Design Of Optimal Monetary Policy Research Articles

Consumption heterogeneity and monetary policy in an open economy

We incorporate two types of agents (Ricardian versus Keynesian) into a standard open economy macro model. We find that consumption heterogeneity has major implications for the impact of monetary policy shocks, the international transmission mechanism, and the design of optimal monetary policy. With sticky prices, the existence of Keynesian agents causes a spillover of shocks across countries, and leads to the interdependence of optimal monetary targeting rules. In the case of local currency pricing, consumer heterogeneity leads an optimal monetary policy to generate currency misalignment and deviations from the law of one price. Theoretically, there are ranges of household heterogeneity in which monetary policy becomes ineffective, but this depends sensitively on the interaction of aggregate demand and relative price effects.

Optimal Monetary Policy Under Sectoral Interconnections

We explore the role of intersectoral factor demand linkages for the design of optimal monetary policy. A two-sector new-Keynesian model is developed in which the sectors are connected through factor demand linkages. Moreover, they differ in price stickiness. We obtain two important results: first, the presence of factor demand linkages causes amplification effects in resource mis-allocation and, hence, the concern for price stability becomes relatively more important. Second, the optimal price index is not the same as the aggregate price index, although it does not directly depend on the factor demand linkages themselves. Furthermore, based on the micro-founded loss function we derive a policy rule that implements the optimal allocation.

Inflation and optimal monetary policy in a model with firm heterogeneity and Bertrand competition

We study the joint implications of heterogeneity of total factor productivity and strategic price interactions between firms on the dynamics of inflation and the design of optimal monetary policy. In this setting, more productive firms respond less to shocks affecting their marginal costs than less productive firms. As a consequence, economies with a larger proportion of highly productive firms face a flatter Phillips curve. Moreover, when these two features concur, the Ramsey problem gives rise to an optimal non-zero long run inflation that amplifies the differences in relative prices between more efficient and less efficient firms, thus increasing the market share of the former. Nevertheless, in the presence of transitory technology shocks, optimal short term deviations from this positive long run inflation are negligible.

A Note on Imperfect Credibility

We explore how outcomes of optimal monetary policy with loose commitment (Schaumburg and Tambalotti, 2007; Debortoli and Nunes, 2010) can be observationally equivalent, or interpretable as outcomes of deeper optimal policy under sustainable plans (Chari and Kehoe, 1990). Both interpretations of “imperfect credibility” in optimal monetary policy design are attempts to rationalize outcomes that lie in between the conventional extremes of optimal policy under commitment and under discretion. In a standard monetary-policy framework, when we match impulse responses of inflation and the output gap to large enough markup shocks, we find that a small probability (1 – a = 0.05) of replanning in the quasi/loose commitment world corresponds to N = 18 in the N-period punishment optimal sustainable monetary policy, in terms of observable outcomes. For plausible cases of loose-commitment model economies (with a between 0.77 and 1) we can find an observationally equivalent sustainable-plan economy indexed by some N.

Animal spirits and optimal monetary policy design in the presence of labour market frictions

Using a New Keynesian DSGE model with labour market frictions, we compare outcomes for backward-looking animal spirits expectations with rational expectations after technology and demand shocks. For optimal monetary policy, major differences arise only for technology shocks, and discretionary policy performs better than commitment policy under animal spirits expectations. If Taylor rule parameters are chosen to best replicate optimal monetary policy outcomes, inflation targeting is only appropriate for technology shocks, particularly for large labour frictions, while targeting only economic activity is appropriate for demand shocks. Fault tolerance analysis shows high costs from failing to identify true animal spirits expectations and technology shocks.

Expectations and optimal monetary policy: A stability problem revisited

A landmark result in the optimal monetary policy design literature is that fundamental-based interest rate rules invariably lead to rational expectations equilibria (REE) that are not stable under adaptive learning. In this paper, we make a novel information assumption that private agents cannot observe aggregate fundamental shocks, and use simple linear forecasting rules for learning. We find that with fundamental-based rules, there exist limited information equilibria that are stable under learning. Moreover, there are multiple equilibria. Learning can be used as a selection tool to identify a unique equilibrium.

La Reserva Federal de Estados Unidos y el Banco de Inglaterra: Propiedad, estructura e 'independencia'

