Epistemic Resources Research Articles

The Institutional Preconditions of Epistemic Justice

ABSTRACT This paper proposes four comprehensive institutional measures for countering epistemic injustice. Driven by the distinction between transactional and structural injustice, we argue that approaches which call for individual virtue overlook the social inequalities that reproduce unjust epistemic relationships. The task of remedying epistemic injustice, therefore, falls upon institutions. First, we review recent empirical research to show why the virtue theoretical model fails to address even transactional instances of epistemic injustice. We then argue that, due to unequal access to education, seemingly justified ascriptions of trust can entrench differential epistemic development. We have limited our proposal to four measures that shield vulnerable groups against injustice and improve the epistemic environment. Institutional epistemic justice demands that, first, all groups enjoy fair and equal access to education and the opportunity to acquire the socially recognized markers of credibility. Second, epistemic justice requires that marginalized groups have access to the relevant public platforms, such as politics and journalism, for voicing their social perspectives. Third, fair access to public positions can aid vulnerable groups in attaining rewarding careers, publicly affirming their epistemic resources, and rupturing the cycle of epistemic disadvantage. As our fourth and final measure, we propose institutional mechanisms for eliminating identity markers from formal epistemic exchanges.

Bioinformational diplomacy: Global health emergencies, data sharing and sequential life

Global health emergencies – like COVID-19 – pose major and recurring threats in the 21st century. Now societies can be better protected against such harrowing outbreaks by analysing the detailed genetic sequence data of new pathogens. Why, then, is this valuable epistemic resource frequently withheld by stakeholders – hamstringing the international response and potentially putting lives at risk? This article initiates the social scientific study of bioinformational diplomacy, that is, the emerging field of tensions, sensitivities, practices and enabling instruments surrounding the timely international exchange of bioinformation about global health emergencies. The article genealogically locates this nascent field at the intersection of molecularised life, informationalised biology and securitised health. It investigates the deeper political, economic and scientific problematisations that are engendering this burgeoning field. It finally analyses the emergent international instruments developed by governments, scientists and industry to facilitate more rapid global sharing of bioinformation through novel practices of data passporting. Overall, the in-depth study of bioinformational diplomacy reveals just how deeply, and even constitutively, international relations are entangled with the life sciences – by carefully tracing how laboratory practices of sequencing life at molecular scale also end up recontouring the play of sovereignty, power and security in international relations.

Rethinking Epistemic Appropriation

AbstractEmmalon Davis has offered an insightful analysis of an under-theorized form of epistemic oppression calledepistemic appropriation.This occurs when an epistemic resource developed within marginalized situatedness gains inter-communal uptake, but the author of the epistemic resource is unacknowledged. In this paper, I argue that Davis's definition of epistemic appropriation is not exhaustive. In particular, she misses out on explaining cases of epistemic appropriation in which an intra-communal epistemic resource isobscuredthrough inter-communal uptake. Being attentive to this form of epistemic appropriation allows us to identify unique forms of epistemic oppression that emerge as a result of socially maintained active ignorance.

On the politics of discomfort

This article engages the politics of discomfort as a critical but neglected dimension of feminist methodologies and research praxis. Discomfort is explored as a ‘sweaty concept’ that opens space for transformative praxis and the emergence of feminist forms of knowing, being and resisting. I theorise discomfort as an epistemic and interpretive resource and a lively actant in research encounters, fieldwork and analytic and theory-praxis spaces. Building on the work of Clare Hemmings and Sara Ahmed, I trace discomfort as an affective intensity that matters for opening up resistant and anti-colonial feminist research practices and modes of knowledge production. Starting, and staying, with discomfortis theorised as a form of resistance to the reiteration of comfortable and normative truths and ‘wilful ignorances’. Weaving together the work of postqualitative and postcolonial feminist theorists, the sticky praxis of discomfort is conceptualised as involving a number of research strategies, including: (1) engaging with ‘gut feelings’ and (2) embracing interpretive hesitancy. In moving beyond an idealisation of empathy as the central affective principle underlying feminist research praxis, this article explores the epistemic and political salience of discomfort as affective intensity, ‘sweaty concept’ and potentially transformative interpretive resource.

Begging the Question Against a Peer?

