Why is sustained political dialogue possible between divided nations under unresolved sovereignty competition, and why do such mechanisms diverge over time? This article compares the only two contemporary cases meeting these scope conditions: inter-Korean and cross-Strait relations. It develops a configurational framework of interactional resilience, explaining divergent outcomes through three dimensions: the structural basis of peace, the motivational structure of dialogue, and two-level coupling between international shocks and domestic political competition. The inter-Korean configuration—punitive deterrence, weak non-military buffers, rent-oriented motivations, and tight regime-survival coupling—produces brittle resilience, leaving dialogue vulnerable to institutional negation. The cross-Strait configuration—denial-based deterrence, economic embeddedness, function-oriented motivations, and politicization buffered by constitutional-legal ambiguity and functional interdependence—produces frozen resilience, hollowing out dialogue while making abolition costly. The framework clarifies when dialogue becomes an object of hostility and distinguishes forms of non-functioning dialogue more precisely than conflict management or frozen conflict.

ABSTRACT In an increasingly globalized and intricate global supply chain, understanding the interaction between geopolitical risks (GPR) and global supply chain is critical to ensuring efficiency and viability. We examine the causality and transmission mechanism between GPR and global supply chain pressure (GSCP) in Taiwan. By identifying the time-varying transmission mechanism through the bootstrap rolling-window Granger causality test, we find that GPR has positive and negative effects on GSCP. The positive one suggests that GPR leads to supply chain disruptions and increases transport costs, thus increasing the pressure on global supply chains; the negative one indicates that GPR promotes restructuring and innovation in industries, hence improving supply chain resilience. In turn, GPR is positively influenced by GSCP, which suggests that the restructuring of supply chains leads to pressure on Taiwan to shift the industrial chain and thus at risk of marginalization. The results suggest that Taiwan’s deep integration into the global supply chain makes the latter highly vulnerable to geopolitical risk shocks originating from Taiwan. With tensions in Sino-U.S. and cross-Strait relations, these findings provide valuable implications for responding to GSCP and enhancing its resilience by preventing and mitigating potential risks arising from geopolitical events.

Mazu, also known as A-Ma or Tianhou, is a sea goddess revered by over 200 million devotees and holds a unique historical and cultural significance in Macau. This relationship has evolved profoundly since Macau’s 1999 handover and the 2005 UNESCO recognition of Mazu heritage. Central to this transformation are two developments: the establishment of the A-Ma Cultural Village and the introduction of the A-Ma Cultural and Tourism Festival. Adopting a cultural governance framework based on anthropological research, interviews and informal conversations with various stakeholders, devotees, and visitors in Macau, Taiwan and mainland China, this study reveals the socio-economic and political significance of these developments. It uncovers a collaborative dynamics between state actors (the Macau and Chinese governments) and non-state actors (the Fujian community and Taiwanese Mazu temples). By mobilizing the cult of Mazu, they drive Macau’s economic diversification through Mazu-related tourism while fostering cross-Strait cultural and religious exchanges. This aligns with mainland China’s religious united front strategy under the ‘one country, two systems’ framework. The evolving interplay between the Mazu cult, cross-Strait relations, and Macau’s economic diversification highlights a distinctive state-religion dynamic reshaping trilateralties. This transformation reflects not only localized economic strategies but also the extension of mainland China’s cultural governance model into the special administrative region.

