding European standards, using the local ownership trap, simulating reforms, and lowering the bar.

The Credibility of European Union Military Operations’ Deterrence Postures

ABSTRACTSince 2003, the European Union (EU) has launched eight military operations with an executive mandate in the framework of its European (now Common) Security and Defence Policy (ESDP/CSDP), all of which have utilized deterrence to fulfil their missions. Some have done so implicitly by having a mission that requires them to keep certain actors from doing something unwanted, whilst others have done so explicitly by having deterrence clearly mentioned as one of their core tasks in their mandates. Despite this, deterrence in the context of CSDP has been an almost totally neglected subject in the academic literature. Furthermore, the EU itself has tended to take the deterrence effect of CSDP operations for granted, which is dangerous because it may blind it to potential problems that may in fact be undermining their credibility. This article seeks to launch a more focused discussion on deterrence in the context of EU security policy by analysing the credibility of CSDP operations’ deterrence postures. Based on findings from case studies on operations Althea and Atalanta, it argues that CSDP operations’ deterrence postures lack credibility because they have insufficient resources for taking care of their deterrence tasks. Furthermore, they do not communicate threats effectively.

Anglo-German intelligence relations and Brexit

ABSTRACTSecurity and intelligence matter to the state; they also matter to the European Union (EU). Germany is a driving force behind the EU, which most naturally also includes support of EU security policy and institutions. However, there is also a long-standing bilateral tradition between the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany in this regard. Anglo-German intelligence and security relations have seen many ups and downs, but at the end of the day they have always proven to be effective in the right moment, with standing political crisis. Brexit means that the UK will be leaving the EU but not Europe – a simple fact often ignored in heated discussions. The UK will continue to share European security interests; she has to. Having said that, the current paper argues that current threats to national and EU security can in fact have soothing effect amid political turmoil around Brexit. The underlying argument is that common strategic interest is likely to lead to a cool-headed pragmatic approach. Intelligence and security relations, liaison and sharing, should, after all, continue to exist and not severely be affected by Brexit. It remains to be seen whether the UK will stay a permanent member of the respective EU security institutions; however, even if technically the answer is no, some sort of arrangement ensuring constant exchange is highly likely. This, after all, leads to the conclusion that from the Anglo-German intelligence and security point of view Brexit will not be a very dramatic affair.

Retos de la política de ayuda humanitaria de la Unión Europea: entre la coherencia y la independencia

El objetivo de este trabajo es contribuir a la comprensión de la ayuda humanitaria de la Unión Europea (UE), con la entrada en vigor del Tratado de Lisboa (TdL), a partir del análisis del Reglamento (CE) 1257/96 del Consejo de la Unión Europea, del Consenso Europeo de la ayuda humanitaria de la Unión Europea (en vigor desde 2008) y del artículo 214 del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea (TFUE) del TDL.En este trabajo se aborda el reto que tiene la UE para ofrecer una ayuda humanitarian independiente, al responder a las emergencias internacionales, al tiempo que trata de coordinar y dotar de mayor coherencia a su política exterior, a partir del análisis de la manera como la Unión concilia estos objetivos conflictivos. En particular, se estudia cómo interactúan las políticas de cooperación para el desarrollo y la de ayuda humanitaria de la UE, la política de comercio común, y la política exterior y de seguridad.Por último, en las consideraciones finales se argumenta que a pesar de que la ayuda humanitaria se haya incorporado en el Tratado de Lisboa como una política más de su acción exterior, esta debe ser independiente, al estar sustentada en la solidaridad internacional, y no en los principios aplicables al resto de las políticas de acción exterior, lo que dificulta establecer sinergias positivas con las otras políticas de la acción exterior de la UE.

