Delle Pene Research Articles

Doctrinal circulations in criminal law 1764-1914

Although criminal law books were comparatively rare before the middle of the eighteenth century, Beccaria’s Dei delitti e delle pene (1764) triggered the development of an enormous literature devoted to penal issues (from philosophical foundations to debates related to prisons) in Europe until 1914. In one and a half centuries, more than 20,000 books were published on these issues, of which about half were published in German lands and the remainder in Italy, France, Great Britain/United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Belgium and the Netherlands. Both philosophers and sociologists participated to these intellectual exchanges. This paper tries to analyse different ways for measuring the circulation of these texts (translations, quotations especially in footnotes, catalogues of private and public libraries, correspondence and travels). Although the debates were clearly transnational, there were also obstacles in the diffusion of foreign books. After evaluating these linguistic or cultural obstacles and considering the changing contexts between the first and second halves of the nineteenth century, this article outlines three conclusions about the globalisation and non-globalisation of legal concepts during this period.

Prosecuting Asymmetrically: On Some ‘Preconditions’ of Criminal Liability of Aged Defendants for Atrocities

Abstract Belated punishment ends up to be nothing more than a ‘mere show#x2019;, Beccaria argues in his Dei Delitti e Delle Pene (1764). The motto remains current with regard to trials of aged defendants for past international atrocities. In such cases, the question arises if the preconditions of criminal liability (Duff, 2001) for aged defendants are properly satisfied. Are aged defendants fully answerable for their atrocities? Based on the idea that a criminal trial is really -except for its nature as a quest of truth and justice- a communicative event between parts, the author argues that there is an important ‘communicative asymmetry’ to be observed in criminal trials against aged defendants for international atrocities, illustrates its dimensions and features and suggests some ways of dealing with it, in order that the trial preserves its pure function as an instance of criminal justice.

NULLUM CRIMEN SINE LEGE

This article discusses the issue of one of the most important Latin expressions that establish at the level of general principle that no crime exists outside the law.The purpose of the criminal law being the defense against the offenses of the right order, ensuring this order implies a strict respect of the principle of legality.Part of the principle of legality, the legality of incrimination, was formulated among the first, by the Beccaria in Dei delitti e delle pene and proclaimed also in the Declaration of Human and Citizen Rights (1789).Subsequently, the principle of legality of incrimination was passed in most criminal codes and even in some constitutions.The Romanian penal code emphasizes that the incriminations can only take place by law, not by other normative acts.In our law, crime is the sole basis of criminal liability.The second part of the principle of legality stipulates the legality of the punishments, so that, the crime being the only theme of the criminal liability, at the time of the commission the sanction must also intervene. Only when the sanction intervenes, it must be taken into account in particular that by sanctioning the offenders and the way in which the punishments are enforced some fundamental rights of the person are restricted, such as: freedom of movement, enshrined in all democratic constitutions, free development of the personality of the man and of his participation in the social and economic life, in the family life, the interruption of the professional activity and not lastly the affectation of his dignity. Therefore legality is a fundamental principle of criminal law: the criminalization can only take place through a law, and the sanction only if it is provided by law.

„Non una sola idea luminosa e nuova“? Beccarias Dei delitti e delle pene nach 250 Jahren

Not even a Single enlightened new idea? Beccarias delitti e delle ofter 250ye Immediately after its publication, Beccaria's Dei delitti e delle pene found itself inthe center of a European discussion on the reformation of criminal law and legal procedure. It hardly contained new ideas, but merged different discussions of the time. Beccaria, therefore, should be rather understood as a C o m p i l e r of much older ideas. His capacity can be explained by his biography and the particular S i t u a t i o n of Milan in his era. The book proved to be expediert for the critique of the Ancien Regime. Many different philosophers used it to delegitiraize or to change their governments throughout Europe. It is this S p e c i a l historical employment, not its originality, which makes this small tract so important. - Keywords: Beccaria, Milan, criminal law/criminal law procedure, torture, capital punishment I . Einleitung. - I I . Beccarias delitti e delle von 1764, - 1. Traditionalitat, - 2. Historische Leistung. - I I I . Besondere Verbreitung. - IV. Biographische Perspektive, - 1. Lombardei, - 2. Beccaria. - V. Schluss

Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments: the meaning and genesis of a jurispolitical pamphlet

