European Collective Bargaining Research Articles

Varieties of organised decentralisation across sectors in Denmark: A company perspective

The decentralisation of European collective bargaining has been subject to much research and IR modelling. However, these studies mainly focus on the implications for national and sectoral bargaining institutions and rarely include a company perspective. Based on cross-sectional representative survey data among managers and shop stewards in Denmark, this paper offers a fresh perspective on the recent decentralisation process. We explore if company-based bargaining structures are in place and whether local social partners have utilised these bargaining opportunities across distinct sectors after decades of decentralisation. Analytically, we seek inspiration from Visser's (2016) distinct forms of organised decentralisation and combine these with insights from the broader literature on IR and institutional change. We find that bargaining practices and institutions at company level depend on a combination of provisions for company-based wage bargaining within individual sector agreements and strong union-affiliated workplace representation.

An Uncertain Future for EU-Level Collective Bargaining: The New Rules of the Game After EPSU

Abstract The General Court of the European Union (GCEU) in EPSU and Goudriaan vs. Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the subsequent appeal judgment reached an identical conclusion on a key aspect of the system of EU level collective bargaining. The Courts held that Article 155(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) does not impose any obligation on the European Commission to send a social partner agreement to the Council. This is in line with the Commission’s recent interpretation of Article 155(2) TFEU that subordinates the implementation of the European agreements to a positive assessment of their appropriateness. This article critically assesses the GCEU and CJEU rulings in EPSU and argues that they confirm a major break with the praxis of European collective bargaining that will have negative consequences for the social partners’ autonomy and role in the EU. In order to better understand this break, the article examines how and when the Commission changed its approach to European social dialogue, resulting in the new interpretation of Article 155(2) TFEU, and proposes a hypothesis to understand why. The article concludes by describing the consequences of the new reading of Article 155(2) TFEU for the idea of collective autonomy in EU law as well as for the practice of EU level social dialogue and collective bargaining.

Northern European collective wage bargaining in the face of major political-economic challenges: common and differing trajectories

We address developments in collective wage bargaining arrangements in northern Europe in the light of two major political-economic challenges: EU eastern enlargement and the financial and economic crisis which broke in 2008. Through the lens of debates on convergence and divergence, we examine three dimensions of collective wage bargaining: coordination across sectors; articulation between different levels; and regulation of wage floors. We draw on findings from five countries and four sectors. Our analysis undermines the proposition that developments exhibit a common liberalising trajectory. It points to the differential impact of the two major political-economic challenges as between sectors, highlights similar and different policy responses by actors within a sector across countries, reveals differing consequences for governance of collective wage bargaining across sectors and countries, and finds no uniform trend in wage inequality outcomes. L’examen des accords issus de la négociation collective sur les salaires en Europe du Nord est replacé dans le contexte de deux défis politico-économiques majeurs: l’élargissement de l’UE à l’Est et la crise financière et économique qui a éclaté en 2008. La question de l’existence d’une convergence ou d’une divergence est abordée selon trois dimensions de la négociation collective des salaires: la coordination entre les secteurs, l’articulation entre les différents niveaux et la réglementation des planchers salariaux. Nous nous appuyons sur les résultats obtenus dans cinq pays et quatre secteurs. Notre analyse remet en question l’idée selon laquelle les évolutions présentent une trajectoire commune de libéralisation. Elle souligne la différence d’impact, entre les secteurs, des deux principaux défis politico-économiques évoqués et met en lumière les similarités et les différences dans les réponses politiques apportées par les acteurs d’un secteur dans les différents pays. L’analyse montre également les conséquences différentes pour la gouvernance des négociations collectives salariales entre les secteurs et les pays, et ne relève aucune tendance uniforme dans les résultats en matière d’inégalité salariale. Wir befassen uns im vorliegenden Artikel mit der Ausgestaltung von Tarifverhandlungen in Nordeuropa vor dem Hintergrund zweier wichtiger politisch-wirtschaftlicher Herausforderungen: der Osterweiterung der EU und der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, die 2008 ihren Anfang nahm. Anhand der Debatten über Konvergenz und Divergenz untersuchen wir drei Dimensionen von Tarifverhandlungen: branchenübergreifende Koordinierung, Verständigung zwischen den unterschiedlichen Ebenen und Mindestlohnregelungen. Zu diesem Zweck haben wir Ergebnisse aus fünf Ländern und vier Sektoren ausgewertet. Unsere Analyse widerlegt die Annahme, dass alle Entwicklungen einem gemeinsamen Liberalisierungstrend folgen. Sie zeichnet die unterschiedlichen Auswirkungen der beiden großen politisch-wirtschaftlichen Herausforderungen in den einzelnen Sektoren nach; und beschreibt vergleichbare und unterschiedliche politische Antworten der Akteure eines Sektors in verschiedenen Ländern mit unterschiedlichen Folgen für die Gestaltung von Tarifverhandlungen in Sektoren und Ländern. Ein einheitlicher Trend bei der Entwicklung von Lohnungleichheiten ist nicht festzustellen.