This study investigates global news media representations of cross-Strait relations from 2014 to 2023 using the GDELT database, framed within the mediatization of politics. Combining large-scale event data and computational text analysis, it offers a multi-level analysis of representational patterns, structural inequalities, and framing dynamics. Six indicators track longitudinal trends including four continuous indices and two event type distributions, show attention spikes during major political events and a discursive shift toward negative, conflict-focused coverage, even as low-intensity communicative events dominate. Structurally, a source-domain analysis of 50 high-impact outlets employs a six-dimensional Deviation Index to evaluate differences in visibility and event production preferences. Results reveal a concentrated discourse, with Western and Taiwanese media occupying more central positions in agenda-setting processes, with Mainland Chinese outlets appearing comparatively less visible. Textually, topic modeling uncovers five key frames, reflecting a discursive thematic evolution from event-driven, low-politics coverage to high-politics narratives emphasizing conflicts, ideological divides, and great-power rivalry. Complementary sentiment analysis of news headlines using large language model-based tools indicates the persistent dominance of negative actor-sentiment framing in global coverage. Overall, the study underscores an increasingly securitized and asymmetrical pattern of global media representation of cross-Strait relations. Theoretically, the study extends the applicability of mediatization of politics framework to the analysis of cross-Strait communication. Methodologically, it illustrates integrating large-scale event data with machine-learning techniques to examine international news framing in a highly politicized geopolitical context.

In the National Security Law era, Taiwan politics have been carefully reported by mainstream media in Hong Kong. This study analyzes 3,800 YouTube videos, an alternative media, to compare how pro-government and pro-democracy influencers frame cross-strait relations and potential wars. The results indicate that videos about foreign military attract active audiences’ engagement from both sides, pro-Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) videos receive higher engagement but anti-DPP content garners less and China’s intervention and separation from China attract less pro-democracy engagement. The conclusion indicates audiences of pro-democracy influencers are more sympathetic toward Taiwan whereas audiences of pro-government influencers show less concern for the official narratives.

We study whether outbound diplomatic visits by politicians from minor powers help them build an image of national security competence. Using a choice-based conjoint experiment in Taiwan, where voters closely monitor relations with the United States and China, we assess how visits to major powers shape political evaluations. Politicians who have visited either the US or China are viewed more favorably, with those visiting both receiving the highest ratings. However, the effects are context-dependent. Visits to the US are most effective when Taiwan–US relations are perceived as good or when ties with China are bad. Visits to China improve a politician’s image only when cross-Strait relations are seen as bad. These findings contribute to research on public diplomacy and international signaling by showing that voters in minor powers interpret diplomatic visits as cues about political competence and that such effects are dependent on bilateral relations.

Compulsory military service and opinions toward cross-strait relations: evidence from Taiwan’s 2013 military reform

A Sovereign Peace: Reconceptualizing The Law Of Sovereignty In The Taiwan Strait

The historical heritage of Taiwan’s dragon boat sports culture reveals its modern transformation from a festival-based tradition into a competitive sport. The findings indicate that dragon boat racing is a traditional Chinese folk festival activity that maintains local social stability, strengthens community cohesion, and stimulates regional economic vitality. With the Kuomintang government takeover of Taiwan, dragon boat racing took on a militarised character, utilised both as military training and as a means to promote national consciousness through the veneration of Qu Yuan. Following Taiwan’s lifting of martial law in 1987, dragon boat racing gradually shifted from a tool for nationalistic propaganda to a sport emphasizing strength and aesthetics, fostering international sports and cultural exchanges. In 1995, cross-strait relations thawed, leading to the first friendly exchange through dragon boat sports, further enhancing sports, economic, and cultural interactions between Taiwan and mainland China.

Abstract Mainland Chinese director Wang Quan’an’s Apart Together , which won the Silver Bear Award for Best Screenplay in 2010, tackles the issue of cross-Strait relations by telling the story of Kuomintang veteran Liu Yansheng’s return to mainland China after nearly 40 years of separation from his wife and son. Shanghainese is the main language of the film, a dialect that is used to suggest a local attitude towards the national issue. While earlier Chinese films on similar themes often emphasise the cultural and emotional ties between Taiwan and China, in Wang’s film Liu is characterised as an unwelcome Taiwanese guest, an intruder in his wife’s Chinese family. This essay argues that Wang’s Apart Together contests the People’s Republic of China’s official discourse of cross-Strait reunification by demonstrating the cultural and identity divisions between the Taiwanese character and his Chinese family. Wang provides an alternative perspective on the ‘Taiwan issue’, showing that ordinary people’s experience of cross-Strait reunion might be painful and problematic.

