European Elections Research Articles

France’s Political Crisis

Owing to the far-right Rassemblement National’s (RN) strong showing in the European Parliament elections in May, French President Emmanuel Macron abruptly dissolved the French National Assembly and called for elections three weeks later. He hoped centre-right and centre-left voters would decisively coalesce behind him and against the RN. Ultimately, due to the emergence of a ‘Republican Front’ and its tactical voting, the left-wing Nouveau Front Populaire alliance finished first, Macron’s centrist bloc second and the RN third. No group gained an absolute majority, leaving a hung parliament. This could have tectonic consequences for the French political landscape and European politics. If efforts to forge a centrist coalition fail, a provisional government – possibly a ‘technocratic’ one – would probably materialise. This would mean a much less audible France on the European stage; minimum spending that would drain material support for Ukraine; and new elections in a year.

What’s left of the populist radical left? SYRIZA and Die Linke compared

ABSTRACT This paper examines the discursive articulations of populism with egalitarianism in the parties of the Greek Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) and the German The Left Party (Die Linke). I draw on tools of political discourse analysis and use a discursive-analytical perspective to develop an analytical framework for examining egalitarianism and populism as separate yet interconnected concepts in the examined cases. My data is drawn from speeches and interviews of each party’s leadership during the national and European Parliament elections from 2009 to 2019. The aim is to make an argument for the analytical utility of ‘the elite’ term and its importance within each party’s socio-political context to separate egalitarian from populist elements in each party’s discourse and offer a renewed understanding of the distinction between egalitarianism and populism as two concepts that are often conflated in radical left parties. The analysis showed that there was a distinction between egalitarian and populist discursive elements in both parties’ discourses, with each party employing them on different levels depending on their respective contexts.

Do (too many) elections depress participation? How the position, frequency and nature of domestic ballots affect turnout in European Parliament elections

In Europe, the multiplication of elections makes the election calendar a decisive issue given the decreasing participatory trend. Turnout is expected to be higher in simultaneous elections, while it lessens if several elections are held over a short period. The saliency of the preceding ballot may also affect participation in the next one. In this article, we argue that these temporal effects are crucial for European Parliament elections due to their second-order nature. We analyse how the position, frequency and nature of domestic ballots affect European Parliament elections turnout since 1979. Our results indicate that the participation level is less affected by the timing of elections than by their overall frequency. The type of preceding election also matters, although not the second-order nature per se.

Riding the yellow wave: the online populist communication of Rassemblement National (RN) leaders in response to the Gilets Jaunes protests and the 2019 European elections

ABSTRACT Radical-right populist parties will often try to exploit and ride a wave of popular discontent for their own electoral gain. This paper studies the online populist communication of the leaders of the Rassemblement National (RN) in France in the context of the Gilets Jaunes (GJ) protests and the 2019 European election. It analyses the Twitter activity of these leaders to determine whether they temporarily softened their nativist and exclusionary stances to align their communications with the anti-elitist discourse of the protest movement. We explored this question by employing a quantitative text analysis using R Studio tools of their tweets over a 12-month period in combination with a more qualitative analysis of their output on this social media platform. We carried out tests on bigram frequency, network structure, as well as qualitative analysis of posts on the GJ protests and then compared this data with existing works on the GJ, to identify whether and how the RN adapted its social media discourse at strategic times in the election cycle to better suit the Gilets Jaunes’ demands and themes. The results provide support for the expectation of a strategic modification and moderation of exclusionary populist discourse online with both politicians returning to nativist themes after the European election campaign was over and the GJ mobilisation lost momentum. We therefore suggest that the change in output is part of a strategic moderation or ‘de-demonisation’ in order to gain a wider pool of potential voters and in particular those sympathetic to the protest movement.

Wie wichtig ist die europäische Integration für pro-europäische Wähler:innen in Zeiten der Politisierung?

AbstractThe increasing success of Eurosceptic parties and multiple European crises have fostered the politicization of European integration. However, we know little about how pro-European voters behave in this politicized environment. How important is European integration for pro-European voters? Do they care more about European integration when their vision of Europe is increasingly contested? The past 15 years have been characterized by persistent politicization of Eurosceptic parties and an increasing willingness of Europhile parties to engage with European topics. Moreover, European crises illustrated potential consequences of political disintegration. I expect these developments to be reflected in an increasing salience of European integration among pro-European voters. I derive salience estimates from spatial vote models encompassing four issue dimensions to track the development of salience. I use data from the European Social Survey, the European Election Studies, and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, which cover many EU member states between 2008 and 2019. The results show that the salience of the European integration issue is most pronounced among Eurosceptic voters, while it is less pronounced among pro-European voters. However, in countries with a successful Eurosceptic party, it is more likely that the European integration issue also matters to pro-European voters. Moreover, there has been an increasing trend over time that European integration is not only important for anti- but also for pro-European voters across Europe.

