Moral Rationalism Research Articles

Motivated Reasoning and Research Ethics Guidelines

ABSTRACTThe creation of guidelines has long been a popular means of conveying normative requirements in scientific and medical research. The recent case of He Jiankui, whose research flouted both widely accepted ethical standards and a set of field‐specific guidelines he co‐authored, raises the question of whether guidelines are an effective means of preventing misconduct. This article advances the theory that guidelines can facilitate moral rationalization, a form of motivated reasoning. Moral rationalization in research occurs when individuals justify their actions with plausible reasons that cohere with their moral standards. This allows them to act as they want while believing in their own goodness. If guidelines facilitate moral rationalization, this has implications for research ethics training and for the work of applied ethicists. Research ethics training ought to incorporate reflection on conative features of reasoning, including incentives to commit misconduct, and applied ethicists ought to be circumspect about their use of ethics guidelines. Otherwise, they are feeding the fire of rationalization with the cognitive material practitioners need to accomplish their desired ends.

The Correlation among Religion and Work in the Philosophy of German Idealism

The philosophy that built by German Idealism is obtained and never neglected religion, this is not about the religious dogmas or the fantasy and legendary nature of religion, but it is about the spirit and the crux of religion. Nevertheless, there is always struggled to deprive it from fantasies and rebuilt by philosophical ideas. These ideal philosophers are asserted to reconstruct the stories and imaginary schemes of religion into philosophical and rational thinking. There is a change in the result of this process which is religion is retreated and the metaphysics is slightly appeared. In other word, this change is directed from revelation to metaphysical views.
 In the light of this, the German Idealism is taking two different ways toward religion: the negative direction; which is involved to the critical studies of the basis and construction of religion, and the positive direction; this direction is returned to religion, but this return is happened after reconstruct religion by the critical and rational process. The relation between religion and ethics is one of the subjects that represent this division toward religion. For instance, if we read Kant, Fichte and Schelling, regardless some details and differences between them, and regardless the stages of developing their philosophies, in the general, their philosophy not tried too much to approve the existence of God in the rational way, and they asserted that it is impossible to approve God’s existence in the rational way. That is why in the basic moral is independent and ties to ration not religion.
 The ethical values are absolute, they legitimate themselves by themselves, and they are not legitimated by the transcendental power out of them. The bad is bad, and the good is good, that is why morality became the first foundation for religion, and the true religion is the one is compatible with rational morality. Even, morality is not complete by itself, because it needs motivations and goals, these motivations and goals are not existing inside the morality itself, just God can provide these motivations and goals to make morality complete. God can make human be a moral creature, in return, God reaches human to the endless happiness. To gain this endless happiness which is not available in this life, it requires soul immortality. Form this point, the God and soul immortality which is not approved by ration, the morality make them a logical and obligation necessity.

New Perspectives on Ethics in Islam [whole issue

Complete volume, containing all articles CONTENTS Introduction: Feriel Bouhafa, Towards New Perspectives on Ethics in Islam: Casuistry, Contingency, and Ambiguity I. Islamic Philosophy and Theology Feriel Bouhafa, The Dialectics of Ethics: Moral Ontology and Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy Frank Griffel, The Place of Virtue Ethics within the Post-Classical Discourse on ḥikma: Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s al-Nafs wa-l-rūḥ wa-sharḥ quwāhumā Ayman Shihadeh, Psychology and Ethical Epistemology: An Ashʿarī Debate with Muʿtazilī Ethical Realism, 11th-12th C. Hannah C. Erlwein, The Moral Obligation to Worship God Alone: Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Analysis in the Tafsīr Anna Ayse Akasoy, Philosophy in the Narrative Mode: Alexander the Great as an Ethical Character from Roman to Medieval Islamicate Literature II. Islamic Jurisprudence Ziad Bou Akl, From Norm Evaluation to Norm Construction: The Metaethical Origin of al-Ghazālī’s Radical Infallibilism Felicitas Opwis, The Ethical Turn in Legal Analogy: Imbuing the Ratio Legis with Maṣlaḥa Robert Gleave, Moral Assessments and Legal Categories: The Relationship between Rational Ethics and Revealed Law in Post-Classical Imāmī Shīʿī Legal Theory Omar Farahat, Moral Value and Commercial Gain: Three Classical Islamic Approaches III Hadith, Quran, and Adab Mutaz al-Khatib, Consult Your Heart: The Self as a Source of Moral Judgment Tareq Moqbel, “As Time Grows Older, the Qurʾān Grows Younger”: The Ethical Function of Ambiguity in Qurʾānic Narratives Enass Khansa, Can Reading Animate Justice? A Conversation from Alf Layla wa-Layla (The Thousand and One Nights) Nuha AlShaar, The Interplay of Religion and Philosophy in al-Tawḥīdī’s Political Thought and Practical Ethics William Ryle Hodges, Muḥammad ʿAbduh’s Notion of Political Adab: Ethics as a Virtue of Modern Citizenship in Late 19th Century Khedival Egypt

