The fragmentation of the Dutch cybersecurity government landscape is a widely discussed phenomenon among politicians, policy makers, and cybersecurity specialists. Remarkably though, a negative narrative is underlying the idea of fragmentation, suggesting that we are dealing with a serious problem. A problem that has the potential of impeding cybersecurity governance in the Netherlands. This research zooms in on how cybersecurity governance is organised within the central government, and which organisations are concerned with the creation, implementation, and oversight of cybersecurity policies vis à vis Dutch society. This article provides an overview of all central government organisations (de Rijksoverheid) that are involved in cybersecurity governance on a strategic level. This research provides the first step in doctoral research into the possible implications of the fragmentation of cybersecurity governance in the Dutch central government, and how this fragmentation could potentially impact policy creation, implementation, and oversight. Based on the mapping of this governance landscape, it set out to measure fragmentation based on the number of units or organisations that are concerned with cybersecurity governance in the central government on a strategic level. This study has found that based on Boyne's (1992) notion of fragmentation and the Dutch governments’ definition of tiers, the Dutch cybersecurity governance landscape could indeed, when meticulously following Boyne's counting procedure, be regarded as fragmented.
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