Support For Democracy Research Articles

The populist ambivalence. Presidents and democracy in Latin America

ABSTRACT This article aims to explore the conditions under which populist presidents undermine, preserve or improve democracy, with evidence from Latin America. We address five varieties of democracy in the region (electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian) from 1994 to 2019 in 18 countries and focus on the backsliding or its absence during each presidential term. To do so, we rely on a QCA approach, through which we interpret the changes on each variety, acknowledging the presence/absence of populist presidents, presidents’ popularity, political and economic critical junctures, support for democracy, an institutionalised party system and political stability. Results show an ambivalent relationship between populism and democracy as highlighted by part of the literature. Although populism emerges as an almost necessary condition for democratic backsliding in any variety, there are several cases where the presence of populist presidents led to an improvement of democracy in the different aspects analysed.

Youth Authoritarianism in Korean Democracy: What Makes the Youth in a Consolidated Democracy Withdraw Support for Democracy?

Why do young adults in Korea appear to reject the democratic system and embrace with authoritarianism? Employing a specially designed survey, this study examined the influence of the models of extreme economic hardship, social threat, fairness, and populism using the structural equation model. Thus, the determinants of the authoritarian system were found to be multidimensional and somewhat at odds with each other in the direction of causation. The threat of economic hardship and intolerant attitudes toward North Korea and minorities were important factors that led young adults to support authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, young adults who are critical of the fairness of democracy in Korea continue to support the democratic system. Young adults who are critical of representative democracy and oriented toward populism showed the same preference. This result provides the hopeful prospect that Korea may not join the recent trend of deconsolidation and further reauthoritarianism in the near future.

Ideological beasts or effective organizations? Do voters’ views of democracy affect their expectations of political parties?

ABSTRACT While the functions of political parties have been extensively defined in the political science literature, it is still an open question whether citizens attribute the same roles to parties. Established theories of parties emphasize their linkage functions geared towards representation or effectiveness. This article investigates where citizens locate parties within these perspectives and whether their understanding of party functions is connected to their democratic values, preference for democratic institutions, and evaluations of the democratic systems. We base our exploratory investigation on original data from a survey run in the UK and Australia in 2020, which includes novel survey instruments measuring citizens’ preferences for party behaviour. The findings show that citizens rate both representation and effectiveness highly and that their preferences are unrelated to their support for democracy. Significant effects of preferences for representative vs direct democracy and the evaluation of their country’s democracy indicate that dissatisfied citizens are more likely to value representation. Importantly, we identify a large group of respondents who cannot choose between representation and effectiveness, which has theoretical and measurement implications.

Social media and support for democracy in 18 Latin American countries: A comparative analysis of moderated mediation (2018–2020)

Participating in social networks has become a controversial phenomenon. In this study, we explore the relationship between the type of social network used by citizens of 18 Latin American countries (moderated by age) and satisfaction with democracy, based on the mediation carried out by satisfaction with life and economic self-placement. To do so, we have prepared a moderated mediation analysis with the survey carried out by Latinobarómetro in 2018 and in 2020. The results confirm an indirect effect between the networks included and satisfaction with democracy, mediated by the proposed variables, in a majority of the cases.

Political Partisanship and Union Representation Elections

Voting behavior in union representation elections is influenced by rational and non-rational choices alike. This study shows a correlation between one nonrational choice, political partisanship, and such voting behavior. Comparing general election support for Democratic U.S. Presidential nominees where union representation elections occurred—a proxy for political partisanship—with support for a union in those representation elections shows positive, highly statistically significant correlations between Democratic support and union support in every consecutive twelve-month period between the 2008 and 2020 general elections. Furthermore, between 2008 and 2020, the magnitude of this correlation increased to a statistically significant degree.

Strategic considerations and support for direct democracy in the United States

Recent research finds that variation in direct democracy support is partially explained by whether this institution helps advance policy interests. We test this relationship in the United States, whose status as the world's most frequent practitioner of direct democracy and unique nature of citizen-legislating experiences allows us to contribute to this literature. Using a survey of thirteen initiative states that includes questions about every measure on the respondent's ballot, we find that having proposition contests decided as desired, especially for the measure perceived as the most important, is associated with higher support. Those who want a larger percentage of measures to pass are similarly more supportive. We also demonstrate that out-of-power partisans are more favorable toward direct democracy, a finding we replicate for Republicans in a nationwide survey (though this relationship is limited to those aware (or likely aware) of legislative control). We discuss these findings' implications in the conclusion.

