Development Of Nuclear Weapons Research Articles

Nuclear weapons in an international security environment

Nuclear weapons are a historically acknowledged factor of security development and maintenance of the strategical balance. Therefore, in spite of programs preventing its proliferation, most states having such weapons modernize and develop their nuclear arsenals, perceiving it as a sign of power and a guarantee of security. The methodology employed in this article critical analysis and synthesis of reliable sources from the scope of the area of research. The nature of the article is explanatory with elements of inference. This paper presents an evaluation of circumstances inducing a state to possess nuclear weapons, in consideration of both the positive and negative consequences of their possession. In the author’s view, studying this article should at least evoke a reflection on the development of nuclear weapons as a means of forming modern relations of security.

Environmental radioactivity aspects of recent nuclear accidents associated with undeclared nuclear activities and suggestion for new monitoring strategies

Recently environmental radionuclide signals were observed in the atmosphere which could be associated with undeclared nuclear activities, not directly connected with development of nuclear weapons. Large-scale contamination of European air with Ru-106 observed in 2017 may represent such an accident, which was probably associated with the Mayak nuclear fuel reprocessing facility in the Chelyabinsk region of Russia. A recently announced nuclear accident at Nyonoska in the Archangelsk region may represent an undeclared nuclear activity associated with the development of a nuclear jet engine which could be based on radionuclide energy generator or a small nuclear reactor. It is concluded that environmental radioactivity impacts associated with recent nuclear activities create new challenges for fast and reliable national and international monitoring systems which would require development of new monitoring strategies.

The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and the Proliferation “Danger Zone”

ABSTRACT Horizontal nuclear proliferation presents what is sometimes referred to as the “Nth country problem,” or identifying which state could be next to acquire nuclear weapons. Nuclear fuel cycle technologies can contribute to both nuclear power generation and weapons development. Consequently, observers often view civilian nuclear programs with suspicion even as research on nuclear latency and the technological inputs of proliferation has added nuance to these discussions. To contribute to this debate, I put forth a simple theoretical proposition: En route to developing a civilian nuclear infrastructure and mastering the fuel cycle, states pass through a proliferation “danger zone.” States with fuel cycle capabilities below a certain threshold will likely be unable to proliferate. States that pass through the “danger zone” without proliferating will be unlikely to do so in the future. I support this proposition by introducing preliminary analysis from the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (NFC) Index, a new heuristic tool to complement political assessments of the connection between civilian nuclear energy development and nuclear weapons proliferation. I conclude with policy implications for contemporary Iran, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and South Korea. Taken together, this article calls for increased policymaker interaction with historical cases and more sophisticated academic engagement with the nuclear fuel cycle.

The American Lab: An Insider's History of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory by C. Bruce Tarter

