This article applies a Nietzsche-inspired geophilosophy to re-examine some persistent dilemmas of European Union (EU) – Mediterranean relations. Moving beyond institutionalist and security-driven accounts, it considers the Mediterranean as a generative cultural-philosophical force whose vitality, plurality, and volatility often resist EU-drive initiatives for governance. Inspired by Nietzsche’s writings on the region, this article extracts two propositions: (1) volatility is constitutive, not pathological; (2) universalizing moral claims mask power asymmetries. These are operationalized to reinterpret the trajectory of EU policy for the region, from the Barcelona Process through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), the 2021 Agenda for the Mediterranean and the recently endorsed Pact for the Mediterranean (2025). For each policy step, the article identifies the ‘Nietzschean’ tension at work, shows how it influenced design or failure, and derives an alternative reading of outcomes. The analytical payoff is twofold: it reframes recurrent ‘implementation failures’ as the predictable result of imposing order on a space defined by flux, and it demonstrates the added explanatory power of integrating cultural-philosophical imaginaries into EU foreign policy analysis. This methodological provocation broadens the theoretical toolkit for European studies, offering a framework capable of explaining enduring dissonances between declared aims and lived realities in the Euro-Mediterranean context.

ABSTRACT How do the European Union (EU) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as leadership-type regional powers, use discourse to shape regional order and structure the roles, responsibilities and expectations of neighbouring states? A corpus-assisted critical discourse analysis (CDA) of European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) documents (2004-21) and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) texts (2013-21) identifies recurring patterns of role attribution, action modality and expectation framing. The EU performs leadership primarily through procedural legitimation, embedding partners within rules, instruments and administrative pathways, whereas the PRC foregrounds symbolic and relational language, historical narratives and ‘win-win’ promises. Viewed through the lens of regional leadership, these styles share a logic of discursive governance: repeated formulas stabilise expectations, encode hierarchy and sustain authority without overt coercion. Discursive leadership can thus be conceptualised as a strategic mechanism of regional power.

This article traces the evolution of European Union engagement with the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) from the chaotic post-Soviet years to the present day. Beginning with ad-hoc technical and humanitarian assistance through TACIS (1991–2006) and ECHO, the EU initially operated in a region it barely understood, providing emergency aid and modest state-building support amid wars and separatist conflicts. These early efforts were demand-driven and often poorly coordinated, yet they laid the first institutional bridges. The 2004 enlargement and the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) marked a shift toward a more ambitious structural foreign policy aimed at creating a “ring of friends” sharing EU values and prosperity without offering membership. In the South Caucasus, the ENP introduced bilateral Action Plans, increased financial assistance via ENPI, and tentative regional initiatives. However, its one-size-fits-all approach, lack of membership perspective (“everything but institutions”), and inability to address frozen conflicts limited its transformative impact. Growing differentiation among the three countries together with the 2008 RussoGeorgian War exposed the ENP’s shortcomings. These developments paved the way for the 2009 Eastern Partnership, which introduced stronger conditionality and deeper integration instruments. The article argues that lasting EU influence in this contested region depends on combining normative ambitions with pragmatic, conflict-sensitive, and genuinely differentiated policies.

Currently outside the European Union for various reasons, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK share with the EU common values which should lead to more intense cooperation in the present geopolitical situation, beyond economic matters and also including security and defence. On the constitutional level, we argue that the EU’s relations with these countries – and with others such as Andorra, Monaco and San Marino – should be perceived as a special and distinct sub-part of the European Neighbourhood Policy under Article 8 TEU, where not only geographical proximity and economic ties, but also and foremost common values form an essential basis for the mutual relations and which must lead to mutual trust. These aspects should be seen as a key pillar of the EU’s partnership architecture and of EU constitutionalism.

This article is inspired by the empirical puzzle that the comparison of the Baltic states’ and Georgia’s European integration cases embody during the period of 1991- 2004, – that is from the break up of the Soviet Union to when Baltic States became the members of the European Union and Georgia was included in the European Neighbourhood Policy. By comparing EU policy and discursive practices towards the Baltic states and Georgia during these 13 years of their independence, the author finds that the different pathways of their European integration were shaped in light of the distinctive perception of Balts’ and Georgians’ European identity held by the EU. European identity is scrutinized as an operational social construction in the EU’s hands that often serves as a reason/justification for more or less European integration. The subsequent findings are theoretically interpreted through Discursive Institutionalism along with the methodology of Discourse Analysis, that discerns the differences in the EU’s manner of communication towards the Baltic states and Georgia in its foreign policy towards the two.