Perceived discrimination and support for democracy among immigrants

ABSTRACT Does perceived discrimination and exclusion promote or hinder support for democracy among immigrants? While many studies investigate the drivers of prejudice and discrimination toward immigrants, relatively less is known about the impact of discrimination on immigrants’ political attitudes. In this paper, we assess whether perceived discrimination is associated with higher levels of support for democracy among Muslim immigrants using the EURISLAM survey dataset, which includes data from immigrants from Muslim-majority countries residing in four European countries. We find that in particular, perceived discrimination toward the ethnic or religious in-group is associated with increased support for democracy. These results are robust to alternative control variables, model specification, matching procedures and coefficient stability analysis. Our findings make an important contribution to understanding the implications of discriminatory experiences for immigrants.

To Belong: Feeling “At Home” and Support for Democracy

What explains support for democracy? We ask this question in the context of scholarly assertions that democratic values are weakening among citizens of long-time democracies, most notably among young people. We leverage a panel survey of young Swedes to explore the development of pro-democratic sentiments over time. Investigating whether belonging—specifically, feeling “at home” in Sweden, the municipality, and the neighborhood—strengthens support for democracy, we find that it does positively influence principled support for democracy. In relative terms, we find the impact of belonging to be stronger than that of well-known predictors such as socio-economic status and social capital. Our analysis stands to inform scholarship on democratic values and to illuminate the implications of belonging for political behavior. It also offers insight into the ways that societal integration in the form of belonging can develop among young democratic citizens: through feeling integrated into a range of social communities.

What drives public trust in the military in non-democracies: Evidence from Libya (2014-2019)

ABSTRACT This article investigates the conditions that lead to heightened trust in the military in non-democracies through an empirical study of post-2011 Libya. Drawing on the political science and sociology literatures on institutional trust in non-democratic contexts, we develop hypotheses linking public trust in the military to personal safety, political interest, Islamist orientation, trust in institutions, regionalism, and support for democracy. Using survey data collected by the Arab Barometer between 2014 and 2019, we empirically test these hypotheses. Our findings reveal a confluence of factors driving trust in the military in Libya, including regional, generational, educational, and class divides. Being older, male, and from the East contribute positively to trust in the military as well as perceived personal safety, trust in government, interest in politics, and support for democracy. On the other hand, an Islamist orientation, education and income are negatively correlated. These results allow us to speculate about the drivers of trust in the military. In particular, the positive impact of personal safety and support for democracy could reflect the public's perception of the army as responsible for ensuring safety and protecting a nation in turmoil. The role of interest in politics could be attributed to the charged context of politics and security after the 2014 elections. Notably, regional exceptionalism in the East could be related to the role and behaviour of the eastern-based, self-proclaimed Libyan National Army. Our paper contributes to the limited empirical research on trust in the military in non-democracies, backsliding in conflict countries, and political attitudes in Libya.

The Promise of Representative Democracy: Deliberative Responsiveness

AbstractIn the eyes of its citizens, liberal democracy is connected to at least three promises—the promises of autonomy, equality and rationality. To what extent citizens can view these promises as being fulfilled will affect political trust and support for democracy. The rise of populism and trends towards technocratic government have rightly been interpreted as arising from a gap between normative aspirations and institutional and practical realities. Does this mean that we should adjust our ideals to reality, or that we should strive to bring realities closer to the ideal? Self-proclaimed ‘realists’ argue that democratic ideals are unattainable and that we should therefore settle for a second-best alternative, such as a competitive oligarchy. Against this position, we point out that deliberative democracy offers an attractive ideal for successful representation that can inform democratic innovation. However, deliberative democracy also remains institutionally underdetermined and needs to develop better criteria that enable us to determine if, how and under what conditions the attempt to fulfil democracy’s promises succeeds in practice. In this paper, we suggest a criterion of deliberative responsiveness as a measure for representative democracy’s success in fulfilling promises of autonomy, equality and rationality. We go on to show in what respects these promises tend to be broken in contemporary representative democracies and discuss strategies for institutional reform that have potential to counteract these problems.