A dialectical conception of justification helps conciliationists about peer disagreement establish the symmetry considerations on which their account is premised. On this conception, appeals to personal or hidden forms of evidence fail to provide a symmetry breaker that would allow one to dismiss a conflicting peer opinion. Furthermore, the act of citing the same evidence repetitively tends to illegitimately beg the question against the peer, no matter how accurate one’s own overall assessment of this evidence. However, the dialectical conception of justification does not automatically vindicate conciliationism. In many of the most interesting cases of peer disagreement there are vast bodies of dialectically sharable evidence that can ultimately provide enough non-question-begging epistemic resources to settle the dispute, even if appealing to those resources violates the independence requirement—a further premise of conciliationism. Absent modifications to the independence requirement, it would therefore be premature to embrace conciliationism.

Inventive Factfinders: Investigative Journalism as Professional Self-representation, Marker of Identity and Boundary Work

ABSTRACT This study explores the boundaries of investigative journalism by examining how investigative journalists compete to construct, reiterate and challenge acceptable epistemic practices. Departing from the notion that investigative methods are fixed tools and tactics, the paper argues that methods also serve as relational skills and epistemic resources in the struggle for identity and recognition within the field of journalism. By conducting a qualitative textual analysis of 44 method reports submitted to the annual Norwegian investigative journalism award (SKUP) in 2018, both the transformative and normative aspects of the investigative epistemology are examined. The findings suggest that the investigative method can be conceptualized as a continuum of intertwining epistemic practices whose distribution and emphasis are context dependent. Within these contexts, some identity markers emerge as more contingent than others. The study contributes to two streams of scholarship by deploying the concept of boundary work within the field of journalism, and by reassessing the epistemology of investigative journalism as an object of ongoing negotiations.

Collaborative work on an online platform in video-mediated homework support

This study concerns the interactional work involved in the accomplishment of video-mediated homework support and is based on a single case analysis of an instructional encounter between a tutor and an upper-secondary student working together on mathematical assignments. In addition to communicating through video, the participants use an online digital platform that constitutes a shared workspace and interface between the participants, who are situated in geographically disparate locations. A crucial feature of the setting is the unequal distribution of epistemically rich artefacts, such as the maths book, to which the tutee has sole access. Drawing on ethnomethodology and multimodal interaction analysis, the analyses show how the interaction is shaped by and contingent upon the affordances of the online platform and the particular circumstances of the video-mediated setting. The findings reveal how the participants work together to establish shared points of reference from which they embark on collaborative problem-solving trajectories while establishing the problem to be worked upon and its interpretation, as well as negotiating proper presentations of solutions. Additionally, the way in which the participants overcome the interactional and epistemic challenges implicated by the unequal access to crucial epistemic resources is shown.

Using students’ epistemic uncertainty as a pedagogical resource to develop knowledge in argumentation

ABSTRACT This longitudinal case study explores how students’ epistemic uncertainty in argumentation can be adapted as a resource to develop knowledge in a fifth-grade classroom. Major data sources include 12 videotaped whole-class discussions focused on group presentation of arguments to obtain peers’ critiques across two course units, the ecosystem and the human body systems, over a 16-week period. Grounded in a qualitative, interpretative approach, the results show that when students' epistemic uncertainty was leveraged as a resource, students were able to construct a more coherent and consistent knowledge system by integrating their prior and target scientific knowledge. We argue that to effectively use students’ epistemic uncertainty as a pedagogical resource in managing uncertainty, teachers need to consider the status of students’ knowledge of the target concept, if they are aware of uncertainty, and how uncertainty is resolved through critique that leads to knowledge construction. As students had opportunities to practice managing uncertainty, they developed skills necessary to attend to each other’s utterances and use them as collaborative epistemic resources to develop, with their peers, acceptable knowledge. Conceptualising argumentation as an enterprise to manage uncertainty can help instructors to design a productive and authentic environment to facilitate the learning of science.

