Eidetic Method Research Articles

Взаимната обусловеност между ейдетичния и генетичния метод в Хусерловата философска логика

The principle characteristics of Husserl’s eidetic and genetic method have been elucidated in connection to transcendental criticism, intersubjective constitution, various types of evidence, fulfilled intentionality, and eidetic intuition. The mutual interdependence of both methods is discussed stressing the leading role of the eidetic method. Special attention is paid to the term “deceptive evidence”; it is explained how through the combined efforts of both methods the deceptive evidence can be identified and overcome. The primordial function of circular teleology based on transcendental Ego’s inherent teleology is underlined.

Eidetic intuition as physiognomics: rethinking Adorno’s phenomenological heritage

Adorno’s intensive criticism of phenomenology is well known, his entire early period during the 1920s and 1930s being marked by various polemical engagements with Husserl. This engagement finds its peak during his work at his second dissertation project in Oxford, a dissertation that was supposed to systematicaly expose the antinomies of phenomenological thinking while particularly focusing on Husserl’s concept of “eidetic intuition” or “intuition of essences” (Wesensschau). The present paper will take this criticism as its starting point in focusing on two highly specific aspects of Adorno’s interpretation: the opposition between eidetic intuition and the traditional theories of abstraction and its relationship to genetic phenomenology. In light of this criticism I subsequently show: 1. that, in his later work, Adorno’s understanding of eidetic intuition undergoes a significant revaluation; 2. that he reappropriates key elements of the eidetic method in his own procedure of physiognomic analysis, and 3. that his account of physiognomics is relevant for addressing the aforementioned incongruities of phenomenological eidetics itself.

“Until the End of the World”: Eidetic Variation and Absolute Being of Consciousness—A Reconsideration

This paper suggests interpreting Husserl’s thesis of the “fictional destruction of the world” (gedankliche Destruktion der Welt) in the light of the eidetic method of variation. After having reconstructed Husserl’s argument and shown how it relies on the methodologically regimented joint venture of free fantasy and bounded concepts, the author concludes that (1) the a priori of a world, namely its empirical (more or less rational) style, is tantamount to the a priori of a world that can be possibly experienced by some conceivable form of consciousness. (2) If consciousness is a priori bound to transcendence, such transcendence is not necessarily supposed to be the transcendence of a world, for a non-world would be enough to entertain the intentional directedness. This twofold claim allows for a novel interpretation of Husserl’s principle of the asymmetry between world and consciousness.

Phenomenology and political idealism

This article considers the possibility of articulating a renewed understanding of the principle of political idealism on the basis of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. By taking its point of departure from one of the most interesting political applications of Husserl’s phenomenological method, the ordoliberal tradition of the so-called Freiburg School of Economics, the article raises the question of the normative implications of Husserl’s eidetic method. Contrary to the “static” idealism of the ordoliberal tradition, the article proposes that the phenomenological concept of political idealism ought to be understood as a fundamentally dynamic principle. As opposed to the classical understanding of political idealism as the implementation of a particular normative model—political utopianism—the phenomenological reformulation of this idea denoted a radically critical principle of self-reflection that can only be realized on the basis of perpetual renewal. In order to illustrate this point, the article considers Husserl’s distinction between two types of ideals of perfection, the absolute and the relative, and argues for their relevance for political philosophy.

O wielości metod w filozofii Wolffa

The main goal of the article is to demonstrate that (against general opinion) Wolff used not one but few different research methods in his philosophy. Except mathematical (more geometrico), there were semiotic, eidetic and reflective ones. Moreover I indicate the presence of reductive, transcendental, and rhetorical method elements in Wolff's works. Each of this methods are represented in this article in details with an examples of their usage by Wolff. The choice of the methods and the structural relation between them are not coincidental. In the current article I try to prove that the heuristic epistemological primacy in Wolff's philosophy belongs not to the mathematical but to eidetic method. Speaking of the relation type between eidetic method and the rest of them – semiotic, reflective and axiomatic (mathematical one) – I would define it as: (1) genetic dependence, since eidetic method is the reason of existence of the rest of the methods, (2) heuretic dependence, while eidetic one gives the opportunity for the reflection over the rest of the methods, and (3) epistemological dependence, while eidetic method provides criteria of truth (reliability) of the knowledge for the rest of methods.

