Reviewed by: Confederate Conscription and the Struggle for Southern Soldiers by John M. Sacher Kenneth W. Noe (bio) Confederate Conscription and the Struggle for Southern Soldiers. By John M. Sacher. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2021. Pp. 296. Cloth, $45.00.) Alas the poor conscript, we hardly know him. Forced into Civil War armies against his will, sometimes at bayonet point, he suffered and sometimes died for a cause that was never fully his. Succeeding generations shut their eyes to him in their urgency to depict every soldier-ancestor as a heroic volunteer worthy of veneration. In the avalanche of scholarly books about the Civil War soldier experience that ensued in the 1980s, historians ignore him too. Despite conventional estimates that perhaps 4 percent of Federal soldiers and 10 percent of Confederate soldiers or more were draftees, scholars hasten past the conscript’s embarrassing shade in favor of those eager boys of 1861. Often illiterate or nearly so, the conscript, to be sure, did himself no favors by leaving many fewer traditional sources for later students. Small surprise that Albert Burton Moore’s standard examination of conscription appeared almost a century ago.1 Like Moore’s venerable volume, John M. Sacher’s new study is more concerned with the policy of conscription and its top-down implementation than the draftees themselves. Unlike the older book, Sacher’s firmly rejects the familiar argument that conscription undermined the Confederacy from within. Embracing an “externalist” interpretation of Confederate defeat, the author contends that most white Confederates understood that they were outnumbered, grasped the need to field as many soldiers as possible, and supported the draft when volunteering failed to meet expectations. The first conscription laws of 1862 passed with little debate or opposition in Congress or in public. Only a few die-hard states’ rights proponents, hardly more than unpatriotic ideologues according to the author, attacked conscription’s constitutionality then and later. Where [End Page 261] most Confederate loyalists came to differ with the law, Sacher argues, was in the devilish details of conscription, in terms both of a community’s individual cases and of questions about which additional professions and trades deserved exemptions in order to feed and serve both soldiers and civilians. While such debates reflected real class and ideological fault lines in the Confederacy, as well as competing ties of loyalty to locality and the nation-state, Sacher insists that, as a rule, they did not indicate significant general opposition to conscription itself or to the government that mandated it. Soldiers resented the extension of their enlistments, disliked the rules of substitution, and damned the men at home who gained exemptions denied to volunteers already under arms, yet they too supported the overall concept and largely fought on. Richmond’s willingness to debate and amend the rules and practice of conscription several times won further support. Conscription constantly evolved, according to Sacher, reacting to civilian and military needs. Both Jefferson Davis and Congress demonstrated responsiveness to a supportive public that largely wanted the draft tweaked for fairness but not eliminated, as the 1863 congressional election results seem to indicate. Congress notably passed, and then later in the war tightened, the notorious “Twenty Negro Law,” first in direct response to complaints from the folks at home who feared starvation and violence in the aftermath of the Emancipation Proclamation, then again later when citizens came to fear the evils allegedly wrought by stay-at-home speculators. Sacher adds that no more than 10 percent of planters ever took advantage of the law. Rich men fought the so-called rich man’s war. In a similar manner, Congress widened age limits for the draft as a direct reaction to the expressed needs of proconscription generals, such as Robert E. Lee and Joseph E. Johnston, after Antietam, Gettysburg, and Vicksburg. The lull before the Federal onslaught in 1864 brought similar calls for more men, resulting in the elimination of substitution and in the drafting of men who had hired substitutes. Lee’s need for more men at Petersburg likewise led directly to congressional debate over drafting the enslaved. Sacher admits that Bureau of Conscription officers still had their hands full when it came...
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