Dmitri Trenin Research Articles

Imperialism and nationalism

AbstractIs Russia a neoimperial or postimperial state? In this paper, I compare two interpretations proposed by political commentators Marcel Van Herpen and Dmitri Trenin. Van Herpen holds that the Russian empire is literally being rebuilt, whereas Trenin believes that Russia is just ceasing to be an empire. I argue that, contrary to popular belief, the current war against Ukraine cannot be interpreted as an attempt to restore the Russian empire. This is because being an empire requires a universalistic ideology that can be accepted by other nations. Meanwhile, the ideological foundation of the current war is an obviously nationalistic conception of the “Russian world.” Polish historians Andrzej Nowak and Włodzimierz Marciniak brilliantly argued that it was Russian nationalism that had previously led to the collapse of both Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. Under this interpretation the current war in Ukraine can be seen not as the rebirth but rather as the dramatic end of Russian imperialism.

Dmitri Trenin: Moscow’s New Rules. Moskau: Carnegie Moscow Center, 11. November 2020

Article Dmitri Trenin: Moscow’s New Rules. Moskau: Carnegie Moscow Center, 11. November 2020 was published on June 1, 2021 in the journal SIRIUS – Zeitschrift für Strategische Analysen (volume 5, issue 2).

Russia's ‘Sharp Power’ Manifestations in Lithuania's Mass Media

Abstract The concept of ‘sharp power’ has recently emerged as a reaction to the assertiveness of authoritarian regimes. It serves to underline the complexity of challenges which are posed by authoritarian regimes, referring to diverse front lines in the overall ‘battle’, be they culture, education, or the media. The latter, according to Dmitri Trenin, “has become such a crowded battlefield”. This paper attempts to fill in the information gap regarding Russia’s ‘sharp power’ manifestations in Lithuania’s mass media and focuses on NATO related messages in particular. The paper presupposes that messages which evoke an air of support for Russia’s foreign and security policy tend to pass through to Lithuania’s mass media, and argues that, as a result of the insufficient activity by Lithuania’s mass media in terms of forming an independent perception of Russia vis-à-vis NATO, the preconditions for possible manifestations of Russia’s use of sharp power are therefore created. The article is organised into four parts. The first section sets out a theoretical framework for the analysis which focuses on the concept of sharp power. Then the research methodology is outlined. The third section presents features of the informational environment of Lithuania in 2016 and 2019. The final, and most elaborated, section investigates messages which apparently serve to support Russia’s foreign and security policy in terms of the NATO‘s topic in Lithuania’s mass media based on the aforementioned criteria.

Commissioned Book Review: Dmitri Trenin, What Is Russia Up to in the Middle East?

Commissioned Book Review: Dmitri Trenin, <i>What Is Russia Up to in the Middle East?</i>

