Efforts Of Interest Groups Research Articles

Interest group representation on government committees in Kenya

Business associations engage in dialogue with policy makers—and sometimes succeed in influencing policy outcomes. One strategy—largely overlooked by researchers—involves seeking appointment to government boards and committees. This is an important omission since many committees review, draft and implement policies and regulations. Securing representation on government committees could thus lead to considerable influence but little is known about the extent to which interest groups seek such appointments. And very little is known about dialogue in developing countries, especially those that seek a consensual rather than an adversarial approach to policy formulation. This research, based on desk research of government committee membership and interviews with business associations, thus addresses two gaps. It has been undertaken in a developing country, Kenya, since there is a relatively small number of interest groups compared to other countries of a similar population. This research focuses on the efforts of interest groups, and business groups in particular, to place nominees on government committees. This article highlights the level of regulatory activity in Kenya effectively delegated to government boards and committees and demonstrates the apparent success of business associations in securing participation in a majority of the committees with a regulatory function. It argues, however, that interest groups could be more professional and more strategic when they are represented on government committees.

Stakeholder participation in the formulation of Brazilian biofuel policy (RenovaBio)

Abstract In this article, we examine the establishment of the Brazilian biofuels policy (RenovaBio). We identify whether there was participation of stakeholders, and efforts of interest groups (associations, sugar refineries, and fuel distributors) to send technical notes and comments in order to have their perspectives heard and demands met, mainly regarding the definition of individual targets for reducing greenhouse gases (GHG). Government documents and stakeholder comments were consulted. For this purpose, we used the social network analysis technique. We argue that the capacity for social participation in these hearings can increase the influence of specific groups on political decisions. The results of the study show the predominant participation of trade associations and companies linked to the energy and biofuels sector. RenovaBio reaffirms the argument in favor of decarbonization, energy security, and the contribution of biofuels to reducing GHG, as motivating and legitimizing factors for their establishment.

The efficacy and efforts of interest groups in post elections policy formation

This paper presents a new model of interest groups and policy formation in the legislature. In our setting, the already given party ideological predispositions and power distribution determine the expected policy outcome. Our analysis applies to the case of un-enforced or enforced party discipline as well as to two-party and multi-party (proportional representation) electoral systems. The interest groups’ objective is to influence the outcome in their favor by engaging in a contest that determines the final decision in the legislature. Our first result clarifies how the success of an interest group hinges on the dominance of its ideologically closer party and, in general, the coalition/opposition blocks of parties under un-enforced party or coalition/opposition discipline. Such dominance is defined in terms of ideological inclination weighted by power. Our second result clarifies how the success of an interest group hinges on the dominance of its ideology in the ruling coalition (party) in a majoritarian system with enforced coalition (party) discipline. We then clarify under what condition an interest group prefers to direct its lobbying efforts to two parties or the two coalition and opposition blocks of parties under un-enforced discipline rather than to the members of the ruling coalition (party) under enforced discipline. The lobbying efforts under un-enforced and enforced party discipline are also compared. Finally, we clarify the effect of ideological predispositions and power on the efforts of the interest groups.

The Efficacy and Efforts of Interest Groups in Post Elections Policy Formation

This paper presents a new model of interest groups and policy formation in the legislature. In our setting, the already given party ideological predispositions and power distribution determine the expected policy outcome. Our analysis applies to the case of un-enforced or enforced party discipline as well as to two-party and multi-party (proportional representation) electoral systems. The interest groups' objective is to influence the outcome in their favor by engaging in a contest that determines the final decision in the legislature. Our first result clarifies how the success of an interest group hinges on the dominance of its ideologically closer party and, in general, the coalition/opposition blocks of parties under un-enforced party or coalition/opposition discipline. Such dominance is defined in terms of ideological inclination weighted by power. Our second result clarifies how the success of an interest group hinges on the dominance of its ideology in the ruling coalition (party) in a majoritarian system with enforced coalition (party) discipline. We then clarify under what condition an interest group prefers to direct its lobbying efforts to two parties or the two coalition and opposition blocks of parties under un-enforced discipline rather than to the members of the ruling coalition (party) under enforced discipline. The lobbying efforts under un-enforced and enforced party discipline are also compared. Finally, we clarify the effect of ideological predispositions and power on the efforts of the interest groups.

The Efficacy and Efforts of Interest Groups in Post Elections Policy Formation

This paper presents a new model of interest groups and policy formation in the legislature. In our setting, the already given party ideological predispositions and power distribution determine the expected policy outcome. Our analysis applies to the case of unenforced or enforced party discipline as well as to two-party and multi-party (proportional representation) electoral systems. The interest groups’ objective is to influence the outcome in their favor by engaging in a contest that determines the final decision in the legislature. Our first result clarifies how the success of an interest group hinges on the dominance of its ideologically closer party and, in general, the coalition/opposition blocks of parties under unenforced party or coalition/opposition discipline. Such dominance is defined in terms of ideological inclination weighted by power. Our second result clarifies how the success of an interest group hinges on the dominance of its ideology in the ruling coalition (party) in a majoritarian system with enforced coalition (party) discipline. We then clarify under what condition an interest group prefers to direct its lobbying efforts to two parties or the two coalition and opposition blocks of parties under unenforced discipline rather than to the members of the ruling coalition (party) under enforced discipline. The lobbying efforts under unenforced and enforced party discipline are also compared. Finally, we clarify the effect of ideological predispositions and power on the efforts of the interest groups.

Weight Perception and Efficiency Loss in Bilateral Trading: The Case of US and EU Agricultural Policies

This study determines the perceived weights of various producer groups by policy makers in selected sectors (wheat, corn, sugar, beef and veal, and milk), for both the US and the EU, from 1980 to 2000, in five-year intervals. Results show that the US’s weights deviate less than the EU’s, compared with the external protections, indicating that the lobbying efforts of interest groups in the US are reflected more closely in external policy design, and are therefore more efficient than those in the EU. Game simulation suggests that it is in the best interest of both blocs to choose the status quo action among various trade liberalization scenarios with the latest calculated weights.

The Economics and Politics of Wilderness Conservation in Australia

Wilderness conservation has a checkered history in Australian politics. Initially, wilderness was protected in national parks, and specific areas or legislation did not exist. In the 1960s, wilderness conservation became an important issue in Australian politics. Pressure from environmental groups and the general public created several conflicts. Several successes were scored by the joint efforts of interest groups, the public, charismatic individuals, the media, and support of governments and politicians. A number of areas were declared wilderness areas and several states now have wilderness protected through legislation. The 1990s have not been as good as the previous decades for wilderness. Large forest areas are still being cleared and bias toward consumptive use of forest by governments is emerging. Clearly, wilderness protection in Australia is intensely political. It is important that interest groups maintain pressure to protect future wilderness. Efforts to obtain national legislation for wilderness and to couch wilderness in terms of other aspects such as biodiversity and ecosystems values may prove necessary.