Purpose: This study aims to analyze capital market regulation through the lens of philosophical principles to evaluate the balance between transparency for the public interest and the protection of individual privacy rights in achieving justice. Methodology/Approach: This research adopts a normative legal method supported by conceptual and philosophical approaches. The study analyzes primary legal instruments, secondary literature, and tertiary references through qualitative library research to examine regulatory tensions between transparency and privacy in Indonesia’s capital market governance. Results/Findings: The findings show that Rawlsian justice, Kantian autonomy, and utilitarian ethics are useful frameworks for evaluating the ethics of capital market regulation. Although Indonesia’s Capital Market Law and OJK regulations emphasize transparency, investor data privacy remains inadequately protected. Adopting stronger data protection standards, such as the GDPR, alongside local principles of maslahah and subsidiarity, can enhance regulatory fairness and reduce burdens on small market participants. Conclusions: The study concludes that harmonizing transparency and privacy requires risk-based, ethically informed reforms that are responsive to technological changes. Strengthening the integration between capital market law and personal data protection is essential for creating a more just and sustainable regulatory framework. Limitations: This research is limited to theoretical-normative analysis and focuses primarily on the Indonesian legal context, which may affect its broader applicability. Contribution: The study contributes to the intersection of legal philosophy, capital market regulation, and data governance by proposing a value-based framework for balancing transparency and privacy. Its implications are particularly relevant for lawmakers, regulators, and legal scholars in emerging economies.

Abstract This article reads chapter 6 of Huaping Lu-Adler’s Kant, Race, and Racism as a contribution to the contemporary debate about racism and the philosophical canon that began with Peter Park’s Africa, Asia, and the History of Philosophy. Lu-Adler adds to Park’s narrative a detailed analysis of the link between racism and the historiography of philosophy in Kant’s own work, not just in his followers or those who influenced him. By doing so, this article argues, Lu-Adler enables critical philosophers of race to tell a new version of the story about racism in the history of philosophy that preserves the main conclusions drawn by Park, without having to rest so much of the case on an argument about the influence of Christoph Meiners. The second part raises two problems for Lu-Adler’s account, the first relating to the question of methodology and the role of pre-Kantian historian of philosophy Jacob Brucker, and the second relating to Lu-Adler’s account of Kant as an educator who contributed to racist ideology.

In an era marked by rapid technological advancement and the proliferation of digital platforms, the boundaries between truth, opinion, and disinformation have become increasingly blurred. This paper critically examines the misuse of modern communication technologies and their implications for privacy, knowledge acquisition, and democratic governance. It explores how filter bubbles, data profiling, and algorithmic manipulation empower corporations, political actors, and governments to shape public opinion and suppress dissent. Against this backdrop, the paper questions whether a universal “right to truth” can serve as a viable legal principle or whether such a construct risks legitimizing censorship and authoritarian control. Drawing from philosophical critiques – particularly those of Michel Foucault and J.S. Mill – the paper argues that truth is best approached not as a static right, but as a continuous process supported by freedom of speech, access to education, and institutional safeguards. Ultimately, it calls for the development of dynamic legal, educational, and technological strategies that enable societies to resist disinformation, protect privacy, and foster an informed public capable of engaging in truth-seeking dialogue.

Universities can neither ban nor ignore generative AI (GenAI); they must govern and design for it. This paper argues that the core challenge is not ‘cheating’ per se but the misalignment between legacy assessment designs and AI-mediated learning. We contribute (1) a practical, tiered governance model that aligns policy, pedagogy, and assessment operations; (2) an assessment redesign heuristic that integrates authenticity, cognitive demand, and evidence provenance; and (3) a risk-mitigation view adapted from the Swiss-cheese model that places student learning, rather than surveillance, at the centre of integrity work. Building on recent philosophical critiques of instrumental responses to GenAI in education, we position assessment as a socio-technical system where teacher judgement, student agency, and tool affordances co-evolve. We illustrate the approach with ready-to-adopt patterns (e.g. oral defence with artefact trail; cohort-specific data briefs; constrained-tools practicals) and specify implementable governance levers (role clarity, template language, moderation workflows, analytics). The result is a coherent pathway ‘beyond bans’ toward trustworthy assessment that is educative, fair, and feasible at scale.

