Degree Of Altruism Research Articles

The welfare impact of a managerial oligopoly with an altruistic firm

I analyse the welfare impact of a mixed market with a private or public firm that is characterised by wider objectives or altruism, in the presence of an agency problem. Contrary to some earlier findings, the total surplus turns out to be increasing in the degree of altruism. This impact is stronger than without an agency problem, despite more stringent conditions for the market to remain mixed. The altruistic firm is more cost efficient, and viable if the market can remain mixed. A competition policy that encourages entry may increase welfare, but its scope is reduced by higher altruism.

Determinants and Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility in German Agribusiness: A PLS Model

ABSTRACTThe authors analyze the determinants and effects of a corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategy for enterprises in the German agribusiness. Based on an overview of the literature addressing interrelations between society and agribusiness, we define CSR. Next a theoretical framework that explains the interrelationships between CSR, its various determinants, corporate reputation, and financial performance is introduced. Then the results of a survey of 170 German agribusiness companies are presented and using partial least squares (PLS) methodology for evaluating a structural equation model, they test their conceptual framework. CSR efforts in their sample are significantly influenced by the competitive strategy a company pursues, its number of employees, and the degree of altruism it incorporates. Moreover, in their model CSR efforts significantly enhance corporate reputation. They conclude with some theoretical and managerial implications and outline some future research directions. [EconLit classifications: Q130, M140] © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

P4P, Reputation and the Reduction of Costly Overprovision

We investigate the effect of reputational motivation on output in a scenario of overprovision of medical treatment. We assume that physicians differ in their degree of altruism, enjoy being perceived as good but dislike being perceived as greedy. We show that better reputational motivation unambiguously reduces the costs of healthcare provision and the magnitude of overprovision which in turn rises patient benefits.

Migration decisions, expected remittances, and altruism

We investigate the effects of altruism on migration decisions by the potential migrant as well as the effects of altruism on remittances by the migrant to clarify how altruism affects remittances that the household in the home country will receive, i.e., expected remittances. Previous studies did not pay adequate attention to the effects of altruism on migration decisions of the potential migrant when examining the effects of altruism on remittances that will be sent from aboard. We find that if migration does not incur any costs, the potential migrant always migrates, and altruism increases expected remittances monotonically. On the other hand, if migration incurs costs, the potential migrant does not necessarily migrate, and the potential migrant with a higher degree of altruism is less likely to migrate. As a result, with migration costs, altruism may decrease expected remittances. Therefore, altruism does not increase expected remittances monotonically. Our results falsify the usual assumption of monotonicity regarding the effects of altruism on remittances.

The Crowding-Out Effect of Formal Insurance on Informal Risk Sharing Arrangements: An Experimental Study

This paper investigates the crowding-out effect of formal insurance on informal risk-sharing arrangements via theory and laboratory experiment. Our model and simulation predict that the crowding out of private transfers is often more than one-for-one and will reduce the total risk coverage. Furthermore, the existence of a moderate degree of altruism exaggerates the crowding-out effect, especially when there is an ex-ante income inequality. These predictions are mostly supported by the laboratory experiment, except that the crowding-out effect is not more than one-for-one, and hence the total risk coverage is not significantly reduced by formal insurance.

Are nurses more altruistic than real estate brokers?

We report results from a dictator game experiment with nurse students and real estate broker students as dictators, and Amnesty International as the recipient. Although brokers contributed substantial amounts, nurses contributed significantly more, on average 76% of their endowment. In a second part, subjects chose between a certain repetition of the experiment and a 50–50 chance of costly exit. About one third of the brokers and half of the nurses chose the exit option. While generosity was indeed higher among nurses, even when taking exits into account, the difference cannot readily be attributed to different degrees of altruism.

Quality Competition with Profit Constraints: Do Non-Profit Firms Provide Higher Quality than For-Profit Firms?

In many markets, such as education, health care and public utilities, firms are often profit-constrained either due to regulation or because they have non-profit status. At the same time such firms might have altruistic concerns towards consumers. In this paper we study semi-altruistic firms’ incentives to invest in quality and cost-reducing effort when facing constraints on the distribution of profits. Using a spatial competition framework, we derive the equilibrium outcomes under both quality competition with regulated prices and quality price competition. Profit constraints always lead to lower cost-efficiency, whereas the effects on quality and price are ambiguous. If altruism is high (low), profit-constrained firms offer higher (lower) quality and lower (higher) prices than firms that are not profit-constrained. Compared with the first-best outcome, the cost-efficiency of profit-constrained firms is too low, while quality might be over- or under-provided. Profit constraints may improve welfare and be a complement or substitute to a higher regulated price, depending on the degree of altruism.

Are Nurses More Altruistic than Real Estate Brokers?