Non-Language Thinking in Mathematics

After a brief outline of the topic of non-language thinking in mathematics the central phenomenological tool in this concern is established, i.e. the eidetic method. The special form of eidetic method in mathematical proving is implicit variation and this procedure entails three rules that are established in a simple geometrical example. Then the difficulties and the merits of analogical thinking in mathematics are discussed in different aspects. On the background of a new phenomenological understanding of the performance of non-language thinking in mathematics the well-known theses of B. L. van der Waerden that mathematical thinking to a great extent proceeds without the use of language is discussed in a new light.

Informational needs and the experiences of women with abnormal Papanicolaou smears

To describe the experience of women with abnormal Papanicolaou (Pap) smears with a particular focus on their informational needs. The small purposive sample consisted of 10 demographically diverse women with a history of at least one abnormal Pap smear, who attended one Women's Health outpatient clinic that typically serves a multiethnic, low-income population. Individual 30- to 60-min tape-recorded interviews were conducted, transcribed verbatim, and analyzed according to Colaizzi's eidetic method of phenomenological analysis. A manual categorizing strategy and a computer software (Qualrus, version 2.0) strategy were used for data management and coding. Six major themes emerged from the data: initial response to the diagnosis; dealing with stigma; seeking information and support; enduring diagnostic and treatment procedures; formulating a concept of disease; and normalizing. The essential structure of the experience of having an abnormal Pap smear in terms of informational needs involved initial anxiety at disclosure, followed by an urgent need for information. Stigma associated with a sexually transmitted disease (STD) and a dearth of information available for male partners were problematic and influenced decisions about disclosure of human papillomavirus (HPV) infection to current or future partners. Misinformation or misunderstanding of available information was common. Information obtained from the Internet was experienced as private and allowed adequate time, but Web sites that grouped HPV with general STD information were confusing and further stigmatizing. Information obtained from healthcare providers was experienced as supportive if facts were accompanied by reassurance and familiar analogies were used. Information from providers was experienced as nonsupportive if too much medical jargon was used, if not enough time was spent to explain the information, if facts were not accompanied by interpersonal concern, or if a patient-provider relationship was not established. Patient education regarding abnormal Pap smears and HPV should address the concerns of those affected and should use message framing that informs but decreases stigmatization. Women should be offered the option of individualized informative and supportive counseling resources after initial disclosure of an abnormal Pap smear to adequately address concerns such as information for partners, the nature of HPV, an appropriate concept of cancer risk, and reassurance regarding potential effects on sexuality and fertility. Public information forums should address issues specific to high-risk HPV rather than generalization as an STD.

Informational Needs and the Experiences of Women with Abnormal Papanicolaou Smears