On the Economic Constitution of Old Testament Religion: A Critique of Buchanan’s Understanding of Religious Moral Precepts

ABSTRACT When discussing social contract, James Buchanan distinguished two approaches for generating order and cooperation in society: A religiously inspired moral precepts approach, which he dismissed; and constitutional economics, which he favored. He associated the former with the irrational: spiritual, non-secular, pre-modern—theological—concept; whereas the latter set out in his understanding enlightened, modern and rational social contract, which he followed up in institutional economic terms. The paper casts doubt on this strict separation of religion from economics. It argues the thesis that Old Testament religion portrays, in addition to a spiritual dimension, a rational economic one also. The paper proposes a concept of “rational religion” that traces, in substance and nature, institutional economics into Old Testament-based religion. This contests the boundaries between economics and religion. Further implications result regarding the philosophical foundations of Buchanan: i.e. the Enlightenment’s agenda of separating the ancient/ pre-modern from the modern; or indeed, traditional religion from rational ethics and science. The paper challenges such dualistic opposites that have separated religion from economics for so long.

Notes on Contributors

Notes on Contributors

Tarihsel ve Çağdaş Yönleriyle Heterodoks Dinî Bir Kimlik Olarak Deizm

Deism from the beginning has positioned itself as a heterodox religious identity contrary to orthodoxy. In this regard, it is the review of established classical theological presuppositions regarding the following headings: conception of God; God-world relationship; religion-science relationship; ethical considerations regarding the problem of evil, etc. In these contexts, deism could be seen as a sort of religious self-criticism. As arose in British philosophical-theological circles, deism sounds to have resisted some conventional Christian presuppositions as put forward by E. Herbert of Cherbury, the father of English deism, in the forthcoming articles: “There is a supreme God. This sovereign deity should be worshipped. Virtue arises from the piety created by this worship. As the man is filled with wickedness, he needs repentance, which means communication with this sovereign Being. There is reward or punishment in the life to come.” In the course of time, different kinds of deisms turned up, ranging from accepting God as a sublime creator alone and rejecting revelation, i.e., institutional religion, to those accepting religion on the condition that it should be compatible with reason. Samuel Clarke mentions the arguments of different kinds of deists and skillfully criticizes them. Historical and contemporary deism have the following in common: “The compromise between truth of revelation and truth of reason; saving knowledge versus saving faith; rejection of institutional structures; glorification of reason and human nature; ethical rationality.” With this doctrinal backdrop, hot debates on deism in Turkey have recently gotten new dimensions. Figures showing the rise of deism in recent years under an Islamist political rule makes the case all the more thought-provoking. The visibility of religion in the public sphere has increased, and the rate of religiosity would also be expected to increase. However, the result is quite the opposite. There is a widespread and remarkable secularization in conservative circles. After they got the political power and economic welfare, which enabled them to attain worldly glory, they have gradually left religious glory behind and glorified profanity. In this case, deism seems to take the form of secularized orthodoxy. Deists in Turkey, rather than rejecting revealed religion they want it to be compatible with reason, to demythologize it from supernatural narratives, and to find a way of getting rid of fanatical elements in the religion. They want to replace religious institutional authority with the authority of reason, which rests itself on innate ideas and a priori truths. They claim ethical rationality, which means ethical truths are accessible through reasoning. My study tackles some statistical data specifically signifying why youngsters tend to claim to be deists. Some surveys among high school students have been included in the study and due evaluations have been made. It seems sectarian identities, radical voices, authoritative religious language, blockades to freedom of speech, a dichotomy between religious and scientific facts in the curricula and mythological religious language are among the reasons counted by the youngster to reject conventional religion and embrace deism. The mainstream theological tradition of Islam is quite familiar with deistic claims. The discussions on deism will finally bring the enlightened minds together with the reasonable religious line.