ABSTRACTAt the heart of the criminal reform proposed in Cesare Beccaria’s 1764 Dei delitti e delle pene (On Crimes and Punishments) are the principles of penal parsimony derived from a precise interpretation of the social contract. Punishment, being no more than a necessary evil devoid of any intrinsic virtue, must serve no more than a preventative function to the smallest possible extent; its application strictly bound by the principle of legality. Beccaria’s criminal philosophy, therefore, attempts to drastically reduce the power of the penal institution. After recounting its principal aspects, this article seeks to propose a new interpretation of Beccaria’s theory from the perspective of its historical context. The Italian Enlightenment philosopher did not so much express indignation against the barbarism of the Milanese penal system, but rather instigate a rebellion against the political dominance of its patriciate, whose power had long been validated by its juridical functions. In this respect, Beccaria sought to combat the political hegemony of the jurists, concluding his treatise by excluding juridical thought from, and thus removing the intellectual foundations of, the practice of criminal law.

The economist and the enlightenment: how Cesare Beccaria changed Western civilization

This Article traces the influence of Cesare Beccaria’s writings on Western civilization. It explores the global impact of Beccaria’s 1764 book, Dei delitti e delle pene, later translated into English as An Essay on Crimes and Punishments. In particular, the Article highlights Beccaria’s advocacy for proportion between crimes and punishments and against the death penalty. The Article gives a short sketch of Beccaria’s life and describes the impact of Beccaria’s book and his legacy in shaping the world’s laws. The Article further describes how Beccaria’s role as an influential eighteenth-century economist has been neglected by some economic historians.

Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments

Cesare Beccaria’s pamphlet, On Crimes and Punishments (Dei delitti e delle pene) of 1764, takes us back to the School of Milan, the core of the Lombard Enlightenment during the latter half of the eighteenth century. This is the only work of the whole School of Milan that almost immediately achieved worldwide fame. Its treatment of the fundamental issues of penal law is one of the main pillars of the age of rights from the Enlightenment down to the present day. To understand the work properly it must be set in context within the utilitarian view of public happiness which was the key element of the whole Italian School at the time.

Beccaria on Discounting Intentions in Adjudicating Punishments for Crimes

This essay considers Cesare Beccaria's arguments in Chapter 7 of Dei delitti e delle pene for discounting an agent's intentions in assigning punishments for crimes. Beccaria offers four different arguments in this compact section of the book, including the impenetrable subjectivity of another subject's intentionality and the risk of committing blasphemy by punishing intentions to act as sins and effectively usurping God's authority. These objections are answered and the role of intentions in determining criminal guilt and appropriate punishments is investigated in light of Beccaria's objections.

The Making of a Condamné: State Power and the Ritual of Trial in Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné and Claude Gueux

Research Article| January 01 2011 The Making of a Condamné: State Power and the Ritual of Trial in Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné and Claude Gueux Briana Lewis Briana Lewis Allegheny College Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Romanic Review (2011) 102 (1-2): 183–199. https://doi.org/10.1215/26885220-102.1-2.183 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Briana Lewis; The Making of a Condamné: State Power and the Ritual of Trial in Le Dernier Jour d’un condamné and Claude Gueux. Romanic Review 1 January 2011; 102 (1-2): 183–199. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/26885220-102.1-2.183 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search Books & JournalsAll JournalsRomanic Review Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Copyright © 2011 The Trustees of Columbia University2011 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Iluminismo e absolutismo no modelo jurídico-penal de Cesare Beccaria

Cesare Beccaria, known as the author who, elaborating a system of criminal law based on illuminists principles, has created the bases of the modern liberal criminal law, had, however, very deep bonds with the Austrian absolutism. Thus, in the present paper, we will analyze some points of the politic structure where Beccaria produced his work Dei Delitti e delle Pene, seeking to exa- mine the understanding about the way Illuminism, in the context of the Habsburg absolutism’s formation, would operate in the elaboration of the Italian jurist’s legal criminal model.

INVENTING CRIMINOLOGY: THE “SCIENCE OF MAN” IN CESARE BECCARIA'S DEI DELITTI E DELLE PENE (1764)*

This paper challenges existing images of the context and object of Cesare Beccaria's (1764) Dei delitti e delle pene. It offers textual and other evidence that the chief object of Beccaria's famous treatise was the application to crime and penality not of humanism and legal rationality, as convention holds, but of the Scottish‐inspired “science of man.” This latter was a deterministic discourse whose key principles—utilitarianism, probabilism, associationism, and sensationalism—implicitly defy, conventional assumptions about the volitional basis of classical criminology. The paper thus questions Dei delitti's proper place in the history of criminology and, in so doing, casts doubt on the very existence of a distinctive “classical criminology.”