Autonomy or integration? Small-state responses to a changing European security landscape

ABSTRACTIn this special issue, we examine whether there is a pattern in how small European states, inside and outside of the European Union (EU), adapt and adjust to EU foreign and security policy. We assess selected European small states’ room for manoeuvre within these fields, and within EU institutional structures more broadly, as part of everyday diplomatic interactions in Brussels and in the context of the rotating EU presidency. As the European integration process enters a new phase, possibly marked by a trend of more differentiated integration and flexibility of individual attachments, small states will continue to face the choice between formal autonomy and integration, and between de facto hesitance and adaptability. With Brexit, the remaining large states may become more influential, but small states will collectively have a majority of the votes and total population. Perhaps the coming era of European integration will become the era of small states.

The EU as a Coherent (Cyber)Security Actor?

AbstractThe last three decades have seen the development of the European Union (EU) as a security actor. The transnational character of the security threats and the challenges identified by the EU have led to progressive integration between internal and external security concerns. These concerns have often led to calls for greater coherence within EU security policies. The literature, however, indicates that this need for coherence has, so far, not been systematically operationalized, leading to a fragmented security field. This article has two main aims: To devise a framework for the analysis of the EU's coherence as a security actor, and to apply it to the cybersecurity field. By focusing on EU cybersecurity policy, this article will explore whether the EU can be considered a coherent actor in this field or whether this policy is being implemented according to different and unco‐ordinated rationales.

CSDP and the open method of coordination: Developing the EU's comprehensive approach to security

How can we best describe the operation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and how can we improve policy-making in CSDP? The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) is predicated on the conviction that there are clear limits to the extent that European Union (EU) foreign and security policy can be strengthened through the restricting tendencies of intergovernmental cooperation between EU member states. Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) - agreed by the European Council and 25 EU member states in 2017 - offers practical instruments towards delivering value-added capacity to the process of crisis management beyond intergovernmentalism. As a process, PESCO is analogous to the logic of OMC, including more appropriate levels of coordination at the national organisational level in order to effectively facilitate the EU's comprehensive approach to conflict prevention and crisis management. The requirement for new and 'open' types of EU foreign and security policy coordination is underlined by the immense differences between EU member states in external policy, both concerning national crisis management structures and the resulting inefficient segmentation of policy at the EU level. .

Power Shifts and Tensions in East Asia: Implications for European Security

This article seeks to answer two questions: What are the security implications of the conflicts and shifting balance of power in East Asia for European security? Is Brussels prepared for these developments or the escalation of individual conflicts? To this end, I discuss the rise of China and its growing global ambitions, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Sino-Russian cooperation, and cyber warfare. Further, I outline possible consequences of military clashes in East Asia for Europe. The results are frustrating: European Union (EU) members are both mentally and materially unprepared for the changes afoot in the Far East and the possible outbreak of war. To change this, the EU would have to take a narrow conception of security (i.e. traditional security issues) more seriously. This includes the insight that the European experience does not apply to the current security dilemma in East Asia. If the EU wants to be taken seriously as a strategic actor in the Far East, it will have to reconsider its self-conception as a civilian power. The article ends with suggestions for a better EU security policy in East Asia.

European Military Capabilities, Weakness or Future?

Maastricht Treaty created three pillar structure for European Union, and one of the three pillars was the Common Foreign and Security policies pillar (CFSP). A book refers to treaty`s article J (4), which states following:” all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense’.” (Lindstrom; pp.17,2017). In 1990`s several meetings in EU level were held to contemplate working under CFSP, and the most progressive of them was Saint-Malo`s meeting, including declaration afterwards (Ibid). Year 2003 marked the beginning of operations conducted under CFSP framework, and also announcement of European union security strategy (Lindstrom;19). Lisbon Treaty in 2009 merged three pillar system and renamed CFSP to Common security and defense policies (CSDP). Treaty created the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

Turkish Soft Balancing Against the EU? An Analysis of the Prospects for Improved Transatlantic Security Relations

