THE END OF COLD WAR DIVISIONS has placed a range of new choices before Western publics and governments. Few will be more important than the future shape of the alliances that bind some parts of the European continent, but not others. Three countries-the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland-are already a part of NATO. These three and 10 others are moving-although more slowly than they would wish-towards full membership of the European Union. But there is no immediate prospect of membership for the states that lie beyond, many of them former republics of the USSR (the European Union, at its Copenhagen summit in 1993, itself made clear that membership was 'out of the question' in such cases).1 We call these states 'the outsiders', and for the foreseeable future they will constitute a borderland between full members of the European family and the rest of the Eurasian landmass. The relations that are established between them will in turn be crucial for a changing Europe, and for economic development and political stability in the countries that have become its newly constituted eastern frontier.2 In this article we explore the implications of European enlargement for the 'outsider' states, drawing our evidence from four of the republics that formerly constituted the USSR but which now find themselves outside the negotiation of a framework that will bring together the rest of the continent: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Our evidence is drawn, in part, from a programme of interviews with more than 140 members of the foreign policy-making community in our four countries: in ministries and presidential administrations, in the offices of parliamentary committees and political parties, in newspapers and news agencies, in government and independent research institutes, and with the representatives of a small but growing private sector. We draw also upon the evidence of popular attitudes that was provided by 18 focus groups, and by nationally representative surveys carried out in each of our four countries in the first half of 2000 and, in Russia alone, in 2001. In this article we have based ourselves primarily upon our survey evidence.3 In the discussion that follows we focus upon this wider public dimension of the process of eastward enlargement, and upon the distribution of opinion within our four countries on the place they occupy within a changing international order. Do ordinary
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