Integrated Care Systems as an Arena for the Emergence of New Forms of Epistemic Injustice

Epistemic injustice has rapidly become a powerful tool for analysis of otherwise hidden social harms. Yet empirical research into how resistance to knowing and understanding can be generated and replicated in social programmes is limited. We have identified a range of subtle and not-so-subtle inflections of epistemic injustice as they play out in an intervention for people with chronic depression in receipt of disability benefits. This article describes the different ‘species’ of epistemic injustice observed and reveals how these are unintentionally produced at frontline, management, commissioning and policy levels. Most notably, there remains a privileging of clinical knowledge over other forms of knowledge, producing a ‘pathocentric epistemic complex’. This, combined with the failure of different agencies with competing ideologies to adequately understand each other, and a vicious policy context, added to the injustices already faced by people with mental health issues, generating multiple harms. This has important implications for a range of integrated care and welfare interventions – not least by drawing attention to their unintended potential for replicating epistemic injustice as an institutionalised complex. Careful evaluation and design of such programmes, applying the philosophical and epistemic resources illustrated here, can help mitigate this outcome. Further, by raising awareness of epistemic injustice among programme participants, we can generate epistemic structures that secure programme integrity locally, and promote better policy.

Epistemic injustice and deepened disagreement

Sometimes ordinary disagreements become deep as a result of epistemic injustice. The paper explores a hitherto unnoticed connection between two phenomena that have received ample attention in recent social epistemology: deep disagreement and epistemic injustice. When (pre-existing) epistemic injustice comes into play in a regular disagreement, this can lead to higher-order disagreement about what counts as evidence concerning the original disagreement, which deepens the disagreement. After considering a common definition of deep disagreement, it is proposed that the depth of disagreements is best understood as a matter of degree. Then, a case study of real-life disagreement is introduced: the disagreement about whether racism is a significant issue in the Netherlands, illustrated by the tradition of ‘Black Pete’. It is argued that there is disagreement about what counts as evidence in the case study because of two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. Specifically, there is disagreement about (the application of) epistemic principles concerning (A) whether private first-personal experience of racism is a weighty source of evidence in this domain, (B) whether victims of racism count as important testifiers in this domain, and (C) how to assess testimony that is not (fully) intelligible to you because it employs concepts and terminology you are unfamiliar with. By dismissing the relevant testimony and epistemic resources, the disagreement boils down to disagreement on the level of epistemic principles concerning (A), (B), and (C). Introducing injustice-based deep disagreement highlights moral and political aspects of disagreements that might seem factual.

Epistemic Decolonization as Overcoming the Hermeneutical Injustice of Eurocentrism

This paper is broadly concerned with the question of what epistemic decolonization might involve. It is divided into two parts. The first part begins by explaining the specifically epistemic problem to which calls for epistemic decolonization respond. I suggest that calls for decolonization are motivated by a perceived epistemic crisis consisting in the inadequacy of the dominant Eurocentric paradigm to properly theorize our modern world. I then discuss two general proposals, radical and moderate, for what epistemic decolonization might involve. In the second part, I argue that the inadequacy of Eurocentric epistemic resources constitutes a hermeneutical injustice caused by an irreducible form of epistemic oppression. I then argue that addressing this form of epistemic oppression requires thinking ‘outside’ of the Eurocentric paradigm because the paradigm might fail to reveal and address the epistemic oppression sustaining it. This lends further plausibility to the radical proposal that epistemic decolonization must involve thinking from ‘outside’ the Eurocentric paradigm, but also accommodates the moderate proposal that adopting critical perspectives on Eurocentric thought is an important part of epistemic decolonization.

Knowledge, evidence, expertise? The epistemics of experience in contemporary healthcare

This paper explores how personal experience acquires the status of knowledge and/or evidence in contemporary healthcare contexts that emphasise being both patient-centred and evidence-based. Drawing on a comparative analysis of three case studies – self-help and mutual aid groups; online patient activism; and patient feedback in healthcare service delivery – we foreground: a) the role that different technologies and temporalities play in how experience is turned (or fails to be turned) into knowledge or evidence; b) the role that experts-of-experience, in addition to the more frequently referenced experts-by-experience, play in mediating how, when and why experience is turned into an epistemic resource; and finally, c) how the need to be ‘evidence-based’ remains a persistent, yet at times productive, challenge to how patient and user experiences are incorporated in contemporary healthcare policy and practice. Throughout the paper, we argue that it is necessary to look at both democratic and epistemic imperatives for including patient and service users in healthcare services and policymaking based on their experience.