Dialektika Legalitas Hak Asasi Manusia dan Rasionalisme Moral

<p>Human rights are basic rights or basic rights that humans are born with as a gift from God Almighty. These human rights form the basis of other rights and obligations. As is known, in addition to human rights, there are human obligations that should receive attention first in their implementation in our social life. We must fulfill our obligations first, then demand rights.<br />In an individualistic society, there is a tendency for excessive prosecution of the implementation of these human rights, even though the implementation of human rights cannot be demanded absolutely because the prosecution of the implementation of human rights means violating the same human rights of other people.<br />For example, print and television news reporters often use argumentation in finding or interviewing artists who have personal problems, these reporters dig and interview artists down to the most personal issues in the artist's life, and if the artist refuses or is angry, the answer is: the journalist is carrying out his journalistic duties and they demand that their human rights be fulfilled or obeyed so that the artist must tell his problem. Here it can be seen that on the journalist's side, he demands that his human rights be fulfilled, on the other hand, it can be seen that the artist's human rights are trampled on by the journalists, which means that the artist's human rights are violated by the journalists.<br />The question is: Where is the legality of human rights and moral rationalism???</p>

Too far beyond the call of duty: moral rationalism and weighing reasons

The standard account of supererogation holds that Liv is not morally required to jump on a grenade, thereby sacrificing her life, to save the lives of five soldiers. Many proponents defend the standard account by appealing to moral rationalism about requirement. These same proponents hold that Bernie is morally permitted to jump on a grenade, thereby sacrificing his life, to spare someone a mild burn. I argue that this position is unstable, at least as moral rationalism is ordinarily defended. The proponent of the standard account of supererogation must either reject moral rationalism or endorse that Bernie is morally required to remain in safety. Along the way, this paper brings together three neglected topics: going *too far* beyond the call of duty, moral rationalism about *permission*, and how to weigh reasons when some reasons have a different proportion of justifying and requiring weight than others.

The Ideas of Russian Slavophiles and Occidentalists as Reflected in Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s Discourse on Freedom

When developing ideological concepts and creating literary characters, Dostoyevsky drew from, among others, the ideas of the then most important trends in the Russian thought: Slavophilic and Occidental, as refl ected, among other examples, in his discourse on freedom. The condemnation of certain aspects of Western European civilization, present in the writer’s work – often articulated by the Slavophiles – expresses his aversion to negative freedom and excessive individualism, which undercut the roots of the social organism. Dostoyevsky’s affi nity with the Slavophiles is also refl ected in his positive attitude towards the Russian people and fascination with the unspoiled Christianity and community which they preserved. The formation of Dostoyevsky’s views was also infl uenced by the Occidentalists. The need to maintain the personality ideal, as the Occidentalists understood it, was extremely important to him. The writer glorifi ed the values that cemented the Orthodox community, without negating the knowledge and experience gained in the course of the 200-year Europeanization of the upper classes of the Russian society. He considered Occidentalism to be a phenomenon “leaning towards” specifi c social realities from which it drew its strength. The writer envisaged a harmonious coexistence of freedom and love, their unity. In his opinion, this unity could not be an expression of excess, egoism, pride, moral and moral promiscuity, exaggerated individualism and rationalism. He equated genuine freedom with commitment to God and to the well-being of the humankind.

Moral rationalism on the brain

I draw on neurobiological evidence to defend the rationalist thesis that moral judgments are essentially dependent on reasoning, not emotions (conceived as distinct from inference). The neuroscience reveals that moral cognition arises from domain‐general capacities in the brain for inferring, in particular, the consequences of an agent's action, the agent's intent, and the rules or norms relevant to the context. Although these capacities entangle inference and affect, blurring the reason/emotion dichotomy does not preferentially support sentimentalism. The argument requires careful consideration of the empirical evidence (from neuroimaging to psychopathology) and philosophical analysis of the commitments of rationalism versus sentimentalism in ethics.

