Since the 1970s, the world has witnessed a proliferation of international treaties championing the protection of wildlife. The effectiveness of those treaties, which together comprise international wildlife law (IWL), depends on their national implementation by individual states rather than on their number. National implementation of IWL ranges from legislative action, to resource allocation, to individual behavioural change. Inadequate IWL implementation can facilitate and even lead to wildlife crime. Therefore, examining how countries operationalise their commitments derived from IWL is important to understand the efficacy (or lack thereof) of wildlife treaties. The main goal of this article is to investigate the dynamics by which nations internalise international wildlife commitments into state law, by using Norway as a case study. The article thus explores the social dynamics that shaped the domestic legal action that Norway undertook after its ratification of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (Bern Convention). The study is based on historical data documenting Norway’s legislative processes derived from the conventions and historical records of the country’s environmental conflicts. It applies Chambliss’s sociology of law perspective on conflict to interpret the material. While many globalisation scholars hold that globalisation stripped states of legislative sovereignty, this article argues that Norway’s wildlife policy is mostly dependent on clashes between national forces, rather than Norway conceding legislative powers to the international community. In other words, the tension between economic growth and ecosystem conservation determines how Norway implements IWL commitments. This article contributes to the literature on environmental regime effectiveness and the domestic impact of treaties.
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