We report results from a dictator game experiment with nurse students and real estate broker students as dictators, and Amnesty International as the recipient. Although brokers contributed substantial amounts, nurses contributed significantly more, on average 76 percent of their endowment. In a second part, subjects chose between a certain repetition of the experiment and a 50-50 chance of costly exit. About one third of the brokers and half of the nurses chose the exit option. While generosity was indeed higher among nurses, even when taking exits into account, the difference cannot readily be attributed to different degrees of altruism.

Risky Altruism as a Predictor of Criminal Victimization

This research tested the hypothesis that risky altruism is a significant predictor of criminal victimization. Two hundred sixty-eight respondents filled out a questionnaire measuring their experiences as crime victims, several personality variables, and their degree of altruism. Using factor analysis, a general altruism scale was subdivided into risky and safe altruism. Risky altruism correlated .31 with victimization, compared to .09 for safe altruism. This basic finding was true for both personal and property crime, and the pattern held for four different subgroups: a student sample and citizens from high-, moderate-, and low-crime areas. Separate measures of recent victimization and victimization directly related to helping someone (altruistic victimization) also showed significant relationships with risky altruism. Risky and safe altruism had different patterns of relationships with personality variables, with risky altruism being less related to prosocial personality, agreeableness, and conscientiousness, and more related to extraversion and sensation seeking.

Health Insurance, Treatment Plan, and Delegation to Altruistic Physician

We study delegating a consumer’s treatment plan decisions to an altruistic physician. The physician’s degree of altruism is his private information. The consumer’s illness severity will be learned by the physician, and also become his private information. Treatments are discrete choices, and can be combined to form treatment plans. We distinguish between two commitment regimes. In the first, the physician commits to treatment decisions at the time a payment contract is accepted. In the second, the physician does not commit to treatment decisions at that time, and can wait until he learns the patient’s illness to do so. In the commitment game, the first best is implemented by a single payment contract to all types of altruistic physician. In the noncommitment game, the first best is not implementable. All but the most altruistic physician type earn positive profits, and treatment decisions are distorted from the first best.

Do Altruists Detect Altruists Easier Than Non–Altruists?

Previous studies indicated that humans have a cognitive architecture for detecting altruism in others based on non–verbal cues. According to the perspective of ‘green beard effect’, green beard gene should produce recognition of the green beard in other individuals, which predicts that altruists can detect altruists easier than non–altruists. In a game situation in which perceivers respond to videotaped altruists and non–altruists, we measured the altruism of perceivers and examined the relationship between degree of altruism and ability to identify altruists. We found no significant relationship between the accuracy with which altruism levels were detected and the altruism level of perceivers.

DRG prospective payment systems: refine or not refine?

We present a model of contracting between a purchaser of health services and a provider (a hospital). We assume that hospitals provide two alternative treatments for a given diagnosis: a less intensive one (for example, a medical treatment) and a more intensive one (a surgical treatment). We assume that prices are set equal to the average cost reported by the providers, as observed in many OECD countries (yardstick competition). The purchaser has two options: (1) to set one tariff based on the diagnosis only and (2) to differentiate the tariff between the surgical and the medical treatment (i.e. to refine the tariff). We show that when tariffs are refined, the provider has always an incentive to overprovide the surgical treatment. If the tariff is not refined, the hospital underprovides the surgical treatment (and overprovides the medical treatment) if the degree of altruism is sufficiently low compared with the opportunity cost of public funds. Our main result is that price refinement might not be optimal.

Population growth in a model of economic growth with human capital accumulation and horizontal R&D

This paper reconsiders the effects of population growth on per-capita income growth within a Romerian (1990)-type endogenous growth model with human capital accumulation. One important novelty of our contribution is that in the human capital supply equation we explicitly consider the possibility that agents’ investment in skill acquisition might be positively, negatively or not influenced at all by technological progress. We find that both the growth rate and the level of real per-capita income are independent of population size. Moreover, the population growth may affect or not real per-capita income growth depending on the size of the degree of altruism of agents towards future generations and on the nature of technical progress, for given agents’ degree of altruism.

Charity and redistributive taxation in a unionized economy

European economies are characterized by unionized labor markets and governmental redistribution of income. This paper studies a model where those two features are combined with the possibility for individuals to make charitable contributions to the poor. The model exhibits equilibrium unemployment that increases with the degree of altruism. It is shown that a more progressive income tax can both reduce the unemployment rate and improve the public budget. These results are driven by charity increasing wage pressure and the altruistic rich failing to internalize the effect of their donations on the wage setting behavior of the unions.

On the sustainability of bargaining solutions in family decision models

This paper analyses the sustainability of family bargaining agreements by developing a non-cooperative game between two spouses with symmetric preferences. To that end, we develop, by using a general utility function, a repeated non-cooperative game involving two players with symmetric preferences, where the characterization of a Nash sub-game perfect equilibrium allows us to demonstrate that the spouse with the greater bargaining power has a greater incentive to reach an agreement. This result is also reproduced by using a particular example of linear preferences in consumption. However, the influence of the bargaining power on the sustainability of a bargaining solution depends on the specification of the individual preferences, as well as the degree of altruism between the spouses.