The differential impact of EU attitudes on voting behaviour in the European parliamentary elections 2019

ABSTRACT EU attitudes are multidimensional and likely to matter differentially for voting across different parties. The 2019 European Parliament (EP) elections offer a unique setting for testing the differential effects of multidimensional EU attitudes, as the election results entailed increased political fragmentation – with notable pro- and anti-EU party groups in the EP gaining strength. This article examines the importance of EU attitudes on electoral choice and zooms in on the influence of specific EU attitudes on party voting in EP elections (‘EU issue voting’). We use original survey data collected around the 2019 EP elections in ten EU member states, which include a fine-grained measurement of EU attitudes. We find evidence for EU issue voting in all countries, albeit not equally structured across countries. EU issue voting matters across all party groups with affective and performance evaluations having the strongest effects.

European Elections and Financial Markets: Navigating Political Winds and Market Reactions

Abstract A new wave of extreme right-wing political parties entered the European political scene both on the national levels and the European supra-governmental level sparking fears about the rule of law among investors and policymakers. The European Parliament’s elections scheduled for June 2024 are seen as a crucial turning point in the continent's political landscape. Using a mix of OLS regressions and event study, this paper analyzed how stock markets and bond markets reacted to European elections. The results show that the incumbent government's fiscal record appears to influence its re-election chances in developing countries and markets price weak fiscal balances around elections. The paper assessed how government bond markets reacted to the EP’s elections rounds of 2014 and 2019. These rounds of elections have been dominated by the political parties with cantered-orientated ideologies which may not be the case for the next round of elections in 2024. The results show how EP’s elections stabilized bond markets, especially in countries with weak macroeconomic fundamentals. The results emphasize the intricate relationship between fiscal policies, political events, and financial market behaviour. Investors, policymakers, and governments should consider these findings when assessing electoral and market dynamics, particularly in the context of the upcoming 2024 European Parliament elections.

2019 European Elections in Cyprus: An Empirical Exploration of Second-Order Election Effects and Europe Salience

Abstract By focusing on Cyprus’ constitutional and political system in light of the most recent European elections, this article explores and empirically analyses the second-order election theory and the European salience theory. The study applies these theories to identify key trends in Cypriot voters’ electoral behavior, including their attitudes toward European integration. The contribution starts with a brief preliminary section on the country’s historical background, geopolitical profile, and political landscape. It then provides insights on Cyprus’ electoral system, the political parties’ campaigns, and election results. The findings seek to unveil voter attitudes and political trends in Cyprus, feeding public discussion and academic dialogue on the issue in anticipation of the upcoming 2024 European election. The article aims to clarify the European South’s attitudes toward voting and what to expect in the upcoming 2024 elections, considering challenges, threats, and volatility.1

Nationalist environmentalism: can nationalism fuel climate action?

While nationalism and environmentalism have traditionally been viewed as conflicting ideologies, an increasing number of Western parties across the political spectrum are putting forward a discourse that justifies the green energy transition by emphasising its benefits in terms of the national interest, national security and the country’s economy. The discourse of “nationalist environmentalism” is one of the main ways European political leaders have advocated green policies since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and it is the result of a growing concern for climate change in an increasingly conflictive international context. However, although it can be a powerful rhetorical tool, this discourse has important limitations when it comes to addressing climate change, and it may prove unable to prevent the anti-environmental backlash that is expected at the European elections.

Review of Koller (2023): Voices of Supporters: Populist Parties, Social Media and the 2019 European Elections

Review of Koller (2023): Voices of Supporters: Populist Parties, Social Media and the 2019 European Elections

Az európai regionális integráció jövője. Kormányzási és elosztási dilemmák

The cornerstone of the global system, as well as the EU, is the principle of the sovereign equality of states. However, states are far from being equal. This paradox is one of the main obstacles to the smooth functioning of international organisations, including the EU. Sovereigntist critics of the EU pretend that national competencies are sacrificed in exchange for co-operation and joint governance at a larger scale. In reality, EU membership has widened the scope of member states’ sovereignty: they are better informed and can take part in decision-making at the European level. However, the EU’s decision-making power has weakened for two main reasons. First, EU competencies have been watered down: exclusive union competencies exist only in five sectors, in parallel with a large and growing number of mixed and shared competencies. As a result, EU decision-making tends towards intergovernmental methods, and consensus seeking opens the way for veto players. Second, after the end of the Cold War, in the 1990s, many new states were formed because of the dissolution of former federal structures. In place of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia 24 new states have taken form so far, 19 out of them Europeans, and the majority is attracted by the EU. The EU member states from the former eastern bloc which have Soviet-type political, economic, and social heritage, have ‘imported’ their unsolved – internal and external – conflicts into the EU. After the European elections in 2024 and the renewal of the European Parliament and the European Commission, those institution should undergo a ‘slimming diet’ and speed up decision-making by extending qualified majority voting. This is an absolute precondition of further enlargements.

The European Parliament as the voice of the European citizens? Examining the European Parliament’s role as a representative of the European citizens in the 2019 elections

The European Parliament is considered a solution to the democratic deficit because the citizens of the EU directly elect it. This article aims to examine the validity of this claim. Concerning representativeness, the focus is on the homogeneity of rules and procedures used for electing the members of the European Parliament (MEPs). This homogeneity is considered as necessary for the EP to represent the EU citizens. Thus, it aims to assess the impact of the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union on the level of homogeneity of the rules used to conduct the 2019 European Parliament elections. This work claims that the European Parliament's role as representative of European Citizens is weakened by the consistent level of heterogeneity characterising the electoral rules used to elect it and that the withdrawal of the UK and the partial redistribution of seats simultaneously increased and decreased the level of homogeneity of the rules used to elect the MEPs.