<p><strong>Resumen </strong></p> <p>Este ensayo explora la fundación y desarrollo de la Reserva Federal (Fed) de Estados Unidos (US) y el Banco de Inglaterra (BI), en la perspectiva del debate reciente de la independencia de la banca central y el diseño de la política monetaria óptima. Se muestra que los creadores de la Fed fueron agudamente conscientes de que estaban fundando un banco central (basado en algún grado en el BI al punto en que había evolucionado). Por esto fueron conscientes del poder potencial que la institución podría tener, de manera que la cuestión del control e influencia fue central. De forma interesante, los padres fundadores finalmente optaron por la independencia de los intereses del dinero de Wall Street en lugar de la independencia del Estado. La reputación de la Fed de competencia política e independencia se debe mucho más al papel de sus fuertes presidentes en años recientes que a cualquier diseño formal.</p> <p>En contraste, el BI fue fundado como un banco privado. Preocupaciones sobre su independencia no jugaron ningun papel en su historia temprana y solamente surgieron después de que había adquirido, paso a paso, las responsabilidades de un banco central. Las primeras preocupaciones serias sobre su independencia fueron durante el periodo de entreguerras cuando se pensaba que el Banco estaba demasiado atento en su apoyo al papel de Londres como centro de finanzas internacionales, a expensas de los intereses de la economía doméstica. En parte por esa razón fue nacionalizado en 1947. Cuando se otorgó su independencia operacional en 1997, se le quitaron dos de sus responsabilidades para evitar conflictos de interés.</p> <p>Lo que enseña la historia de los bancos es, primero, que la independencia del gobierno no es lo esencial para alcanzar una política óptima, sino la libertad de perseguir una sola prioridad, y segundo, que la efectividad con la cual eso se lleva a cabo tiene poco o nada que ver con leyes, actas constitutivas, y estatutos.</p>

UNION POWER, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, AND OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY

We study the design of optimal monetary policy (Ramsey policies) in a model with sticky prices and unionized labour markets. Collective wage bargaining and unions monopoly power tend to dampen wage fluctuations and to amplify employment fluctuations relatively to a DNK model with walrasian labour markets. The optimal monetary policy must trade-off counteracting forces. On the one side deviations from zero inflation allow the policy maker to smooth inefficient employment fluctuations. On other side, the presence of wage mark-ups and wage stickiness produce inflationary pressures that require aggressive inflation targeting. Overall we find that the Ramsey planner deviates from full price stability and that an optimal rule targets inflation the real economic activity alongside inflation.

Limited Asset Market Participation: Does it Really Matter for Monetary Policy?

We study the design of monetary policy in an economy characterized by staggered wage and price contracts together with limited asset market participation (LAMP). Contrary to previous results, we find that once nominal wage stickiness, an incontrovertible empirical fact, is considered: The Taylor Principle is restored as a necessary condition for equilibrium determinacy for any empirically plausible degree of LAMP; the implications of LAMP for the design of optimal monetary policy are minor; optimal interest rate rules become active no matter the degree of asset market participation. For these reasons we argue that LAMP is not particularly important for monetary policy.

Inventories and optimal monetary policy in a small open economy

We study how inventory investment affects the design of optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian small open economy model. We find that under producer currency pricing, when the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is smaller than 1, optimal monetary policy in our model with inventories is similar to a standard model without inventories. However, when the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is larger than 1, inventory investment increases the importance of nominal exchange rate stabilization relative to a standard model without inventories. The importance of nominal exchange rate stabilization increases with the intratemporal elasticity of substitution.

Inventories and Optimal Monetary Policy

We introduce inventories into a standard New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model to study the effect on the design of optimal monetary policy. The possibility of inventory investment changes the transmission mechanism in the model by decoupling production from final consumption. This allows for a higher degree of consumption smoothing since firms can add excess production to their inventory holdings. We consider both Ramsey optimal monetary policy and a monetary policy that maximizes consumer welfare over a set of simple interest rate feedback rules. We find that in contrast to a model without inventories, Ramsey-optimal monetary policy in a model with inventories deviates from complete inflation stabilization. In the standard model, nominal price rigidity is a deadweight loss on the economy, which an optimizing policymaker attempts to remove. With inventories, a planner can reduce consumption volatility and raise welfare by accumulating inventories and letting prices change as an equilibrating mechanism. We find also find that the application of simple rules comes very close to replicating Ramsey optimal outcomes.

Ramsey monetary policy with labor market frictions

Traditional New Keynesian models prescribe that optimal monetary policy should aim at price stability. In the absence of a labor market frictions, the monetary authority faces no unemployment/inflation trade-off. The design of optimal monetary policy is analyzed here for a framework with sticky prices and matching frictions in the labor market. Optimal policy features deviations from price stability in response to both productivity and government expenditure shocks. When the Hosios [1990. On the efficiency of matching and related models of search and unemployment. Review of Economic Studies 57 (2), 279–298] condition is not met, search externalities make the flexible price allocation unfeasible. Optimal deviations from price stability increase with workers’ bargaining power, as firms incentives to post vacancies fall and unemployment fluctuates above the Pareto efficient one.

Labor Turnover Costs, Workers' Heterogeneity, and Optimal Monetary Policy

We study the design of optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian model with labor turnover costs in which wages are set according to a right to manage bargaining where the firms’ counterpart is given by currently employed workers. Our model captures well the salient features of European labor market, as it leads to sclerotic dynamics of worker flows. The coexistence of those types of labor market frictions alongside with sticky prices gives rise to a non-trivial trade-off for the monetary authority. In this framework, firms and current employees extract rents and the policy maker finds it optimal to use state contingent inflation taxes/subsidies to smooth those rents. Hence, in the optimal Ramsey plan, inflation deviates from zero and the optimal volatility of inflation is an increasing function of firing costs. The optimal rule should react to employment alongside inflation.