How do altruistic parental transfers affect the welfare gains of marriage?

This paper analyses the effects of altruistic parental transfers on the welfare gains of marriage. To that end, it develops a sequential game which, in a first stage, determines the optimum level of the transfer between the altruistic donor (the parent) and the recipient (the daughter/son). In the second stage, the levels of consumption and provision of a family good are deduced by way of a Nash bargaining solution, with the threat point being represented by divorce. We find that the degree of altruism of the recipient has a null effect on the gains in welfare derived from the marriage by the recipient’s spouse, and a positive effect on those derived by the recipient. Additionally, the degree of altruism of the donor has a positive effect on the gains in welfare derived from the marriage by the recipient’s spouse, and an ambiguous effect on those derived by the recipient.

"Sweeping Up After the Parade": Professional, Ethical, and Patient Care Implications of "Turfing"

"Turfing" denotes a patient transfer or triage from one physician to another when the care of that patient feels more troublesome than it is worth. A widespread phenomenon in medical training programs, turfing appears to allocate patient care to meet physicians' rather than patients' needs. Although turfing reportedly causes inter-physician discord and inter-specialty stereotyping, its deeper consequences are poorly understood. Turfing is an interpersonal conflict masquerading as a medical issue. After examining turfing alongside other patient-related slang, I analyze the distinction between "the turf," a person, and "to turf," a practice. Several explanatory models from medical practice are explored in order to illuminate turfing's implications for medical professionalism, ethics, and patient care. I suggest that a physician's medical specialty or practice type--that is, professional culture--may link to that physician's degree of altruism. If so, then what it means fundamentally to be a physician might vary across medical specialties. Such a link calls for a new notion of cultural competence, one that physicians may apply not to patients but to each other.

Public Preferences and Private Choices: Effect of Altruism and Free Riding on Demand for Environmentally Certified Pork

Sales of private goods with affiliated public good attributes have markedly risen in recent years. This fact is difficult to explain within the paradigm of purely self-interested behavior. This paper investigates factors influencing consumer demand for pork products with certifications related to the environment, animal welfare, and antibiotics. Using psychometric scaling techniques, we measure individuals’ degree of altruism and propensity toward free riding. Results of a random parameter logit model applied to choice data obtained from a nationwide survey in the United States indicates that more altruistic individuals are willing to pay more for pork products with public good attributes than less altruistic individuals and free riders. These results indicate that private purchases of goods with public-good attributes are not simply a result of individuals’ perceptions of the ability to mitigate private risks such as food safety, but that individuals are making private choices to affect public outcomes. Results have implications for policy makers weighing the relative costs and benefits of food labeling policies versus bans related to certain livestock production practices.

Power and Social Preferences: The Role of Hierarchy in Promoting Selfishness

We run an experiment in order to evaluate the relationship between power, or the search for power, and the degree of altruism. In particular we experimentally tested whether an organization structured in a strictly hierarchical way was able to reduce the degree of altruism of a group of experimental subjects. The subjects were divided into groups and played a series of dictator and ultimatum games with the members of other groups; for each experimental euro that they earned, the experimenter assigned half of it to the group. Two different settings were analyzed according to how this group surplus was distributed among group members. In the control setting (treatment A) the group surplus was distributed equally among group members, while in the power setting (treatment B) there was a ranking of the earnings in the group, and the subject who earned the higher sum was given the power to decide the distribution scheme of the group surplus. It is argued that this latter setting represents a very general framework and can mimic different real life situations: the straightforward interpretation is to look at this hierarchical organization as a firm in which the most productive - here, the least altruistic - subject takes the lead, but the frame is valid for any structured group in which there is competition for leadership. The results are quite interesting. It is found that the introduction of a hierarchical structure significantly modified the behaviour of subjects; in particular, the power tournament led to a decrease in the rate of altruism, measured in terms of the allocation given to the receiver in the dictator game. It appears that an important role in the dynamics of the experiment was played by some agents' reciprocative behaviour which acted as a powerful device in spreading selfish behavior among agents.

Bilateral Donors’ Interest vs. Recipients’ Development Motives in Aid Allocation: Do All Donors Behave the Same?

AbstractI provide an overall empirical assessment of the motivations of ODA granted by rich countries to developing countries, as revealed by aid allocation behaviors. Aid motives combine self‐interested and altruistic objectives. I use a three‐dimensional panel dataset, combining the donor, recipient and time dimensions, which shows a lot of heterogeneity in donor behavior. Thanks to the width of this dataset, I can test differences of parameters among donors and, in particular, compare their degrees of altruism. Switzerland, Austria, Ireland and most Nordic countries are among the most altruistic. Australia, France, Italy, and to some extent Japan and the United States are among the most egoistic.