Reviewed by: The American Lab: An Insider's History of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory by C. Bruce Tarter Benjamin Sims (bio) The American Lab: An Insider's History of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory By C. Bruce Tarter. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018. Pp. 472. In The American Lab, former Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory director C. Bruce Tarter provides a detailed history of the laboratory from its origins in the 1950s through 2009. Tarter has done his homework; this is a carefully researched account, citing many primary sources and oral history interviews. While large portions of the book are devoted to administrative details and quick glosses on a plethora of minor projects likely to interest insiders, it nonetheless provides a useful record of an important and understudied institution (Livermore) and time (the late- and post-Cold War periods). While Tarter's early history of the laboratory is comprehensive, the book really comes to life with his account of the political and technical maneuvering that enabled the weapons laboratories to continue to thrive under the rubric of stockpile stewardship following the end of the Cold War. His observations on the transition of nuclear weapons work to a routine and bureaucratic enterprise and the cultural differences between Livermore and Los Alamos laboratories also illuminate the changing roles and influence of these two laboratories between the Cold War era and the present. Tarter characterizes the relationship between the laboratories as one between an older, established, conservative institution (Los Alamos) and a brash start-up company eager to innovate and make a name for itself (Livermore). Unlike Los Alamos, which emerged out of urgent efforts at a time of national emergency, Livermore's existence was the result of hard-fought [End Page 1238] political and technical battles going back to its main founders, E.O. Lawrence and Edward Teller. In Tarter's account, Livermore was a driver of innovation through the 1960s and 1970s and quickly staked its claim in the nuclear weapons business as an equal partner with Los Alamos, which was largely content to work within existing constraints. Livermore continued to display greater willingness than Los Alamos to engage in political and technical maneuvering to push new and risky projects and concepts, even where technical feasibility had not quite been established. Although this strategy enabled the laboratory to grow, in some cases it led to technical and administrative difficulties. It also contributed to the laboratory's reputation for actively pushing a militaristic, "hardline, anticommunist point of view" that led to public criticism—particularly in relation to missile defense. Tarter led Livermore from 1994 through 2002, a time period that encompasses the core of the difficult transition of the United States nuclear weapons complex from a Cold War footing, focused on development and testing of nuclear weapons, to a post-Cold War era of diversifying missions and increased bureaucratic oversight. The American Lab provides an engaging account of this period, partly from Tarter's own perspective. It also highlights the role of Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs Vic Reis in the development of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, which enabled the weapons laboratories to survive and even prosper after the Cold War. Although Tarter covers many of the other players, Reis appears as an energetic and charismatic force who broke the laboratories' post-Cold War sense of malaise, encouraged new ideas, and laid the groundwork for the future. Tarter might have written a more focused and accessible (if less comprehensive) book had he chosen to cover this period in detail rather than the entire history of the laboratory. Much of the scholarly work on the nuclear weapons laboratories in the post-Cold War period has been by sociologists and anthropologists, including Donald MacKenzie and Graham Spinardi, Hugh Gusterson, Joseph Masco, Laura McNamara, and the author of this review in collaboration with Christopher Henke. Gusterson's work is particularly relevant here because of its focus on Livermore scientists. While these authors cover key events and delve deeply into the mindset and experiences of weapons scientists, they do not provide a comprehensive institutional perspective or historical timeline for the weapons laboratories. The collection Doomed to Cooperate, compiled by Siegfried Hecker, Tarter's...

Strait Rituals: China, Taiwan, and the United States in the Taiwan Strait Crises, 1954–1958 by Pang Yang Huei

Reviewed by: Strait Rituals: China, Taiwan, and the United States in the Taiwan Strait Crises, 1954–1958 by Pang Yang Huei Xiaobing Li bli@uco.edu Pang Yang Huei Strait Rituals: China, Taiwan, and the United States in the Taiwan Strait Crises, 1954–1958 . Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2019. 317 pp. $55.00 (cloth). Few areas of research on international crises are more difficult than the Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s, due to their historical role in the origins of the Cold War in East Asia and their unique geopolitical position in relation to the ongoing tensions among the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan), and the United States. Conventional texts have adopted a Cold War approach, characterizing the Taiwan Strait crises as byproducts or a sideshow of the confrontation between two contending camps: the free world and Communism. Therefore, the crises resulted naturally from an ideological conflict, misunderstanding, or miscommunication of the other's intention. The communication obstacle between Communist and non-Communist governments was that each projected themselves into the frame of reference within which the other operated. On the basis of extensive, multiarchive research, Pang Yang Huei diverts from the usual Cold War approach, focusing instead on the relatively neglected area of each government's national interest, security concern, and a "quiet diplomacy" (267) through their "tacit communication" (268). His interpretation of the tacit accommodation process "allows one to appreciate the complexity of adversarial and alliance diplomacy" (6) and makes a new contribution to this case study. Beginning in the first chapter, Pang follows major historical events and introduces his approach and sources. Then, he sets up a stage for the crises in chapters 2–4 by providing a historical background of PRC-ROC-United States relations from 1950 to 1954, emphasizing the Geneva Conference (1954) as "a foundation for Sino-US tacit communication" (49). Nancy Bernkopf Tucker's work indicated that the Truman and Eisenhower administrations made commitments to Taiwan's security in the early 1950s, despite it being riddled with mistrust, ignorance, and "strategic ambiguity." 1 In retrospect, US policy and the Korean War simultaneously disengaged the Chinese from their hot civil war and engaged them in the global Cold War. Harry Truman's legacy was to keep the Taiwan Strait military struggle "cold" and build the basis for political and international competition in which both Chinese parties could find alternatives or potentially a peaceful solution to their civil struggle. Truman did not intend to postpone the Chinese Civil War or provide Beijing with a different reason to attack Taipei. Leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Beijing understood Truman's policy and stopped their planned landing operation against Taiwan in 1950–1953. 2 Certainly, the Korean War played an important role in Beijing's strategic shift from the Taiwan Strait to the Korean Peninsula. Pang devotes chapters 5 and 6 to the crisis of 1954–1955 and shows that "a ritualized pattern of diplomacy emerged in spite of the belligerent rhetoric hurled around" (152). Scholars have searched for the answers to Chinese war decisions and use of military forces. 3 In 1954, Beijing perceived unmistakable indications that the Taipei-Washington collaboration was accelerating. If a quick and effective message was not conveyed to the Eisenhower administration, Beijing believed, American cooperation would legitimize Taiwan within international politics, hindering the PRC's goal of gaining full acceptance [End Page E-14] in the international community. On the one hand, Chinese leaders seemed willing to accept the fact that the PLA (People's Liberation Army; the PRC's armed forces), as a weak army, would not fight the superior US armed forces in the Taiwan Strait if the Americans made a commitment to its defense. On the other hand, Beijing used armed forces in the Taiwan Strait explicitly to demonstrate its determination as well as to encourage possible restraint from Washington. Meanwhile, US nuclear threats in the spring of 1955 forced Chinese leaders' momentous decision to make their own nuclear bomb. Thus, the 1954–1955 Taiwan Strait crisis may be viewed as the starting point of China's nuclear weapons development program. 4...

