Elements Of Episodic Memory Research Articles

Elements of episodic memory: insights from artificial agents.

Many recent artificial intelligence (AI) systems take inspiration from biological episodic memory. Here, we ask how these 'episodic-inspired' AI systems might inform our understanding of biological episodic memory. We discuss work showing that these systems implement some key features of episodic memory while differing in important respects and appear to enjoy behavioural advantages in the domains of strategic decision-making, fast learning, navigation, exploration and acting over temporal distance. We propose that these systems could be used to evaluate competing theories of episodic memory's operations and function. However, further work is needed to validate them as models of episodic memory and isolate the contributions of their memory systems to their behaviour. More immediately, we propose that these systems have a role to play in directing episodic memory research by highlighting novel or neglected hypotheses as pursuit-worthy. In this vein, we propose that the evidence reviewed here highlights two pursuit-worthy hypotheses about episodic memory's function: that it plays a role in planning that is independent of future-oriented simulation, and that it is adaptive in virtue of its contributions to fast learning in novel, sparse-reward environments. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

The function of episodic memory in animals.

The best-known example of episodic memory in animals came from food-storing birds. One of the beauties of the food-storing system was that inherent in the behaviour were the elements that (at the time) made up episodic memory: what, where and when. While there were then already plenty of data on animals' ability to put together what and where, the addition of the time element in animals' memory and its testing was one that was both new and experimentally challenging. It has, however, led to an increasing variety of examples showing that animals can put together all three informational components. If episodic memories can be described as those memories that make any one of us who we are, why should non-human animals have such memories? Here, we argue that episodic memories play a significant functional role in the lives of real animals, in particular, enabling them to make decisions about how they might or should act in their future. We support our argument with data from a range of examples, focussing on data from the field.This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Children's mental time travel into the future: a functional perspective.

Children's episodic future-thinking is typically assessed using experimental tasks that measure whether children select an item with future utility. Although these tasks-inspired by Tulving's seminal 'spoon test' (Tulving E. 2005 Episodic memory and autonoesis: uniquely human? In The missing link in cognition: origins of self-reflective consciousness [eds HS Terrace, J Metcalfe], pp. 3-56. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. [doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195161564.001.0001])-are passed around age 4, they tell us little about the functional significance of children's episodic future-thinking in their day-to-day lives. We highlight how a naturalistic approach can shed light on this issue, and present a small study where we recruited mothers to report on their children's (N = 12, 3- and 4-year-olds and 6- and 7-year-olds) future-thinking over a 7-day period. We used a thematic analysis to understand why children express future thoughts and derived the following themes: (1) expressing future desires and/or intentions, (2) future-oriented information-seeking, (3) connecting present actions with future outcomes, and (4) predicting future mental/physiological states. We compare these themes with recent accounts of the functional significance of future-thinking in adults and conclude that children largely express their future-thinking verbally to request information or support from their parent-likely because they do not yet possess enough control/autonomy to independently act for their own future. Our findings both complement and extend an experimental approach and further elucidate the functional significance of mental time travel in children. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Measuring episodic memory and mental time travel: crossing the species gap.

Mental time travel is the projection of the mind into the past or future, and relates to experiential aspects of episodic memory, and episodic future thinking. Framing episodic memory and future thinking in this way causes a challenge when studying memory in animals, where demonstration of this mental projection is prevented by the absence of language. However, there is good evidence that non-human animals pass tests of episodic memory that are based on behavioural criteria, meaning a better understanding needs to be had of the relationship between episodic memory and mental time travel. We argue that mental time travel and episodic memory are not synonymous, and that mental time travel is neither a requirement of, nor an irrelevance to, episodic memory. Mental time travel can allow improved behavioural choices based on episodic memory, and work in all species (including humans) should include careful consideration of the behavioural outputs being measured. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Beyond the episodic-semantic continuum: the multidimensional model of mental representations.

Tulving's concept of mental time travel (MTT), and the related distinction of episodic and semantic memory, have been highly influential contributions to memory research, resulting in a wealth of findings and a deeper understanding of the neurocognitive correlates of memory and future thinking. Many models have conceptualized episodic and semantic representations as existing on a continuum that can help to account for various hybrid forms. Nevertheless, in most theories, MTT remains distinctly associated with episodic representations. In this article, we review existing models of memory and future thinking, and critically evaluate whether episodic representations are distinct from other types of explicit representations, including whether MTT as a neurocognitive capacity is uniquely episodic. We conclude by proposing a new framework, the Multidimensional Model of Mental Representations (MMMR), which can parsimoniously account for the range of past, present and future representations the human mind is capable of creating. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

A short natural history of mental time travels: a journey still travelled?