This article addresses Europeanization in third countries and aims to map and explain compliance patterns in EU’s Eastern neighbourhood. This study attempts to define under what conditions the EU can trigger the transformation beyond its borders and to explore whether EU’s conditionality principle in the absence of membership prospect can motivate reforms at domestic level and if not, what drives Europeanisation processes in these countries. This research is concerned with sector - specific explanations and dynamics of sectoral reforms under the European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership. Metic- ulous investigation of Border Management reforms in Georgia and Ukraine provide profound insights for the final research findings. Keywords: Europeanisation, Conditionality, Border Management, Georgia, Ukraine

Algeria's Mediterranean Pivot: Energy Leverage, Diplomatic Realignment, and the Restructuring of Euro-North African Order

This article proposes the concept of "ambivalent diplomacy" against the backdrop of the relationship between the European Union and Palestine, covering its historical evolution and its own contribution to the origin of the conflict with Israel. This type of diplomacy would be characterized by a persistent tension between the values it proclaims and its executive decisions, especially diplomatic and commercial ones. The European Neighborhood Policy is examined as a key piece to understand the asymmetric configuration of relations in the conflict, raising the question of whether this tool, in its current design and application, contributes to perpetuating structural imbalances that demand a thorough review. Furthermore, the article examines the commitment of EU Member States to international justice, particularly in relation to the potential crime of genocide, evaluating their consistency with the Union's fundamental values and their role in promoting global justice. The article concludes by reflecting on the challenges posed by the EU's ambivalent involvement in the region.

Following the 2004-2007 ‘Big Bang’ enlargement, the European Union turned away from further enlargement prospects. Projects such as the European Neighbourhood Policy were launched with the express goal of limiting enlargement and outstanding enlargement commitments were neglected. The EU’s apathy towards enlargement seemed to change in February 2022, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine applied for membership four days after Russia’s invasion, with Moldova and Georgia following less than a week later. Four months later, the EU granted Moldova and Ukraine candidate status. As the EU claims that the accession process is merit-based, with a candidate’s progression being directly related to their compliance with the Copenhagen accession conditions, that raises two questions: Why did the EU so radically change its view on enlargement, and were Moldova and Ukraine treated favourably in the accession process? Using a comparative framework to assess the candidacy progression of Moldova and Ukraine against four Western Balkan candidates - Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia – this paper argues that Moldova and Ukraine have been treated more favourably in the accession process, and that the reasons for this treatment cannot be attributed to superior compliance with the Copenhagen criteria.

The eastward expansion of the European Union, with the accession of former Soviet republics, the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (2004) and the Eastern Partnership (2009), saw old balances being dismantled. The admission of new members previously excluded as candidates signaled a new European Union strategy to extend its values and norms. The article considers that the critical juncture of the new geopolitical crisis in Eastern Europe following the war against Ukraine brings a new trajectory for the objective of accession negotiations. This is exemplified by the European Union’s decision to grant candidate status to Moldova and Ukraine, bringing a new reflection on the role of candidacy as a strategy of approximation and influence, rather than merely a stage in the accession process defined by strict criteria and predictable timelines for full compliance.

Abstract Existing studies of EU foreign policy often contrast its normative and geopolitical ambitions while overlooking its colonial entanglements. Although recent scholarship has interrogated the Union’s neo-imperial tendencies, the structuring role of race in external relations remains underexplored. This article introduces the concept of the “Mediterranean colour line” to capture how the EU’s relationship with its Southern Neighbourhood has consistently cast the region as politically marginal, economically extractable, and epistemically devalued. These hierarchies are not incidental: they are central to the reproduction of capitalism within racialized global orders. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) provides a key site to examine these dynamics. Through a critical discourse analysis of the 2021 New Agenda for the Mediterranean, the article shows how colonial logics are retooled in the language of reform, resilience, and partnership. By focusing on digital transition and green growth—domains rarely read through race—the analysis demonstrates how racial capitalist governance persists precisely where its effects are most obscured.

This article examines the design and implementation of the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP espoused a very ambitious agenda using a wide range of instruments; however it was hindered in its ambitions by a number of design flaws. In this article, first, we analyse the original design of the ENP to illustrate how the ENP’s wide geographic coverage of eastern and southern neighbours, conferred a degree of vertical coherence to the policy. However, this was achieved at the expense of horizontal coherence with other EU policies. Second, we draw attention to the fact that the focus on ENP’s multiplicity of tools lead to a focus on outputs rather than impact in partner countries. Third, we argue that the ENP focus on promoting‘good governance’, resulted in a rather technocratic, de-securitized implementation of the policy and a degree of horizontal disjointedness – namely the failure to align it with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). We argue that this lack of horizontal coherence stemmed from the lack of consensus amongst the Member States on the ENP in general and the EU’s role in security of the partner countries, in particular. Finally, we explore the implications of these weaknesses in the case of Georgia and demonstrate how the de-securitized implementation of the ENP in a highly sensitive conflict-setting, involving Russia, had a detrimental impact on Georgia’s relations with the EU.