This analysis of the philosophical foundations of the right to health explores the contributions of rationalist, modernist, and critical thinkers, as well as theorists of justice and rights. Rationalists such as Descartes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant laid the groundwork for a scientific understanding of health. Critical philosophers like Bentham, Arendt, Foucault, Goffman, and Sontag highlighted inequalities and power dynamics in access to healthcare. Lastly, theorists of justice and rights, including Rawls, Agamben, Sen, Nussbaum, Pogge, Farmer, Daniels, and Singer, developed ethical and political perspectives on health equity. A comprehensive examination of these philosophical perspectives on the right to health reveals a consensus on the fundamental importance of this right for human dignity and collective well-being. The right to health is inseparable from human dignity and social justice. Discrimination and vulnerabilities based on socio-economic status, gender, ethnicity, or other factors hinder access to healthcare and exacerbate health inequalities. To ensure equitable access to healthcare, it is imperative to recognize and address systemic discriminations and vulnerabilities that compromise the health and well-being of individuals and communities. Guaranteeing the right to health for all requires a firm commitment to equality, justice, and respect for human rights. It is a collective endeavor that requires the collaboration of all members of society, from governments to civil society organizations, healthcare professionals, and individuals themselves. By working together, we can build a future where health is truly a universal right, accessible to all without discrimination or exclusion.

This paper undertakes a comparative analysis of Immanuel Kant’s distinction between phenomenon and noumenon (the “thing-in-itself”) and Ernst Cassirer’s reinterpretation of this distinction. Focusing on how each thinker delineates the limits of human knowledge, it examines Kant’s epistemological boundary between appearances and things-in-themselves and then explores Cassirer’s transformation of that boundary through his philosophy of symbolic forms. The analysis highlights how Cassirer, as a Neo-Kantian, extends Kant’s critical philosophy into the cultural domain, mediating the noumenon via symbols and cultural meaning. The implications of this comparison are far-reaching: the concept of freedom is reframed by situating human autonomy either in a noumenal realm (for Kant) or in the creative spontaneity of culture (for Cassirer); the understanding of modernity and technology is enriched by considering Kant’s critical limits alongside Cassirer’s view of science and technology as symbolic constructions; a more pluralistic cross-cultural philosophy emerges from Cassirer’s vision of multiple symbolic worlds, complementing Kant’s universalism; and the human sciences gain a philosophical foundation by Cassirer’s integration of cultural forms with Kantian rigor. In conclusion, the paper argues that Kant’s Critical philosophy and Cassirer’s philosophy of culture are not opposed but complementary: Kant provides the necessary critical boundaries for knowledge and morality, while Cassirer expands this framework to include the richness of cultural life and symbolic mediation, thereby offering a more comprehensive understanding of human experience.

Purpose The paper looks at Maldonado-Torres's (2016) idea of “metaphysical catastrophe” and how it helps to understand the marginalization happening in the Global South. This paper, by focusing on the LGBTQ + community in Iran, uses one clear example to show the kind of systemic exclusion that many marginalized groups face. The point is not to generalize one group's experience, but to show how these realities can push us to rethink and redesign the educational foundations in a more honest and responsive way. Design/methodology/approach This research employs a theoretical approach shaped by postcolonial and decolonial ideas. By using the Iranian LGBTQ + community as the main example, the paper connects their lived experiences to the larger patterns of structural exclusion and leans on critical philosophy to show how material conditions and deeper knowledge hierarchies come together to shape these realities. Findings The analysis demonstrates that marginalized groups are relegated to what Fanon terms the “zone of non-being” which highlights both the philosophical depth and the material consequences of systemic exclusion, while also underscoring the potential for educational transformation. Research limitations/implications The study does not provide an ethnographic or quantitative account of LGBTQ + experiences in Iran. Instead, it uses the case as a symbolic point of entry into a larger theoretical reflection, which may limit the concreteness of its conclusions. Practical implications Educational policymakers and curriculum designers can use these insights to develop inclusive frameworks that move beyond Western-centric paradigms. Social implications The paper invites societies to confront systemic exclusion and to embrace practices that enable all communities to transcend conditions of non-being. Originality/value By linking metaphysical catastrophe to education and drawing from a Global South perspective, the paper offers a novel lens for rethinking educational foundations as transformative and inclusive.