Why ‘normal’ feels so bad: violence and vaginal examinations during labour – a (feminist) phenomenology

In this article, I argue that many women lack the epistemic resources that would allow them to recognise the practice of vaginal examinations during childbirth as violent or as unnecessary and potentially declinable. I address vaginal examinations during childbirth as a special case of obstetric violence, in which women frequently lack the epistemic resources necessary to recognise the practice as violent not only because of the inherent difficulty of recognising violence that happens in an ‘essentially benevolent’ setting such as the medical one, but also, and mainly, due to the pervasive sexual reification of women under patriarchy and the pervasive shame to which women are subjected. My argument is that the practice of vaginal examinations is indeed experienced – bodily apprehended – as violent by many women, but that full epistemic recognition of this violence is frequently obstructed because the experience perfectly coincides with the normal phenomenological situation of women within patriarchy and thus cannot really be framed as violent. A phenomenological analysis presenting the embodied experience of women under patriarchy as always already essentially tied to sexual availability and commodification, and to shame, will explain this epistemological impairment. A phenomenological take on Judith Butler’s distinction between ‘recognition’ and ‘apprehension’ informs my analysis: I deploy it to provide a richer, more nuanced response to the question of why vaginal examinations are not fully recognised and expressed as violent – even when they are, frequently, apprehended as such. Furthermore, Butler’s ideas about the epistemic ‘framings’ through which we make sense of different kinds of lives (grievable versus ungrievable) will help me to explain how the patriarchal sexual reification of women in fact already frames sexual violence as not-violence – which ultimately also prevents labouring women (and obstetrics staff) from recognising vaginal examinations during labour as violence.

Ethics and Global Governance of Human Germline Genome Editing: The Problem of Techno-Scientific Colonialist Paternalism.

I want to enrich the debate about the ethics and governance of human germline editing (HGE) by emphasizing an underappreciated, yet important, set of concerns regarding exclusionary practices, norms, and efforts that impede a broader discussion about the subject. The possibility for establishing a binding, global, regulatory framework is influenced by economic and geopolitical factors as well as historical processes and sociopolitical problems, such as anti-scientific social movements and the politicization of science. Likewise, it is influenced by different understanding, epistemic resources, and goals between the CRISPR/genome editing community and the rest of society. In this Perspective, I explain the concept of "techno-scientific colonialist paternalism" and why it negatively affects our discussion around HGE. I also discuss the pitfalls of scientific self-regulation, and finally, I advocate that the implementation of HGE should cease to allow time and care for a thoughtful global discussion to emerge.

The Critical Situation

Academic writing is the art of writing down what you know for the purpose of discussing it with other knowledgeable people. In so far as students and scholars approach it in these terms, they often tend to focus on the role of knowledge. Students imagine that they must demonstrate what they know to their examiners (who know more than they do) and scholars imagine that they must communicate what they know to their colleagues (who don’t yet know their results). This is completely understandable since knowledge is at the core of academic work, but both scholars and students sometimes lose sight of the discussion. They think of the discourse as a performance rather than a conversation. In this paper, therefore, I will explore the formation of academic discourse and the building of academic competence in terms of the rhetorical situation (not just the epistemic resources) of academic readers and writers. 
 This shift of focus has some important implications. Academic writing is not merely the communication of ideas or the transmission of facts; much more importantly, it is the exposure of ideas to criticism. The academic writer is not interested in “ideas worth spreading,” to invoke the famous slogan of TED talk, but in ideas worth testing. To sharpen the point, we might say that academic writers are always writing for people who are qualified to tell them that they are wrong. As writing consultants and information specialists, we help scholars and students face this situation squarely.

Climate change in sociology: Still silent or resonating?

Since Lever-Tracy’s call for stronger sociological engagement with climate change in 2008, the number of climate-related contributions to leading sociological journals has increased. Yet, they still represent a small percentage of contributions overall. Reviewing the 37 articles published in eight top-ranked sociology journals until 2018, the authors of the present article identify five main subfields of research: (a) reflections on the role of the social sciences, (b) politics, (c) economy and consumption, (d) media and public perceptions, and (e) global flows. They conclude that the rise in contributions since 2008 indicates that climate change creates some resonance in the disciplinary core of mainstream sociology but that most sociological climate change research is undertaken and published in inter- and transdisciplinary spaces beyond the boundaries of the discipline. Emphasizing that climate change research can provide important epistemic resources for the discipline, the authors argue that sociology would benefit from being more responsive to it.