Purpose: To describe the experience of women with abnormal Papanicolaou (Pap) smears with a particular focus on their informational needs. Data source: The small purposive sample consisted of 10 demographically diverse women with a history of at least one abnormal Pap smear, who attended one Women’s Health outpatient clinic that typically serves a multiethnic, low-income population. Individual 30- to 60-min tape-recorded interviews were conducted, transcribed verbatim, and analyzed according to Colaizzi’s eidetic method of phenomenological analysis. A manual categorizing strategy and a computer software (Qualrus, version 2.0) strategy were used for data management and coding. Conclusions: Six major themes emerged from the data: initial response to the diagnosis; dealing with stigma; seeking information and support; enduring diagnostic and treatment procedures; formulating a concept of disease; and normalizing. The essential structure of the experience of having an abnormal Pap smear in terms of informational needs involved initial anxiety at disclosure, followed by an urgent need for information. Stigma associated with a sexually transmitted disease (STD) and a dearth of information available for male partners were problematic and influenced decisions about disclosure of human papillomavirus (HPV) infection to current or future partners. Misinformation or misunderstanding of available information was common. Information obtained from the Internet was experienced as private and allowed adequate time, but Web sites that grouped HPV with general STD information were confusing and further stigmatizing. Information obtained from healthcare providers was experienced as supportive if facts were accompanied by reassurance and familiar analogies were used. Information from providers was experienced as nonsupportive if too much medical jargon was used, if not enough time was spent to explain the information, if facts were not accompanied by interpersonal concern, or if a patient–provider relationship was not established. Implications for practice: Patient education regarding abnormal Pap smears and HPV should address the concerns of those affected and should use message framing that informs but decreases stigmatization. Women should be offered the option of individualized informative and supportive counseling resources after initial disclosure of an abnormal Pap smear to adequately address concerns such as information for partners, the nature of HPV, an appropriate concept of cancer risk, and reassurance regarding potential effects on sexuality and fertility. Public information forums should address issues specific to high-risk HPV rather than generalization as an STD.

Die phänomenologische Methode der Wesensschau und ihre Präzisierung als eidetische Variation

In this contribution I will discuss Husserl’s eidetic method, which is dedicated to discover the apriori structures of consciousness. The method of seeing essences of the Logical Investigations (1900) should mark the opposition of phenomenology as an apriori science of consciousness and empirical psychology. The eidetic method starts as an everyday human ability to recognize equalities in different things, but it can and must be refined to become the basic phenomenological method. In the lecture Phenomenological Psychology (1925) the eidetic method is specified as eidetic variation, which is characterized by the demand for unlimited variation of the starting example in phantasy. – The second part of my article is dedicated to critical considerations. One topic is the problematic interaction of an ideally infinite variation together with the necessary limitation of this variation (to avoid crossing the conceptual demarcations of the starting example). From this point of view questions concerning the true sense and unavoidable limitations of the eidetic method are discussed anew.

Reading Notes and Comments on Aron Gurwitsch's The Field of Consciousness*

Editor’s Introduction Merleau-Ponty’s research between the spring of 1959 and the autumn of 1960, the period during which he began writing The Visible and the Invisible, 1 is well revealed by his handwritten reading notes on the work of Aron Gurwitsch’s The Field of Consciousness. 2 The comments which accompany these reading notes are often placed between brackets, and the principal subject of these critical comments is the intellectualism of Husserlian phenomenology, insofar as it makes things into pure objects of perception, without any reality of their own. 3 If the thing is reduced to being the object of perception, what guarantees its identity (in the sense of being identifiable)? What guarantees that one is truly thinking something of that thing, and that it is not a matter of a purely nominal imputation lacking any objectivity whatsoever – that is, which would neither be based on nor refer to any thing in particular? These reading notes pose the problem of the unity of experience from the side of the object and the subject and raise a discussion of the eidetic method in a very precise manner. They sketch the possibility of an interrogation of the unity of perceptual experience such as Merleau-Ponty announces it in Eye and Mind, where no perception would be named by the thing: as speech speaks to me, the thing in its nature as worldly object – that is, as spatial unity, as body in the world, as flesh of the world – arouses my perception. These notes are in keeping with his research on a non-dualistic philosophy such as is found in The Visible and the Invisible. We have identified different levels of reading of this text. Merleau-Ponty reads Gurwitsch, who reads phenomenology and Merleau-Ponty himself. Sometimes agreeing with Gurwitsch’s criticisms of Phenomenology of Perception, 4 at other times Merleau-Ponty defends certain aspects of his philosophy criticized by Gurwitsch. These reading notes allow one to appreciate Merleau-Ponty’s critical distance with respect to certain ideas from Phenomenology of Perception with which he finds himself at odds when reading