Moral Epistemology and the Revision of Divine Law in Islam

Abstract This essay explores the relationship between moral epistemology and legal theory in Islamic thought. Reviewing selected works of Khomeini, Maududi, and Qutb, I show that Islamism, drawing upon certain currents of Muslim intellectual tradition, presupposes a rejection of moral rationalism and on that basis opposes the permanent alteration of explicit divine injunctions. Next, I argue that the unwillingness of ‘Abduh, Iqbal, and Soroush to articulate a consistent moral rationalism prevents these reformists from offering a tenable theoretical alternative to Islamist legalism. I subsequently consider the moral epistemology of classical Mu‘tazili scholar ‘Abd al-Jabbar in order to show how a robust moral rationalism justifies the prudential revision of divine law. On that basis, I suggest that moral rationalism is the necessary epistemic basis of any legal theory that stands as a clear alternative to Islamism while still remaining grounded in the most fundamental tenets of Muslim piety.

A Rationalist Critique of Sally Gadow’s Relational Nursing Ethics

The ethic of care proposed by Carol Gilligan in late twentieth century instantly elicited a wide range of adaptations and elaborations in numerous disciplines, under the banner of ‘relational ethics’. Sally Gadow’s ‘relational narrative’ is one of these adaptations. Like Gilligan, Gadow aims to dismantle ethical rationalism or universalism, wherein the foregoing mainstream nursing practice had purportedly focused on applying existing philosophical theories of ethics to all conceivable clinical situations. For Gadow, every moral engagement, such as that between a nursing professional and a patient, comes with inherent unique features that render impotent any attempt at universalisation. Each clinical encounter is rather defined by the ability of the professional to engage the client in an intimate, caring relationship that enables healing to take place. Against this backdrop, this paper argues that the theory of Relational Narrative, particularly as conceptualised and articulated by Sally Gadow, cannot be carried through without making some rationalist assumptions, because professionalism in nursing practice is by definition, a deeply embedded ingredient of rational reflection. Furthermore, nursing professionals can make progress or impact only by having recourse to the code of ethics; also, direct application of Gadow’s theory puts the nurse in a dilemma when it comes to dealing with patients suffering from chronic contagious diseases, such as the Ebola or the coronavirus disease (COVID-19). Finally, juxtaposing Gadow’s work with the ideas of the earlier scholars she criticises unsparingly, the paper found that traces of universalist, rationalist assumptions abound in her thought precisely because of the wealth of influence she has garnered from philosophers and psychologists; influences going as far back as Descartes and Kant, down to Rawls and Kohlberg. The data used for this study came from library and archival materials, as well as from internet resources.

The Desirability of Legal Rights for Novel Beings.

The debate around whether novel beings should be legally recognized as legitimate rights holders is one that has produced a vast amount of commentary. This paper contributes to this discourse by shifting the normative focus of moral rights away from criteria possessed by the novel beings in question, and back toward the criterion upon which we ourselves are able to make legitimate rights claims. It draws heavily on the moral writing of Alan Gewirth's identification of noumenal agency as the source of all legitimate rights claims. Taking Gewirthian ethical rationalism as providing a universally applicable hypothetical imperative which binds all agents to comply with its requirements, the paper argues that it is at least morally desirable that any legal system should recognize the moral rights claims of all agents as equally legitimate. By extension, it is at least morally desirable that the status of legal personhood should be granted by a legal system to all novel beings who are noumenal agents, insofar as this status is necessary for rights' legal recognition. Having established the desirability of this extension, the paper closes with an examination of recent cases involving both biological and nonbiological novel beings in order to assess their conformity with the desirable approach outlined above. The paper demonstrates that such recognition is conceptually possible, thus requiring us to move beyond the current anthropocentricity of legal systems and recognize the legitimate moral claim for legal personhood for all novel beings who possess noumenal agency.

