July Crisis Research Articles

Bolesław Roja. Legionowym szlakiem dowódcy czwartaków

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Emotions and the British Government’s Decision for War in 1914

ABSTRACTRecent years have witnessed increasing interest amongst international historians in the impact of emotions on foreign policy decisions as part of a broader movement usually known as the ‘emotional turn’. This trend is associated with findings from the field of neuroscience that cognition and emotion—rather than operating independently—remain inextricably bound together in human decision-making. Most work thus far has concentrated on American foreign policy since 1945, but this analysis broadens the focus to consider the impact of emotions on British decision-makers, especially Cabinet ministers, as they debated whether to go to war in 1914. It shows that despite a tendency by the protagonists themselves to interpret their actions in rational terms, sufficient evidence of emotions exist in the written record to allow a fresh approach to the July Crisis. Whilst emotions must be seen as acting alongside rational mental processes, rather than regularly over-powering them, a focus on the subject helps explain different approaches taken by individual ministers, why the majority came to approve intervention in the conflict, and how Prime Minister Herbert Asquith, partly by appearing to control his feelings, minimised resignations over the fateful decision. It also allows a new view about why the Cabinet decided to go to war on 4 August in defence of Belgium, despite deciding just a few days earlier that the question of fulfilling the 1839 guarantee of Belgian neutrality was ‘one of policy than of legal obligation’.

Nothing fails like success: The London Ambassadors’ Conference and the coming of the First World War

ABSTRACTDuring the July Crisis Britain’s foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, focused on organising a conference through which differences could be reconciled. After the war, he maintained that Germany’s unwillingness to join this conference was one of the immediate causes of war. This essay disputes Grey’s contention, arguing that his plans for a conference, based on a misleading analogy to the previous Balkan Crises, actually helped facilitate the outbreak of war in 1914 by sanctioning inaction in the first phase of the crisis (28 June–22 July) and by tacitly encouraging Russian mobilisation in the second phase (23 July–4 August).

Lewis Harcourt's Journal of the 1914 War Crisis

ABSTRACTLewis Harcourt, who was Colonial Secretary in Britain's Liberal government, from 1908 to 1915, kept a political journal for many years, some earlier parts of which have already been published. Reproduced below is the whole neat version of the journal from 26 July 1914, when Harcourt first mentions the events of the ‘July Crisis’, until 4 August, when Britain declared war on Germany. Originals of the entries are kept at the Bodleian Library, Oxford in file Ms. Eng. c. 8269 of the ‘Further Papers of Lewis Harcourt’, which only came to light in 2008. Historians can be grateful that Harcourt kept such a record of ministerial discussions during the July Crisis, because no official records were taken of Cabinet meetings before 1916, apart from short reports by the Prime Minister to the King. There are some diary entries, letters and memoranda from those involved, but the only source with comparative detail to Harcourt's is the diary kept by the education minister, Jack Pease, which has already been published.

The Welsh press and the July Crisis of 1914

Until recently, studies of how Wales entered the First World War have generally been overlooked. Often, the British narrative has been assumed for the Welsh experience, with the once popular topos of war enthusiasm being recently displaced by a more nuanced approach. This paper revisits the July Crisis of 1914 as presented in the Welsh press and argues that on the whole, a complicated picture existed in Welsh newspapers where narratives of race and civilization formed the roots of war culture, yet justification for war was often submerged beneath feelings of opposition and indifference. Eventually, despite some strong feelings of opposition, the Welsh press succumbed to the inevitability of a general European war.

The Interbank Network Across the Global Financial Crisis: Evidence from Italy

This study examines the effects of the global financial crisis (GFC) on interbank market connectivity using network analysis. More specifically, using data on Italian banks’ bilateral interbank positions between 1998 and 2013, we analyze the impact of the following events on each bank’s network centrality: the liquidity crisis in August 2007, the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, Eurosystem’s long term refinancing operations (LTROs) between 2009 and 2012, the sovereign debt crisis in July 2011, and the announcement of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) in 2012. The results show that the 2007 liquidity crisis and especially the collapse of Lehman Brothers are associated with a marked reduction of the relative interconnectedness of the Italian banking sector (i.e., a shift in the distribution of banks’ centrality to the left, away from the most connected bank). In the following years, the system progressively recovered its initial patterns of integration among banks, which coincided with the main Eurosystem’s monetary policy interventions. However, the average outcome conceals different results across banks, depending on their characteristics and initial positions within the system.