Europäischer Tarifbericht des WSI – 2017 / 2018: Lohnentwicklung und Ungleichheitsdynamiken

WSI-Mitteilungen , Seite 401 - 412

Europäischer Tarifbericht des WSI – 2016/2017

The latest European Collective Bargaining Report of the WSI gives an overview of recent trends and wage developments in the European Union for the years 2016 and 2017. It analyses the development of collectively agreed and effective wages against the background of the general economic conditions in Europe. Despite a generally favourable economic environment and decreasing unemployment rates, wage growth has remained sluggish across most of Europe. To stabilise the economic recovery, not only the European trade unions, but more and more also the European institutions – among them, in particular, the European Central Bank – have argued in favour of more dynamic wage growth.

The Meaning of Extension for the Stability of Collective Bargaining in Europe

Although union densities have fallen markedly almost everywhere in Europe over recent decades, many European countries still have particularly high and stable levels of binding collective bargaining coverage. The main reason is State support for collective bargaining systems. A central feature of this is the instrument of the declaration of general applicability, which makes it possible to extend collective agreement coverage even to non-unionised workplaces. As these declarations are so important to the stability of European collective bargaining systems, it is particularly problematic that they are being called into question in many countries, as part of current anti-crisis strategies.Against this background, the objective of this policy brief is to: (1) briefly review the different forms, the spread and current practice of extension mechanisms across Europe; (2) discuss the relationship between extension mechanisms, collective bargaining coverage and union density; and finally (3) formulate political recommendations of how to ensure the future of multi-employer bargaining through extension procedures.

The trade union response to the European economic governance regime. Transnational mobilization and wage coordination

Since 2010 European economic governance has not only had an impact on the framework for collective bargaining but also, subsequently, on the power and legitimacy of the unions. European unions, under attack, are seeking to react through a relaunch of their earlier European initiatives in favour of a European coordination of national collective bargaining. They are also formulating a new demand for a European minimum wage. This article argues, however, that in order to achieve these euro-demands an additional step is needed: transnational social mobilization. On the basis of the 14N case (14 November 2012 general strike), it analyses how transnational social mobilization has been increasing in pace and intensity since the onset of the crisis. The article concludes on the crucial link between transnational mobilization and wage coordination. Both constitute the first steps in the process of Euro-unionism representative functions on the road towards a genuine European collective bargaining system, refounded above the institutionalized social dialogue process.

On the road to transnational cooperation? Results from a survey of European trade unions

Economic globalization and political developments within the EU have put pressure upon trade unions to engage in cross-border cooperation. The most realistic step in the foreseeable future is transnational coordination of collective bargaining, but the process is still very much in its infancy. We use a web and postal survey of a large number of European trade unions to illuminate their current practices and their preferences for the future. The most common activity is exchange of information on collective agreements, followed by collaboration in training programmes for union representatives, and such cross-border cooperation primarily involves unions in manufacturing. Support for European collective bargaining is far from overwhelming, and unions are clearly divided on the idea of statutory minimum wages: this has rather strong support in Spain and Germany, but very little in Scandinavia.