A personal history of the political economy of education

The past sixty years have witnessed a stormy growth in the insights on the one hand concerning the importance of one’s education for one’s life, the importance of education and science for collective welfare and on the other hand on the delivery of education and science to strengthen individual and collective welfare. In that case –as one might imagine- we are ready for a golden age of education and science, as societies would organize themselves such as to deliver the best in human talents and in scientific advances. The insights in the political economy of education are less advanced. We understand little of the engineering for long run policies and for the social cohesion which generates the support for such policies. The notion of “institutions” has not yet reach a stage where it gives concrete support for political decision makers. Short term selfinterest of dominant political forces continues to rule the waves. The years ahead will require an essential role for education to share the insights in climate change and overall sustainability and to find democratic support for the transitions which have to be made to maintain a planet inhabitable for its eight plus billion inhabitants.

Spain as the EU’s ‘champion’ in Latin America: elites, government trustworthiness, and free trade

ABSTRACT This paper addresses attitudes around the projection of the EU among Latin American elites, namely the determinants of support for a Free Trade Agreement between the two regions and the trustworthiness of the EU government. We take as data elite surveys conducted in 15 Latin American countries (2014–2019) and consider sociodemographics, ideology, support for democracy, views of foreign powers, exports to the EU, and electoral democracy. Results show that ideology and support for democracy are key determinants of support for an interregional FTA, and that the trustworthiness of governments in the US, China, and Spain covary with attitudes toward the EU. The latter (trust in the government in Spain) proves to be the main driver and, furthermore, its impact is conditional on the economic strength (observed as exports) of the EU: wherever the EU is not a strong economic actor in Latin America, trust in the Spanish government does nothing but improve the image of the EU.

Analysing the lobbying behaviour of experts during the due process of the International Integrated Reporting Framework

PurposeDrawing on Suchman’s conception of cognitive legitimacy and Boswell’s account of the political functions of expert knowledge, this paper aims to study the due process followed by the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) prior to the publication of the first version of the International Integrated Reporting Framework (IIRF). Specifically, the author analyses the lobbying strategies used in the comment letters sent by a subset of lobbyists, “the experts”, represented by accounting bodies and firms, regulators and academics.Design/methodology/approachFrom both a form- and meaning-oriented analysis, this paper focuses on how the experts resorted to the functions of knowledge when they took part in the IIRF’s public consultation. The author first carries out a quantitative content analysis of the responses to the 2013 Consultation Draft submitted by those constituents considered as accounting expert lobbyists. Then, the author analyse how these actors framed their comments under expert knowledge to legitimise the IIRC, the IIRF and the accounting profession itself.FindingsThe findings suggest that the expert groups welcomed the opportunity, not simply to legitimise the IIRC through their democratic support, but to provide a technocratic settlement that ensures the due process is based on the mobilisation of expert knowledge as a legitimate source. By drawing on the cognitive legitimacy of expert lobbyists, the IIRC drew on the political functions of expert knowledge to reduce uncertainty and gain stability.Practical implicationsAnalysis of the lobbying strategies used by the accounting experts whose position could make a difference and receive more attention from the IIRC makes this contribution of particular interest, especially since the first version of the IIRF sought to guide disclosure and sustainable business practices around the world.Social implicationsExperts as political actors play a legitimising role since they are capable of producing relevant knowledge that, due to its nature and scope, certainly affects policymaking and sustainable development.Originality/valueThis research provides a sociopolitical perspective to comprehend how some lobbying strategies, in this case, of expert actors, contribute to legitimising a standard-setter body and its endeavours in the context of voluntary standards.

Understanding public attitudes toward restrictive voting laws in the United States

Existing research on voting legislation argues that Republican lawmakers enact strict voting laws as part of a racialized, partisan electoral strategy—they believe that the laws will reduce minority turnout and benefit Republicans electorally. Yet, the empirical effects of strict voting laws on turnout are mixed, with some studies finding that restrictive legislation can actually increase minority turnout due to counter-mobilization effects. I leverage this empirical finding to study the foundations of public attitudes toward voting laws, specifically testing whether exposure to information that restrictive voting laws can boost minority turnout impacts Republicans’ or Democrats’ attitudes. My results show that Republican support for restrictive voting laws generally does not change in response to information about the consequences of the laws, but Democrats are significantly less opposed when they become aware of the laws’ potential impact on minority turnout. These results pose challenges for building majorities that will defend the franchise in the United States.