This article examines Ukraine’s European integration course as one of the main directions of contemporary foreign policy and a crucial mechanism for strengthening national security, ensuring sustainable development, and modernizing the state. It traces the historical evolution of Ukraine–EU relations, starting with the 1990 Declaration of State Sovereignty, the 1993 Verkhovna Rada Resolution “On the Main Directions of Ukraine’s Foreign Policy,” and the signing of the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, and culminating in the granting of EU candidate status in 2022. The paper reviews key legal and institutional frameworks, including the Ukraine–EU Action Plan, the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership initiative, the Association Agreement, and the establishment of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. Particular attention is paid to the transformation of European integration following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which turned EU accession from a political and economic project into a strategy for survival, recovery, and security consolidation. The study analyzes the economic, political, and security dimensions of integration, focusing on the harmonization of Ukrainian legislation with EU law, modernization of state institutions, promotion of democratic reforms, and the prospects for accession negotiations in 2025. Key obstacles to integration are identified, including insufficient competitiveness of certain economic sectors, difficulties in meeting financial obligations, and the need to improve the professional capacity of civil servants. The article highlights the EU’s role as a strategic partner in security cooperation, including Ukraine’s participation in PESCO and EUMAM initiatives and the signing of bilateral security agreements. The findings emphasize that Ukraine’s European integration course is a comprehensive strategy aimed at establishing the country as an integral part of the European political, economic, and security space, strengthening its international position, and improving citizens’ quality of life.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has triggered a renewed impetus for the EU’s Enlargement Policy, which has acquired geopolitical significance with the unprecedented inclusion of three Eastern partners under this framework, together with the revitalization of negotiations with the Western Balkans. Following Aldecoa’s understanding of enlargement as a process that implies a restructuring of the EU’s political system, there is also a need to address internal reforms to accommodate this new wave of accession. The consideration of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine as candidate countries has changed the raison d’être of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Originally conceived for states without clear prospects of EU integration, the ENP’s purpose has shifted, effectively opening the door for further integration of other Eastern Partnership countries into the European Union. In this context, Armenia is enhancing its relations with the EU, seeking closer integration, and even sparking debates in the country about formally requesting membership. Major challenges ahead may include the need to consolidate democracy, reverse its economic and military integration with Russia, and reach a peace agreement with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.

The eastward expansion of the European Union, with the accession of former Soviet republics, the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (2004) and the Eastern Partnership (2009), saw old balances being dismantled. The admission of new members previously excluded as candidates signaled a new European Union strategy to extend its values and norms. The article considers that the critical juncture of the new geopolitical crisis in Eastern Europe following the war against Ukraine brings a new trajectory for the objective of accession negotiations. This is exemplified by the European Union’s decision to grant candidate status to Moldova and Ukraine, bringing a new reflection on the role of candidacy as a strategy of approximation and influence, rather than merely a stage in the accession process defined by strict criteria and predictable timelines for full compliance.

The idea of European integration played an important role in Ukrainian political discourse, but was attributed different meaning in the course of its political development. This idea was crucial for a definition of Ukrainian foreign policy preferences and for the construction of Ukrainian national identity. In the Ukrainian context, this idea was found to be primarily constructed in regard to the question of the historical and geopolitical place of Ukraine. Public opinion in general largely reflects the instability in Ukraine-EU relations, as well as the inconsistent European integration policy of the Ukrainian government and the lack of a coherent policy from the side of the European Union. This article focuses on a study of how the European integration was conceptualized and metaphorically presented in the Ukrainian press in the period of 2005 – 2010. By examining the metaphors used to describe this process in the Ukrainian media between 2005 and 2010, we gain valuable insights into the historical and discursive nuances that have shaped contemporary perceptions of European integration in Ukraine. Based on the Critical Metaphor Analysis and Conceptual Metaphors approach, we investigate the main frames and metaphorical representations of Europe and the European integration in the Ukrainian media. It can be noticed that the European integration was described in Ukraine before 2014 with a tension between the two discourses – the discourses of closeness and of openness. The European Neighborhood Policy was created for an opening of the door for Ukraine to Europe and as a ‘road map’ for the Ukrainian way towards the EU. Despite that, for the majority of Ukrainians the EU before 2014 was still an unrealistic ‘dream’ where doors were ‘rather closed’ then opened.