The stock market reaction to political and economic changes: the Spanish case

As other European countries, Spain has experienced a turmoil in which new political parties emerged with force after the global financial crisis in 2008. In this context, we analyze whether the empirical implications of the opportunistic and partisan theories, as well as the Uncertain Information Hypothesis, are met in the Spanish stock market, considering the size and the industry of the companies. The horizon of our study takes into account the seven general elections, 24 regional elections and 4 European elections held from 2002 to 2019, period in which Spain is fully integrated in the economic and monetary union and under the macroeconomic imbalance procedure. Our results do not support the opportunistic and partisan theories, or the Uncertain Information Hypothesis. Our evidence suggests that the short-term negative market reaction to the general elections is linked to the uncertainty with a change in the political sign of the incumbent. Besides, it is not related to size or industry characteristics.

A tale of multiple crises: Populist and non-populist narratives in European institutions from the Great Recession to the 2024 European elections

In the past decade, the strength of populist forces, especially those of the far right, has grown considerably in Europe, influencing European politics and modifying the composition of European institutions, and in particular the European Parliament. This essay posits that populist and non-populist narratives in EU institutions have evolved through the dynamics of polarization and reciprocal influence across multiple crises, from the start of the Great Recession in 2007 to the outbreak of war in Ukraine in 2022. Depending on the results of the upcoming 2024 European elections, and especially in the case of a successful outcome of far-right populist parties, there might be more radical changes in the dominant forces and discourses of EU institutions.

Election integrity across Europe: who thinks elections are held fairly and why?

Abstract If elections are to perform their legitimizing role, they should not only be objectively free, fair and non-fraudulent, but should also be perceived by the public as such. This paper investigates who perceives elections to be fair and why by contrasting two main logics: one based on the idea that perceptions of election integrity arise from external cues voters get from their environment and a second logic claiming that perceptions are internally created based on attitudes and beliefs. We use original survey data collected in ten countries around the European Elections 2019. We find that perceptions of election fairness are unrelated to country levels of integrity but mainly relate to voters’ status as winners/losers of the elections, attachment to the institutions they elect and populist attitudes. We also find beliefs on fake news influence to weakly mediate the relation between populist attitudes and perceptions of election fairness.

European Parliament Elections 2024: What Is at Stake?

European Parliament Elections 2024: What Is at Stake?

Farmer Protests and the 2024 European Parliament Elections

Farmer Protests and the 2024 European Parliament Elections

Contextual Sources of Euroscepticism in Eastern Central and Western Europe: The Role of Peripheral Regions

Abstract This paper examines how regional contextual factors influence Eurosceptic voting in Eastern Central and Western Europe. It employs a theoretical framework of multidimensional regional periphery and relative deprivation to explore how economic, spatial and demographic factors can generate collective feelings of deprivation among regional inhabitants. This relative deprivation is supposed to manifest as political discontent expressed at the EU level, either by attributing responsibility for regional peripherality to the EU or by blaming national institutions, potentially spilling over to the EU level. Based on an integrated dataset encompassing economic, spatial and demographic indicators as well as election data from the European election 2019 for 1169 NUTS 3 regions within the EU, the findings support the hypotheses. Poor economic performance in a region, relative to the national average and historical levels, increases Eurosceptic voting, and the impact of an ageing population is significant. Spatial infrastructure conditions have minimal direct but moderating effects: Eurosceptic parties benefit more from economic underperformance, if the infrastructure is also poorly developed. The paper further shows differences in cue -taking between Eastern Central Europe and Western Europe suggesting that citizens in Eastern Central Europe consider the EU more often as saviour than as creator of regional deprivation. The paper underscores the importance of regional contextual factors and infrastructural effects, and highlights the need to avoid one-size-fits-all explanations for Euroscepticism in Eastern Central and Western Europe.

Investing in European Public Goods While Maintaining Fiscal Discipline at Home

Abstract Putting the high public debt ratios on a downward path after the surge during the pandemic and allocating sufficient resources to deliver on the green and digital transition will be among the priorities confronting the EU institutions emerging from the June 2024 European elections. After a long and painful debate, EU institutions have agreed upon a new fiscal rulebook that aims to incentivise the reallocation of national public spending to the green and digital transition. However, the additional public investment is unlikely to suffice to comply with the goals of net zero that the EU has set for itself. In particular, investments of a transnational nature will remain undersupplied. This article proposes setting up a successor to NextGenerationEU – a new EU fund until 2030 for financing European public goods (EPGs) to address the double transition. Access to the facility would be conditional on adherence to the EU fiscal rules. By tying up the implementation of the new fiscal framework, the debate on the future of NextGenerationEU and the next multiannual EU budget post-2027, the credibility and internal consistency of these various instruments will be greatly enhanced.

The Far Right and the 2024 European Elections

The Far Right and the 2024 European Elections