Under the Duterte administration, the Philippines’ adopted an unconventional policy that lessened reliance on the US and other Western nations, and improved relations with the People’s Republic of China (China) and other unorthodox partners. At the same time, such development coincided with increasing Cross-Strait tensions. However, despite the overarching context, Philippine-Republic of China (Taiwan) relations remained stable and even improved. At first glance, the phenomenon may seem counterintuitive amid such a context, but the study explores the nuances and inner workings of the Duterte administration’s approach to Taiwan. In understanding the Philippines’ “Pivot” position in the “Romantic Triangle” between Taiwan and China during the Duterte administration, the study stresses the practical nature of international relations being a product of various stakeholders with their respective influences. Using Allison & Halperin’s (1972, World Politics, 24(S1), 40–79.) “Bureaucratic Politics Model” theory as an analytical lens, the following research focuses on the influence and actions of various actors within the Philippines’ Taiwan policy bureaucracy. The study gained a comprehensive understanding of the country’s balanced position under the Duterte administration through interviews from major and minor actors within the Philippine-Taiwan bilateral relationship and cross-referenced their statements with archival data. In its conclusion, the research underscores the uniqueness of Philippine-Taiwan relations and the reason for the country’s “Pivot” position in Cross Strait relations during the Duterte administration.

Tensions between China and Taiwan have escalated, particularly during President Tsai’s tenure. Following World War II, China endured the Chinese Civil War between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The KMT’s defeat in 1949 marked the end of the conflict, after which it retreated to Taiwan and became an opponent force to Beijing. Since then, Cross-Strait relations have remained tense. Under President Tsai, the issue has become more apparent as she consistently rejects China’s reunification agenda while strengthening Taiwan’s ties with Southeast Asian countries and the United States (U.S.) in particular. This paper also adopts a qualitative desktop research, relying on secondary data collection method which includes treaties, white papers, policy documents, defense reports, and news articles. This paper is also significance because Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) prioritizes safeguarding Taiwan’s autonomy and democratic values and the Kuomintang (KMT) advocates for closer ties with China. Concurrently, scholarly attention to the contemporary dynamics of Cross-Strait relations remains insufficient. Existing studies often focus on outdated analyses, such as the deficiencies in Taiwan’s 2012 elections, rather than the policies and developments under Tsai Ing-wen’s administration (2016–2024). Therefore, this paper examines China-Taiwan relationship during Tsai’s presidency demonstrates the significance of defending Taiwan’s democracy and maintaining its status quo as an autonomous territory within China.

ABSTRACT This article aims to explore how and why the literary reputation of Lin Yutang has changed in China and Taiwan from 1949 to the present day. To achieve this, a comparative approach is adopted to bring out the competing nature of the relations between the two culturally connected yet politically separated entities where Lin’s reputation fluctuated due to a seesaw effect. I argue that, in the vortex of cross-Strait relations, literary reputations are a product of a top-down pyramid mechanism where political ideology at the apex sways or controls subordinate components such as language, literature, culture, and historiography. Processed through this mechanism, authors are assigned a position at the bottom, either included or excluded, dishonoured or canonised. The article finds that Lin’s reputation hinges on the extent to which his international fame, ideas, and actual words can be appropriated, adapted, and manipulated to endorse a national initiative focused on fostering nationalism and patriotism. This finding highlights the dynamics of self and other that are threaded through the imaginative process of Chinese or Taiwanese national identity, each imagining itself initially and predominantly against the other, and subsequently and additionally against culturally distinct others on the global map.

This article analyses Beijing’s evolving Taiwan policy under Xi Jinping through a case study of Chung Ming-hsuan, a queer Taiwanese influencer and LGBTQ+ advocate, whose mainland visits have been recognized by Beijing as fostering cross-Strait harmony. Chung’s transformation from a critic of the People’s Republic of China to a figure promoting cross-Strait engagement provides an illustration of Beijing’s changing approach to Taiwan. Central to this approach is the Chinese concept of ‘heart-soul’ (心灵), which Beijing deploys to foster personal connections across the Taiwan Strait. This allows Beijing to strategically distinguish between what they term ‘“Taiwan independence” diehards’ and critics who remain open to dialogue and engagement. The analysis demonstrates how Beijing strategically leverages influencers such as Chung to project an image of openness and reframe cross-Strait relations as a domestic, emotionally driven matter. This approach prioritizes heartfelt exchanges and personal connections over traditional diplomatic and political negotiations.

