The political power is said to be efficient if good results in decision making are achieved by moderate means. For example, if a large parliament makes the same decisions as a given president, the power efficiency of the president is better than that of the parliament. We study the efficiency of three forms of political power, president, cabinet of ministers, and the parliament, using the model from the author's earlier publications on the mathematical theory of democracy. We define an indicator of power quality, referring to the weight of the coalition whose preference is satisfied by each decision. We prove that a presidential power can be absolutely efficient when the society is divided by preferences into (almost) equal coalitions, which is interpreted as social instability, because a small change in preferences breaks the equilibrium. When the society is stable, i.e. there are predominant coalitions, the cabinet and the parliament provide a better power quality. For a model with a large number of independent individuals we derive approximation formulas of the indicator of the power quality which imply a geometric interpretation of optimal president, cabinet, and parliament as providing the greatest projections of their characteristic vectors on the characteristic vector of the society. We draw an analogy to the geometric interpretation of forces in physics. From our standpoint, democratic (collective) forms of power are efficient in a stable society. In an unstable society, a parliament and a cabinet are less efficient than personal power. Linking social stability to economic development, we conclude that a democratic political system is not the cause but rather a result of economic development which makes the society stable. We comment on the political development in the ex-Soviet Union. In particular, we justify the separation of the Soviet Union into independent states as a measure to make the power more powerful when its potential has been exhausted. However, we doubt that democratic transformations can contribute to solving economic problems and that real democratic systems will be established in the ex-Soviet republics before at least major economic difficulties have been overcome. We also outline some applications of our results to Gallup polls of public opinion and to multicriteria decision making.
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