Focus: European wages and collective bargaining under pressue

Across Europe there is increasing direct political intervention into collective bargaining INTERNATIONAL union rights Page 17 Volume 20 Issue 4 2013 TORSTEN MÜLLER is Senior Researcher and MAGDALENA BERNACIAK is Researcher with the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) in Brussels the country-specific recommendations issued in the framework of the European Semester; since these recommendations were formulated for the first time in 2011 they have been applied to 12 EU Member States. The second being the bilateral agreements concluded by national governments either with the International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’) and the European Union (‘EU’) or with the European Commission, the European Central Bank (‘ECB’) and the IMF (collectively known as the Troika). In these ‘Memoranda of Understand-ing’, or ‘Stand-by Arrangements’, national governments commit themselves to carry out the required reforms in return for direct financial support. The third instrument involves the purchase of state bonds by the ECB in exchange for policy reforms. The formal distinctions among these three intervention instruments notwithstanding, the general policy intention remains the same, namely , the implementation of substantial labour market reforms. These, as a rule, include the demand for moderate wage developments and the decentralisation of the collective bargaining system. Decentralisation and dismantling of multiemployer collective bargaining Even though the current crisis has reinforced the decentralisation of wage-setting and collective bargaining institutions throughout Europe, this process was most pronounced in the countries subject to direct political intervention by the Troika and the IMF/EU. Figure 1 provides an overview of the procedural changes to the collective bargaining systems undertaken in these so-called ‘programme countries’ in return for financial support. Two of them, Romania and Ireland, saw a complete breakdown of national-level collective bargaining structures that had been in place before the crisis. In the case of Ireland, the employers withdrew from the social partnership agreement at the end of 2009, which after 22 years of crosssectoral wage coordination brought the return to company-level bargaining. In Romania, national cross-sectoral collective bargaining was abolished in 2011 by the Social Dialogue Act, implemented unilaterally by the government. Since at the same time the Act re-organised branch-level bargaining structures and introduced stricter criteria for the representativeness of social partner organisations as a precondition for negotiations, the bargaining process virtually came to a standstill. In effect, the collective bargaining coverage rate has gone down from 90 percent to an estimated 20 percent. In Greece, Portugal and Spain, sectoral bargaining structures have formally remained intact, but they have been hollowed out by legal T he neoliberal reform policies pursued by European and national policy-makers to come to terms with the crisis have far-reaching implications on collective bargaining throughout Europe – both in terms of bargaining outcomes and procedures. In a nutshell, their impact manifests itself in three ways: first, in the continuing pressure for moderate wage developments ; second, in the growing decentralisation of collective bargaining processes; and third, in the increasing direct political intervention into collective bargaining in order to ensure the effective implementation of the policies of wage moderation and decentralisation. Before we look at each of these processes in more detail, it is worthwhile to examine the role of wages within the reform policies. The policies of wage restraint and decentralisation of collective bargaining are part of the broader strategy of the IMF and the political elites in the EU to solve what they view as being first and foremost a debt and cost competitiveness crisis. As a consequence , their crisis management is heavily based on austerity policies which aim to reduce public expenditure and to consolidate state budgets, and on the pursuit of so-called ‘structural reforms’ designed to improve national competitiveness. In both approaches, wages play a crucial role as an adjustment variable. In the case of austerity policy , cuts and freezes of public sector wages, alongside the abolition or reduction of fringe benefits for public sector employees, have been part and parcel of governments’ efforts to reduce public spending. The neoliberal structural reforms in the field of collective bargaining are based on the assumption that macroeconomic imbalances between surplus and deficit countries are attributable primarily to differing developments of wages and unit wage costs...

Focus: European wages and collective bargaining under pressue

Focus: European wages and collective bargaining under pressue

Europäischer Tarifbericht des WSI – 2012/2013

WSI-Mitteilungen , Seite 588 - 597

Between Local Interests and International Solidarity: Negotiating Restructuring at General Motors Europe

At no other firm has transnational worker cooperation been taken further than at General Motors Europe. Worker representatives engaged in European wide mobilization, strikes, and collective bargaining, with the aim of “sharing the pain” of concessions and preventing plant closures. We argue that this is a case of identity work, a deliberate shift in the ideational underpinnings of union strategy, orchestrated by the European Works Council. While trade union strategy was subject to the reshaping of interests due to the objective facts of corporate restructuring, it was also subject to an additional subjective and internal political process of identity work.

Autonomy in European Social Dialogue

This paper examines the meaning of 'autonomy' in European social dialogue, starting from the definition of social dialogue as adopted by the Commission and the social partners in various ways. In addition, the paper considers the applicability of collective autonomy parameters - as traditionally developed by labour law and industrial relations theory - especially after the amendments made by the Lisbon Treaty. Finally, the paper explores social dialogue as a governance model using the conceptual perspective of political science. The analysis leads to two main arguments: first, autonomy should be seen as a primarily procedural matter, related to the implementation of European collective bargaining outputs rather than to a real independence from institutions in managing negotiations. Second, autonomous agreements should be recognized as having relevance for the European legal system, even though defined as soft-law sources. In this regard, a comparison with the open method of coordination adds further meaning to autonomy in the context of European social dialogue.

European Level Collective Bargaining: A New Phase?