Taiwan is a potential flashpoint for conflict between the U.S. and China. Although it has been de facto independent of China for more than seventy years, China’s leaders regard Taiwan as an inseparable part of the PRC. While China claims to strive for peaceful “reunification,” it has never renounced the use of force against Taiwan. Despite a 45-year policy of “strategic ambiguity” regarding Taiwan’s defense, the U.S. has declared its support for the use of military force to defend Taiwan. China’s threats and U.S. support have created a security dilemma, in which adversaries build up their respective offensive or defensive capabilities in response to each other’s actions. This article employs game theory to assess whether the United States and China are more likely to use force or seek accommodation in determining Taiwan’s future. The paper seeks to answer the following questions: What risks would China’s leaders be willing to take to secure the benefits of seizing Taiwan? What costs would they be willing to bear? Is the United States prepared to use military force to defend Taiwan? To demonstrate the usefulness of game theory, the paper begins with an explanation of the history of classical game theory. It then provides an overview of cross-strait relations and the role of the United States as Taiwan’s security guarantor. The payoff structure of this analysis reflects the dynamics of a Chicken Game with asymmetric stakes: China’s pursuit of peaceful unification represents a strategic imperative tied to national identity, while the United States prioritizes regional stability and ally credibility. These differing levels of urgency and risk tolerance shape their strategic decisions.

ABSTRACT This paper examines the bordering and debordering deployment of water infrastructures on the Islands of Kinmen. Located less than 5 km off the coast of China, yet 200 km from their governing authority, Taiwan, Kinmen holds a critical position in cross-strait relations, and its water infrastructures have carried opposite political intentions. The 2018 Fujian-Kinmen water transfer pipeline serves as a debordering tool as it showcases that the People’s Republic of China could offer benefits to the people on the islands. In contrast, Kinmen’s existing water infrastructure, established during the Cold War, served as part of the bordering campaign to counter Communist China, as it represented progress and modern living under the government of the Republic of China (Taiwan). However, rather than assuming the successful deployment of infrastructure or a passive role of the islands, this paper highlights that the planning and construction of Kinmen’s water infrastructures were influenced by conditions of militarisation, shifting cross-strait relations, the islands’ socio-material constraints and their relationships with Taiwan and China. The case of Kinmen illustrates the capacity of water infrastructure to serve bordering and debordering purposes, as well as how other factors disrupt or facilitate these processes.

The literature on Hirschman's exit-voice dynamics has long argued that voice (protests) is more likely to be selected in public affairs. In nondemocratic regimes, however, the cost of voicing out is high so citizens opt for exit (emigration). This study identifies individuals who engage in “voices after exit” as “migrant influencers” who emigrate overseas for criticizing their home government. It analyzes prodemocracy influencers in Hong Kong, revealing that 70.7% (29 out of 41 YouTube channels) have chosen to emigrate overseas due to increasing political restrictions in recent years. In the post-National Security Law era, commentary on Taiwan politics has become more constrained. This study analyzes 1,414 YouTube videos outside Greater China to examine how migrant influencers frame (1) cross-strait relations, (2) Taiwan's domestic politics, and (3) Taiwan's future prospects. The findings show that influencers physically distant from Hong Kong adopt more radical stance against China. Drawing on the concept of “long-distance nationalism,” the study concludes that distance from their original location and perceived equal rights protection in their new location foster a sense of personal safety and obligation to criticize home authorities openly. This article presents preliminary findings to further explore the concept of migrant influencers.