Tulving's introduction of episodic memory and the metaphor of mental time travel has immensely enriched our understanding of human cognition. However, his focus on human psychology, with limited consideration of evolutionary perspectives, led to the entrenched notion that mental time travel is uniquely human. We contend that adopting a phylogenetic perspective offers a deeper insight into cognition, revealing it as a continuous evolutionary process. Adherence to the uniqueness of pre-defined psychological concepts obstructs a more complete understanding. We offer a concise natural history to elucidate how events that occurred hundreds of millions of years ago have been pivotal for our ability to mentally time travel. We discuss how the human brain, utilizing parts with ancient origins in a networked manner, enables mental time travel. This underscores that episodic memories and mental time travel are not isolated mental constructs but integral to our perception and representation of the world. We conclude by examining recent evidence of neuroanatomical correlates found only in great apes, which show great variability, indicating the ongoing evolution of mental time travel in humans.This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Episodic memory without autonoetic consciousness.

Ever since Tulving's influential 1985 article 'Memory and consciousness', it has become traditional to think of autonoetic consciousness as necessary for episodic memory. This paper questions this claim. Specifically, it argues that the construct of autonoetic consciousness lacks validity and that, even if it was valid, it would still not be necessary for episodic memory. The paper ends with a proposal to go back to a functional/computational characterization of episodic memory in which its characteristic phenomenology is a contingent feature of the retrieval process and, as a result, open to empirical scrutiny. The proposal also dovetails with recent taxonomies of memory that are independent of conscious awareness and suggests strategies to evaluate within- and between-individual variability in the conscious experience of episodic memories in human and non-human agents. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Schema-driven prediction effects on episodic memory across the lifespan.

The predictive processing framework posits that one of the main functions of the brain is to anticipate the incoming information. Internal models facilitate interactions with the world by predicting future states against which actual evidence is compared. The difference between predicted and actual states, the prediction error (PE), signals novel information. However, how PE affects cognitive processing downstream is not fully understood: one such aspect pertains to how PE influences episodic memories, and whether those effect on memory differ across the lifespan. We examine the relationship between PE and episodic memory in children, young and older adults. We use a novel paradigm whereby rich visual narratives are used to build action schemas that enable probing different mnemonic aspects. To create different levels of PE, we manipulate the story endings to be either expected, neutral or unexpected with respect to the unfolded action. We show that (i) expected endings are better encoded than neutral endings and (ii) unexpected endings improve the encoding of mismatching events and other aspects of the narrative. These effects are differentially modulated across the lifespan with PE-driven encoding being more prominent in children and young adults and with schema integration playing a larger role on memory encoding in older adults. These results highlight the role of predictions by enriching past experiences and informing future anticipations.This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

The history of episodic memory.

Over the course of his research, Endel Tulving offered a number of somewhat different characterizations of episodic memory. Do they indicate that he changed his mind over time as to what episodic memory is, or did his core understanding of the nature of episodic memory stay the same? In this article, we offer some support for the latter claim, and in particular for thinking that, throughout his life, Tulving took as a defining feature of episodic memory the distinctive awareness of the self in time it involves. We argue that it is easier to see the continuities rather than the discontinuities in Tulving's writings once their historical context is taken into account, where this involves both the authors who influenced his thinking, as well as the intellectual climate at the different times he was writing. We also discuss two recent bodies of work on episodic memory that take aspects of Tulving's writings as their point of departure, but try to factor out into separate ingredients what he arguably saw as a unitary phenomenon. Considering aspects of the dialectic between them and Tulving's view might shed further light on some of the motivations behind the latter.This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Eliminating episodic memory?

In Tulving's initial characterization, episodic memory was one of multiple memory systems. It was postulated, in pursuit of explanatory depth, as displaying proprietary operations, representations and substrates such as to explain a range of cognitive, behavioural and experiential phenomena. Yet the subsequent development of this research programme has, paradoxically, introduced surprising doubts about the nature, and indeed existence, of episodic memory. On dominant versions of the 'common system' view, on which a single simulation system underlies both remembering and imagining, there are no processes unique to memory to support robust generalizations with inductive potential. Eliminativism about episodic memory seems to follow from the claim that it has no dedicated neurocognitive system of its own. After identifying this under-noticed threat, we push back against modern eliminativists by surveying recent evidence that still indicates specialized mechanisms, computations and representations that are distinctly mnemic in character. We argue that contemporary realists about episodic memory can retain lessons of the common system approach while resisting the further move to eliminativism. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Mental time travel in animals: the 'when' of mental time travel.