Collision Rather Than Collusion: Issues in Russian-U.S. Relations

Collision Rather Than Collusion:Issues in Russian-U.S. Relations Dmitri Trenin (bio) The election of Donald Trump was welcomed in Moscow in November 2016 as a chance to at least temper the adversity that had beset Russia-U.S. relations since 2014, when President Vladimir Putin used military force to seize control of Crimea and provided support to the rebels in Ukraine's Donbas region. Above all, the Republican victory suddenly relieved Russian leaders of the prospect of continued Democratic control over the White House, which by fall 2016 they had come to view as inevitable. Hillary Clinton, a staunch supporter of the post–Maidan revolution leadership in Kiev and an advocate of a no-fly zone in Syria and possibly U.S. intervention there, was regarded as simply hostile toward Moscow. Trump, by contrast, surprised the Russians by his neutral-to-positive remarks about Putin and his policies. This essay opens with a discussion of the impact of U.S. domestic politics on Russian-U.S. relations. It then proceeds to analyze the major issue in the bilateral relationship, which is summarized as "confrontation with islands of cooperation." Finally, the essay concludes by describing the outlook for the future of relations between Moscow and Washington. The New Political Environment in the United States and Its Impact Trump's victory came laden with serious and persistent allegations of Russian involvement in the election and even collusion between the Kremlin and the new president and his staff. This put U.S.-Russian relations in an entirely new environment compared to anything Moscow had experienced before, even during the Cold War and Senator Joseph McCarthy's 1950s campaigns against Soviet spies and Communist sympathizers in the U.S. government. What was particularly striking to Russian observers was a surprising lack of self-confidence demonstrated by the U.S. political elite and its palpable feeling of insecurity. The notion that the U.S. political system was vulnerable to outside meddling essentially destroyed, in the Russian assessment, a key pillar of American exceptionalism. Essentially, the United States was like every other country. What was no less striking was the [End Page 33] de facto lack of confidence of the U.S. elite in the American people, who, the allegations implied, could be easily manipulated by a foreign power on the paramount issue of electing the president of the United States. Finally, the toxic status conferred by the U.S. media on Russian officials in the United States, particularly the ambassador, who was portrayed as no less than a spymaster running a ring of agents of influence among senior U.S. officials, betrayed a heretofore nonexistent American fear of contamination by mere contact with Russians. Many Russians concluded with amazement that the United States, in some respects, looked like the Soviet Union of their younger days. Even if some of these things appeared to be a remake of the Cold War atmosphere, the difference between then and now was enormous. Present-day Russia is not a political, economic, ideological, or even military rival to the United States in the way that the Soviet Union was. The many disparities between the United States and Russia are stark, and virtually all are in the United States' favor. What in the days of the Cold War was understandable in view of the raw power of the Soviet Union, its global drive for influence, and its active championship of Communist and leftist movements around the world looks very different today. To Moscow, all this suggested no less than an advent of political warfare within the United States, very different from the usual political games the two main parties had been playing. As a result, the United States became, in Russian eyes, an unpredictable adversary. Looking ahead, Russian observers see the unfolding political drama in the United States as much more than the aftermath of the 2016 elections. They assume that Washington has entered a prolonged political crisis that could lead to a major showdown and potentially national upheaval if President Trump is impeached. From being an unpredictable global player, as it is now, the United States could then become an unstable country: something the world last saw in...

Introduction

Introduction Jessica Keough (bio) Considerable uncertainty has surrounded the Trump administration's priorities in Asia. While U.S. cabinet officials have at times sought to reassure the region that the United States intends to preserve its commitment to the post–World War II international system, other comments and actions by the administration have indicated an inward turn that suggests less active U.S. engagement. These mixed signals have left regional allies, partners, and other states wondering what the future holds for their relationships with the United States. A roundtable discussion in the January 2017 issue of Asia Policy, "Assessing U.S.-Asia Relations in a Time of Transition," presented mainly American perspectives on the major issues facing the United States in its bilateral relations with leading powers in the Asia-Pacific at the outset of the Trump administration. This Asia Policy roundtable offers perspectives on U.S.-Asia relations from leading scholars and policy practitioners in select Asia-Pacific states. In their essays, these experts identify the most salient current and over-the-horizon issues in their countries' evolving relationships with the United States and evaluate how bilateral relations have progressed so far under the Trump administration. For China, Xie Tao examines four major issues confronting the U.S.-China relationship that both raise the possibility of conflict and offer prospects for cooperation: North Korea, the South China Sea, democratization in Taiwan and Hong Kong, and the sharing of global major-power responsibilities. The United States and China will likely find themselves working with each other in these areas, whether they want to or not, and will need to treat each other respectfully to avoid escalating risks. In Japan and South Korea, the U.S. alliance continues to form the bedrock of bilateral relations. Noboru Yamaguchi finds that, to Japan's relief, the U.S. commitment to the alliance and to Northeast Asian security seems unchanged, despite indications during Trump's presidential campaign that he might shift the burden for Northeast Asia's defense to the region. Kang Choi also addresses the importance of the United States' role as Northeast Asia's security guarantor in his essay on South Korea. Although Japan and [End Page 2] South Korea are concerned about China's rise and regional dominance, both identify North Korea as their most urgent security threat. According to Choi, the new administrations in Washington and Seoul will need to closely coordinate their policies toward the North and establish trust in each other. In light of North Korea's alarming acceleration of its nuclear weapons and missile programs, the allies face critical challenges ahead. While U.S. allies in Northeast Asia worry about abandonment, similar fears are very high in Taiwan. Ming Lee argues that, given its unofficial relations with most countries (including the United States) but also its unique security commitments from Washington, Taiwan struggles to make its voice heard internationally and fears becoming a bargaining chip in U.S. relations with China. The Kremlin is watching with interest the domestic upheaval in U.S. politics over allegations about the Trump campaign's possible links to Russia. Dmitri Trenin characterizes Russia's relationship with the United States under Trump as "confrontational with islands of cooperation." Issues such as NATO, European security, Afghanistan, and sanctions over Ukraine continue to generate friction, while reaching an agreement on sensitive issues such as Syria and the renegotiation of strategic arms control treaties will require a cautious, patient approach to overcome obstacles along the path of cooperation. China's rise is the defining structural characteristic shaping U.S.-India relations. Balancing China will likely bring Washington and New Delhi closer together over the long term, Rajesh Rajagopalan argues, however, that a number of roadblocks—the Trump administration's transactional approach to bilateral relationships, U.S. relations with Pakistan, economic nationalism, and domestic chaos in U.S. politics—could hinder this progress in the short term. Pakistan and the United States, by contrast, remain bound together over Afghanistan and the war on terrorism, but the long-term prospects for this strained relationship are uncertain. Moeed Yusuf details how Islamabad's and Washington's views of each other and their strategic priorities in South Asia increasingly...

