Psychological Essentialism Research Articles

Ameliorative projects, psychological essentialism, and the power of nouns

Ameliorative projects design and propagate new linguistic content for some expressions we use for political or social justice purposes. These projects are often driven by an anti‐essentialist agenda: they aim to debunk the idea that social categories such as “woman”, “man”, or “race” are constituted by natural essences. But critics argue that nouns tend to trigger essentialist thinking. And because ameliorative projects typically retain nouns, it is argued that these projects cannot achieve their anti‐essentialist goals. In response, I argue that the psychological effects of noun use tend to support, rather than hinder, the anti‐essentialist goals of ameliorators.

Essentials of Occupational Health Psychology

Essentials of Occupational Health Psychology

Metaphors They Kill by: Dehumanization of Palestinians by Israeli Officials and Sympathizers

Within the cognitive paradigm, metaphors are said to play a key role “not just in language but in thought and action” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: p. 3). As a form of action, genocide in recent human history has been incited by metaphor, with Holocaust Jews as “parasites” (Musolff 2010), Iraqis as “rapists” (Lakoff 1991), Rwandan Tutsis as “cockroaches” (Hintjens 1999; Mowarin 2014), Bosnians as “Islamic fundamentalists” (Karčić 2022), etc. The aim of the present study is to investigate the ongoing genocide committed by Israel against the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip by bringing political ideology to bear on cognition both in thought and action (Gibbs 2017). In particular, it will be shown that the conceptual metaphor politics is religion (Charteris-Black 2004) in the Christian Zionists’ in-group’s socio-cultural cognition, acts in tandem with and motivates the “animalized dehumanization” (Sevillano and Fiske 2023) of Palestinians. Such an ideology, which is tainted by psychological essentialism (Leyens et al. 2001) of the Jews supremacy, is instrumentalizing the deliberate, superordinate conceptual metaphor (Steen 2023) humans are animals and other basic-level metaphors such as Palestinians are rats, ants and cockroaches, therefore stripping the Palestinian outgroup of their humanity (Leyens et al. 2000; Leyens et al. 2003; Haslam 23.2.2024, 2006; Haslam, Loughnan and Sun 2011; Harris and Fiske 2011) in order to legitimize the Palestinian genocide. Animalized dehumanization, which is a blue print for genocide, will be accounted for using Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980, 1999) Conceptual Theory of Metaphor together with Lakoff and Turner’s (1989) Great Chain of Being Metaphor.

Self or Non-Self? Self-Essentialism and Well-Being in Tibetan Buddhist Monks

In monastic Tibetan Buddhists, we explored the psychological construct of self-essentialism, looking at links to satisfaction with life and meaning in life. We selected this population due to their deep commitment to teachings that emphasize the notion of “non-self.” We further explored the role of self-construal in the association between self-essentialism and psychological well-being. Finally, we explored how differences between the formal learning stages in Tibetan Buddhism affected our outcome variables. Replicating findings with other samples, there was small positive endorsement of self-essentialism, and a positive association between psychological essentialism and psychological well-being in this Tibetan Buddhist sample. Those on the highest learning stage in Tibetan Buddhism indicated greater self-essentialism, satisfaction with life, and search for life-meaning compared with the other stages. Interdependent self-construal moderated the association of self-essentialism with satisfaction with life. Contextualizing these findings within Tibetan Buddhist doctrine, it appears that Tibetan Buddhist monks utilize self-essentialism to clearly identify their path from the self toward “non-self.”

More than just changeability: Specific factors are used to explain the changeability of personality traits.

Implicit theories and psychological essentialism are valuable frameworks used to model how changeable many traits are perceived to be. These frameworks, however, characterise changeability as a broad and generalised construct and do not fully capture the nuance and specificity involved in personality changeability. We therefore sought to deconstruct implicit theories about changeability into underlying more specific aspects of changeability. We measured how changeable people theorise personality traits to be according to three underlying specific factors: volitional control, context and age. We investigated how specific implicit theories about changeability vary across different personality traits. We show that two personality traits (agreeableness and conscientiousness) are linked to dissociable patterns of specific factors used to explain how changeable they are. These findings yield new insight into the way people explain why personality traits are changeable and demonstrate that different types of reasons are used to explain the changeability of agreeableness and conscientiousness.