Ambassador George Buchanan and the July Crisis

ABSTRACTDuring the July Crisis, the United Kingdom was put under strong pressure from Russia and the latter's ally, France, to declare it would fight alongside them. Britain had made the entente cordiale with France in 1904 and a Convention with Russia in 1907. The British Ambassador to St. Petersburg, George Buchanan, was the key figure in diplomatic communication between Britain and Russia at this time and his performance has drawn diverse comments over the decades. Some analysts believe he genuinely sought to restrain Russia from war, but was undermined by his own government, who too easily accepted St. Petersburg must mobilise its army. But others feel Buchanan's reports of Russian mobilisation were ill-informed and unhelpful to the government in London. This article examines Buchanan's performance, arguing that he attempted to preserve peace for a time and does not deserve some of the criticisms levelled at him. Nonetheless, the preservation of the Triple Entente was a priority for him and, after about 28 July, once it became clear that European war could not be avoided, he became tardy in reporting Russia's war preparations, appearing more interested in defending his hosts’ behaviour than in providing an accurate analysis of events.

The Great War, Revolution and the Struggle Over Peace: Russia, 1917

War and revolution were so tightly intertwined in 1917 Russia that the question of continuing the war to victory or finding a way to a negotiated peace became the basis for fundamental political conflict. This caused a dramatic realignment of politics and parties and drove the revolution steadily leftward. The question of the war was central to the three big crises of the Provisional Government’s period – the April Crisis, the July Crisis and the Kornilov Affair – as well as to the coming of the October Revolution. Despite their leadership of the soviets and effective control of the Provisional Government, the Menshevik and Socialist Revolutionary led Revolutionary Defencist bloc failed to solve the many problems facing Russia in the spring and summer of 1917. In no area, however, was the failure so disastrous as the failure to find some way to get Russia out of the war. The tragedy, perhaps pathos, of the Russian Revolution is that hope for a broad democratic outcome depended on a negotiated peace programme that, in the political and military conditions of Europe of 1917, had virtually no chance of success.

The interbank network across the global financial crisis: Evidence from Italy

This study examines the effects of the global financial crisis (GFC) on interbank market connectivity using network analysis. More specifically, using data on Italian banks’ bilateral interbank positions between 1998 and 2013, we analyze the impact of the following events on each bank's network centrality: the liquidity crisis in August 2007, the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, Eurosystem's long term refinancing operations (LTROs) between 2009 and 2012, the sovereign debt crisis in July 2011, and the announcement of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) in 2012. The results show that the 2007 liquidity crisis and especially the collapse of Lehman Brothers are associated with a marked reduction of the relative interconnectedness of the Italian banking sector (i.e., a shift in the distribution of banks’ centrality to the left, away from the most connected bank). In the following years, the system progressively recovered its initial patterns of integration among banks, which coincided with the main Eurosystem's monetary policy interventions. However, the average outcome conceals different results across banks, depending on their characteristics and initial positions within the system.

Viktor Chernov in 1917: A Reappraisal

In 1917, Chernov intended to introduce a revolutionary land law proposal for the Constituent Assembly. As a corollary measure, he argued for a proposal to suspend all transactions on land backdated to 1 March 1917. Accordingly, Chernov strongly argued for the rapid convocation of the Constituent Assembly to be convened in late September or early October. During July Crisis, he got cabinet approval for his schedule. Chernov's plan was thwarted by the Kadets who in the Second Coalition successfully demanded the prolongation by eight weeks of the election and the convocation of the Assembly. Chernov's political position was also weakened by the disintegration within the SR party that during the summer of 1917, divided the party into three factions. The Kornilov episode ended Chernov's ministerial career. In Bolshevik Russia, Chernov was a still a credible alternative to Lenin. Chernov got majority in the Second Congress of the Peasant Soviet between 26 November and 2 December. The SR party also received majority in the elections to the Constituent Assembly. In January 5, 1918, Chernov introduced the first ten paragraphs of the SR land law in the only session of the Assembly; the entire law proposal only emerged from the archives after the dissolution of the USSR.

