Anorexia Nervosa is an eating disorder typified by low body weight, restrictive eating behaviours, and body image distortion. It is associated with significant risk of medical complications, with one of the highest mortality rates of any mental illness. While the majority of patients receive treatment on a voluntary basis, a small proportion of severely ill patients refuse treatment and are treated involuntarily. The legal mechanisms used for involuntary treatment vary between jurisdictions, including mental health law, capacity-based law, guardianship, and use of inherent jurisdiction, the power of a superior court to rule on matters not included in statute. In Ireland, involuntary treatment of anorexia nervosa occurs within a legislative lacuna, not regulated by either the Mental Health Act 2001, or the Assisted Decision Making (Capacity) Act, 2015. Instead, treatment occurs under the Inherent Jurisdiction of the High Court, resulting in reliance on judicial discretion for decision-making. In this article, we explore the gaps in Ireland's current legal framework as applicable to care and treatment of anorexia nervosa, with reference to case law in England and Wales as a comparison. This includes an examination of the potential impact of the proposed changes to legislation as set out in the Mental Health Bill, 2024. We argue that these gaps mean that legislation governing the involuntary treatment of anorexia nervosa is urgently needed to safeguard the rights of this potentially vulnerable patient cohort, and ensure justice, transparency and consistency in legal approach.

This article addresses, in an Irish context, some of the complexities associated with advance planning documents which have been discussed more broadly by Ruck Keene. While the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015 is an important step forward in Irish law, there remain significant areas of uncertainty. In this regard, the article considers issues around the creation of advance planning documents and difficulties which may arise when they are intended to be activated and compares some of those difficulties with the law in England and Wales.

ABSTRACT In Rihanna, the Court of Appeal restated the longstanding view of English courts that there is no ‘image right’ or ‘character right’ in English law. However, in Irvine, which was decided before Campbell, although the claimant was able to successfully rely on passing off to protect his image, Justice Laddie was willing to explore whether the Human Rights Act 1998 could be used to protect the claimant if the conclusion had been reached in that case that passing off had not developed sufficiently. This is similar to what the House of Lords did in Campbell by drawing on the Human Rights Act to develop a new tort of misuse of private information. In light of recent technological developments (including AI), this article proposes that English courts can use Campbell’s development of the tort of misuse of private information as a model to develop a new tort of publicity rights.

ABSTRACT The House of Lords’ decision in Campbell v MGN [2004] UKHL 22 is celebrated for having introduced a new cause of action into English law: the tort of misuse of private information (MPI). Whilst in Campbell, the tort’s role in protecting the individual claimant and their private life is emphasised, subsequently the tort has expanded to protect both the claimant’s information and to protect the family from intrusion. This article explores the reasons for this expansion, identifying through detailed analysis of the MPI cases that many post-Campbell decisions are underpinned by family privacy, an ideology that recognises the importance of the family unit and its need for protection from unwarranted scrutiny and intrusion. This article argues that the tort’s widened focus is entirely justified; the jurisprudence properly acknowledges the important role the family plays in society, and the need to protect that family from intrusion

Compulsory schooling laws introduced across Europe in the 20th century aimed to expand educational attainment and may have shaped key determinants of cognitive health. We exploit variations in compulsory schooling laws in England to assess whether increased education, mandated by these policies, impacts cognitive function, dementia risk, and related risk factors in older age. We focus on two major reforms: the 1947 reform, which raised the school-leaving age from 14 to 15, and the 1972 reform, which increased it to 16. Using data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) and a novel dementia risk algorithm based on the Harmonized Cognitive Assessment Protocol (HCAP), we find that while both reforms increased schooling, their effects on cognitive aging differ. We find suggestive evidence that the 1947 reform improved cognitive outcomes and reduced dementia and mild cognitive impairment risk specifically for women and individuals from low parental education backgrounds. In contrast, we find no statistically detectable reductions in dementia risk associated with exposure to the 1972 reform. Our findings suggest that the impact of compulsory schooling laws on cognitive aging and dementia is context dependent. Findings highlight the importance of institutional context and heterogeneity when assessing the long-run effects of education policies.