On Gaslighting and Epistemic Injustice: Editor's Introduction

Social justice demands that we attend carefully to the epistemic terrains we inhabit as well as to the epistemic resources we summon to make our lived experiences tangible to one another. Not all epistemic terrains are hospitable—colonial projects landscaped a good portion of our epistemic terrain long before present generations moved across it. There is no shared epistemicterra firma,no level epistemic common ground where knowers share credibility and where a diversity of hermeneutical resources play together happily. Knowers engage one another on a politically saturated,unlevel knowing fieldwhere members of dominant groups work to forcibly maintain their epistemic home-terrain advantage. I use the metaphor of the unlevel knowing field to capture these oppressive epistemic structures. The unlevel knowing field is a hungry place where all knowledge that fails to nurture and sustain dominant ways knowing risks being dragged onto the dominator's epistemic home turf to be mined, coopted, consumed, or destroyed. Knowledge and willful ignorance circulate with equal vigor in this hungry world. From the standpoint of oppressed/resisting peoples, the unlevel knowing field is a minefield, an epistemic twilight zone, which must be traversed with considerable care and endless attention. The harms epistemic injustice produces are not disembodied harms. Repeated acts of injustice (epistemic or otherwise) weather our bodies, dull our minds, weaken our hearts, and traumatize the spirit of our communities. They create public-health precarities and invite mental, emotional, physical, and spiritual illness into our being. Epistemic oppression is a cruel thief. It is disorienting, exhausting, and deadly. It triggers anger, anxiety, depression, and resistance. It steals our time, energy, and attention away from more beautiful things.

A substructural epistemic resource logic: theory and modelling applications

AbstractWe present a substructural epistemic logic, based on Boolean BI, in which the epistemic modalities are parametrized on agents’ local resources. The new modalities can be seen as generalizations of the usual epistemic modalities. The logic combines Boolean BI’s resource semantics—we introduce BI and its resource semantics at some length—with epistemic agency. We illustrate the use of the logic in systems modelling by discussing some examples about access control, including semaphores, using resource tokens. We also give a labelled tableaux calculus and establish soundness and completeness with respect to the resource semantics.

Interactional and epistemic challenges in students’ help-seeking in sessions of mathematical homework support: presenting the problem

ABSTRACT This article concerns students’ help-seeking in one particular educational setting in Sweden, namely mathematical homework support. It presents in-depth analyses of video-recorded instances of interactions using multimodal conversation analysis. By exploring how tutors and students with no prior interactional history collaboratively establish an agreement upon what constitutes the student’s problem, the study sheds light on the problem presentation and its interactional and epistemic challenges and pitfalls. The results of the study demonstrate the sequential pattern of help-seeking interactions and the crucial role of objects, such as notepads, as epistemic resources for determining the student’s problem. It moreover shows how students put their (mis)understandings on display using verbal, embodied and material resources to describe their problem-solving efforts. Finally, it shows how epistemic framings of the help request are of consequence, in which responsibility for the problem presentation may be transferred from student to tutor.

Disagreement in discipline-building processes

Successful instances of interdisciplinary collaboration can eventually enter a process of disciplinarisation. This article analyses one of those instances: agent-based computational social science, an emerging disciplinary field articulated around the use of computational models to study social phenomena. The discussion centres on how, in knowledge transfer dynamics from traditional disciplinary areas, practitioners parsed several epistemic resources to produce new foundational disciplinary shared commitments, and how disagreements operated as a mechanism of differentiation in their production. Two parsing processes are examined to illustrate this claim. The first one is the parsing of the qualitative–quantitative dualism, arguably the most important methodological disagreement in social science. The second one is the parsing of prediction, a key value in contemporary science. The analysis evidences that disagreements have fostered both external and internal dynamics of differentiation in agent-based computational social science. The former have permitted a more efficient use of epistemic resources, whereas the latter have forced practitioners to modify the foundational narrative and the agenda of the field.