DON COSSACKS AND THE GREAT RUSSIAN REVOLUTION OF 1917 (FROM FEBRUARY TO OCTOBER)

The article discusses the position of the don Cossacks during the February and October revolutionary events of 1917. According to the authors of the February and October revolutions were the stages of the Great Russian revolution of 1917. One of the arguments in favor of this concept is, in our opinion, the position of the don Cossacks. The February revolution and the overthrow of the autocracy, the Cossacks were received with understanding the task of shaping the new democracies, and generally supportive of their participation in the struggle. In terms of the July crisis of the revolutionary army, the Cossacks were used by the new Republican authorities to disperse the protesters, the masses of workers, which caused the protest of the Cossack masses. In the period of the Kornilov revolt the majority of the Cossacks were not included in the rightwing for the army in the Cossack environment weakened conservative forces. During the October revolution, the commanders of all regiments of the don was brought to the attention of the government that the Cossacks refuse to come to the defense of the government without the support of infantry army units, armored cars and machine guns. For the Cossacks “infantry”, consisting of peasants and workers, were the dominant expression of political views and moods of the majority of the population. Speaking about the possibility of any action in support of the government only in conjunction with the infantry, Cossacks joined with the will of the people, the voice of which, in their opinion, could serve as the soldiers of the garrison. The situation was repeated during the unsuccessful campaign Krasnov on Petrograd. The Cossacks at this time were unwilling to take any part in the confrontation erupted opponents and supporters of the Soviet regime, sought to evade the orders of their commanders, I can't wait to go home. With the arrival of the don, they almost spur of the moment went to the native villages. Because of social stratification, the Cossacks were not united in the struggle to preserve the former system of land tenure and property rights. Social-class war-on-don due to the peculiarities of historical development has acquired a caste color. At all critical stages of the revolution of 1917 from February to October - the don Cossacks in the objective reasons showed significant fluctuations on defining its political position up to sabotage and even failure in the support of the authorities. It testifies to a certain natural understanding of the Cossacks of the natural course of events, and, in our opinion, on the integrity and internal unity of the revolutionary process in 1917. In the ensuing civil war, the situation changed radically.

Lieven, Dominic Towards the Flame: Empire, War, and the End of Tsarist Russia (review)

