Government Agencies’ Demand for Audit Quality: Evidence from Government Audit Procurement

SUMMARY Audit quality is influenced by both the demand for and the supply of audits. A major challenge in audit quality research involves isolating supply effects. The audits of Canadian provincial governmental entities present an appealing setting, where there is low variation in the demand for audit quality. Our analysis, employing various audit quality metrics, reveals that Big 4 firms underperform both government auditors and non-Big 4 firms in our setting. We find robust evidence that less government audit knowledge is a key channel through which Big 4 auditors underperform. Additionally, the weaker performance of Big 4 firms may be due to lower effort. Insights from interviews with government audit executives and audit committee members provide evidence supporting the quantitative results. Our results are robust to propensity score matching and to tests that address alternative explanations. Our findings have important implications for governments, audit committees, and auditors in the government sector. JEL Codes: M41; M42.

This study examines the impact of ownership structure and board characteristics on the demand for high-quality audit services in Saudi-listed firms, drawing on agency and stakeholder theories. Using panel data from 162 firms listed on the Saudi Stock Market (Tadawul) between 2018 and 2023, audit quality is measured by auditor brand (Big Four vs. non-Big Four), with audit fees used as an alternative measure for robustness. A Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) regression with instrumental variables is applied to address endogeneity. The findings reveal that firms with higher foreign and institutional ownership are more likely to engage high-quality auditors, while family ownership has no significant effect. Additionally, greater board independence and gender diversity positively influence the demand for audit quality. These results are consistent across different measures of audit quality. The study offers valuable insights for investors, policymakers, and regulators, suggesting that promoting independent and diverse boards, along with encouraging foreign institutional investment, can enhance audit quality, reduce agency costs, and strengthen corporate governance in Saudi Arabia.

Does CEO age matter in auditor choice and audit pricing? The role of CEO dominance

To date, the studies on managerial loss aversion have produced contradictory findings, making it impossible to: (i) identify the ultimate impact of managerial loss aversion on the value that organisations create for themselves and for their stakeholders, and (ii) mitigate the effect of managerial loss aversion to improve corporate value creation. With the aim of filling this gap, the authors of this paper first performed a Systematic Literature Review (SLR), resulting in 65 relevant papers. The 65 papers were then analysed through a Thematic Analysis (TA), which was aimed at isolating and revising the single effects of managerial loss aversion on the corporate value creation process. Once it became clear when and how managerial loss aversion leads to negative impacts on corporate value creation (such as suboptimal investments in corporate social responsibility, short-term-oriented budget expenditures, illegal corporate conduct in favourable contexts, and low demand for audit quality), a novel theoretical framework was built. This framework proposes some preliminary approaches to mitigate these detrimental effects. In particular, future empirical research may operationalise potential debiasing strategies, derived from critical analysis of the literature, to reduce managerial loss aversion in different business settings, thereby improving corporate value creation.

This study presents current evidence on the impact of different corporate ownership types on audit quality in Oman and potentially in other developing countries with similar institutional environments, such as GCC countries. While previous research has primarily focused on overall ownership concentration, this study aims to examine the role of specific shareholder identities and their influence on the demand for audit quality. This research sheds light on the relationship between ownership identities and audit quality of Omani financial companies listed on the Muscat Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2020. This study employs additional analysis to mitigate potential confounding factors and ensure robust results. Additionally, a GMM test establishes the robustness of our findings, alleviating potential endogeneity concerns. The findings highlight the positive impact and significance of bank, government, and foreign ownership in promoting high audit quality. In contrast, ownership by financial institutions (non-banks) and block holder concentrations negatively and significantly impact audit quality. In addition, this study found that family members on boards play positive moderating roles in the relationship between ownership concentration and audit quality. In addition to contributing to the existing literature, this study provides valuable insights for regulatory bodies to consider the role of ownership types in their decision-making processes. Our findings also assist investors in making informed choices and offer a better understanding of how ownership structures influence audit quality for other stakeholders. The implications of this research extend beyond Oman and can be relevant to countries with similar ownership structures and regulatory frameworks.

Board members with multiple directorships develop reputational capital as decision experts. Prior studies based on public firms suggest that such directors would use higher quality auditors to improve the quality of financial reporting and, thereby, protect their reputational capital. This study is the first large-scale study that investigates whether multiple directorships influence auditor choice in the setting of private firms. The result indicates a significant positive association between the proportion of board members with outside directorships and audit quality. Furthermore, it shows that the propensity to hire a higher quality auditor is significantly influenced by directors’ network. Finally, the results indicate that the incentives to invest in higher quality auditors are largely influenced by the size of the companies in which board members have their outside directorships.