Was Putin Ever a Friend of the West? Realism and the Rise and Decline of Putin's Rapprochement with the Bush Administration after 9/11

It is a common notion among a lot of analysts including but not limited to Dmitri Trenin of Carnegie Moscow, that Vladimir Putin was a friend of the and due to causal and structural reasons, like Iraq War, NATO expansion, East Europe missile defense and oil price index, he turned into a revanchist ruler that he is today. I argue, that was not the case, and this essay highlights that he was always a shrewd Realist, on a tactical alignment with the West, looking to chart his own course at his earliest convenience. The study of this time period, of Putin’s first two terms, highlights the importance and suggests future policy course in dealing with him. This study is expository and tests the theory of Realism with Russian actions under the first two terms of Vladimir Putin, which broadly coincides with the George W Bush Administration.

The Ukraine Crisis, Cold War II, and International Law

The Ukraine crisis has, yet again, called into question the coherence and stability of international law both as a language for mediating particular types of international disputes—such as conflicts between the so-called Great Powers— and as a set of institutions capable of serving asforafor the resolution of these disputes. Given the scale and intensity of the ongoing war in Ukraine and the magnitude of its regional and global repercussions, a number of policymakers and historians have already made compelling arguments for why the conflict may be the most significant threat to global order since the end of the Cold War—perhaps even since the Cuban Missile Crisis. While policymakers in the U.S. and Russia have cautioned against drawing Cold War parallels, numerous analysts in both countries have proclaimed the start of a new Cold War in light of the rapid deterioration in relations between Moscow and Washington. Beyond bilateral U.S.–Russia relations, and in the words of Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, Cold War Two (hereinafter “CWII”) has “effectively put an end to the interregnum of [post-Cold War] partnership and cooperation betweenthe Westand Russia.” While sharing the view that a new Cold War has erupted, this article suggest that its causes are far deeper and its likely battlegrounds are far wider than mere antagonism between the United States and Russia over the fate of Ukraine, To the extent that CWII has begun, it may mark a return to interbloc rivalry, East versus West, or even Great Game geopolitics. To complement these frames, the present conflict may also be understood by viewing it through the prism of political economy, particularly the study of “new-statism,” or the new developmental state within the broader context of the development of global capitalism. Thinking of CWII this way allows one to ask whether CWII is actually a war between Western liberal capitalism and various systems of state capitalism, of which Russia's is but one. To be even more precise, one can also ask whether the conflict is better thought of as a contest between different state capitalisms for control over key trade or transit routes, production locales, and markets. Tribes, states, and empires have always waged mortal combat over these material matters. CWII—whether it has started or soon will—will likely rest on similar considerations. And yet, despite the seriousness of the threat, there has been remarkably little academic discussion, and much less public debate, regarding the configuration of global power flows that has contributed to this crisis or the role, and limitations of law in structuring our political imaginations in response to these challenges. This Article is an attempt to call attention to several serious aspects of the Ukraine crisis which have hitherto been underanalyzed, namely the role of information warfare in exacerbating its magnitude.

Russia: the challenges of transformation

Russia: The Challenges of Transformation. Edited by PIOTR DUTKIEWICZ and DMITRI TRENIN. New York: New York University Press. 2011. $45. Cloth. ISBN: 9780814785003. Click here to read the full review.