SEER, 94, 4, October 2016 752 “hurrah!” But tomorrow will be holding red flags’ (p. 148). Nevertheless, the rightists soldiered on with a wide variety of civic projects, including charitable undertakings, anti-alcoholism campaigns and outreach among university students. Student activists insisted on keeping separate politics and learning (Gilbert mistranslates this term as ‘science’). Interestingly, many rightist organizations supported a fairly ‘inclusive role for women’ (p. 179). The right gradually declined during these years, according to Gilbert, because of factionalism, ideological disputes and the deeply unpopular Beilis Affair. The author’s wonder at ‘the inability of moderate and extreme rightists to work together’ (p. 216) is hard to understand; one found the same inability among Russian leftists. In fact, if one replaced the Beilis Affair with the Azef Affair, then the Russian left declined for the same reasons as the Russian right. Exploring such commonalities would have increased the study’s analytical power. The book includes a helpful glossary of rightist individuals and organizations and a detailed map of the Pale of Settlement. Unfortunately, the editors let slip many typos; clarity of expression could have been much improved. Uniformly lowercase section titles — e.g. ‘Revolutionary odessa’ — are sometimes jarring. A few references do not seem to corroborate assertions advanced in the text. Gilbert is generally fair and objective, but occasionally displays a partisan attitude, for example, evincing surprise that rightist organizations should engage in charity. There are significant errors of fact or conceptualization: the Kadets did not see themselves as ‘tsarists’ (p. 6), the Holy Brotherhood was not shut ‘down soon after its formation’ (p. 25), and there could be no such thing as ‘a right-wing civil society’ (p. 155) since civil society is the aggregate of all civic activism. Despite these concerns, the book greatly increases our knowledge of the Russian right. Department of History Jonathan Daly University of Illinois at Chicago Lieven, Dominic. Towards the Flame: Empire, War, and the End of Tsarist Russia. Allen Lane, London, 2015. xv + 429 pp. Maps. Illustrations. Notes. Index. £25.00. Every thirty years, Dominic Lieven writes a field-defining book on the origins of World War One. In 1983, he penned a thin volume entitled Russia and the Origins of the First World War, which argued that Russia took an aggressive stance and escalated the July Crisis primarily because ‘capitulation to open Austro-German coercion would have dealt a tremendous blow to Russia’s prestige and thus to her ability to defend her interests and retain her clients REVIEWS 753 and allies in the Near East’ (p. 147). Lieven still holds this position today, but the book that supports his claim is now much richer, thanks to a wealth of archival evidence and a career spent thinking about the Russian Empire, Russian statesmen, and the aristocratic milieu from which they sprang. Readers should be aware that, titles notwithstanding (the title in the US is The End of Tsarist Russia: The March to World War I and Revolution), this book focuses largely on the period before 1914. There is one brief chapter on World War One and one concise chapter on the July Crisis; together they account for roughly fifty pages of a 370-page book. Time-pressed readers should not, however, skip directly to these chapters, for the real strength of the book lies in the picture it paints of the Russian foreign policy establishment between 1905 and 1914. This is a study of a small but important group. In Russia, fewer than 200 men were eligible for diplomatic posts, and Lieven’s goal is to understand their mindset and their decisions. What were the cultural predispositions associated with their social class? What books and briefing papers shaped their view of the world beyond their windows? What events drove their understanding of the motives and tactics of their allies and enemies? Lieven has answers to all of these questions. His archival research is essential, though not because he found any ‘smoking guns’. There are no hidden transcripts of the meetings between Russian Tsar and French President in July 1914 and no blueprint for world domination craftily followed. Instead, the archival documents allow him to demonstrate the range of policies debated...

David-Fox, Michael; Holquist, Peter and Martin, Alexander M. (eds) Fascination and Enmity: Russia and Germany as Entangled Histories, 1914–1945 (review)