While many aspects of cognition have been shown to be shared between humans and non-human animals, there remains controversy regarding whether the capacity to mentally time travel is a uniquely human one. In this paper, we argue that there are four ways of representing when some event happened: four kinds of temporal representation. Distinguishing these four kinds of temporal representation has five benefits. First, it puts us in a position to determine the particular benefits these distinct temporal representations afford an organism. Second, it provides the conceptual resources to foster a discussion about which of these representations is necessary for an organism to count as having the capacity to mentally time travel. Third, it enables us to distinguish stricter from more liberal views of mental time travel that differ regarding which kind(s) of temporal representation is taken to be necessary for mental time travel. Fourth, it allows us to determine the benefits of taking a stricter or more liberal view of mental time travel. Finally, it ensures that disagreement about whether some species can mentally time travel is not merely the product of unrecognized disagreement about which temporal representation is necessary for mental time travel. We argue for a more liberal view, on the grounds that it allows us to view mental time travel as an evolutionarily continuous phenomenon and to recognize that differences in the ways that organisms mentally time travel might reflect different temporal representations, or combinations thereof, that they employ. Our ultimate aim, however, is to create a conceptual framework for further discussion regarding what sorts of temporal representations are required for mental time travel.This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Of popsicles and crackers: when spatio-temporal memory is not integrated into children's decision-making.

Prior research has used innovative paradigms to show that some non-human animal species demonstrate behavioural choices (i.e. foraging for a food item at a specific location, and at a time that guarantees it has not yet decayed), reflecting episodic-like or 'WWW' memory (memory for 'what' happened, 'where' and 'when'). These results raised the question of whether similar approaches could be used to examine memory in young children in order to reduce verbal demands. The present research examines the extent to which children's WWW memory aligns with memory-based choices in 3- to 5-year-olds (n = 95; study 1) and in 7- to 11-year-olds and adults (n = 168; study 2). Results indicate that preschoolers' struggle with choice-based tasks probably reflects difficulty integrating their WWW memory with an understanding that certain items decay over time. Moreover, a convergence between verbal recall measures and choice-based measures is observable in 7-year-olds and beyond, reflecting a stronger integration of memory signals, understanding of state transformation, and decision-making. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Travelling beyond time: shared brain system for self-projection in the temporal, political and moral domains.

Mental time travel (MTT), a cornerstone of human cognition, enables individuals to mentally project themselves into their past or future. It was shown that this self-projection may extend beyond the temporal domain to the spatial and social domains. What about higher cognitive domains? Twenty-eight participants underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while self-projecting to different political, moral and temporal perspectives. For each domain, participants were asked to judge their relationship to various people (politicians, moral figures, personal acquaintances) from their actual or projected self-location. Findings showed slower, less accurate responses during self-projection across all domains. fMRI analysis revealed self-projection elicited brain activity at the precuneus, medial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, temporoparietal junction and anterior insula, bilaterally and right lateral temporal cortex. Notably, 23.5% of active voxels responded to all three domains and 27% to two domains, suggesting a shared brain system for self-projection. For ordinality judgement (self-reference), 52.5% of active voxels corresponded to the temporal domain specifically. Self-projection activity overlapped mostly with the frontoparietal control network, followed by the default mode network, while self-reference showed a reversed pattern, demonstrating MTT's implication in spontaneous brain activity. MTT may thus be regarded as a 'mental-experiential travel', with self-projection as a domain-general construct and self-reference related mostly to time. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Distinct mechanisms and functions of episodic memory.

The concept of episodic memory (EM) faces significant challenges by two claims: EM might not be a distinct memory system, and EM might be an epiphenomenon of a more general capacity for mental time travel (MTT). Nevertheless, the observations leading to these arguments do not preclude the existence of a mechanically and functionally distinct EM system. First, modular systems, like cognition, can have distinct subsystems that may not be distinguishable in the system's final output. EM could be such a subsystem, even though its effects may be difficult to distinguish from those of other subsystems. Second, EM could have a distinct and consistent low-level function, which is used in diverse high-level functions such as MTT. This article introduces the scenario construction framework, proposing that EM crucially rests on memory traces containing the gist of an episodic experience. During retrieval, EM traces trigger the reconstruction of semantic representations, which were active during the remembered episode, and are further enriched with semantic information, to generate a scenario of the past experience. This conceptualization of EM is consistent with studies on the neural basis of EM and resolves the two challenges while retaining the key properties associated with EM. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Synthesizing the temporal self: robotic models of episodic and autobiographical memory.