Confronting the Stalinist Past: The Politics of Memory in Russia

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Acknowledgements This article draws on interviews and research conducted in Russia from 2008–2010. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not reflect the view of the U.S. Army or the U.S. government. The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the Institute for National Security Studies. Notes 1. Alexey Miller, Georgiy Kasianov, Robert Traba et al., “The Politics of History,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Pro et Contra 13, no. 3–4 (May-August 2009), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=24797&lang=en#politics. 2. Simon Shuster, “Rehabilitating Joseph Stalin,” Time, December 22, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1949500,00.html. 3. According to a recent poll, 35 percent of respondents born before Stalin's death in 1952 said that family members had been victims of Stalinist repressions. Alexei Levinson, “Uses and Abuses of Stalin's Image,” Open Democracy Russia, http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/alexei-levinson/uses-and-abuses-of-stalin%E2%80%99s-image. 4. For this general point, see Chris Lorenz, “Towards a Theoretical Framework for Comparing Historiographies: Some Preliminary Considerations,” in Theorizing Historical Consciousness, ed. Peter Seixas (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), p. 34. 5. Dmitri Trenin, “Russia's Spheres of Interest, not Influence,” The Washington Quarterly 32, no. 4 (October 2009): pp. 3–22, http://twq.com/09october/docs/09oct_Trenin.pdf. 6. A.V. Filippov, Noveishaya istoriya Rossii. Kniga dlya uchitelya (Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 2007). 7. A.A. Danilov, A.I. Utkin, A.V. Filippov, eds., Istoriya Rossii. 1945–2008 (Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 2008). 8. A.A. Danilov and A.V. Filippov, eds., Istoriya Rossii. 1900–1945 (Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 2009); and A.A. Danilov and A.V. Filippov, eds., Istoriia Rossii. 1900–1945. Kniga dlya uchitelya (Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 2008). 9. Filippov, Noveishaya istoriya Rossii, pp. 91–92. 10. Sophia Kishkovsky, “Russian Archbishop Hilarion Calls Stalin ‘a Monster’,” Presbyterian Outlook, August 4, 2009, http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/blog/2009/08/07/russian-archbishop-hilarion-calls-stalin-a-monster/. 11. Dmitry Medvedev, “Speech at meeting with Russian ambassadors and permanent representatives in international organisations,” July 12, 2010, http://www.eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/610. 12. “Blame for massacre of Poles cannot be put on Russians – Putin,” RT.com, April 7, 2010, http://rt.com/Politics/2010-04-07/katyn-poloes-massacre.html. 13. “Dmitry Medvedev's Article, Go Russia!” September 10, 2009, http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/298. 14. ITAR-TASS, December 3, 2009. 15. Dmitry Medvedev, “Memory of National Tragedies is as Sacred as the Memory of Victories,” October 30, 2009, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2009/10/30/1218_type207221_222423.shtml. 16. For the order, dated September 9, 2009, of the Ministry of Education and Science mandating the compulsory assignment of Gulag Archipelago, see http://mon.gov.ru/press/reliz/5691/. 17. Dmitry Medvedev, “Interview with Der Spiegel,” November 7, 2009, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2009/11/07/1230_type82916_222598.shtml. 18. Dmitry Solovyov, “Gorbachev Warns Russians Against Rise of Stalinism,” Reuters, September 26, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL268062220070926. 19. Interview with a member of the group, March 14, 2010. 20. Sarah E. Mendelson and Theodore P. Gerber, “Soviet Nostalgia: An Impediment to Democratization,” The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 1 (Winter 2005–06): pp. 83–96, http://twq.com/06winter/docs/06winter_mendelson.pdf. 21. Sarah E. Mendelson and Theodore P. Gerber, “Us and Them: Anti-American Views of the Putin Generation,” The Washington Quarterly 31, no. 2 (Spring 2008): pp. 131–150, at pp. 131–132, http://twq.com/08spring/docs/08spring_mendelson.pdf. 22. VCIOM, “Russians About Perestroika: Are They Becoming Less Negative About It?” March 9, 2010, http://wciom.com/news/press-releases/press-release/single/13379.html. 23. VCIOM, “Stalin: Was He a Tyrant or a Hero?” March 5, 2008, http://wciom.com/archives/thematic-archive/info-material/single/9770.html?no_cache=1&cHash=5028e83c70. 24. VCIOM, “Do We Need Another Stalin?” December 18, 2009, http://wciom.com/news/press-releases/press-release/single/12922.html. 25. ITAR-TASS, December 21, 2009. 26. Levinson, “Uses and Abuses of Stalin's Image.” 27. Anna Malpas, “Stalin casts long shadow ahead of Russian parade,” AFP, May 8, 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jsYHT4ILSVWS2zlCTQaPa-v6wvqQ. 28. Levinson, “Uses and Abuses of Stalin's Image.” 29. Medvedev, “Memory of National Tragedies is as Sacred as the Memory of Victories.” 30. VCIOM, “Do We Need Another Stalin?” 31. VCIOM, “Stalin: Was He a Tyrant or a Hero?” 32. Levada Center, September 4, 2009, http://www.levada.ru/press/2009090404.html. 33. Levada Center, December 21, 2009, http://www.levada.ru./press/2009122101.html. 34. “A Conversation with Vladimir Putin,” December 16, 2010, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/russia-putin-q-a-transcript-dec-496.cfm. 35. VCIOM, “World War II,” April 27, 2010, http://wciom.com/news/press-releases/press-release/single/13539.html. 36. “Patriotism is remedy to stop race-hate violence says Putin,” RIA Novosti, December 27, 2010, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20101227/161953303.html. 37. Sergei Karaganov, “Russkaya Katyn,” Rossiiskaya gazeta, July 22, 2010, http://www.rg.ru/2010/07/22/istoriya.html. 38. For further discussion, see Thomas Sherlock, Historical Narratives in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Russia (New York: Palgrave, 2007). 39. For perceptive analysis of this issue, see Miller, Kasianov, Traba et al., “The Politics of History.” Additional informationNotes on contributorsThomas SherlockThomas Sherlock is Professor of Political Science at the United States Military Academy at West Point and the author of Historical Narratives in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Russia (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007)