The Astana International Financial Centre was established in 2018 to attract international investors to the Republic of Kazakhstan and with ambitious goal of becoming a financial hub not only among CIS countries but for the entire Central Asian region. The creation of AIFC was inspired by the experience of Gulf countries, with the Dubai International Financial Centre serving as the main prototype, having established itself as an innovative and leading financial center in the Middle East. Significant financial investments were made to implement the financial center project, along with the involvement of leading experts and specialists from both DIFC and the neighboring Qatar Financial Centre. One of the key features of modern financial centers is the establishment of specialized commercial courts, operating on the basis of English common law and appoint judges from England and Wales. This provides international investors with guarantees that local legislation does not apply to their activities and ensures that all commercial disputes can be resolved in a court staffed with internationally reputable judges. However, the activities of AIFC Court have not received due attention from Kazakhstan's legal academic community. This is particularly important since the AIFC Court's decisions may set precedents for future disputes and thus become part of the AIFC’s legal framework. A key conclusion from the analysis of the AIFC Court's activities is that through its decisions, the Court has clearly defined its jurisdiction and has consistently ruled in favor of private companies in disputes with state authorities of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

A study by the Law Commission of England and Wales resulted in amendments in 2025 to the Arbitration Act 1996 that include a default rule that an arbitration agreement will be governed by the law of England and Wales if the arbitration is seated in that territory. Given the importance of London as an arbitration center, this has implications for many international commercial contracts. In this Article, I challenge the premise behind the amendment that there is a single “law of the arbitration agreement.” Instead, I demonstrate that there are multiple laws applicable to an arbitration agreement. I explain this multiplicity of applicable laws by considering the possible grounds for challenge of jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal based on the arbitration agreement. Such an analysis demonstrates that very different laws may apply to questions of the existence, formal validity, substantive validity, scope, and exclusivity of an arbitration agreement. I review these issues in the broader context of choice of forum clauses generally, including both arbitration and choice of court agreements. I then consider a hypothetical international commercial transaction in which questions might arise about the first four of these five jurisdictional questions—demonstrating both the problems with the idea of a single “law of the arbitration agreement,” as well as the practical impact and importance of well-drafted choice of forum agreements, including provisions on choice of law. Although prompted by the proposed change in English law, this discussion has implications for the law in every jurisdiction regarding agreements to arbitrate, indicating that both transaction planners and dispute resolution lawyers need to be cognizant of the laws applicable to arbitration and choice of court agreements.

Abstract Liquidated damages (LDs) lie at the heart of every transaction and dispute, whether private–public, involving a State or a State-owned entity, or purely commercial, a private–private nature. This article tackles this theme in the specific context of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, where the influence of Egyptian law—a civil law legal system—cannot be overstated. The article offers useful insights and analysis of some of the challenges that plague ‘dualist’ systems of law that distinguish between public law and private law, administrative courts and civil and commercial courts, and administrative contracts and private law contracts. The article is divided into four parts. Following an introductory section, the article is divided into four parts. The second section deals with the doctrine of penalty clauses in LDs in comparative approaches. The third offers the main objectives of harmonization of contract law principles and provides an analysis to the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (UPICC) in LDs. The fourth provides an analysis to convergences and divergences between administrative and private contracts in Egypt and the English doctrine of LDs. Finally, the article offers concluding remarks and suggestions showing the necessity of UPICC in Egypt and the MENA region in light of punitive nature of LDs, given the reality of a clear lack of coherent uniform standards in awarding LDs in the region.