PurposeFrom an agency perspective, the authors investigate whether family ownership and control configurations are systematically associated with a firm's choice of auditor and audit fees. Agency theory is an economic theory that purposes the existence of a contract between two parties, principals and agents. Auditor choice and audit fees by family firms provide interesting insights given the unique nature of the agency problems faced by such firms.Design/methodology/approachThe authors employ Big-4 auditors (PWC, KPMG, E&Y and Deloitte) as a proxy for high quality auditor (Big N) for the auditor choice model. For the audit fee model, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of audit fees (LnAF). The authors use two measures for family firm as explanatory variables: (1) a dummy variable (FAM_Control), which equals one if the firm is classified as a family firm and (2) FAM_Ownership, which is an indicator variable with a value of one if a firm has family members who hold CEO position, occupy board seats, or hold at least 10% of the firm's equity. Data of Chinese listed firms from 2011 to 2021 are used. The authors adopt the Heckman (1979) two-stage model to mitigate the potential endogeneity issue involved in the selection of Big-N auditors.FindingsThe findings suggest that compared with non-family firms, Chinese family firms have a less tendency to employ Big-4 auditors due to less severe agency problems between owners and managers. Additionally, Chinese family firms sustain higher audit fees than non-family firms. Similar to the prior literature, however, Chinese family firms audited by Big-4 auditors incur lower audit fees than family firms audited by non-Big-4 auditors in this study. In contrast to young-family firms, old-family firms are less likely to pick top-tier auditors and sustain lower audit fees. Consistent and robust results are found from endogeneity tests and sensitivity analyses.Originality/valueThe empirical evidence provides a unique insight, for accounting practitioners, policymakers, family owners and other capital market participants concerning the diverse effects of various family ownership and control features on selecting high-quality auditors and audit fees. This study advances the understanding, showing that a lower demand for audit quality occurs in Chinese family firms as they encounter less severe Type I agency problems. However, the more severe Type II agency problems in Chinese family firms sustain higher audit fees due to higher audit risk and greater audit effort.

Social trust and the demand for audit quality

'The Only Woman in the Room': Women in the Top Management Team and the Demand for Audit Quality

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to discuss Kalia, Basu and Kundu's (KBK’s) paper's motivation, findings and contributions and suggest further development.Design/methodology/approachThis paper is to discuss the meta-analysis of board characteristics and demand for audit Quqality by KBK.FindingsKBK paper is well motivated and makes new contributions to the literature. Future research can expand the sample and examine the moderating effects of institutional factors such as ownership structure, regulatory reforms and country-level investor protection and legal enforcement.Originality/valueBased on the review of KBK’ spaper, this study suggests that future research should expand the sample and examine the moderating effects of institutional factors such as ownership structure, regulatory reforms and country-level investor protection and legal enforcement.

PurposeThe study explores extant knowledge on the nature of the relationship between internal and external corporate governance mechanisms, particularly board characteristics and audit quality, respectively, while also investigating how the relationship varies across geographies.Design/methodology/approachThe extant knowledge is synthesized using a meta-analysis, which is conducted using a sample of 56 empirical studies from publications of varying grades. The studies span over 25 years (1996–2021) and cover 147 empirical samples (343,787 firm-year observations) across more than 20 countries. The dependent variable is audit fees, and the independent variable captures 12 different measures of board characteristics.FindingsOverall, the results reveal a positive association between board characteristics and audit fees, indicating complementarity between governance mechanisms. Effect size analysis shows board characteristics, like size and independence, are positively associated with audit fees. However, heterogeneity is noted for some characteristics, and further analysis by geography (developed vs emerging countries) explains the heterogeneity.Practical implicationsThis study helps multiple stakeholders like firms, shareholders, boards, regulators and policymakers in designing and strengthening governance frameworks.Social implicationsBoth governance and auditing literature benefit from identifying specific board characteristics that drive audit quality consistently across different institutional settings and samples. Heterogeneity analysis helps improve the understanding of contradictions documented in prior literature.Originality/valueThis meta-analysis is the first to explore the interplay between internal and external corporate governance mechanisms, with a focus on board characteristics and audit quality. The study provides valuable insights on how different governance mechanisms influence each other while highlighting, for the first time, how the interaction between governance mechanisms varies by a country's level of development.