Reforming the Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture: An Opportunity for U.S. Leadership

For the past year and a half, President Dmitry Medvedev of Russia has been pressing the United States and its European allies to open negotiations on a treaty establishing a new Euro-Atlantic secur...

Foreword

Foreword Efrem Fisher, Shane Perkinson, and Sam Abrams Our issue's theme, when first introduced for discussion, was suggested as a look at the global trend towards religiously-influenced conservative political parties. The topic was quickly expanded beyond politics to encompass broader ideas and trends: the seeming rise of religious conservatism globally, the threat to and retreat of economic conservatism as a result of the global financial crisis, and the unsettled impact of increasing interconnectedness on social conservatism. Ultimately, we sought to explore the state of conservatism and its future, whether in jeopardy or thriving, under our broad themes. We never expected to reach a definitive conclusion on the fate of conservatism. The endeavor itself is foolish considering the breadth of the concept, but also because trends are rarely so conveniently linear. Still, the developments of the moment are deeply meaningful and need to be understood and debated. Therefore, we have aimed to include some of the most interesting and important topics, cases, and perspectives across the globe today. Our issue begins with the section, "Perspectives on American Conservatism." In the first piece economist John Williamson identifies the central tenets of conservative economic thought, offering both support and critique of those ideas. Joshua Muravchik, formerly of AEI and currently a fellow at SAIS's Foreign Policy Institute, follows with an explanation, assessment, and defense of neo-conservatism. William Poole, former president and chief executive officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, concludes with a libertarian interpretation of the financial crisis. The next section is "Country and Regional Case Studies." Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, looks at conservative modernization in Russia. Yousra Fazili, Senior Consultant for Booz Allen Hamilton, writes on the political tension in Iran. Professor Jens Rydgren (Stockholm University) analyzes the success of conservatism in Denmark versus its failure in Sweden. Former Japanese diplomat, Professor Kazuhiko Togo (Kyoto Sangyo University), illuminates the assertive conservative right in Japan. Finally, Professor Andrew Chesnut (Virginia Commonwealth University) discusses the rise of charismatic Christianity in Latin America. The final section, "Comparing the United States and Europe," does just that in two theoretical pieces by Professors Peter Lawler (Berry College) and Michael Zoeller (Bayreuth University-Germany). Next, in our "Responses" section, Professor Mahmood Mamdani (Columbia University) responds to a review of his book, Saviors and Survivors by Sean Brooks of the Save Darfur Coalition which appeared in our previous issue. [End Page 1] Four book reviews follow. Former CIA deputy and acting director and current SAIS professor John McLaughlin reviews James Mann's The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War. Foreign service officer and current fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations Rachel Schneller reviews Thomas Ricks's The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008. SAIS professor Luis Marques reviews John Be Taylor's Getting Off Track: How Government Actions and Interventions Caused, Prolonged, and Worsened the Financial Crisis. SAIS professor John Karaagac reviews William E. Scheuerman's Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond. Our issue concludes with the winning submissions to our biannual SAIS Prize competition: Iwan Davies for his essay on the impact of the economic crisis on developing countries, Andre Castillo for his review of Shahriar Mandanipour's Censoring an Iranian Love Story, and Jared Katz for his photo essay of Nepal. As always, we are deeply indebted to our advisory board, headed by SAIS Dean Jessica Einhorn, for their time and support. In particular, we would like to thank Professor Francis Fukuyama who was instrumental in shaping our thinking on this issue from the beginning. Professor Fukuyama has been a committed member of The SAIS Review advisory board for years and we wish him the very best going forward. [End Page 2] Copyright © 2010 The Johns Hopkins University Press

Russia's Conservative Modernization: A Mission Impossible?