Natural origins of social essentialism: Ethnic groups, identities, and cultural transmission

This paper argues that the term ‘social essence’ is overused in psychological research and includes instances that are not covered by the basic definition of an essentialist cognition with living beings. Imagining an essence of living beings is conceptualized as a meta-cognition that wraps up an exemplars' characteristics as a marker and assigns it a kind or species. This paper develops a framework of how social essentialism can be conceptualised to originate in natural contexts. Ethnic groups maintain a group identity that is defined by a set of diacritical markers and secured by a rule of endogamy, which functionally replicates the procreative pattern in animal species. This ‘functional homological’ relationship construes a group identity in the image of animal kinds. Thus construed, an ethnic identity appears as a natural given that safeguards the group’s cohesion and stability across generations. Hence, group-related essentialism primarily serves identity formation and provides a cognitive mechanism to distinguish the ingroup from outgroups. The intuition of an essentialised identity is perpetuated across generations by bio-social processes of enculturation. Such processes can explain an historically stable group essentialism, as well as group-biased judgements in former and contemporary societies without the need for innate sources of psychological essentialism.

Social-cognitive biases underlying the development of ableism.

Disabled people are the largest minority group in the world. Like members of many minority groups, they face considerable prejudice and discrimination-known as ableism. Ableism reflects entrenched beliefs about what human bodies and minds should be like and a devaluation of individuals who deviate from that ideal. There is surprisingly little psychological science about ableism, and even less about its development. This chapter considers how social-cognitive biases evident in early childhood could contribute to its development. The chapter is structured around four biases: Prescriptive reasoning, promiscuous teleology, psychological essentialism, and the positivity bias. For each bias, we review foundational research about how it manifests in early childhood, speculate about its connection to ableism, and outline avenues for additional research. Understanding how social-cognitive biases contribute to the development of ableism is an important first step in efforts to equip children (and adults) with the tools to reject it.

What makes us “we”? The positivity bias in essentialist beliefs about group attributes

Psychological essentialism refers to the tendency to view entities as having enduring properties that make them what they are (i.e., essences). Emerging research suggests people possess a positivity bias in essentialism (PBE), a preference to view positively (vs. negatively) evaluated attributes as the essences of an entity. Four experiments (total N = 1020) tested group attributes' association (ingroup vs. outgroup) as a boundary condition of PBE. We expected PBE to be stronger for ingroup than for outgroup and this difference to be accentuated by (a) identity centrality and (b) self-uncertainty. In Studies 1–3, we asked participants to generate one positive attribute and one negative attribute for ingroup and outgroup respectively and measured PBE. PBE was found to be stronger for ingroup attributes and was even reversed for outgroup attributes. Identity centrality, but not self-uncertainty, accentuated this effect. In the pre-registered Study 4, we asked participants to generate as many attributes as possible and replicated the main findings. Moreover, we found differences in PBE, along with intergroup affect, prospectively accounted for intergroup cooperative intentions. The findings suggest that essentialist beliefs about attributes are constrained by collective self-enhancement and have unique implications in intergroup contexts.

Essential shape: The role of essentialist beliefs in preferences for misshapen produce

Understanding the reasons behind consumer rejection of misshapen produce is important because of its dramatic consequences on food waste. Drawing on psychological essentialism, we conduct seven studies to investigate the role of produce shape-related essentialist beliefs (i.e., the belief that produce shape is determined by an underlying and unobservable essence) in consumers’ evaluations of misshapen produce. Our findings show that essentialist beliefs about produce shape are divided into four distinct dimensions (i.e., biological basis, discreteness, informativeness, and immutability). We find that endorsing discreteness beliefs decreases preferences for misshapen produce. Immutability beliefs produce the opposite effect, whereas informativeness and biological basis have little to no effect. These effects operate through typicality judgments. These findings suggest that considering essentialist beliefs have the potential to help enhance the acceptance of edible albeit misshapen produce.

When Essence is Lost: The Consequences of Commercialization in Historical Towns

With the progress of tourism commercialization, historical towns are becoming more accessible and vulnerable than ever before. Drawing on psychological essentialism theory, in this research, a theoretical framework for understanding the consequences of commercialization is developed and tested. Through one field survey and three experimental studies, we reveal that commercialization has a negative effect on tourist preference (attitude and visit intention) for historical towns and that this negative effect is mediated by perceived essence loss. Furthermore, our moderating analysis reveals that the detrimental effect of commercialization can vary by development mechanism (e.g., exogenous mode or endogenous mode) and individual characteristics (e.g., nostalgia-proneness).