After virtually two decades on the side lines, European level collective bargaining is back on the industrial relations agenda. To a large extent, the resurgence ofthis notion can be attributed to the impact of the EC's 1992 programme on European economic and political life. This article examines whether any significant changes or new developments will result from this increase in interest in European collective bargaining. The article suggests that there are two main dimensions to European level collective bargaining: the vertical dimension which covers attempts to get greater collaboration and dialogue between European trade unions and employers inside the institutional framework of the European Community; the horizontal dimension which includes developments at the enterprise and market levels aimed at promoting trade union /employer contact outside the confines of the nation state.

Autonomous Collective Agreements as a Regulatory Device in European Labour Law: How to Read Article 139 EC

This article discusses whether European social partners can derive the competence to autonomously devise European collective labour agreements from Article 139 EC (equals Article III-212 Constitution of Europe). Placing the question in the context of discussions of EU governance and private lawmaking in general, the author starts with a comparative overview of legal conceptions for collective labour agreements in Europe, focusing on three Member States` orders where their effects are not or only partly regulated by state legislation. Based on this comparison, she analyses Article 139(2) and offers a new interpretation of its provisions concerning autonomous implementation of European social partner agreements. She concludes that European social partners do have the competence to agree on a basic agreement stating the rules for European collective bargaining autonomously.

The Right to Bargain Collectively: an International Perspective on its Extent and Relevance

Abstract: It is generally assumed that collective bargaining is a ‘good thing’, a worthwhile goal to be pursued in itself that provides benefits in both the economic and political areas. The aim of this paper is to look more closely at limitations to the right to bargain collectively in various countries and to define more clearly the role it can play, as well as its relevance as a generally applicable concept. After an attempt to provide a definition of collective bargaining, that is often missing in discussions, the paper examines the following points: the limited scope of collective bargaining as a process among others, the limited role assigned to it by many legal systems, and the obstacles that it may constitute to National Economic Policy. Moreover, the transformations in the process and substance of collective bargaining, that weaken its impact, are discussed, as well as ideological obstacles that stand in its way. Finally, the specific case of developing countries is considered. In conclusion, doubts are raised about whether the prospects for European collective bargaining are really as promising as was once thought.

European Collective Bargaining, New Prospects or Much Ado about Little?

This paper deals with the prospects for European collective bargaining. The major changes that occurred during the two last decases on that matter are reviewed. Though these changes have a new steps towards the building of a social dialogue at the European level, numerous obstacles remain before achieving actual true European collective bargaining. The nature of these obstacles is described in detail. In particular, the paper focuses on the role and impact of European Works Councils and illustrates the analysis through original empirical work and case studies.

Review article. European collective bargaining in an age of blockades

Review article. European collective bargaining in an age of blockades

Constructing European Collective Bargaining

Most students of European integration expect that organized labour and business are not likely to develop collective bargaining at the EU level. By analysing the interactions between the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE) since Maastricht, this article challenges this reigning pessimistic view about the prospects for building European collective bargaining. The article's analysis of the emerging collective bargaining practices and relations at the EU level supports Bercusson's prediction of the development of collective 'bargaining in the shadow of law' after Maastricht. It also shows that unlike the dominant view, the labour side is not necessarily underprivileged vis-a-vis the employer side at the EU level, as witnessed in the European Works Council (EWC) case. I also try to make some strategic suggestions for the further development of European collective bargaining, particularly with regard to pay in the context of European Monetary Union (EMU).

“Collective bargaining with the euro” Resolution adopted by the 3rd EMF collective bargaining conference, Frankfurt, 9/10 December 1998

In recent months European trade union organisations have been making progress in the field of europeanisation of industrial relations and coordination of wage policies in particular. The recent policy developed by the European Metalworkers’ Federation aims at coordinating the national-level collective bargaining in this sector. A coordinated bargaining policy should play a major role in intensifying and reinforcing the social dimension of European unity. The EMF is aware that wage bargaining in the EMU will be exposed to the pressures of greater competition with the risk of a downward spiral in wage undercutting and its objective in this respect is to counter the employers’ view of a European economic area with a common currency but with a wage policy fragmented at company, regional and national levels. The resolution adopted at the 3rd European collective bargaining conference in Frankfurt on 9 and 10 December 1998 states that the key point of reference for a coordinated wage policy must be to offset the rate of inflation and to ensure that workers’ incomes retain a balanced participation in productivity gains. The EMF also supports the initiatives regarding regional and bilateral bargaining “cross-linking” and the exchange of collective bargaining observers. Earlier, in July 1998, the EMF adopted a Charter on Working Time establishing common European standards in order to guarantee that working time does not become a subject for European competition. The EMF reconfirmed its commitment to a 35-hour working week, with a 1750 hours maximum normal annual actual working time as a target for bargaining at national level and an annual 100-hour ceiling on paid overtime.