“C is in vogue in Russia,” says Dmitri Trenin, director of the Moscow Carnegie Center. The United Russia Party under Vladimir Putin has already acknowledged itself as a conservative party that can bring modernization to Russia without sacrificing its core values: traditional family, a strong state, patriotism, and “faith in Russia.” However, beneath the veneer of conservative modernization, Trenin believes that systemic problems such as institutionalized corruption and cronyism have created a vicious cycle of rent seeking Despite his critique of the conservatives, Trenin focuses not on whether the conservatives are the rightful rulers of Russia, but rather on how the conservative modernization movement can be effectively channeled to improve the Russian political and economic system and the well-being of its people. Trenin asks the main questions, “What is it that Medvedev and Putin are hoping to achieve and is it achievable through their conservative modernization campaign? If not, is there a credible alternative to ‘conservative’ modernization?” While he asks the right questions and delivers a good explanation of the potential dangers of conservatism without modernization, Trenin falls short in answering the latter question. Trenin asserts that the current rent-seeking bureaucracy was created under the conservative Putin-Medvedev coalition and cannot be solved unless drastic changes are made. He suggests that change must come from within, implying a change of heart from Putin, Medvedev, and other Kremlin insiders. However, he does not show us a situation in which they would do so or offer ideas for how a Russian or outside country could encourage this. Instead he claims that the existence of conservative governments spanning from Europe (Germany’s Christian Democrats) to America (the Republican Party under George W.Bush) and China (the Chinese Communist Party) somehow give comfort to Kremlin leaders in pursuing their own conservative policies. But there is no evidence that conservative governments in the West or China are more likely to support or tolerate conservatism in Russia or that liberal governments are necessarily anti-Russian conservatism. The harsh response of George W. Bush’s government to Russia’s actions in Georgia is a telling counterpoint.

Is Russia Succeeding in Central Asia?

On a number of recent occasions, the top Russian leadership has expressed its special interest in the affairs of former Soviet republics, including the assertion that Russia has a “privileged” relationship with these now independent states. 1 1 On Russian Channel One television on August 31, 2008, President Dmitri Medvedev referred to his country's “privileged interests” [ privilegirovannie interesi] in unspecified regions, similar to other countries’ special interests. In his summary for the Diplomatic Yearbook for 2008 Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov “mutually privileged relations” based on “cultural/civilizational unity” with all the countries of the CIS, but specifically denied that this amounted to a “sphere of influence.” Cf. Dmitri Trenin, “Russia's Spheres of Interest, not Influence,” The Washington Quarterly, October 2009. Is this a claim of accomplished fact, of future intention, or perhaps an empty expression of nostalgia for lost status? As we see it, the record of Russian actions in the largest group of these states—the five of Central Asia—allows us to exclude the first and question whether the second is realizable. Russia must contend with the aspirations of those states themselves, as well as the determined interests of China and, to a lesser extent, the West.

Getting Russia right

In the early 1990s, Russia seemed on the brink of fully shedding its authoritarian and communist past. It made significant progress through engaging the world community as an emerging market democracy, a returning friend and neighbor to Europe and the West, and a strategic partner of the United States. The ensuing fifteen years of Russian history have witnessed several booms, such as the buoyancy provided by high oil revenues, and busts that resulted in retrenchment and centralization of power. What is the real Russia? Is the nation going in the wrong direction and becoming a threat-in-waiting, or is it moving along, and even forward, in a familiar three-steps-forward and two-steps-back pattern? In Getting Russia Right , Dmitri Trenin sheds new light on our understanding of contemporary Russia, providing Western audiences with an insider's explanation of how the country has arrived at its current position and how the United States and Europe can deal with it more productively. Trenin looks beyond Russia's famous leaders to the economic and cultural spaces outside the Kremlin where promising changes are taking place. Russia is probably not going to join the West, but it is on a path toward becoming Western; capitalist even if not democratic; European in terms of civilization, rather than as part of the EU; and gradually more Western than pro-U.S. Insightful and optimistic, Getting Russia Right offers policymakers, students, and stakeholders in the U.S.-Russia relationship an understanding of what Russia is --and is not. Russia will matter in the foreseeable future, and Trenin's innovative and objective analysis provides an understanding that is crucial to rebuilding relationships among the world's key players.

