The liberal world order is vulnerable to the challenges it has created. In other words, the nature of the liberal world order creates two paradoxes that are difficult to resolve on the base of its principles. First, a liberal world order requires open economies to sustain and spread of economic growth. However, as national economies become interdependent on the free flow of capital, labor, and output, income inequality increases, as does the likelihood of job losses and regular economic crises like the Great Recession. Secondly, the idea of promoting democracy and protecting human rights discredits itself with the alleged right of «gendarme powers» to violate the fundamental principle of the sovereignty of individual states. Thirdly, these paradoxes are exacerbated not only by the one-dimensional retreat of the United States from fulfilling the obligations of the hegemonic power, which accelerated under D. Trump, but also by the sharp increase in political ambitions and the economic rise of developing states, especially China. The accompanying dualism of these processes leads to systemic changes in the structure of the distribution of power, the essence of which, revealed through the theory of hegemonic stability, is the non-wests desire to reform this system of global distribution of prestige, as Washington's prestige continues to decline rapidly. Finally, these processes represent a perfect storm for the successful implementation of China’s offensive foreign policy under Xi Jinping, aimed at revising the modern world order in such a way as to achieve greater inclusiveness of Global South. China’s willingness to lead this process and its growing attractive development model are even more confirmed during the current COVID-19 pandemic, when key elements of the modern system of international relations have failed to coordinate efforts and collectively formulate a universal strategy to combat the new global threat.
Read full abstract