Is violence an ineliminable feature of politics?1 In Foucault, Politics, and Violence, Johanna Oksala answers no.2 In order to make her case, she not only questions dominant understandings of relationship between politics and violence offered within traditional and critical theories, but also attempts to cultivate sensitivity to historical and contextual specificity of both concepts. Furthermore, Oksala takes issue with appeal to both negative and positive views of human nature in Western thought. Indeed, she adopts neither sort of view herself and argues instead that theorists interested in problem of violence should turn to Foucault, suspend anthropological universals, and engage in ontology. Doing so promises to open up possibility of contesting idea of any essential connection between violence and politics, to politicize views that deem violence to be inevitable and thereby unnecessarily limit reigning discourses on violence to problem of distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate forms of it.In effect, Oksala claims that view that violence is either an indispensable instrument of politics, or inevitably bound up with it, stems from ontologies and specific rationalities within which theorists are operating. She regards Foucault's genealogical strategy of revealing historicity and specificity of various ontological commitments associated with a given discursive regime or form of rationality as indispensable to effort to show that the connection between violence and political is not internal or essential, but contingent.3Oksala's strategy for eliminating violence from politics centers on questioning current assumptions and beliefs about human violence and politics, suggesting that insofar as these assumptions arise within specific historical power/knowledge relations, they are inevitably Thus her phrase,political ontology, refers to a conception of constituted within power/knowledge regimes. What we take to be real or necessary is politicized insofar as it is constituted within a power-laden context of struggle over truth and objectivity.4 Here, following Foucault, Oksala broadens category of the political. The includes power/knowledge relationships outside confines of state and its corresponding institutions to include those found in micro-level relations between individuals and within and between institutions. She adopts Foucault's understanding of critique as involving resurrection of forgotten constitution of social reality within power-laden contexts as a way of opening up a field of contestation.In what follows I want to raise three questions concerning Oksala's project, questions concerning following: (1) method she takes herself to be employing throughout book, and (2), a more complicated question, namely, whether her assertion that violence is eliminable is warranted by analysis she provides, and (3) whether enlisting Foucault in project of ontology can help her show that it is. I then raise some broader questions about status of empirical research on human nature within a Foucauldian framework.Oksala's MethodIt is not clear to me whether Oksala takes herself to have provided a genealogy of specific ways in which politics and violence have been intertwined, or whether she is simply urging us to recognize its importance for any effort to end or reduce violence. It is clear that she does want to encourage further historical inquiry into how violence comes to be understood as compatible with governmental or rationalities. Moreover, insofar as she endorses an agonistic view of politics that places contestation, not rational deliberation a la Habermas or Rawls, at heart of politics, she deems critical inquiry into ontology an indispensable tool for opening up possibilities for other ways of being and thinking, particularly for disentangling violence from agonistic rationality. …
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