“Business for Peace” (B4P): can this new global governance paradigm of the United Nations Global Compact bring some peace and stability to the Korean peninsula?

North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) is under strict UN economic sanctions because it violated UN policy in its development of nuclear weapons and long range missiles as well as for its militant rhetoric. South Korea (Republic of Korea or ROK) and Japan, as close allies of the USA, are unsure of the future. Is there a way to bring some peace and stability to the Korean peninsula? Some argue that this is a hopeless task as long as the current leadership of North Korea is in power. This article takes a more positive stance and outlines a possible way forward. The study, following the position of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK), assumes that the conflict is at root one over ideology and power. The leadership of North Korea understands itself as “a revolutionary and socialist state” and is determined to continue to control the country through a rigorous and sometimes brutal government oversight of the culture. Although poverty and hunger are widespread, the people have little opportunity to be heard. What if the leaders of North Korea were persuaded that they could gain legitimacy through developing a dynamic economy that brought flourishing to their people and respect by fellow-nations in the global village? The article proposes to start this new adventure by developing enterprise zones in the North (the Kaesong Industrial Complex) that would bring jobs and food to hundreds of thousands of North Koreans. To begin this project, there would need to be dramatic steps toward denuclearization on the part of the North in order to relax the UN economic sanctions. Is it possible? The article outlines a way forward.

Punishing the violators? Arms embargoes and economic sanctions as tools of norm enforcement

AbstractThe persistence and strength of international norms are thought to depend partly on the willingness of actors to punish their violation, but norm enforcement is often inconsistent. This article investigates states’ use of economic sanctions in order to gain insight into the role of metanorms (norms about enforcing norms) in international politics and explain this inconsistency. The quantitative analyses examine patterns of economic sanctions and arms embargo practices across different security norms and reveal two central findings. First, international metanorms may accommodate important interstate relationships. Although severe human rights abuse, conflict, nuclear weapons development, and support for terrorist organisations tend to attract sanctions, they are infrequent in comparison with norm violations. Valued relationships between senders and targets seem to be an accepted limit to the pursuit of costly norm enforcement. Second, norm violations nevertheless remain rare, suggesting that factors other than the prospect of material punishment may encourage compliance. Indeed, by preserving interstate relationships, international metanorms may facilitate the engagement needed for socialisation and social pressures as alternative compliance mechanisms.