Mothers’ responsibility as transmitters of gendered moral rationalities: working-class Palestinian mothers living in Israel

Gendered moral rationalities (GMRs) have been proposed as a means of grounding mothers’ employment-related choices in the structural, policy, and social support contexts of their maternal routines. This article analyzes a form of GMR that is anchored in the class-ethno-national position of mothers and comprises a manifestation of their maternal responsibility toward their daughters’ futures. By focusing on this form of parenting among working-class parents, we are bridging a gap in the scholarship, which has overlooked the salience of the intergenerational transmission of GMRs. Based on the analysis of semistructured interviews with 20 working-class Palestinian mothers living in poverty in Israel, we found that their responsibility for their daughters’ future reflects both the struggle to resist early marriage and prioritize education and the struggle to encourage a model of market citizenship. These struggles reshape mothers’ own GMRs and their attempts to transmit these values to their daughters.

Contextualization of the Classic Moral Sentimentalism

Moral sentimentalism can be defined as the philosophical theory according to which emotions are the source of our value judgements, in general, and of our moral judgements, in particular. It follows that, from a historical and conceptual point of view, moral sentimentalism has emerged and developed in opposition to moral rationalism, according to which reason allows us to formulate and understand value judgments from a psychological point of view and is also the source of our axiological knowledge from an epistemic point of view. In this article we present the theoretical issues related to the sentimentalist approach to morality and evaluative judgments, starting from the diverse theories of the classical representatives of sentimentalism, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume and Smith, and especially the three theses they defended: psychological perspective, the theory of moral sense and the theory of moral feelings. I also argue that the first moral sentimentalism emerged from the confrontation of three distinct aporia: the first aporia refers to the conceptualization of emotions and emotional states; the second deals with the possibility of axiological knowledge; and the third refers to the nature and existence of values. Finally, we are interested in the birth of sentimentalism in order to highlight a series of difficulties inherent in this theoretical approach and which we find today in contemporary moral sentimentalism. The aim is to highlight the conceptual and argumentative tensions that were at the heart of sentimentalism at its emergence.

We stand by our brand: Consumers’ post-food safety crisis purchase intention and moral reasoning

Despite the abundant evidence on the adverse effects of a food safety crisis on consumers, surprisingly little research has been conducted to explain the importance of consumers who are forgiving of failure. Drawing on a social intuitionist model, this study first tests the assumption that there is a distinction between the food safety crises vs. nonfood product crises from the moral psychology perspective. The results show that a food safety crisis evokes consumers’ stronger immorality judgment than a nonfood product crisis through disgust feeling. Then, the main study investigates the role of brand identification (affective-hot) and brand attitude strength (cognitive-cold) on the moral reasoning processes, including moral rationalization and moral decoupling. Results show that brand identification is an important indicator of both moral rationalization and moral decoupling strategies, while brand attitude strength only affects the moral decoupling, thus influencing consumers’ purchase intention.

Impacts of sport consumers’ time perspectives and negative moral emotions on moral reasoning strategies toward sport organization’s misconduct

Purpose Drawing on Socioemotional Selectivity Theory, the present research aims to investigate how sport consumers’ moral reasoning strategies and forgiveness intent toward a sport organization’s misconduct depending on the consumers’ different time perspectives(expansive vs. limited). Methods An experimental study (total n = 129; Baby Boomer generation = 62, generation MZ = 67) was conducted by utilizing a fictitious scenario depicting a sport organization’s misconduct. The proposed hypotheses were tested by conducting T-test, correction analysis, and multiple regression analysis using SPSS 21.0. Results There were significant differences in moral reasoning and forgiveness based on different time perspective. Baby Boomer(MZ) group showed higher(lower) levels of moral rationalization, moral decoupling, and intent of forgiveness compared to MZ(Baby Bommer) group, while showing lower(higher) level of moral coupling. A result also revealed that negative moral emotions had moderating effect between a limited time perspective and moral coupling among MZ participants. Conclusion The results of this study indicated that sport consumers’ time perspective has a predictive function on moral reasoning strategies. Thus, it is necessary for sport organizations to establish strategies focusing on the consumers’ time perspective to effectively respond to an unexpected crisis.