In this study, the criticisms of the Maktab-e Tafkīk School against philo-sophy and philosophers within the framework of the legitimacy of Islamic philosophy will be examined. Maktab-e Tafkīk is a school that emerged in eastern Iran and has a history of nearly a hundred years. This school cla-ims to reach "pure" religion by separating philosophy and Sufism from the Quranic sciences. However, philosophy is more at the center of their criti-cism. Important representatives of the school are Mirza Mehdi Isfahani, Mujtaba Qazvini, Seyyid Jafar Seydan and Muhammad Riza Hakīmī. The followers of Tafkīk base their criticism of philosophy on two basic claims. The first is the assertion that philosophy, having entered the Islamic world from external sources, bears no connection to the Islamic religion. The second is the claim that truth cannot be attained through philosophi-cal reasoning. In support of these arguments, they have frequently pointed to the disagreements among philosophers, seeking through this method to undermine both philosophy and the philosophers themselves. In this study, the views of prominent figures of the Tafkīk on philosophy and phi-losophers will be determined mostly through their own works, and then the consistency of these criticisms will be questioned as objectively as possible. For this purpose, some objections to the Tafkīk will be pointed out and the study will end with a conclusion.

The text explores a philosophical critique of representationalism, the idea that perception, thought, and art fundamentally involve representations of reality. The author, inspired by Frege and later developments, rejects this view, arguing that both perception and conceptual activity apply to objects rather than represent them. Initially focusing on the philosophy of mind, this anti-representational stance extends to aesthetics and everyday practices, challenging the modern belief that access to reality always requires representation. The discussion then turns to Kasimir Twardowski’s 1894 theory of representation, which distinguishes between the represented object and the representation itself, using painting as an example. A painting and the landscape it depicts have different ontological statuses: the painting is real, while the “painted landscape” exists only as an intentional object. Drawing on Aristotle’s ontology, the author explains that represented entities possess a specific mode of being—intentional rather than real. This distinction reveals that representation aspires to transparency, concealing its material reality in favor of the ideality of the represented object. Yet, this transparency is constructed, not natural. Ultimately, the text suggests that understanding representation requires acknowledging both its material conditions and its intentional, ideal dimension.

ABSTRACT The following paper was inspired by editorial work on some of early precritical writings for the new Academy Edition of Immanuel Kant which can be characterized as more or (more often) less coherent compositions of traditional rational cosmology and physical cosmology of his time, the further transformation of which gave rise to some investigations how basic concepts changed in the period from around 1746–1768. The aim of the paper is twofold: Firstly – and for the first time, as far as I can see – to give a concise account of the most important conceptual developments of Kant’s precretical cosmology, especially of his precitical theory of matter. Secondly, to show how innovations in his later pre-critical writings in particular influenced the cosmology of his critical phase, mainly presented in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Although the paper in no way plays down the philosophical significance of Kant’s transcendental turn, it intends to show the extent to which argumentative patterns of the precritical period have found their way into his critical philosophy and others have become obsolete as a result of this turn.

This study argues that Kant’s logic lectures around 1782 can be seen not only as the ‘seedbed’ (“Keimzelle”) of his critical philosophy but also as the preparatory ground of his philosophy of history. By examining Samuel Grosser’s Pharus intellectus and Christian Wolff’s Philosophia rationalis sive logica as major sources, it shows how allegories of a collective voyage, the extension of teleology into history, and the example of Poland’s “bear child” informed Kant’s reflections on the development of reason. The central claim is that the passage from logica naturalis (natural state of thinking) towards logica artificialis (scientific state of logic) provides the structural schema for Kant’s later conception of historical progress. Logic thus becomes both a completed instance of the unfolding of natural dispositions and the analogue by which Kant conceptualized the hidden regularities of human history.

Molly R. Young, “Vanity Fair and the End of the Everyday” (pp. 139–160) Vanity Fair (1847–48) is rarely associated with “the everyday” in Victorian literature, but in this article, I argue that Thackeray’s novel engages and complicates prevailing scholarly assumptions about its status. Regularly associated with realism and its Romantic inheritance, the everyday is understood to rationalize life’s most erratic features within a shared realm of ordinary experience, making those features into meaningful and ethically valuable novelistic content. But in Vanity Fair, Thackeray offers a formal and philosophical critique of such stabilizing effects. He first uses a languid, distinctly deflating style to reveal how the everyday eludes narration, and then offers the experience of the narrator himself as a test case for its moral and social value. In showing the everyday to be a gnarlier, more troubling concept than typically assumed, Thackeray’s corrosive skepticism allows for a new assessment of novelists with whom the term is more commonly associated. The everyday in George Eliot, for instance—arguably the Victorian writer most associated with the term—is structured by Eliot’s own critique when we consider not only her inheritance of Wordsworth or frequent recourse to rural settings and scenes of domestic life, but also her narrator’s mercurial, uneasy inhabitation of everydayness in both story and discourse. Thackeray thus reminds us that the Victorians didn’t merely absorb the Romantic ideals of the everyday, but they also reshaped them as they encountered the burdensome demands of practice.