국제법상 환경보호를 위한 핵무기 규제에 관한 연구

In view of past historical experiences, there have been growing concerns that the development, use and proliferation of nuclear weapons can cause widespread and severe damage to the global environment, in spite of differences in the perceptions of environmental risks of nuclear weapons depending on the time period and situation. Thus, the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons has long been one of the major issues in the international community, including environmental aspects. As a result, international legal regulations have been attempted for the manufacture, production, acquisition, possession, transportation, deployment, stockpiling, tests and use of nuclear weapons through multilateral treaties, including international environmental law, and the issue was subjected to judicial judgment by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).BR In light of the potential danger of environmental destruction and damage caused by nuclear weapons, which is more severe and massive than by any other conventional weapons, regulation of nuclear weapons for environmental protection is recognized as a major task in modern international law. The traditional approach to nuclear weapon regulation has been primarily discussed in connection with national security, the prohibition of use of force, nuclear disarmament, and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, partially establishing relevant international norms in the respective fields.BR However, comprehensive regulation is still a long way off through the traditional approach. In addition, as ICJ indicated in its 1996 advisory opinion, this approach is somewhat inappropriate in obtaining a clear answer as to whether there is an international legal obligation to protect the environment from nuclear weapons, whether in peace or at war. Moreover, it is still questioned whether current international norms on nuclear weapon regulation can be an effective international legal basis for environmental protection.BR The author, based on this perception, reviewed the main relevant provisions of major international treaties in the fields of nuclear disarmament and denuclearization (Chapter Ⅱ), international humanitarian law (Chapter Ⅲ), and multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) (Chapter Ⅳ), which have been discussed as the influential legal basis to regulate nuclear weapons for the environmental protection in international law, and respectively analyzed their effectiveness as well. Through these discussions, from the perspective of ‘environmental protection’ in the non-ideological and non-political points of view, the author looks forward to being able to provide helpful motives to establish regional and/or global legal regime to not only protect the global environment, but also realize genuine humanitarianism and human rights protection by permanently removing nuclear weapons and achieving denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula.

Dialogue with John Dunn on Korean Denuclearization

This dialogue addresses the global risk that broke out of the North Korean development of nuclear weapons and missiles. It starts from the brutal consequences of the national division for Korea and asks why North Korea has been so preoccupied with nuclear projects as has been found to be the case since the 1990s, and how much and why Kim Jung-un today differs from his father in terms of his future, and where the fundamental limit lies in Moon Jae-In’s as well as Trump’s approaches to Korean denuclearization and peace. The highlight of this dialogue is to explain the intrinsic difficulties for Donald Trump and Kim Jung-un in finding a reasonable solution to their respective demands for denuclearization and regime security, and explore the likely future of the Korean Peninsula from the vantage point of Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy and metamorphosis.

Selling the Iran Nuclear Agreement: Prospect Theory and the Campaign to Frame the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

This paper examines the Obama administration’s arguments for ratifying the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to limit Iran’s nuclear capabilities and whether these claims encouraged U.S. senators to approve the agreement. The analysis relies on Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory in which more risk is taken to avoid certain loss and improve conditions when options are framed in terms of losses rather than gains. We argue that the Obama administration was able to persuade Democratic senators to support the JCPOA by arguing the agreement had the potential to curb the development of nuclear weapons by the Iranian regime. But more importantly, the administration was able to frame the status quo as a certain loss, and thus, the risk associated with the JCPOA was acceptable in comparison to not adopting the agreement. Our analysis of the Obama administration’s lobbying efforts and the Democratic senators' statements in support of the agreement demonstrate the value of applying prospect theory to understanding decision making with respect to American foreign policy formulation.

Timely exposure of a secret project: Which activities to monitor?

AbstractA defender wants to detect as quickly as possible whether some attacker is secretly conducting a project that could harm the defender. Security services, for example, need to expose a terrorist plot in time to prevent it. The attacker, in turn, schedules his activities so as to remain undiscovered as long as possible. One pressing question for the defender is: which of the project's activities to focus intelligence efforts on? We model the situation as a zero‐sum game, establish that a late‐start schedule defines a dominant attacker strategy, and describe a dynamic program that yields a Nash equilibrium for the zero‐sum game. Through an innovative use of cooperative game theory, we measure the harm reduction thanks to each activity's intelligence effort, obtain insight into what makes intelligence effort more effective, and show how to identify opportunities for further harm reduction. We use a detailed example of a nuclear weapons development project to demonstrate how a careful trade‐off between time and ease of detection can reduce the harm significantly.