Abstract This paper draws from the literature on social movements and utilises collective memory to examine interactions between structure and agency in transformative protest events. Intra-movement competition between different groups to elaborate and diversify the movement’s ideology are used as a proxy for agency. The empirical analysis builds on Taiwan’s 2014 Sunflower Movement, examining it on its tenth anniversary. While the movement opposed a proposed free-trade agreement with China and was often portrayed as a cohesive student movement, it had significant internal divisions. Special focus is placed on the Low Life Liberation Area, which prioritised class issues and opposition to neoliberal policies over the mainstream focus on procedural justice and anti-China sentiments. Through the analysis of various qualitative data sources and participant observation of the movement’s commemorative events, the paper shows that, despite high levels of agency from competing factions, the outcomes of intra-movement competition and the movement’s transformative force were ultimately shaped and channelled through deep-seated structural divisions centred around Cross-Strait relations.

Taiwan is a potential flashpoint for conflict between the U.S. and China. Although it has been de facto independent of China for more than seventy years, China’s leaders regard Taiwan as an inseparable part of the PRC. While China claims to strive for peaceful “reunification,” it has never renounced the use of force against Taiwan. Despite a 45-year policy of “strategic ambiguity” regarding Taiwan’s defense, the U.S. has declared its support for the use of military force to defend Taiwan. China’s threats and U.S. support have created a security dilemma, in which adversaries build up their respective offensive or defensive capabilities in response to each other’s actions. This article employs game theory to assess whether the United States and China are more likely to use force or seek accommodation in determining Taiwan’s future. The paper seeks to answer the following questions: What risks would China’s leaders be willing to take to secure the benefits of seizing Taiwan? What costs would they be willing to bear? Is the United States prepared to use military force to defend Taiwan? To demonstrate the usefulness of game theory, the paper begins with an explanation of the history of classical game theory. It then provides an overview of cross-strait relations and the role of the United States as Taiwan’s security guarantor. The payoff structure of this analysis reflects the dynamics of a Chicken Game with asymmetric stakes: China’s pursuit of peaceful unification represents a strategic imperative tied to national identity, while the United States prioritizes regional stability and ally credibility. These differing levels of urgency and risk tolerance shape their strategic decisions.

This paper aims to examine how cross-strait dynamics shape India’s policies toward the broader Northeast and Southeast Asian regions. The goal is to identify key scenarios in which India may find itself as cross-strait tensions evolve. India has followed the "One China Policy" since December 30, 1949, when it shifted its diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China (ROC) to the People's Republic of China (PRC). However, India's involvement in the region did not end there. India sought to act as a peace mediator during the missile crises of 1954-55 and 1958, though its efforts were sidelined due to broader geopolitical considerations by major powers (Gokhale, 2023, p. 19). One reason for India's attempt to mediate was the leadership of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who led the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Following this period, India's engagement with Taiwan (ROC) remained minimal until both sides mutually re-established economic and cultural ties in 1995 by opening representative offices, which function as de facto embassies. Since then, relations between India and Taiwan have grown significantly in the areas of education, culture, and politics. India’s border conflict with the PRC in 1962, and subsequent incidents over the years, did not lead to a shift in its "One China Policy." Historically, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) avoided commenting on cross-strait issues. However, following the Galwan incident with the PRC in 2020, India’s stance shifted. In August 2022, the MEA expressed concerns about peace and stability in the region, urging all parties to exercise restraint and avoid unilateral actions. COVID-19 also accelerated India’s engagement with Taiwan, particularly through Taiwan’s early assistance in providing face masks and other medical supplies during the pandemic. The research will delve into the past studies of India’s engagement in the region, but also will highlight on why Cross-strait is important to India’s larger “Act East Policy”. Any Cross-strait contingency will affect India’s trade with other East Asian countries primarily with South Korea and Japan, both of which are strategic partners. The paper argues that, India’s changing stance on Cross-strait relations is a “strategic hedging” against China. As Taiwan faces territorial claims over its territories, India faces the same from PRC on its land borders, which makes India and Taiwan as somewhat natural partners with same set of common aggression faced by them. Key Words: India, Taiwan, China, Act East, One China