The concept of rationality in the sociology of Max Weber and its impact on modern social sciences

The paper analyzes Max Weber’s concepts of rationality and rationalization as components of modernization processes in modern society. The author reconstructs Weber’s interpretation of “spiritual factors” of social development, which emerge in the ethos of Protestantism. The research demonstrates how Weber’s study of capitalism in terms of rationality corresponds with concepts of other classics of German sociology, such as Ferdinand Tönnies, Werner Sombart, Georg Simmel and others. The article emphasizes the relevance of Weber’s sociology for XX— XXI centuries and how its basic concepts and methodological approaches have been further developed by scholars, including Ukrainian ones. Weber’s concept of rationality is applicable not only to the mental-epistemological sphere, it also acquires a social meaning. This approach has gained recognition in phenomenological sociology, theory of social systems, communicative theory and more. In addition to the formal rationality of the economy, modern social sciences use such concepts as social, aesthetic, ethical, environmental, and practical rationality. Weber’s “diagnosis of the age” is still a component of the “diagnosis” of modern society. The gap between values and interests remains an integral feature of the “risks and threats society” in the XXI century. This situation is especially evident in international relations, when “real politics” (Realpolitik), based on interests, becomes insensitive to “value postulates”. The author also discovers ways of value (moral and ethical) reclamation of modern society, particularly in the concepts of “ethical economy”, universalist ethics of discourse, global ethos and more. Keywords: purposive rationality, rationality (formal, material, communicative, systemic), value, ethos.

Which Ethics for Essex? Elizabeth Gaskell, Salem Witchcraft, and the Problem of Forgiveness

Abstract Hawthorne notwithstanding, the nineteenth-century literary response to the Salem witch hunt was not unilaterally unforgiving. There was an equally dominant response of compassion and forgiveness. A moral rationalization of resentment, Elizabeth Gaskell’s Lois the Witch articulates this debate and anticipates contemporary questions about the efficacy of forgiving crimes against humanity.

How Consumers Justify Their Unethical Behavior: The Role of Moral Recognition Strategies (Moral Rationalization, and Decoupling), Complemented by Culture, on the Purchase of Counterfeits in Pakistan

Moral recognition, is defined as a person’s description of a condition as ethical dilemma. However, people will not always interpret situations as ethical problems in the same way with the same force under all circumstances. The literature suggests that when two conditions of acceptance of ethics (moral rationalization and decoupling) are met, people will define the situation as a ethical problem differently. In the moral system, people use it to turn immoral acts into less immoral acts. Therefore, it allows them to violate ethical standards while maintaining a certain standard of conduct such as buying counterfeit goods because of their low prices. Here, consumers are more likely to make a profit by rearranging their actions for less ethical, which means seeking appropriate ethical reasons (including ethical justification, non-professional language, beneficial comparisons, migration of responsibilities, distribution of responsibility, distortion of results, prosecution; (Bandura et al., 1996), to coordinate adjustments and conditions, and to reach a judgment. Moral decoupling is defined as a psychological process chosen to prevent misconduct, in which one separates the judgment of performance from judgments of morality (Bhattacharjee et al., 2013). When people use this strategy, they focus on social benefits (e.g., image, use of status, etc.) as well as economic benefits (e.g., visual fashion content, physical appearance, performance, scarcity, etc. Chen et. al. (2018) linked these two strategies in an empirical assessment to explore the effect of dimensions of moral recognition (moral rationalization and moral decoupling) on counterfeit purchases mediated by moral judgment and perceived benefits respectively. We modified the Chen model with the complementary effect of materialistic culture in this relationship. We argue that moral recognition firstly affects counterfeit purchase (CP) through Moral rationalization, and then through moral judgment in a two-step mediation. Secondly, through moral decoupling and further through perceived benefits. Thirdly, directly affecting CP complemented by materialistic culture as a moderator. Empirical validity was established by conducting a survey employing a close-ended questionnaire. Data was collected from 230 consumers and analyzed using confirmatory factor analysis and structured equation modeling. The results suggested that moral recognition seems to limit purchase intention (PI) directly. Similarly, it neutralizes to Moral Rationalization (MR), and Decoupling (MD) behaviors. Moreover, MR tends to positively affect PI both directly, and well as indirectly through moral judgment (MJ). Similarly, MD also has a direct and positive effect on PI, as well as perceived benefits (PB), however, PB and PI relationship was not substantiated. Hence, MR seems to negatively affect PI through MD, as well as through MR and MJ as a first and second-order mediator. Lastly, materialism seems to promote the counterfeit purchase, at the same time positively complement the effect of MR on PI, in a way that MR would have a more pronounced effect on PI in case of the higher materialistic consumer.