Frustration and Delay: The Secondary Effects of Supply-Side Proliferation Controls

Do trade barriers help slow the spread of nuclear weapons? Supply-side controls on proliferation equipment and material are often dismissed as ineffective because nuclear weapons–seeking states can develop methods to circumvent the controls. However, these global export controls have important secondary effects. By creating barriers to trade, export controls force states to develop costly and inefficient methods that interfere with progress toward nuclear weapons development. Using case evidence beginning with the advent of the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s export control regime in 1974, I argue that the resulting delay and frustration can change leaders’ strategic calculations regarding the value of their nuclear weapons programs. These findings demonstrate that proliferation controls do slow the spread of nuclear weapons, both by delaying existing programs, and by decreasing the likelihood that leaders will make decisions to continue with, or even start, nuclear weapons programs.

Overhaul urged for US nuclear weapons cleanup

An expert science panel is calling for the US Department of Energy to overhaul science and technology development for cleaning up the nation’s nuclear weapons sites. The huge cleanup program has already taken nearly 40 years and will likely take at least 50 more, says a report released by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine on March 4. Cleanup has cost $170 billion to date and is likely to draw at least another $377 billion, according to panel chair and Columbia University engineering professor Patricia J. Culligan. The DOE is responsible for cleaning up 107 sites used for nuclear weapons development, testing, and production during the Manhattan Project and the Cold War. The formal program began in the 1980s and has cleaned up 91 sites so far. The remaining 16 sites present the thorniest radioactive and hazardous waste challenges. To address those challenges, the National Academies report recommends

Conceptual mappings in political cartoons: A comparative study of the case of nuclear crises in US–North Korean relations

This paper aims to provide a cognitive semantic account of the construal of multimodality by conducting a comparative case study of political cartoons on the US–North Korea nuclear crises in two eras. It focuses on how conceptual metaphors and conceptual blends contribute to different meaning constructions in each era's sub-set of the data. Specifically, the paper looks at two groups of political cartoons published in English that contain images of the political leaders of the US and North Korea and that deal with nuclear weapons: those published before US President Donald Trump took office, and those published after. Seventy-eight cartoons that address the relationship between the two nations by situating images of political figures in certain events (e.g., dueling, having drinks together, etc.) were collected from a total of 600 (accessed Jan. 10, 2018) found via a Google image search. The analysis finds that the two groups of cartoons differ in entailments regarding the power relationship between the two nations: the first group frames as negligible North Korea's efforts to develop nuclear weapons and reifies the situation in terms of two people of radically different physical strengths. The second group frames the two nations as equally competent, illustrating seriously escalating tensions over the issue of North Korea's development of nuclear weapons. This study, based on its qualitative and comparative analysis within a cognitive semantics framework, argues that cognitive mechanisms such as conceptual metaphor and blending help effectively convey different viewpoints for the two groups of cartoons, which directly reflect different stances toward the relationship between the two nations in the different eras.

ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЯ СВІТОБУДОВИ ПІСЛЯ ДРУГОЇ СВІТОВОЇ ВІЙНИ ТА МІСЦЕ В НІЙ США І СРСР(1945 – 1946 рр.)

The article is devoted to studing the trunsformation (changes) in the world after the Second World War, as well as the role and the place in it of two powerful states – the USA and the USSR. The article is devoted to the study of the question of the universe after the Second World War, as well as the role and the place in it of two powerful states – the USA and the USSR. In the article, the author emphasizes the objective and subjective circumstances that transformed Soviet-American relations since 1945. At the same time, it is emphasized that relations are complicated by the emergence of a new factor – atomic. Consideration of Soviet-USA relations is proposed through the lens of attempting to establish USA-USSR cooperation in the economic sphere, the development of nuclear weapons, and a technological approach in strategic arms. Much attention is paid to the meeting of the Big Three, which took place in Potsdam. In particular, on the one hand, the focus is on the direct procedure for concluding peace treaties and establishing diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Romania and Finland; on the other, the distribution of spheres of influence across Germany, based on the relevant protocol. In general, the author attempted to prove that the Berlin Conference made it possible to find mutually agreed solutions and to reach compromises, despite the escalation.