Causal vs. Conceptual Heterogeneity: Reply to Turner

Professor Turner’s reply to my article focuses on the ways in which set-theoretic analysis can be used to help solve problems of causal heterogeneity in social science research. By contrast, I discuss the ways in which set-theoretic analysis can be used to help solve problems of conceptual heterogeneity. I identify conceptual heterogeneity as a ubiquitous problem that is disguised by psychological essentialism. The seriousness of this problem must be recognized for scholars to appreciate the advantages of constructivist set-theoretic analysis for the social sciences.

Constructivist Set-Theoretic Analysis: An Alternative to Essentialist Social Science

Psychological essentialism is a cognitive bias through which human beings conceive the entities around them as having inner essences and basic natures. Social scientists routinely generate flawed inferences because their methods require the truth of psychological essentialism. This article develops set-theoretic analysis as a scientific-constructivist approach that overcomes the bias of psychological essentialism. With this approach, the “sets” of set-theoretic analysis are mental phenomena that establish boundaries and identify similarities and differences among entities whose natural kind composition is not known. The approach is illustrated through a consideration of research on intelligence, race, and poverty in the United States.

Is Identity Essentialism a Fundamental Feature of Human Cognition?

The present research examines whether identity essentialism, an important component of psychological essentialism, is a fundamental feature of human cognition. Across three studies (Ntotal = 1723), we report evidence that essentialist intuitions about the identity of kinds are culturally dependent, demographically variable, and easily malleable. The first study considered essentialist intuitions in 10 different countries spread across four continents. Participants were presented with two scenarios meant to elicit essentialist intuitions. Their answers suggest that essentialist intuitions vary dramatically across cultures. Furthermore, these intuitions were found to vary with gender, education, and across eliciting stimuli. The second study further examined whether essentialist intuitions are stable across different kinds of eliciting stimuli. Participants were presented with two different scenarios meant to elicit essentialist intuitions-the "discovery" and "transformation" scenarios. Their answers suggest that the nature of the eliciting stimuli influences whether or not people report essentialist intuitions. Finally, the third study demonstrates that essentialist intuitions are susceptible to framing effects. Keeping the eliciting stimulus (i.e., the scenario) constant, we show that the formulation of the question eliciting a judgment influences whether or not people have essentialist intuitions. Implications of these findings for identity essentialism and psychological essentialism, in general, are discussed.

On the Complexity of Literary and Popular Fiction

Research findings in cognitive literary studies show that lifetime exposure to literary versus popular fiction has a differential association with social cognition processes such as psychological essentialism, attributional complexity, and, particularly, with Theory of Mind. Experimental findings further show that brief exposure to literary, but not popular fiction, boosts performance on Theory of Mind. These results are interpreted as stemming from the greater complexity of the characters and plots of literary fiction; a claim that is consistent with evidence that readers view literary fiction characters as more complex than popular fiction characters. Here we focus on style, and test whether said differential complexity finds a parallel in the language of these two types of fiction. Results of Natural Language Processing analyses on a corpus of literary and popular fiction texts confirm that literary fiction has greater lexical and syntax complexity than popular fiction.

Soul, Myth and Cosmovision in a Changing World: Essentials of Analytical Psychology and the Descendent Path.

This essay addresses the key role of analytical psychology amid our changing world: to work towards an expansion of Humanity's worldview. In current times of utmost transformation, it becomes imperative that we embrace a total cosmovision, one that includes the 360 degrees of existence: not only the 180 diurnal degrees of ascent, light and order, yet also the descendent sphere, incorporating what is unconscious, nocturnal and mysterious. Integrating this lower realm in our psychic life, however, contrasts our Western worldview, in which these two domains are seemingly opposed and mutually excluding. Mythopoetic language, and the mythologems that manifest in different myths, provide the means of delving into the profound paradoxes at the core of the total cosmovision. Myths such as Añañuca (Chile), Osiris (Egypt), Dionysus (Greece) and Innana (Sumer), highlight the descending path, providing a symbolic narrative of an archetypical transformation or spin, a key moment of "turning on its own axis" that merges the realms of Life and Death, ascent and descent, birth and decay. To live this paradoxical and generative path of transformation, individuals must seek their personal myth not outside but within themselves, where springs the Suprasense.