Central Asia: views from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing

Acknowledgments Introduction: Central Asia in the Twenty-First Century, Rajan Menon 1. The United States and Central Asia: In Search of a Strategy, Eugene Rumer 2. Russia and Central Asia: Interests, Policies, Prospects, Dmitri Trenin 3. Central Asia in China's Diplomacy, Huasheng Zhao Index About the Authors.

Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, Eugene Rumer, Dmitri Trenin, and Huasheng Zhao (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2007), viii, 224 pp.

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.

Russia and the Deadlock over Kosovo

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Acknowledgements This article is published with the kind permission of Ifri (the French Institute for International Relations). A version was published in the electronic collection Russie.Nei.Visions and is also available in Russian and French on Ifri's website (www.ifri.org). Notes 1 ichard Holbrooke, ‘Russia's Test In Kosovo’, Washington Post, 13 March 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/12/AR2007031200972.html. 2 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 31 January 2006, http://www.ng.ru/politics/2006-01-31/2_kosovo.html 3 ee‘Putin:reshen??eproblemKosovoSee ‘Putin: reshenije problem Kosovo dolzhno bit’ universal’nim’ (Kosovo Solution Should Be Universal), in RIA Novosty, 8 June 2007, http://www.rian.ru/world/europa/20070608/66931903.html. 4 ee, for example, interview with General Leonid Ivashov, ‘Kremlevskie Intrigi Vokrug Kosovo’ (Kremlin's Intrigues around Kosovo), published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 March 2003, http://nvo.ng.ru/history/2003-04-18/1_ivashov.html; report by Research Institute of Social Systems, http://niiss.ru/yugo.shtml. 5 lexei Arbatov, ‘Poslednyi Shans Rossii na Balkanakh’ (Russia's last chance in the Balkans), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 15 July 1999. 6 .G. Shamgunov, Strany Kaspiiskogo Regiona i Vneshniya Politika Rossiskoi Impperii i Rossiskkoi Federatsii (Urokki Istorrii) (Caspian Sea States and the Policy of Russian Empire and the Russian Federation: Historical Lessons) (St Petersburg: St Petersburg State University, 2005), http://www.http://www.history.pu.ru/biblioth/novhist/mono/vinogr/85.htm. 7 ATO Office of Information and Press, ‘Russia and NATO: Partners in Peacekeeping’, http://www.nato.int/docu/presskit/010219/brocheng.pdf. 8 peech by Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov at the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, ’Peacekeeping Missions of the Russian Federation – Experience, Lessons Learned, Future Perspectives, Including Within the Framework of Cooperation with NATO or the EU’, 25 May 2004, available in Russian at http://www.old.mil.ru/print/releases/2004/06/101109_6856.shtml. 9 or more on NATO–Russian relations in the Balkans see Oksana Antonenko, ‘Russia, NATO and European Security after Kosovo’, Survival, vol. 41, no. 4, Winter 1999, pp. 124–44. 10 See, for example, Alexander Nikitin, ‘Partners in Peacekeeping’, NATO Review, Winter 2004, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue4/english/special.html. 11 Igor Maksimichev, Institute of Europe Russian Academy of Sciences, is of the opinion that the position of the West vis-à-vis Kosovo is motivated by the desire to support ’NATO's reputation’. It all boils down to NATO not wanting to embarrass itself and to avoid conceding that the intervention in the Kosovo conflict was in vain and the destruction endured by Serbia was unjustifiable. The idea of Kosovo's independence is therefore underpinned by NATO's desire to prove its rightness. To read the full article, only available in Russian, please see http://www.ruvr.ru/main.php?lng=rus&q=34297&cid=16&p=21.06.2007. 12 Many argue that Chernomyrdin's agreement to support pressure on Milosevic came at a time when NATO was under pressure to suspend strikes and admit its defeat. There is still widespread speculation that Russia's agreement was linked to a $400m loan from the IMF in June 1999. In this view Russia's ‘betrayal’ of Serbia is synonymous with its weakness and dependency on the West. See, for example, Russian Journal, 27 March 2006, at http://subscribe.ru/archive/russ.politics/200603/27225409.html. 13 Shamgunov, Strany Kaspiiskogo. 14 Http://serbia.rustrade.org/economics/relations/info. 15 ‘Gazprom and Eni Plan European Pipeline’, International Herald Tribune, 24 June 2007. 16 See the FOM: Public Opinion Foundation opinion poll, available only in Russian at http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/countries/serbia/d041309. 17 In an interview with journalists on 4 June 2007, Putin said: ‘We will find it difficult to explain to the small peoples of the North Caucasus why, in one part of Europe, some people are given this right, while here in the Caucasus they have no such right. Moreover, for example, some Ossetian people live in Russia, while others live on the territory of Georgia and consider themselves to be an independent state … Why can the Albanians act this way, but Ossetians cannot? It is impossible to explain’; http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2007/06/132365.shtml. 18 Vitali Churkin, ‘Kosovo mozhet stat argumentum dlya separatistov’ (Kosovo Could become an Argument for Separatists), http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=121016&cid=5. 19 According Vitaly Churkin, the Russian envoy to the UN, Russia is against setting any artificial time limits for the resolution of Kosovo status. See http://www.ruvr.ru/main.php?lng=rus&q=34297&cid=16&p=21.06.2007. 20 Susan Manuel, ‘The UN Security Council Visit to Kosovo’, press release, UNMIK/FR/0046/01, 22 June 2001, http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/ features/fr046.html. 21 Interview with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Der Spiegel, ’Everyone Ought to Stop Demonizing Russia’, 7 February 2007, ‘http://www.spiegel.de/international/ spiegel/0,1518,464531,00.html. 22 Http://www.rian.ru/world/europa/20070608/66931903.html. 23 For more information on Russia's policy towards Abkhazia see Oksana Antonenko, ‘Frozen Uncertainty: Russia and the Conflict over Abkhazia’, in Bruno Coppieters and Robert Legvold (eds), Statehood and Security: Georgia after the Rose Revolution (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 205–70. 24 Ahto Lobjakas, ‘Georgia: Solana Fears Kosovo “Precedent” for Abkhazia, South Ossetia’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 4 October 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/10/8748c1ca-a82c-444b-b2a9-df357251aa54.html. 25 Ibid. 26 See Dmitri Trenin, ‘The Case of Kosovo’, Pro et Contra Journal, no. 5–6 (34), 2006, p.7 27 Http://www.ruvr.ru/main.php?lng=rus&q=34262&cid=16&p=20.06.2007. 28 Http://www.izvestia.ru/news/news137856/. 29 Judy Dempsey, ‘G8 Fails to Agree on Kosovo’, International Herald Tribune, 8 June 2007. Additional informationNotes on contributorsOksana AntonenkoOksana Antonenkois IISS Senior Fellow (Russia and Eurasia).