Farsightedness in Games: Stabilizing Cooperation in International Conflict

We show that a cooperative outcome—one that is at least next-best for the players—is not a Nash equilibrium (NE) in 19 of the 57 2 x 2 strict ordinal conflict games (33%), including Prisoners’ Dilemma and Chicken. Auspiciously, in 16 of these games (84%), cooperative outcomes are nonmyopic equilibria (NMEs) when the players make farsighted calculations, based on backward induction; in the other three games, credible threats induce cooperation. More generally, in all finite normal-form games, if players’ preferences are strict, farsighted calculations stabilize at least one Pareto-optimal NME. We illustrate the choice of NMEs that are not NEs by two cases in international relations: (i) no first use of nuclear weapons, chosen by the protagonists in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and since adopted by some nuclear powers; and (ii) the 2015 agreement between Iran, and a coalition of the United States and other countries, that has been abrogated by the United States but has forestalled Iran’s possible development of nuclear weapons.

Extraordinary Protagonists, Average Issues

Abstract Thriller is considered to be a subgenre of criminal fiction, in which the most significant role is played by fast-paced action, suspense, spectacular events. In case of so called international and political thrillers it should also be mentioned that their authors construct their plots around the problems such as global conflicts, international conspiracy, terrorism, the development of nuclear weapon. However, problems commonly mentioned by many authors of other subgenres of criminal fiction, are also present in the novels classified as thrillers. The collapse of well-being society, unstable interpersonal relationships, mental problems of an individual, childhood traumas are therefore often mentioned by the writers, although they do not usually constitute main subjects of the novels. The article concentrates on some examples from international and political thrillers, in which such issues seem to be equally important, written by the most popular Finnish authors of this particular genre, namely Ilkka Remes and Taavi Soininvaara.

WITHDRAWN (duplicate publication): Deterring the development and use of nuclear weapons: A multi-level modeling approach

WITHDRAWN (duplicate publication): Deterring the development and use of nuclear weapons: A multi-level modeling approach

Challenges to Strategic Stability in South Asia: An Analysis

The South Asian security environment is in a state of flux due to the rivalry of two nuclear powers, India and Pakistan. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by both the states cannot be retracted; however, it is critically important to maintain a stable and credible deterrence at the lowest possible level. Pakistan has often proposed India to develop a “strategic restraint regime” to avert the possibility of a total war that could culminate in a nuclear war. To establish such a regime, there is a need to improve bilateral relations and increase cooperation in the nuclear domain. To avoid chances of nuclear use, India and Pakistan should reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons by spending less on nuclear weapons development. This paper tries to examine the challenges to strategic stability in South Asia from domestic, regional and global perspectives and also explores that how the interplay of these challenges is undermining the South Asian strategic stability. The role of major powers, especially the US, has also been analysed for a thorough understanding of an already fragile security situation in the region.

Oppenheimer Quotes the Bhagavad Gita

Robert Oppenheimer, the scientist who directed the Manhattan Project that built the two atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, remained morally ambivalent about his role in the entire matter. He summed up the effect the first experimental test, code named Trinity, of an atom bomb had on him; he said, “Now I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds”, a rough translation of a verse from the Hindu scripture, the Bhagavad Gita. The iconic mushroom cloud of an atomic bomb explosion and Oppenheimer’s observation after the Trinity test have since become an emotional fixture related to atomic weapons in the minds of people. Here we try to understand the interplay of different perspectives with which different people engaged in the development and use of nuclear weapons view their participation. Oppenheimer’s passing reference to a verse from the Bhagavad Gita still creates awesome emotional and aural sensation but it has had no effect on those involved in the manufacture and deployment of nuclear weapons in warfare. Humankind is addicted to warfare.