Beccaria traduit par Morellet

Jean Pandolfi : Beccaria translated by Morellet. Beccaria's Dei delitti e delle pene was published in July 1764, by Guiseppe Au-bert at Livorno ; Morellet's translation appeared in Paris in December 1765. This article studies the genesis of this publication among the Encyclopédistes, analyses the translation itself and Morellet's modifications, such as the reo-ganisation of the work, the reordering of the chapters and their contents. The reasons for these modifications, which are significant, are considered. This translation gave rise to a wide debate, involving Grimm, Diderot and d'Alembert, which can be seen as a microcosm of the philosophical debates of the second half of the 18th Century.

The Meaning of Bentham's Greatest Happiness Principle

Notes and Discussions THE MEANING OF BENTHAM'S GREATEST HAPPINESS PRINCIPLE The Greatest Happiness Principle has perplexed thinkers from the time it was proposed by Bentham as central to Utilitarianism. Bentham himself was unhappy with the wording of this principle toward the end of his life and considered various formulations of it. His main difficulty did not stem from a vagueness or confusion as to the ends to be achieved, although it has appeared so to some of his critics; but rather in giving an accurate and concise expression to that principle which is to serve as a guide to those ends. In point of fact, such expression is possible, as this article will demonstrate, only by the introduction of a considerable number of qualifications. Without these, no formulation of the Greatest Happiness Principle , including the one that is finally presented in this article, can be understood clearly. Since I will be investigating what Bentham intended to mean by his utilitarian norm, the validity of the grounds upon which the meaning is proffered will be ignored. The absence of an examination of such grounds is innocent in the light of the fact that interesting conclusions may be adduced from both good and bad arguments. II The Greatest Happiness Principle has had an interesting history. Although it did not originate with Bentham----cither in expression or in its ethical and political intent--it has come to be closely associated with Benthamism. At the same time, it cannot be ascribed to Bentham without some qualification. The principle may be traced to such authors as Paley, Priestly, Hutcheson, Helvetius, and Beccaria.1 Among these, the phrase "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" first occurs in Francis Hutcheson's writings.2 Beeearia uses the same phrase in his Dei deUiti e delle pene. 3 There is some conflict of opinion regarding from whom Bentham first learned the phrase. This is not surprising since as David Baumgardt aptly points out, "It See Elie Hal6vy, The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism, trans. Mary Morris (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), pp. 19, 22; Robert Harry Inglis Palgrave, Palgrave's Dictionary oY Political Economy, ed. H. I-tigris(3 vols.; London: Macmillan, 1925), I, 181. 2 An Inquiry Into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (4th ed.; London: J. Darby, 1738), p. 181. * Hal6vy, p. 21. [315] 316 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY was far more difficult for any moralist of Bentham's time to have overlooked the various formulations of the greatest happiness principle than to have become acquainted with it." ( Bentham, in later years, claimed to have first come across the phrase in Priestly. But this can probably be discounted--perhaps on grounds of poor memory--since Beccaria, whom Bentham considered his master, enunciated the principle before Priestly. In any case, the seeds of its conception and significance were already well planted when Bentham arrived on the scene. 5 Why then has the principle become so closely associated with Bentham? The answer is plain enough. No other individual has adhered to the principle so closely as Bentham, nor has any other individual made this principle such an important and central desideratum in all areas of analysis concerning the social relations of human beings. 6 Although Bentham usually characterized the principle in terms of the phrase, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," he also referred to it in a somewhat different phrasing. As he remarks, "The right and proper end of government in every political community, is the greatest happiness of all individuals of which it is composed, say, in other words, the greatest happiness of the greatest number ." 7 It is difficult to know what to make of this passage since neither the phrase, "the greatest happiness of all," nor the phrase, "'the greatest happiness of the greatest number," is clear enough to permit us to say whether they are identical or not in meaning. This ditficulty, however, is alleviated by a consideration which appears to indicate that rather than treating the phrases in question as substitutes for one another, the latter phrase is to replace the former as the guiding principle for deciding policy. As Bentham observes: If such were the conditions of human...