Local Currency Pricing versus Producer Currency Pricing: Direct Evidence from German Exporters

AbstractIn new open-economy macroeconomic models, the assumption on the pricing behavior of firms in international trade plays a central role. Whether firms apply producer currency pricing (PCP) or local currency pricing (LCP) crucially affects, for example, the design of optimal monetary policy or the choice of the optimal exchange rate system. However, empirical evidence has so far been mixed and is furthermore mostly of an indirect nature. This paper draws direct evidence on the price-setting behavior of German exporters from a questionnaire-based survey. We find that PCP applies in more integrated markets. Differences between LCP firms and PCP firms mainly exist with respect to the use of mark-ups and in the validity of the law of one price for their respective products.

RAMSEY MONETARY POLICY WITH CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND NOMINAL RIGIDITIES

Recent literature on the design of optimal monetary policy has shown that deviations from price stability are small whenever prices are sticky. This paper reconsiders this issue by introducing capital accumulation in the model. Optimal monetary policy in this setup implies small deviations from price stability. The monetary authority optimally uses inflation as an explicit tax on monopolistic profits to reduce the price markup across states. Variable markup is achieved in this setup because the share of investment demand over output varies across states and in response to TFP shocks.

Optimal Monetary Policy Under Uncertainty: A Markov Jump-Linear-Quadratic Approach

This paper studies the design of optimal monetary policy under uncertainty using a Markov jumplinear-quadratic (MJLQ) approach. To approximate the uncertainty that policymakers face, the authors use different discrete modes in a Markov chain and take mode-dependent linear-quadratic approximations of the underlying model. This allows the authors to apply a powerful methodology with convenient solution algorithms that they have developed. They apply their methods to analyze the effects of uncertainty and potential gains from experimentation for two sources of uncertainty in the New Keynesian Phillips curve. The examples highlight that learning may have sizable effects on losses and, although it is generally beneficial, it need not always be so. The experimentation component typically has little effect and in some cases it can lead to attenuation of policy. (JEL E42, E52, E58)

Optimal Monetary Policy in an Estimated Dsge Model of the Euro Area with Cross-Country Heterogeneity

This paper investigates the implications of cross-country heterogeneity within the euro area for the design of optimal monetary policy. We build an optimizing-based multi-country model (MCM) describing the euro area in which differences between structural parameters across countries are allowed. Using Bayesian techniques, we estimate the MCM and its area-wide counterpart (AWM). We then question which model is the most appropriate for monetary policy purposes. Several results emerge. First, using an AWM induces relatively large and significant welfare losses. Second, this is not the use of a rule based on aggregated variables that is costly in terms of welfare, but rather the use of a sub-optimal forecasting model. Third, allowing for habit on consumption has important implications for the dynamics of models but taking into account difference in price indexation has more drastic effects on welfare losses.

Solution Algorithm to a Class of Monetary Rational Equilibrium Macromodels with Optimal Monetary Policy Design

In this paper an extended algorithm using well-known solution methods for monetary models characterized by rational expectations and optimal monetary policy design is given. The extension enables first the use of broad dynamic interdependencies within the structural model of the economy, second stochastic shocks on all endogenous variables and third commitment to a policy displaying no time inconsistency problem. All these points are not entirely new, but are seldom included into an operational solution algorithm. Furthermore a computational improvement concerning the splitting process for the stable and unstable part of the solution is proposed.

Ramsey Monetary Policy With Labour Market Frictions

This paper studies the design of optimal monetary policy (in terms of unconstrained Ramsey allocation) in a framework with sticky prices and matching frictions. Furthermore I consider the role of real wage rigidities. Optimal policy features significant deviations from price stability in response to various shocks. This is so since search externalities generate an unemployment/inflation trade-off. In response to productivity shocks optimal policy is pro-cyclical when the worker's bargaining power is higher than the share of unemployed people in the matching technology and viceversa. This is so since when the workers' share of surplus is high there are many searching workers and few vacancies hence the monetary authority has an incentive to increase vacancy profitability by reducing the interest rate and increasing inflation. The opposite is true when the workers' share of surplus is high. This implies that optimal inflation volatility is U-shaped with respect to workers' bargaining power.

Optimal Monetary Policy in an Estimated DSGE Model of the Euro Area with Cross-Country Heterogeneity

This paper investigates the implications of cross-country heterogeneity within the euro area for the design of optimal monetary policy. We build an optimizing-based multi-country model (MCM) describing the euro area in which differences between structural parameters across countries are allowed. Using Bayesian techniques, we estimate the MCM and its area-wide counterpart (AWM). We then question which model is the most appropriate for monetary policy purposes. Several results emerge. First, using an AWM induces relatively large and significant welfare losses. Second, this is not the use of a rule based on aggregated variables that is costly in terms of welfare, but rather the use of a sub-optimal forecasting model. Third, allowing for habit on consumption has important implications for the dynamics of models but taking into account difference in price indexation has more drastic effects on welfare losses.