Episodic memories are experienced as belonging to a self that persists in time. We review evidence concerning the nature of human episodic memory and of the sense of self and how these emerge during development, proposing that the younger child experiences a persistent self that supports a subjective experience of remembering. We then explore recent research in cognitive architectures for robotics that has investigated the possibility of forms of synthetic episodic and autobiographical memory. We show that recent advances in generative modeling can support an understanding of the emergence of self and of episodic memory, and that cognitive architectures which include a language capacity are showing progress towards the construction of a narrative self with autobiographical memory capabilities for robots. We conclude by considering the prospects for a more complete model of mental time travel in robotics and the implications of this modeling work for understanding human episodic memory and the self in time. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Classification of general and personal semantic details in the Autobiographical Interview

The Autobiographical Interview (AI) separates internal (episodic) and external (non-episodic) details from transcribed protocols using an exhaustive and reliable scoring system. While the details comprising the internal composite are centered on elements of episodic memory, external details are more heterogeneous as they are meant to capture a variety of non-episodic utterances: general semantics, different types of personal semantics details, metacognitive statements, repetitions, and details about off topic events. Elevated external details are consistently observed in aging and in neurodegenerative diseases. In the present study, we augmented the AI scoring system to differentiate subtypes of external details to test whether the elevation of these details in aging and in frontotemporal lobar degeneration (including mixed frontotemporal/semantic dementia [FTD/SD] and progressive non-fluent aphasia [PNFA]) would be specific to general and personal semantics or would concern all subtypes. Specifically, we separated general semantic details from personal semantic details (including autobiographical facts, self-knowledge, and repeated events). With aging, external detail elevation was observed for general and personal semantic details but not for other types of external details. In frontotemporal lobar degeneration, patients with FTD/SD (but not PNFA) generated an excess of personal semantic details but not general semantic details. The increase in personal but not general semantic details in FTD/SD is consistent with prevalent impairment of general semantic memory in SD, and with the personalization of concepts in this condition. Under standard AI instructions, external details were intended to capture off-topic utterances and were not intended as a direct measure of semantic abilities. Future investigations concerned with semantic processing in aging and in dementia could modify standard instructions of the AI to directly probe semantic content.

How does the non-conscious become conscious?

In this My Word, Joseph LeDoux describes how his work as a graduate student got him interested in human consciousness. Although he has not studied this topic since 1970s, he never stopped thinking and writing about it during his four-decade career exploring how non-conscious processes involving the amygdala detect and respond to danger. Here, he tells us what is on his mind about consciousness these days.

Episodic memory in nonhuman animals?

Experimental psychologist Jonathan Crystal and evolutionary psychologist Thomas Suddendorf debate with nonhuman animals experience human-like episodic memory.

A Place for Every Event and Every Event in Its Place: Memory for Locations and Activities by 4-Year-Old Children

Episodic memories are of specific events and experiences associated with particular times and places. Whereas memory for the temporal aspects of past events has been a focus of research attention, memory for the location in which events were experienced has been less fully investigated. The limited developmental research suggests that preschool-age children, in particular, may have difficulty remembering the location in which they experienced specific events. In 2 experiments, 4-year-old children engaged in 4 unique activities in 4 unique locations in and around a laboratory suite. In Experiment 1, the children had high levels of recall of the activities, the locations, and the conjunctions of activities and locations, implying that they had formed memory representations that featured activities bound in locations. In Experiment 2, we tested whether 1 element of the bound representation—the location of an activity—served as a reliable cue to recall of the other element—the activity itself. The test was positive, providing further evidence that 4-year-old children form mnemonic conjunctions of activities and locations. The results imply that important elements of episodic memory are available to young children.

Evaluación de la Memoria Tipo Episódica en preescolares empleando una tarea con perspectiva egocéntrica

La Memoria Tipo Episódica (MTE) implica la recuperación integrada de elementos mínimos de la memoria episódica: Qué, Dónde y Cuándo (QDC) de un evento personal. Investigaciones sugieren que una tarea adecuada para niños debe realizarse con una perspectiva egocéntrica y ocurrir en un solo ensayo, porque al realizarse con varios ensayos esto implica el uso de información semántica. Se diseñó una tarea con una perspectiva egocéntrica y realizable en un único ensayo de entrenamiento, que manipuló la magnitud de la consecuencia para dos experiencias, así como el intervalo entre entrenamiento y prueba. Niños preescolares, desde una perspectiva egocéntrica, buscaron monedas grandes o pequeñas en tres contenedores y eligieron el contenido preferido tras dos intervalos de tiempo. La elección de los participantes mostró la recuperación integrada del QDC a partir de un solo ensayo de entrenamiento. Además, las elecciones de los preescolares reflejaron sus estrategias de recuperación: la inmediatez o mayor consecuencia. La tarea se basa en las representaciones del participante más que en la capacidad de reporte verbal, lo que hace a esta preparación sensible a la cognición episódica del recuerdo de la MTE en niños.