This study examines the construction and deconstruction of black humor schemata in American literature from the perspective of the philosophy of language, using Joseph Heller’s ‘Catch-22’ as a case study. Black humor, characterized by its ironic, absurd, and satirical elements, presents a unique narrative technique that challenges conventional literary forms and critiques sociopolitical structures. This research employs a combined methodology of textual analysis and philosophical inquiry to dissect the narrative devices and thematic elements Heller employs to construct black humor. The analysis reveals how Heller’s use of paradox, anti-heroism, and incongruity not only constructs a distinct humor but also deconstructs traditional wartime narratives, reflecting broader existential and linguistic concerns. Through a detailed examination of key passages and motifs in ‘Catch-22,’ the study provides insights into the intricate relationship between language, humor, and meaning in literary contexts. This paper discusses the theoretical underpinnings of black humor within the framework of language philosophy, examines its manifestation in Heller’s work, and explores its implications for contemporary literary theory. The results contribute to a deeper understanding of how black humor functions as both a narrative strategy and a philosophical critique, offering new perspectives on its role in American literature.

This study aims to analyze the formative influence of pre-Buddhist Indian culture on the development of social values within early Buddhist society. Prior to the emergence of Buddhism in the 6th century BCE, Indian civilization had already evolved a complex cultural and philosophical landscape characterized by the varṇa (caste) hierarchy, Vedic ritualism, and the metaphysical doctrines of the Upaniṣads concerning karma, saṃsāra, and mokṣa. Employing a qualitative library research method, this study draws on secondary historical and sociological literature as well as primary Buddhist scriptures from the Sutta Pitaka (Pali Text Society edition). The analysis identifies three major cultural elements Brahmanical ritualism, the doctrine of rebirth and moral causation, and the śramaṇa ascetic movements that provided both the context and the dialectical counterpoint to the rise of Buddhism. The findings reveal that the Buddha’s teaching emerged as a moral and philosophical critique of the Vedic worldview, rejecting hereditary privilege and ritual exclusivity in favor of ethical conduct (sīla), mental cultivation (bhāvanā), and compassionate social responsibility (mettā–karuṇā). Through this transformation, Buddhism redefined human worth based on moral action (kamma), rather than lineage or social status, thus creating an egalitarian and ethically grounded social order. Understanding the pre-Buddhist cultural background offers deeper insight into the sociological, philosophical, and ethical dimensions of early Buddhist thought and highlights its continuing relevance for contemporary discussions on social justice, equality, and interreligious harmony.

Purpose This paper proposes a conceptual framework exploring how text embeddings provide an alternative approach to addressing Patrick Wilson’s “indeterminacy of subject” issue. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that embeddings represent a significant shift from rule-based subject indexing to a geometric model of semantic representation. The analysis engages with recent interpretability work suggesting that large language models may exhibit cross-lingual regularities in their internal representations; however, the scope and stability of such effects remain debated, and we do not assume language-independent conceptual universals. Design/methodology/approach The paper critically reviews Patrick Wilson’s notion of “sense of position,” outlining traditional indexing and classification limitations. It introduces embeddings as mathematical translations of textual content into multidimensional semantic vectors, emphasizing their ability to represent documents through “semantic centroids.” The discussion integrates empirical evidence from recent literature, highlighting real-world applications and evaluations of embedding effectiveness. Findings While embeddings do not resolve the philosophical indeterminacy of “subject,” they provide an operational reframing: a document can be represented by a dense vector that supports retrieval without committing to a single, context-free subject designation. Read in Wilson’s terms, this amounts to adding a fifth way to obtain a possible subject representation – a dense vector or “semantic centroid” – alongside his four (author’s purpose, dominant figure and/or figure-ground, counts of key terms and an inferred unifying principle). Originality/value This paper is original in explicitly connecting Wilson’s philosophical critique to contemporary embedding technologies and in articulating embeddings as a fifth way to determine a possible subject representation (a dense vector or “semantic centroid”) alongside Wilson’s four. By reconceptualizing the “sense of position” from a hierarchical logic to geometric proximity, the work offers a novel theoretical framework and practical insights for information science.