Turkey is increasingly criticized for obstructing communication and coordination between the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Using soft balancing theory and drawing on fieldwork and semistructured elite interviews conducted in Turkey, this article provides an in-depth analysis of Turkey’s foreign policy that leads to an impasse in NATO–EU coordination. It identifies three main reasons behind the Turkish foreign policy on the topic: (1) Turkey’s resentment for its exclusion from European security developments, (2) the uncertainties revolving around Turkey’s EU membership prospects and the subsequent lack of trust toward the EU, and (3) the unresolved Cyprus problem. This article concludes that the provision of a credible roadmap for Turkey’s EU membership and the resolution of the Cyprus conflict are central for breaking the NATO–EU security impasse, both of which seem unlikely in the short to medium run.

Functional Actorness? Border Security in the EU and Turkey

The European Union (EU) has fortified its external borders using a number of measures including the creation of new institutions and networks such as FRONTEX and EUROSUR. In non-EU countries such as Turkey, border security is being reorganized with EU support and cooperation. By combining the literature on EU actorness and neo-functionalism, I provide a theoretical toolkit to critically unpack these new developments through conceptualizing multiple dimensions of what I call functional actorness. The contribution analyzes how the functional transformation of EU and Turkish border security has produced a number of side effects which are critically appraised.

Losing the Rights along the Way: The EU–Western Balkans Visa Liberalisation

This paper examines the conditionality in relation to fundamental rights during and after the visa liberalisation dialogues that took place between the European Commission and national governments of the Western Balkans countries in 2009 and 2010. Conceptually, this paper uses the visa liberalisation to study the interactions between the conditionality mechanism and securitisation paradigm in the context of the European Union (EU) justice, freedom and security area. Analysing both the formal benchmarking process and data from stakeholders’ interviews, this paper demonstrates the securitisation and side-lining of fundamental rights during and in the aftermath of the visa negotiations. As a result, this paper informs of unwanted effects of conditionality and questions the role of the EU in promoting fundamental rights.

Military in Mali: The EU’s Action against Instability in the Sahel Region

The conflict eruption in the Sahel during the last years has provoked new challenges for the European Union's security architecture. Notably the toppling of Libyan long-time leader Muammar al-Qaddafi in summer 2011 negatively affected many countries' stability in the adjacent Sahel region. The EU's 'Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel' in March 2011 suggested a combination of soft and hard policies to foster stabilization and political progress in line with the 2003 European Security Strategy through a Comprehensive Approach. This article analyses to what extent the EU's actions in the region have indeed contributed to conflict resolution. It evaluates the overall effectiveness of the implementation of the EU's Comprehensive Approach, and underlines five critical aspects that might provoke rather worse than better results in the Sahel. The guiding hypothesis is that the increased use of military means lowers the EU's impact on peaceful conflict resolution in the region, as the lost impartiality hinders its chances for civilian success. The Malian malaise, therefore, poses fundamental questions for the EU's Comprehensive Approach towards security and stability - particularly at times when in Brussels the European Neighbourhood Policy and the European Security Strategy are under thorough review.

Patterns of Transnational Partisan Contestation of European Foreign Policy

This article explores the historical and societal roots of transnational partisan foreign and security policy preferences in Europe and assesses whether and how foreign and security policy is structured by the European party system today. It points to the existence of transnational dimensions in the contestation of European foreign policy that are consistent with the dominant axes of partisan competition on a European level (ideology and integration). The ideological dimension is mitigated by the small policy stretch between major party families in the core of the European party system. Even if it is a sign of the maturity of the European party system that it is able to structure in its core a still intergovernmental policy area, the nature of foreign policy as a prerogative of Member States and the adoption of Euroscepticism by parties located in the extremes of national party systems conspire to make the integration axis a more relevant dimension of contestation of European Union (EU) foreign policy. This means that the relevant patterns of contestation of EU foreign and security policy increasingly escape the existing range of rival views established by mainstream political forces.

