This paper aims to view corruption in light of the consequences that arise from it and believes that corruption should not be regarded in individual instances. Corruption is not restricted to any one type office or motive or a single type of compensation. The paper argues that by its very nature corruption is a self reproducing network that leads to a social institution that parallels the government in strength and its impact on the economy. Once corruption is institutionalized, people interacting in a corrupt network often have no choice but to engage in corrupt practices thereby ‘supporting’ and fueling the furtherance of the institution of corruption. The provision of licenses and permits is used as a standing example to measure the nature of corruption because the monopoly that the public sector has over the issue of such public goods and services is exemplified by regulations in licensing and the awarding of permits. The consequences of corruption are identified in the context of license provision. It is very common for ministries or smaller branches of the government to entrust one of their officials with the responsibility of granting a license or permit for a certain project. This is seen in heavy industries or large projects which require a sizable investment and will yield massive revenue in time. Licenses and permits are common for natural resource extraction, steel, coal and natural gas industries, infrastructure development, fisheries, construction and many other such industries. This provide public officials a perfect opportunity to extract rent from citizens who either don't know any better or simply cannot do anything about it because of the system they live in. The dynamics and problems of such a system are highlighted and a few simple solutions are suggested.