Abstract In 1897, an Indian dancer named Piaree Jehan petitioned the Bombay government seeking justice for her two granddaughters—Begum Jehan and Vajir Jehan—who died and allegedly disappeared, respectively, during their 1895–1896 England tour. As traditional sources of patronage for the performers declined owing to the colonial criminalisation of prostitution and rising anti-nautch sentiment in the second half of the nineteenth century, certain groups of Indian women performers started travelling to the British metropole for contractual performances. Despite promises of lucrative salaries and foreign travel, life in the imperial exhibitory spaces proved to be quite precarious. Through a close reading of Piaree’s petition and contemporary British newspaper reports, this article presents a microhistory of Indian women performers’ experience in the racialised and sexualised imperial circuits of performance. It shows how the British imperial government adopted a certain ‘politics of convenience’ to selectively sexualise Indian women performers to erase their contributions as transcultural workers for the empire. By doing so, the empire continued to economically and culturally benefit from the dancers’ labour while avoiding any responsibility towards remedying their working conditions. At the same time, focusing on Piaree’s affective argumentation, the article also demonstrates how the performers used the British legal system to make their voices heard. By writing petitions, demanding unpaid wages, refusing sexual offers, and forging kinship ties, Indian women performers repeatedly foregrounded their identities as professional creative workers. In doing so, they disrupted narratives of passive victimhood, challenged their hypersexualised colonial representations, and brought their overlooked contributions to the late nineteenth-century British stage to the fore.

According to the prevailing scholarly opinion in Turkish law, influenced by Swiss doctrine, the validity of non-compete agreements should primarily be assessed in the light of the circumstances existing at the termination of the employment relationship. This article challenges this approach by drawing on English case law. It demonstrates that the broad judicial discretion exercised by the 11th Civil Chamber of the Turkish Court of Cassation in modifying non-compete clauses operates without sufficiently articulated criteria, thereby entailing a risk of generating uncertainty in practice. Despite the significant impact of non-compete agreements on labour mobility, Turkish legal scholarship has largely confined the debate to private law doctrine, with limited engagement in labour economics or empirical policy analysis. The article contends that the absence of legislative and administrative guidance raises concerns regarding legal certainty, legal predictability, and good governance. In light of the 2024 decision of the Turkish Constitutional Court on Article 444 of the Turkish Code of Obligations, it further argues that a more rigorous constitutional scrutiny was warranted. This article ultimately proposes a more transparent and impact-oriented framework capable of enhancing the coherence of the rule of law.

In 2020, English restructuring law was expanded to include restructuring plan proceedings by the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020. Since then, there has been heated debate in both Germany and England as to whether such a plan (or the court's decision to confirm the plan) is recognisable in Germany. This article takes a recent decision by the Frankfurt Regional Court as an opportunity to argue in favour of recognition as insolvency proceedings under sec. 343 of the German Insolvency Act (InsO),[1] or alternatively as a civil court decision under sec. 328 of the Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO).[2] [1] English translation available at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_inso/index.html (last accessed on 8 December 2025). [2] English translation available at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_zpo/index.html (last accessed on 8 December 2025).

Sermons preached by clerics have been largely neglected by scholars as a resource for the study of the history of English ecclesiastical law since the Reformation. Needless to say, scholarship has focused on the substantive and procedural ecclesiastical law found in the ecclesiastical legislation of Parliament, the canons passed by the convocations, the case law of the spiritual and temporal courts and the treatises of the civilian commentators. However, some historians of early modern England have studied the sermons delivered at the Inns of Court; but these studies have little to say about their preachers’ portrayal of the ecclesiastical law and its jurisprudence. 1 Nevertheless, as we shall demonstrate, in each century since the Reformation, clergy in their preaching commonly treated legal matters or else used legal materials, including ecclesiastical law. The eighteenth century is no exception – and Thomas Sherlock (1678–1761) is an excellent example, whose function included as Master of the Temple (1704–1753) preaching to the common lawyers of Inner and Middle Temple. What follows deals with his life and career, law in his sermons (including jurisprudential concepts common to both the temporal and the spiritual law), and his legal thought in wider context – all at a time when the law was an inescapable part of the religious landscape, the limits on toleration, the constraints on Roman Catholics, and the provision for occasional conformity. 2