Abstract This paper presents a comprehensive account of the rediscovered Logik-Volckmann, a hitherto unedited transcript of Kant’s logic lectures, written by Johann Wilhelm Volckmann between 1782 and 1783. The manuscript, preserved today in the Kant estate at the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences, is shown to derive from the same textual tradition as the Hechsel and Wiener notes, belonging to the so-called “Hoffmann-group” (Adickes). Through a detailed philological and codicological examination, the study reconstructs the provenance, transmission, and internal structure of the text, revealing its dependence on at least two earlier sources. The close parallels with V-Lo/Hechsel and V-Lo/Wiener confirm an early date of composition and thus connect the text with Kant’s lectures immediately following the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781). Volckmann’s transcript preserves numerous formulations that anticipate or echo central distinctions of the Critique , such as that between the world-concept and the school-concept of philosophy. His compilation method illustrates how Kant’s students received, combined, and transmitted his evolving conception of logic. The paper therefore contributes to clarifying the formation of Kant’s logical corpus and the pedagogical mediation of his critical philosophy. It provides a solid textual and historical basis for future editorial and interpretative work on Kant’s lecture materials.

ABSTRACT Garcia de Orta (1501–1568) is largely remembered in academic circles as a minor figure in the history of medicine. The son of converts from Judaism to Catholicism, he fled escalating persecution in Portugal and settled in Goa, where he practised medicine and wrote Colóquios dos simples e drogas da Índia, a dialogue that is generally viewed as nothing more than an unorthodox manual of tropical materia medica. However, here, I cast light on an important philosophical contribution that de Orta makes through this dialogue. I argue that he points to several epistemological failings made by most European natural philosophers in Europe. For de Orta, I argue, the tendency towards four forms of Eurocentrism is a significant cause of these errors. However, de Orta is prone to two of the very sorts of Eurocentrism to which he objects. He is therefore guilty of some of the same failings. Consequently, he makes for a complex opponent of Eurocentrism in the history of philosophy: whilst he provides a nuanced philosophical critique of Eurocentrism, he shows signs of struggling to entirely escape Eurocentrism himself.

We reflect on the current state of participatory planning pedagogy and observe that neither teaching participation as a set of techniques nor as a critical philosophy of inclusion adequately prepares planners to attend to the inherent context-specificity, questions of equity and justice, and profound epistemological differences in engagement settings. We propose that planning educators recognize classrooms as contexts for dynamic, participatory engagement and use this setting to model and teach an integrated set of practices for calling out, calling on, and calling in to respond to the emerging demands for our profession’s active role in democratic decision-making.

The purpose of this article is to find an alternative direction in qualitative research based on the scientific philosophy of critical realism for the purpose of overcoming the current dilemma which qualitative educational research should deal with. Some postmodern qualitative research trend is obsessed with dichotomous criticism of the modernity, in which epistemology replaces ontology and 'text' replaces 'reality'. The common foundation for communication and rational judgment between studies for 'better understanding' or 'better explanation' may be lost. In this awareness this study attempted to define the context of the times in which educational research is now placed as 'post-postmodern', introduce critical realism as the philosophical basis for qualitative research, and suggest the direction of qualitative research based on the ontology. In particular, it attempted to build an ontology based on the overall understanding of the development from basic critical realism to dialectical critical realism and the philosophy of metaReality. By specifying what practical implications the result of this study have for qualitative education research, I tried to suggest the direction of future education qualitative research.

This article aims to demonstrate that the idea of the highest good, in the critical philosophy of Kant, has two distinct but complementary senses, namely, the practical one, the realization of which can only take place in a supersensible world—i.e., the transcendent sense—and the architectonical one, which must be realized in the sensible world or nature—i.e., the immanent sense. Thus, against the current interpretations that maintain the exclusive disjunction between both senses, we argue in favor of their inclusive character. To this end, we clarify the framework that enables us to understand each of the senses. We then demonstrate their complementarity insofar as both are mutually conditioned: the practical sense conditions the validity of the architectonical one, but the latter functions as the teleological condition of the former according to the systematic demands of Kant’s philosophy.