SEER, 94, 4, October 2016 754 apparently endless string of diplomatic crises, for Russia in particular. The Austrian annexation of Bosnia in 1908, the war scare the following year, the Italian attack on Ottoman Libya in 1911, the First Balkan War in 1912, the mobilizational standoff between Austria and Russia in the winter of 1912– 13 and the Second Balkan War in 1913 headed the list, but there were other dangerous moments too. In the wake of these crises, the stance taken by the Council of Ministers in July that Russian weakness would only invite further bellicose action by Germany and Austria makes much more sense. So too does a full understanding of the politics of mobilization in 1914 require the context that Lieven provides here. In sum, this is an essential book for all historians of the diplomatic origins of the Great War. Russia need no longer be the ‘black box’ of decision-making in the July Crisis. If this work does not exactly provide a shiny new thesis about the Great War, it performs the crucial task of debunking many half-cooked and foolish theses that are emerging or re-emerging on the occasion of the war’s centennial. Department of History Joshua Sanborn Lafayette College David-Fox, Michael; Holquist, Peter and Martin, Alexander M. (eds). Fascination and Enmity: Russia and Germany as Entangled Histories, 1914–1945. Pitt Series in Russian and East European Studies. Kritika Historical Studies. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, PA, 2012. vi + 309 pp. Illustrations. Notes. $28.95 (paperback). Two main schools of thought have dominated post-1945 scholarship on the Russian-German encounter in the twentieth century. The totalitarianism school, prominent among Anglo-American and West German scholars during the Cold War, focused on top-down, big picture explanations of Nazism and Stalinism. In the search for overarching explanatory models, its comparative history approach obscured the differences in origins, development and lived experience between the two systems. The other school, based on the modernization paradigm, adopted a similarly theory-driven approach by positing a kind of authoritarian path dependency for late modernizers and likewise obscured the differences between the two regimes. More recent scholarship, building on new developments in transnational history, has turned the focus from top-down comparative systems analysis to the study of actual encounters between Germans and Russians. By examining border crossings, political and cultural exchange, military engagement REVIEWS 755 and evolving perceptions of self and other, recent studies have introduced greater nuance into the study of the ‘special relationship’ between Germany and the Soviet Union. These works eschew moral condemnations of the two systems, turn away from the search for a ‘causal nexus’ for German or Soviet authoritarianism and mass murder, and transcend the earlier politicized dimensions of Nazi-Soviet comparative histories. Fascination and Enmity compiles the best of this new scholarship. The contributions in this collection are united by a common preoccupation not merely with transnational interactions, but with ‘entanglements’, a term which, David-Fox explains, ‘has come to imply not a simple borrowing or interaction but persistent and deep-seated reactions to the other side’ (p. 4). The book’s chapters, while diverse in scope and content, are united in their attention to mid-level conceptualization (neither exclusively theory-driven, nor theoryaverse ), their focus on mutual perceptions and ‘images of the other’, and the transcendence of some of the blatant political motivations driving earlier scholarship. Chapter one, ‘Introduction: Entangled Histories in the Age of Extremes’, by Michael David-Fox, and chapter ten, ‘Mortal Embrace: Germans and (Soviet) Russians in the First Half of the Twentieth Century’, by Dietrich Beyrau, serve as synthetic introductions to the topic of Russian and German entangled histories. As David-Fox notes, ‘perhaps no other entanglements were as central to the age of extremes as the ones between Germany and the Soviet Union, shaping as they did both the domestic directions of both states as well as the titanic clash on the eastern front’ (pp. 4–5). The remaining eight chapters focus on individual episodes spanning the period from 1914 to 1945. Chapter two, ‘“A Belgium of Our Own”: The Sack of Russian Kalisz, August 1914’, by Laura Engelstein, investigates the case of...

Sir Edward Grey and the July Crisis

Thank you for inviting me because I am not, and never will be, an expert on Edward Grey and I have to confess to feeling a little intimidated by this gathering of ‘Fallodonistas’ whose writings on ...

Sir Edward Grey, Germany, and the Outbreak of the First World War: A Re-Evaluation

ABSTRACTHistorians have variously condemned British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey for contributing to the escalation of the July Crisis of 1914, and praised him as an heroic advocate of peace. Addressing this conundrum, this article first assesses historiographical debates around the significance of Grey's policy towards Germany in the events that led to the outbreak of the First World War. It then traces Grey's foreign policy vis-à-vis Germany on the one hand, and the Entente on the other. Finally, it provides an innovative analysis of Grey's policy from the vantage point of Berlin, arguing that in July 1914 decisions taken by the governments of other countries escalated the crisis and were taken regardless of Grey's position. The article concludes that current historiography overestimates British agency in July 1914 and that Grey was not as important to the outcome of the crisis as both his critics and his defenders have claimed. His actions could not change the minds of those on the continent who were bent on war.