The Brussels Convention of 1968 was a pioneer in several respects: it was the first multilateral convention on the recognition of foreign judgements; the first „double“ convention dealing with both recognition and jurisdiction; and also the first convention on recognition that owes its existence to trade policy. I shall focus on the latter point.

The article examines the legal principles of the formation and development of cross-border and regional cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union. Having summarized the entire complex of special legal literature, it is determined that the legal principles of the formation and development of cross-border and regional cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union have practically not been studied by legal science. It is established that the current policy of Ukraine is marked by a European integration priority, the implementation of which is impossible outside the format of cooperation with the European Union, including cross-border and regional cooperation. The process of forming the studied sphere of legal relations is determined, the main trends and features of the development of these relations at different stages of historical development are determined, it is determined that the functioning of cross-border and regional cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union can be possible only under the condition of sufficient and proper regulatory regulation. It has been studied that Ukraine’s intentions to develop relations with the European Union were first enshrined in a Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and later recorded in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Ukraine and the European Communities and their Member States, and the requirements for cross-border and regional cooperation were defined in the Ukraine-European Union Action Plan “European Neighborhood Policy”, and later became more detailed in the Association Agreement between Ukraine, on the one hand, and the European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, on the other hand. It was found that although the analysed regulatory legal acts of Ukraine have become somewhat oriented towards the norms of European Union law in the field of cross-border cooperation and regional cooperation, they still need improvement in terms of unification of terminology in the field of cross-border cooperation and regional cooperation; clear regulation of the status of the cross-border cooperation body under the euroregional cooperation groupings, clear regulation of the competence of local authorities regarding forms of cross-border cooperation, etc.

Abstract Recent years have been marked by the transformation of the European Neighbourhood Policy within the framework of the Eastern Partnership into the expansion policy towards Ukraine and Moldova, as well as the withdrawal of Belarus from the programme. These circumstances determine the research’s relevance. The research aims to analyse the mechanisms of development of the Eastern Partnership programme, formulate the problems of the implementation of this initiative at the present stage and propose options for their solution. The methodological basis of the research was compiled on the combination of such methods as analogy, classification, historical, political, legal analysis, forecasting, statistical data analysis, structural-functional and comparative. The research characterises the main stages of the Eastern Partnership programme’s evolution and identifies cooperation principles within the initiative across different periods. It also formulates the main directions and features of EU interaction with participating countries, determines trade turnover volumes between partners, assesses Brexit’s impact on programme implementation and explores the reasons and circumstances behind Belarus’ withdrawal from the initiative. The article can be used by scholars whose interests include the problems of European integration, the EU foreign policy and areas of cooperation between the countries of the organisation and the post-Soviet states.

Abstract. The article is dedicated to Poland's foreign policy vector regarding Ukraine's European integration path, reflecting strategic support and active participation in processes aimed at bringing Ukraine closer to the European Union. Poland, with its significant experience in European integration, has become an important advocate for Ukraine within the EU, providing political and ideological support for its efforts toward reform and democratic changes, which are necessary for EU membership. It is emphasized that since the early 2000s, Poland has actively proposed concepts aimed at integrating Eastern neighbors, including Ukraine, into the European Union through the expansion of the European Neighborhood Policy. Poland supported the Eastern Partnership initiative, striving to strengthen cooperation with Eastern European countries and ensure their economic and political development. The special role Poland played during the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine is highlighted, when Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski became a key mediator in resolving the political crisis in Ukraine. This period became significant for Poland's policy of supporting democratic changes in Ukraine. Even after the change of administration in Poland in 2010, the Polish strategy regarding Ukraine remained stable, though it became more cautious, continuing to actively support Ukraine's European integration aspirations. It is noted that after Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, Poland became one of the strongest supporters of Ukraine's European integration ambitions, providing diplomatic support within the European Union and promoting the signing of the Association Agreement and visa-free regime for Ukrainian citizens. Poland also actively participated in Ukraine's reform processes, supporting the fight against corruption, improving the business environment, and developing democratic institutions. As a result of this process, Ukraine was able to apply for EU membership in 2022. Poland continues to play a vital role in strengthening ties between Ukraine and the European Union, promoting its European integration and stability in the region. Poland's policy of supporting Ukraine is an important element of geopolitical stability and development on the European continent. Keywords: Poland, European integration, Ukraine, European Union, European Neighborhood Policy, Eastern Partnership, Orange Revolution, national interests, geopolitical stability, political support, lobbying.