Investigating the efficacy of prescribed labeling practices: Conceptualizing persons with disabilities

Advocates for the use of specific labels to describe persons with disabilities presume that these labels fundamentally shape lay conceptions of persons with disabilities, and are thus critical targets for intervention. In two studies ( N = 285) we test this presumption, by presenting participants with descriptions of persons with disabilities that use either person-first labels or condition-first labels; disability diagnoses were either made at birth or during the teenage years. For each description, participants judged how essential (consistent, deeply-rooted, broadly-ramifying) physical, sensory, or cognitive disability symptoms (Study 1) or diagnoses (Study 2) are to that person. Across both studies, participants judged disabilities to be equally essential to persons regardless of how they were labeled; this was robust whether diagnoses were made earlier or later in life. Although there may be other points of influence, these labels, which are primary targets of advocacy groups, do not seem to influence psychological essentialism of disabilities.

Freedom and Agency in The Second Sex

Freedom and Agency in <i>The Second Sex</i>

Award for Distinguished Scientific Contributions: Susan A. Gelman.

The Awards for Distinguished Scientific Contributions are presented to persons who, in the opinion of the Committee on Scientific Awards, have made distinguished theoretical or empirical contributions to basic research in psychology. The 2022 recipients of the APA Distinguished Scientific Contribution Awards were recognized by the 2021 Board of Scientific Affairs and selected by the 2021 Committee on Scientific Awards. For her scientific exploration of the interface of language, thought, and culture and the developing mind. Susan Gelman developed one of the main theories of conceptual development, psychological essentialism, that explains how children come to understand categories. She has increased attention to the effects of generic language on people's inferences and beliefs. Her work identifies fundamental psychological questions and provides rigorous, comprehensive, and compelling answers. Dr. Gelman's theoretical advances engage researchers from fields as diverse as psychology, biology, anthropology, linguistics, and philosophy to move forward the boundaries of our understanding of the human mind and how it develops. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Are we Teleologically Essentialist?

People may conceptualize certain categories as held together by a category-specific "essence"-some unobservable, critical feature that causes the external features of a category to emerge. But what is the nature of this essence? Recently, Rose and Nichols have argued that something's essence is fundamentally its telos or purpose. However, Neufeld has challenged this work on theoretical grounds, arguing that these effects arise only because people infer an underlying internal change when reasoning about a change in telos. In Neufeld's view, it is the underlying internal cause, and not the telos itself, that serves as an essence (consistent with classic views of scientific essentialism). Here, we ask: Is teleology the primary force behind psychological essentialism? We begin by successfully replicating Rose and Nichols' key findings in support of teleological essentialism. In two further experiments, however, we demonstrate that teleology may not be the central way that people understand the essences of living things. We show that internal changes matter at least as much as changes in teleology. These findings suggest that while teleology may be one important cue to category membership and the essences of living things, it may be premature to say that we are "teleologically essentialist."

Biogeographic ancestry information facilitates genetic racial essentialism: Consequences for race‐based judgments

AbstractDirect‐to‐consumer genetic ancestry tests measure biogeographic ancestry (BGA), which refers to an individual's ancestral origin in relation to major population groups. There is growing concern that biogeographic information exaggerates both false beliefs about racial genetic differences and, ultimately, racial bias. Across three studies (N = 1317), we find that biogeographic information impacts racial categorization and beliefs about both genetic racial essentialism (i.e., the extent to which people believe that race is genetically derived) and biological race differences. Specifically, we find people are more likely to categorize Black/White biracial targets as Black and believe that a target is more biologically different from White people (e.g., has thicker skin) as the target's percent sub‐Saharan African biogeographic ancestry (ABGA) increases (Studies 1 and 2). We also find that people misrepresent BGA as “race genes,” such that they perceive Black/White biracial targets with more ABGA as sharing more genes with Black people, which then predicts greater Black racial categorization of the target and increased beliefs that the target is susceptible to certain physical and mental illnesses (Study 2). Notably, BGA remains a predictor of these outcomes even when people know the target's specific racial ancestry, that is, their exact number of Black grandparents (Study 2). Finally, we find that exposing people to the idea that race is genetically derived, compared to biologically derived, exaggerates beliefs that genes determine both human life (genetic essentialism) and racial categories (genetic racial essentialism; Study 3). We discuss implications for studying psychological essentialism, racial bias, and racial health disparities.