The developments relative to Taiwan in 1965 contain one element of supreme irony. In a year when the two alternative was clearly a spectre in United Nations debate and when there was considerable evidence of maturation in a Nationalist commitment to the future of the island, the Vietnam crisis offered renewed hope to those seeking to invigorate the mainland return philosophy. In recent years, the Nationalists have been realistic in emphasizing that their opportunity will come within the context of a larger international confrontation. Could the Vietnam crisis be such a confrontation? Last year, the United States, the People's Republic of China, and the South Vietnamese government were cautious in their relations with Taiwan and thus kept Nationalist China a relative observer to the struggle. The Vietnam crisis, however, will serve to reinforce those factions on Taiwan who oppose the mounting costs of an ongoing modernization program on the island, and in the future may lead the Nationalists to a more direct participation in the Southeast Asian crisis. A resolution of the status of Taiwan is among the most difficult problems in international affairs. The two alternative has been seen largely at the level of state-to-state relations where both have precluded its adoption. In 1965 the policy assumed importance in the United Nations General Assembly debate. Through political negotiations, plus the intransigeance of the People's Republic of China, the Nationalists retained the Chinese seat in an extraordinarily close vote. The Kuomintang analyze their future as intimately related to the African states' vote and recognize the difficulties that beset their cause, especially by virtue of the increased political prestige of the Communist Chinese resulting from nuclear developments. For the present, the Nationalists continue to restate their claims, expand emphasis upon the technical aid program in Africa, and begin to downgrade the importance of United Nations membership in preparation for possible ejection or withdrawal. Whether or not the General Assembly will ultimately opt for some form of a two policy is not clear, nor should the response of the Nationalist government if confronted with a United Nations decision be assumed, since there is ample evidence that the government is not a total prisoner of its philosophy. The final decision will take into account the importance of UN membership, the relative positions of the Nationalists and the Communists, and the domestic situation on Taiwan. For the present, the important dangers posed by the publicly-maintained Nationalist position on two Chinas are these: first, there are the potential