Norm-violating rhetoric undermines support for participatory inclusiveness and political equality among Trump supporters.

Over the last decade, the United States has seen increasing antidemocratic rhetoric by political leaders. Yet, prior work suggests that such norm-violating rhetoric does not undermine support for democracy as a system of government. We argue that, while that may be true, such rhetoric does vitiate support for specific democratic principles. We test this theory by extending prior work to assess the effects of Trump's norm-violating rhetoric on general support for democracy as well as for the principles of participatory inclusiveness, contestation, the rule of law, and political equality. We find that Trump's rhetoric does not alter attitudes toward democracy as a preferred system but does reduce support for inclusiveness and equality among his supporters. Our findings suggest that elite rhetoric can undermine basic principles of American democracy.

Public Support for Democracy in the United States Has Declined Generationally.

Support for democracy in the United States, once thought to be solid, has now been shown to be somewhat shaky. One of the most concerning aspects of this declining attachment to democracy is a marked age gap, with younger Americans less supportive of democracy than their older compatriots. Using age-period-cohort analysis of 12 national surveys collected between 1995 and 2019, we show that this age gap is largely a function of a long-term generational decline in support for democracy, with little evidence of an independent life-cycle effect apparent. The combination of generational decline without a positive and counterbalancing life-cycle effect offers a sober prognosis of how support for democracy in the United States might look in the future.

COVID-19 Direct Relief Payments and Political and Economic Attitudes among Tertiary Students: A Quasi-Experimental Study

ABSTRACTDuring the COVID-19 pandemic, ad hoc direct relief payments were used extensively as a means of economic stimulation and individual compensation. Current studies are focusing on the economic impact of these policies, but they seldom consider how these payments affect individual beliefs and attitudes. This study used a survey with quasi-experimental elements to examine how these payments affected tertiary students in Hong Kong by focusing primarily on a cohort including both eligible and noneligible students. Whereas satisfaction with the economy and government and support for democracy were not affected, nonrecipients assigned greater importance to meritocratic factors in improving life outcomes. The findings of this study shed light on how governments inadvertently may be affecting the outlook of young adults with transfers during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Impact of a Supreme Court Decision on the Preferences of Americans Regarding Abortion Policy

We examine the effect of a U.S. Supreme Court decision regarding abortion laws on Americans’ preferences for political candidates. The decision was leaked in advance of the official announcement, and we track the evolution of political preferences from before to after the leak and, eventually, to after the formal announcement. The abortion issue was already very important to voters before the leak, but the Court’s decision did not simply make it more important for everyone. We find that the decision decreased the importance weight of abortion for Republicans, while increasing it for independents/nonvoters. Further, the decision increased Republican support for candidates who want to ban abortions although this effect is diminished for candidates that oppose exceptions for rape, incest, or the mother’s health. Nonaffiliated voters move sharply away from candidates who want to ban abortions without exceptions. The decision also resulted in a lasting polarization along gender lines whereby men became more likely to vote for a candidate that supports a ban on abortion, while women are less likely to support candidates that ban abortions. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, marketing. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4802 .

MIDDLE CLASS IN UKRAINE: GOVERNMENT OR OPPOSITION?

MIDDLE CLASS IN UKRAINE: GOVERNMENT OR OPPOSITION?

Affective polarization, support for democracy, and the mediating role of the winner-loser status. A comparative study

Does affective polarization undermine support for and satis­faction with democracy? In this article, I argue that it does. However, this effect is mediated by the outcome of elections, which group people along the winner-loser divide. I argue that support for and satisfaction with democracy will remain high or increase among polarized publics as long as the outcome of the elections benefits their own party, but not when it benefits the opposing groups. I test these hypotheses using data for 31 elections in 28 countries from CSES project. Results show that affective polarization does not undermine support for democracy and that it increases satisfaction with democracy. Additionally, the results indicate that the relationship between affective polarization and support for democracy will be diffe­rent for winners and losers of the election.