The Design of Shallow-Draft Steamers for the British Empire, 1868—1906 ROBERT V. KUBICEK “Gunboat diplomacy” is a shorthand description for the means by which the British imperial state in the 19th century imposed its will on weaker polities with navigable coastlines, rivers, and lakes. The negotiations, favorable treaties, and advantageous trading arrange ments that flowed from these impositions have been minutely exam ined by scholars of British expansion and theorists of imperialism.1 Some of the steam vessels employed to back the diplomacy of imperialism have been thoroughly examined, as well—for example, the navy’s classic screw-driven gunboat, which typically drew 8—12 feet of water and was first developed for inshore work in the Black Sea during the Crimean War.2 But the Admiralty and other govern ment departments of the Victorian state used a variety of steam vessels—many of considerably less draft and fitted with other forms of propulsion—for numerous less-remarked-on but nonetheless impor tant tasks. These shallow-draft vessels, the process by which they were chosen, and the uses to which they were put have not been systemat ically studied.3 Dr. Kubicek, professor of history at the University of British Columbia, did archival work for this article with the assistance of the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada. He thanks the Technology and Culture referees and his colleague Fritz Lehmann for their helpful comments. 'See especially Winfried Baumgart, Imperialism, the Idea and Reality of British and French Colonial Expansion, 1880—1914 (Oxford, 1982); David K. Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire, 1830-1914 (London, 1973); Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism in the Dark Continent, 2d ed. (London, 1981). 2Antony Preston and John Major, Send a Gunboat; A Study of the Gunboat and Its Role in British Policy, 1854-1904 (London, 1967); Barry M. Gough, Gunboat Frontier, British Maritime Authority and Northwest Coast Indians, 1846—1890 (Vancouver, B.C., 1984); David Lyon, The Ship: Steam, Steel and Torpedos: The Warship in the 19th Century (London, 1980), pp. 42-43. ’Preston and Major (n. 2 above), p. 191, exclude river gunboats from their elaborate analysis. For the selection and deployment of steam vessels for Asian and African rivers, ca. 1820—45, see Henry T. Berstein, Steamboats on the Ganges, an Exploration in the History of India's Modernization through Science and Technology (Calcutta, 1960), and Daniel R.© 1990 by the Society for the History of Technology. All rights reserved. 0040-165X/90/3103-0001$01.00 427 428 Robert V. Kubicek Sir Edward J. Reed (1830-1906), one of the best-known naval architects of the Victorian era, designed or surveyed numerous shallow-draft craft for British colonies and protectorates. But histo rians have neglected this part of Reed’s long, controversial, and illustrious career, focusing instead on his work as the navy’s chief constructor between 1863 and 1870, as inventor of the ironclad warship, as contributor to the development of the forerunner of the modern battleship, and as designer of warships for the governments of several nations. He also was a Liberal member of Parliament (1874-95, 1900—1905) and a frequent contributor to contemporary discussion on the construction and performance of steamships. His arrogance, “fiery” temperament, “prolific pen,” and insistence on theoretical study rather than practice as the source of superior naval design stirred “violent opposition” to his career.4 In 1906, Reed, though near death, felt compelled to defend his work designing ships for colonial administrations. In a paper he was too ill to present himself to the Institution of Naval Architects, he reviewed the spec ifications and performance of some seventy-five vessels that he had designed or whose construction he had supervised since 1885 for twenty-five British crown colonies and protectorates.5 Almost all were destined for work in the tropics. Reed’s work contributed to the transfer of technology from the temperate industrialized to the tropical nonindustrialized regions of the world. As such it may be viewed, in Daniel Headrick’s phrase, as the “geographic relocation of technology by Western experts.”6 Within that process, two interrelated sets of priorities and preferences determined the...
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Nov 11, 1991
Joseph Haggin 
Open Access