Codification is generally thought of as a feature of modern legal systems in the civil law world. However, codification is also used by common law systems, although there is a real question whether the form of ‘codification’ employed by common law legislators is comparable to the codification employed by civil law legislators. The focus of the discussion here will be on the role of codification in English private law, in particular contract law, where codification has been explored in the modern era, but abandoned. There may, however, still be a role for the intervention of codifying legislation to solve some of the problems faced within the general rules of English contract law.

This paper critically examines the Hungarian legal system’s recent turn toward a limited precedent model, introduced by the 2019 Precedents Act. Originally presented at a conference celebrating Professor Vékás’s 85th birthday, the study situates this development within the broader debate over the role of courts in shaping civil law and evaluates whether the new framework enhances legal certainty or instead obfuscates the applicable law. Through a detailed comparison with the English common law precedent system, the paper identifies structural weaknesses in Hungary’s quasi-precedent regime, including the lack of clarity around binding elements, challenges in accessing and navigating a vast body of precedents, and the rigidity imposed on the Curia’s jurisprudential development. The analysis raises fundamental questions about the viability and legitimacy of the Hungarian precedent system and calls for greater transparency, judicial infrastructure and professional engagement to ensure the rule of law. The paper concludes by reaffirming the importance of comparative legal dialogue, as advocated by Professor Vékás.

This research aims to study the impact of Artificial Intelligence (AI) applications, particularly smart contracts and smart agents, on the traditional rules of contract theory in civil law. The study analyzes and compares the extent to which the legislation and judiciary in Iraqi and Egyptian law (belonging to the Latin Civil Law family), French law (the historical origin), and English law (belonging to the Common Law family) accommodate the challenges posed by AI to the essential elements of a contract, primarily consent, object, and cause, in addition to the problem of legal liability arising from the errors of these applications. The research concludes that the traditional rules of contract theory face significant difficulties in adapting to these new phenomena, necessitating legislative intervention to regulate liability and define the legal framework for the operation of smart agents, while considering the divergence between the compared legal systems.

This article explores the concept of an agent’s liability for breach of warranty of authority under English law. It examines the legal nature of such a warranty, the conditions under which it arises, and the consequences of its breach. It is argued that in English law, the warranty of authority constitutes a contractual undertaking by the agent, arising within the framework of a collateral agreement with the third party. Particular attention is paid to the criteria applied by courts in identifying the existence of such a warranty, as well as to the distinction between liability for breach of warranty of authority and liability for misrepresentation. The article reviews key judicial decisions that have shaped the modern understanding of the warranty of authority doctrine. In addition, it analyses the agent’s liability under instruments of international private law harmonisation, including the Principles of European Contract Law and the UNIDROIT Principles. The article concludes by comparing the English approach with continental legal models and argues in favour of a contractual qualification of the agent’s liability under Article 183 of the Russian Civil Code.

Addressing the false dichotomy between autonomy and preservation of life: Clinical, legal, and ethical considerations in severe and longstanding anorexia nervosa.

Legal translation serves as a means of cross-cultural communication and plays an indispensable role in the interaction and integration of different legal systems. With the continuous elevation of China's opening-up level, the demand for mutu-al translation between Chinese and English legal texts has been expanding. Con-sequently, a series of issues regarding the accuracy, uniformity and standardiza-tion of legal terminology translation have gradually become a focal point of com-mon concern. Eugene Nida's Functional Equivalence Theory emphasizes that a target text should achieve equivalent effect with the source text in terms of in-formative function and communicative effect, rather than merely clinging to me-chanical correspondence in linguistic forms. This theory provides an important approach to addressing problems such as legal system differences and cultural default in legal translation. However, legal texts possess mandatory binding force and high authority, which requires legal terminology translation to be not only conceptually precise but also formally standardized in expression. In practical translation, these two requirements are often difficult to be balanced simultane-ously, leading to frequent trade-offs. Based on the Functional Equivalence Theory and combined with typical examples of Chinese and English legal terms, this paper analyzes the specific manifestations and underlying causes of the imbalance be-tween accuracy and authority, and finally proposes balancing methods that can take both into account. It aims to provide more practical references for legal translation practice and facilitate more standardized, efficient and precise cross-border legal communication.