‘Postponing the Evil Day’: Sir Edward Grey and British Foreign Policy

ABSTRACTSir Edward Grey is remembered largely as Britain's Foreign Secretary when ‘the lights went out all over Europe’ in the summer of 1914. His record remains contested. From David Lloyd George's crafty deception in his wartime memoirs to more recent revisionist historians, writers have sought to blame Grey for the outbreak of the First World War. Drawing on substantial research in private and official, British, and foreign archives, this paper will reconstruct Grey's career as Foreign Secretary with an emphasis on his objectives and the means which he employed to obtain them. Crucially, it places Grey's stewardship of British foreign policy within the broader international context, defined by the steep decline and subsequent renaissance of Russian power in the years between 1905 and 1912/13, with the aim of establishing the limitations of British power. More especially the shift in the international balance around 1913/14 shaped towards Russia, and away from Germany, shaped Grey's calculations during Europe's last summer. The July Crisis showed both the strengths and the limitations of Grey's diplomacy, this persistent and subtle pressing for mediation, but also his misreading of Austro-Hungarian policy.

July Crisis: The World's Descent into War, Summer 1914. By T. G.Otte. Cambridge University Press. 2014. xxiv + 534pp. £25.00.

July Crisis: The World's Descent into War, Summer 1914. By T. G.Otte. Cambridge University Press. 2014. xxiv + 534pp. £25.00.

Miroslav Spalajkovic, the Serbian Minister in Russia in the july crisis of 1914

One of those who played a supporting role in the prologue of the great European tragedy of 1914 was Miroslav Spalajkovic, the Serbian Minister in St Petersburg. Known as a sworn enemy of Austria-Hungary, he was a close associate of the Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pasic. The latter was aware of Spalajkovic?s weaknesses but trusted him nevertheless. Although Spalajkovic had spent a brief period of time in St Petersburg prior to the July Crisis and could not have exerted considerable influence on the Russian ruling circles, he spared no effort to secure support for Serbia in the face of Vienna?s sabre-rattling. In fact, the Russians did not need a Serbian diplomat to point out what was obvious: that they could not allow the destruction of an independent and pro-Russian Serbia on the southern border of Austria-Hungary. Having sensed the political mood in St Petersburg, he enthusiastically reported to his government that Serbia would not be left in the lurch. His dispatches boosted self-confidence in Serbia and made its leaders firmer in their resistance to Austria-Hungary?s demands.

July Crisis: The World's Descent into War, Summer 1914

Book Review| December 01 2015 July Crisis: The World's Descent into War, Summer 1914 Otte, T. G.: July Crisis: The World's Descent into War, Summer 1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 555 pages. ISBN 978-1-107-06490-4. $18.90 (hardcover). Robbie Gramer Robbie Gramer Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Mediterranean Quarterly (2015) 26 (4): 132–135. https://doi.org/10.1215/10474552-3425222 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Robbie Gramer; July Crisis: The World's Descent into War, Summer 1914. Mediterranean Quarterly 1 December 2015; 26 (4): 132–135. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/10474552-3425222 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search Books & JournalsAll JournalsMediterranean Quarterly Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Copyright 2015 by Mediterranean Affairs, Inc.2015 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal Issue Section: Reviews You do not currently have access to this content.

Reform or cataclysm? The agreement of 8 February 1914 regarding the Ottoman eastern provinces

On 8 February 1914, Ottoman Grand Vizier Said Halim and the Russian chargé d'affaires Konstantin Gulkevich signed a reform project for seven Ottoman eastern provinces that covered roughly half of Asia Minor. This international Reform Agreement differed considerably from a first Russian draft the year before. Though little known by most World War I historians in the West, this agreement was a central but fragile piece for the future of Ottoman coexistence in egalitarian terms in Asia Minor on the eve of World War I. Often called ‘Armenian Reforms’, it was also a last seminal, more or less consensual project of European diplomacy before the latter's breakdown in the July crisis of 1914. Important Ottoman and non-Ottoman protagonists then chose the road towards cataclysm instead of efforts for Ottoman coexistence, reform and international consensus building. The cataclysm of greater Europe in World War I produced various seminal outcomes. One main result in the Levant was a Turkish nation-state in Asia Minor that excluded Asia Minor's Christians and tried to assimilate non-Turkish Muslims, above all Kurds, into ‘Turkdom’. This article argues that the agreement of 1914 had opened for a short time a completely different perspective and that it played a crucial role on the road that led to genocide in spring 1915. Its postulates are still topical.