Cooperation in EU disaster response and security provision: circulating practices

There is a profound disconnect between the practice and scholarly study of security in Europe. The 2010 Internal Security Strategy added disasters such as forest fires, earthquakes, and floods to the list of European Union (EU) internal security concerns, expanding on the more traditional anxieties over militaries, border protection, and the effects of poverty. This article explores how evolving practices of disaster response, a policy area once separate from EU security discourse, have become part of the EU's wider security provision and with what implications. Based on interviews conducted at the Directorate-General (DG) for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO), it provides a detailed study of three EU disaster response practices – monitoring, training, and information co-ordinating – and their circulation to the wider field of EU internal security provision. It uses this case to outline that new understandings of what it means to “voluntarily co-operate” in European security projects have been radically under-theorized.

Reform or Business as Usual? EU Security Provision in Complex Contexts: Mali

The European Union (EU) is to promote various principles, including peace and justice for human rights violations in its external action, according to the Treaty. In fragile contexts, peace and justice are considered fundamental for contributing to reform that addresses the causes of conflict and prevents recurrence. This paper draws on field research to examine whether and how the EU translated these principles of peace and justice into policy and put them into practice in its response to the crisis in Mali in 2012 by contributing to peace mediation, transitional justice and security sector reform. It demonstrates the importance of considering practice to understand EU foreign policy. It finds that the EU emerged from the crisis a political actor, and although in many ways it promoted reform, in practice it risks supporting business as usual.

The European Union's “Comprehensive Approach” in Chad: Securitisation and/or Compartmentalisation?

The European Union (EU) aims for a comprehensive approach to security in developing countries. As a result, attempts have been made to enhance the nexus between the EU's security policy and other policy areas, particularly development, humanitarian assistance, and democratic governance. This article analyses the EU's comprehensive approach in the case of Chad, focusing on two questions. First, has the EU's comprehensive approach been able to supersede the compartmentalisation of the EU's political system? Second, has it led to the securitisation of non-security policy areas? These questions are answered by investigating the nexus between the EU's security, democracy, development and humanitarian aid policies in Chad from 2006 onwards. This analysis confirms the compartmentalisation scenario, especially regarding development and humanitarian aid where the relation with security policies was at times openly conflicting. While the EU's democracy promotion policies are found to be securitised, this is not the case for development and humanitarian aid.

Public support for European defence: Does strategic culture matter?

AbstractThis article identifies previously ignored determinants of public support for the European Union's security and defence ambitions. In contrast to public opinion vis‐à‐vis the EU in general, the literature on attitudes towards a putative European army or the existing Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) suggests that the explanatory power of sociodemographic and economic variables is weak, and focuses instead on national identity as the main determinant of one's support. This article explores the possible impact of strategic culture, and argues that preferences vis‐à‐vis the EU's security and defence ambitions are formed in part through pre‐existing social representations of security. To test this proposition, ‘national’ strategic cultures are disaggregated and a typology is produced that contains four strategic postures: pacifism, traditionalism, humanitarianism and globalism. Applying regression analysis on individual‐level Eurobarometer survey data, it is found that strategic postures help explain both the general level of support for CSDP and support for specific Petersberg tasks.

Biometric Technologies Trends in Relation to Fundamental Rights Protection in European Union Security Policy: With a Particular Approach to DNA Technology

Biometric data represent a challenge for security systems in the actual global world. Now, new technologies help us to identify persons using this new biometric technologies, using for example fingerprint/palm print identification, iris identification, face recognition or DNA technology. However, we need to respect fundamental rights when we are using these technologies. In this sense we need to focus on proportionality to limit the use of these technologies when they are necessary in order to guarantee public or private security but with respect to fundamental rights (rights to integrity, image, data protection, etc.).In this paper we present that the advances of these biometric technologies and their use have as a challenge the use of them in our security systems in order to respect fundamental rights.Really, using the human face as a key to security, biometric face recognition technology, and particularly DNA technology have received significant attention in the past several years due to its potential for a wide variety of applications in security policy.