The Russian Military: Power and Policy by Steven E. Miller and Dmitri Trenin, Eds.

The Russian Military: Power and Policy <i>by Steven E. Miller and Dmitri Trenin, Eds.</i>

Russian foreign policy in transition: concepts and realities

Contents Introduction Part I Documents Part II Statements Strategy for Partnership, Andrei Kozyrev International Relations on the Eve of the 21st Century: Problems and Prospects, Yevgeny Primakov Russia at the Turn of the Millennium, Vladimir Russian Foreign Policy on the Eve of the 21st Century: Problems of Formation, Development and Continuity, Igor Ivanov On the Version of the National Security Conception of the Russian Federation, Sergei Ivanov Part III Analysis International Relations After the Kosovo Crisis, Anatoly Torkunov The Syndrome of Absorption in International Politics, Aleksei Bogaturov Russia's Security in a Multipolar World, Aleksei Arbatov The Phenomenon of Globalization and National Security Interests, Andrei Kokoshin Turn in Russian-American Relations, Sergei Rogov The Russian Bridge Over the Atlantic, Vladimir Lukin Back to the Concert, Vyacheslav Nikonov The Backside of Foreign Policy: Internal Factors in the System of International Ties, Obligations and Projects of the Russian Federation, Aleksei Salmin Foreign Policy Therapy A la Dr Putin , Andrei Melville Putin's New Course Is Now Firmly Set: What Next?, Dmitri Trenin The Chances and Challenges of the World, Sergei Karaganov Do We Need Reform of Russian Foreign Policy?, Yuriy Fyodorov List of Contributors Index