Abstract: Scholars have identified numerous obstacles that appear to stand in way of democracy taking root in Russia, including country's religious heritage. In an attempt to understand role of Orthodoxy in Russian society more accurately, this article explores civic, political, and democratic values of devout Orthodox Christians and more secular-leaning Orthodox. The findings suggest that whereas Russian citizens are only loosely predisposed toward democratic governance, devout Orthodox Christians as a group are somewhat more favorably inclined toward democracy than are other Russians. Moreover, religious belief and practice have virtually no impact on democratic values, suggesting that Orthodoxy may not be obstacle to democracy that some have made it out to be. Key words: Christianity, religion, Russia ********** During Soviet era, many people assumed that Communist Party dictatorship was all that stood in way of democracy in Russia. Once Soviet Union entered dustbin of history, however, path to democracy in Russia was clearly plagued by other, perhaps more formidable obstacles than decaying monolith of Soviet state. Indeed, body of scholarship on Russian democratization since collapse of Soviet Union has been a virtual enterprise of identifying many obstacles to democracy in Russia. The range of such obstacles is dizzying and seemingly endless, extending from country's autocratic past, to authoritarian tendencies of President Putin, and even to some regional leaders, such as Novgorod Governor Mikhail Prussak and Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiev, not to mention debate over absence or existence of a democratic political culture and civil society in Russia. It is not surprising, therefore, that Russia's religious heritage has had its share of blame for country's woes. Shortly after collapse of Soviet Union, Samuel Huntington proclaimed that the cultural division of Europe between Western Christianity ... and Orthodox Christianity and Islam was reemerging, and that the eastern boundary of Western Christianity in year 1500 was the most significant dividing line in (1) Huntington not only predicted that Orthodox world would clash with rest of Europe, but that Orthodox societies seemed much less likely to develop stable democratic political systems. In a similar vein, Michael Radu later announced burden of Eastern Orthodoxy, arguing that Eastern churches were only interested in promoting nationalism and could not contribute in any meaningful way to construction of civil society and democracy in postcommunist Europe. (2) As Prodromou has argued, such ideas are not exception, but rather part of a map that has been drawn, dividing Europe between modern and civilized West and anti-modern and uncivilized East, with region's Orthodox religious tradition serving as a major defining characteristic. (3) Given seriousness of implications that follow from such characterizations, topic certainly warrants a more detailed and robust examination than that offered by Radu, Huntington, and others. If we are to understand role of Orthodoxy in Russian society accurately, we must do more than analyze political maneuverings of Moscow patriarchate and religious rhetoric of pragmatic politicians who seek to appeal to spirituality of Russian citizens; we must look to actual civic, political, and democratic orientations of Russian Orthodox Christians themselves. This is what I do in pages that follow, as I explore civic, political, and democratic values of devout Orthodox Christians and more secular-leaning Orthodox, whose connections to church are more cultural than religious. The findings suggest that although Russian citizens are only loosely predisposed toward democratic governance, devout Orthodox Christians as a group are more favorably inclined toward democracy than are other Russians. …
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Jan 1, 2024
Morgan Mcbride 
Open Access