PurposeThe paper aims to explore the impact of two types of monitoring mechanisms, namely, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) comment letters (CLs) and short sellers, on management’s demand for audit quality.Design/methodology/approachUsing information on the short interest positions and a panel data of SEC CLs between 2005 and 2015, this study applies logit regression model to estimate the likelihood of hiring Big 4 and industry expert audit firm. This study also applies an ordinary least squares regression technique to estimate audit fees.FindingsConsistent with disclosure and agency theories, results from empirical analyses provide that management demands higher quality audits measured by higher audit fees, and higher likelihood to hire Big 4 and industry expert audit firm. However, this study finds that the effect varies depending on the specific monitoring mechanisms. Additionally, when both monitoring mechanisms are in place, the SEC CLs drive the overall direction of the demand for audit quality when audit demand is captured by propensity to hire Big 4/industry expert audit firm.Research limitations/implicationsThis study provides researchers with enhanced understanding of the factors having effect on the demand side for audit quality. Furthermore, it adds to the stream of literature on economic consequences of SEC CLs and short selling.Originality/valueTo the best of authors’ knowledge, this is the first comprehensive study to document the effect of two types of monitoring mechanisms, namely, SEC CLs and short selling, on the demand for audit quality.

The effect of small audit firms’ failure to remediate the PCAOB’s quality control criticisms on audit market segmentation

This study examines the effect of agency theory on the demand for external audit quality in Cameroon. Specifically, it looks at the impact of shareholder/manager agency cost, shareholders/creditors agency cost, and majority/minority shareholders agency cost on external audit quality demand in Cameroon. The focus is on a sample of 171 companies drawn from the regions of Littoral, Centre and North-West using questionnaires. We assess the explanatory power of agency theory on the demand for a better quality of audit in the Cameroonian context by modelling external audit quality as a function of agency costs. The logistic regression analysis allows us to study the nature of any possible interaction. The analysis shows that while an increase in shareholder/creditor agency cost and an increase in shareholder/manager agency cost negatively affect the demand for audit quality, the majority/minority agency cost and the size of the audited client positively and significantly affect the demand for audit quality.

ABSTRACTThis study uses experimental economic markets to investigate the impact of risk and the potential for loss on managers' demand for audit quality. We posit that these two important contextual factors influence managers' audit quality preferences. We study these factors because they are ubiquitous to companies, and we focus on their influence on managers because managers continue to play a significant role in the auditor hiring process and we know relatively little about their auditor preferences. We predict that risk, the potential for loss, and their interaction will each decrease manager demand for high audit quality due to a desire to achieve greater reporting flexibility. Experimental results are consistent with our predictions; specifically, increased risk, the potential for loss, and to a lesser extent their interaction, significantly reduce managers' likelihood of hiring the best available auditor in the market. Path analysis indicates that this reduction in audit quality demand leads to increases in misreporting. Finally, we observe investors overpaying for assets to a greater extent when managers hire lower‐quality auditors. Our results show that the contextual factors of risk and the potential for loss, which are ubiquitous to companies, can reduce demand for audit quality, which can increase misreporting behavior and ultimately harm investors.

Do Big 4 Auditors Consistently Provide Better Audit Quality? Evidence from Government Audits

Prior research documents that financial capacity could be positively or negatively associated with the demand for audit quality. We re-examine this relation using changes in local real estate prices as exogenous shocks to corporate financial capacity. Using auditor size, auditor industry specialisation, and auditor fees as measures of audit quality, we find robust evidence that an increase (decrease) in financial capacity significantly reduces (increases) the demand for audit quality, and that this relation is more pronounced when firms are more financially constrained, when external monitoring by institutional investors and financial analysts is weaker, and when there is more negative news about real estate price changes. Our study enriches the related literature by describing a more complete and dynamic relationship between audit quality and financial capacity.

Weak Incentives for Audit Quality: Evidence from Broker-Dealers

ABSTRACT The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) Part II inspection reports, which disclose systemic quality control issues that auditors fail to remediate, signal poor audit quality for triennially inspected audit firms. Auditors that receive a Part II inspection report typically experience a decrease in clients, which demonstrates a general demand for audit quality. However, some companies hire auditors that receive Part II inspection reports. We examine potential reasons for hiring these audit firms. We find that relative to companies that switch to auditors without Part II reports, companies that switch to auditors with Part II reports have higher discretionary accruals in the first fiscal year after the switch, which indicates lower audit quality and a heightened risk for future fraud. We find no difference in audit fees. Our results suggest that PCAOB Part II inspection reports may signal low-quality auditors to companies that desire low-quality audits. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.