ABSTRACT This article examines the complex negotiation of queer Muslim subjectivities in post-colonial Sri Lanka, where individuals experience intersecting systems of oppression rooted in state surveillance, religious orthodoxy, and colonial-era legal frameworks. While scholarship has separately explored LGBTIQ+ identities in South Asia and queer Muslim experiences, a critical gap remains in understanding their convergence within the Sri Lankan context. This research addresses this lacuna by analyzing how queer Muslims, specifically from the Sri Lankan Moor ethnic community, negotiate their identities at the nexus of Islamic communal norms and the enduring legacy of British colonial law, such as Sections 365 and 365A of the Penal Code. Drawing on qualitative research approach, the qualitative data from 77 in-depth interviews with queer Muslims in Maruthur, and framed by an integrated theoretical approach of intersectionality, queer theory, and postcolonial studies, the findings reveal a multifaceted reality. Participants’ experiences are characterized by a “double consciousness,” managing profound internal conflict between religious adherence and queer selfhood, while performing public conformity to ensure safety and belonging. The analysis demonstrates that these subjectivities are not formed through simple oppression but through dynamic, strategic performances of identity. Crucially, the article identifies acts of religious reinterpretation, where individuals employ Islamic principles of mercy (Rahma) to create affirming spiritual frameworks, constituting a form of decolonial resistance. The paper argues that the personal journeys of queer Muslims occur within broader, intersecting systems of power—state, religious, colonial, and global. Consequently, their self-formation is a profoundly political act, situated in a contested space defined by a continuous interplay of resistance, reinterpretation, and survival. This research contributes to broader discussions on decolonial queer politics and non-Western Muslim subjectivities by insisting on an integrated analytical lens to understand these complex lived realities.

The article examines the key features of academic and professional training of Master of Laws (LL.M.) students at universities in Great Britain from historical, methodological, organizational, content-related, and procedural perspectives. It is established that the formation of the fundamental principles of legal education in Great Britain is linked to the emergence of the Anglo-Saxon legal system in the twelfth century, which was based on the activities of royal courts, legal customs, and statutes, as well as to the establishment of the first universities in Oxford and Cambridge that developed from monastic law schools. The two-tier system of legal education originated in England in the seventeenth century, when universities, upon completion of a defined educational program, awarded bachelor’s and master’s degrees, with master’s-level training being broader in content and extending over an additional three years. Alongside the study of Roman and canon law at classical universities, opportunities for the practical acquisition of English common law were provided through training at the Inns of Court. It is shown that in the nineteenth century, the division between university-based legal education, aimed at implementing the ideals of classical education, and the practical training in common law at the Inns of Court gradually lost its significance. Over time, the distinction between classical education and practical legal training became blurred, which was reflected in the development and legislative consolidation of a unified model of higher legal education. The training of legal professionals for various branches of legal services (barristers, solicitors, etc.) has undergone changes in both content and organizational structure in the context of Brexit. At present, academic and professional training of Master of Laws students in universities in the United Kingdom is implemented on the basis of student-centred and competency-based methodological approaches. From an organizational perspective, such training is characterized by its intensity; in terms of content, – by variability, interdisciplinarity, and alignment with the demands of the legal services market; and from a research perspective, – by a focus on developing analytical and research skills of Master of Laws (LL.M.) students, alongside the formation of key legal and applied competencies across various fields of law