Coreferential Names Research Articles

КОРЕФЕРЕНТНІСТЬ У ПОЕТИЧНИХ ТВОРАХ ЛЕСІ УКРАЇНКИ

The category of coreference plays an important role in the creation of texts, as it is based on fundamental principles of text organization. The linearity of a text and the non-linearity of a situation described in the text are closely related to the mention of elements of a situation with another nomination of this object. Therefore, chains of coreferential names appear in the text and, having a binary relation, partly cause the emergence of a secondary nomination, which is an anaphoric relation with the primary nomination. The purpose of this article is to study the category of coreference in the poetic speech of Lesia Ukrainka based on the corpus of the Ukrainian language represented on mova.info. The object of the research is the idiostyle of Lesia Ukrainka’s poetry, and the subject is the functioning of the category of coreference. The categorical essence of coreference is characterized, the types of representatives of real objects, their functional and stylistic varieties and typical objects of representation in a poetic text are determined, and the most frequent structures are considered. Software for working with coreference has been developed and implemented. It has a user-friendly interface, which allows searching, sort, and doing the quantitative processing of the collected information according to the needs of researchers. On the material of 153 texts, 1520 referentially identical pairs are established. The coreferentiality index and the index of coreference coverage of the text proposed in this article helped to quantitatively assess the saturation of the text with the category of coreference. In addition, the classification of coreferential relations is composed: 1) identity; 2) collection gap; 3) part-whole; 4) predicative identity; 5) metonymy; 6) association. A dependency tree of a sentence made it possible to determine the location of coreferential pairs in the sentence, the position relative to each other, the belonging of the segment with the coreferent or the referent to the complicators of the sentence, i.e., a subordinate clause or phrases. This representation also helped to establish the type of syntactic relationship between the coreferent and the referent, the type of syntactic-semantic relationship between them, the presence of referent-dependent words, the intersection of the coreferent and the referent in gender and number. Automatic extraction of coreferential pairs from dependency trees allowed building intersentential coreference.

Logical Form, Truth Conditions, and Adequate Formalization

Abstract I discuss Andrea Iacona’s idea that logical form mirrors truth conditions, and that logical form, and thus truth conditions, are in turn represented by means of adequate formalization. I criticize this idea, noting that the notion of adequate formalization is highly indefinite, while the pre-theoretic idea of logical form is often much more definite. I also criticize Iacona’s claim that certain distinct sentences, with the same truth conditions and differing only by co-referential names, must be formalized by the same formula (in the same context). I criticize this claim, noting that it imposes implausible demands on adequate formalization. Finally, I offer some brief remarks on the connection between Iacona’s ideas and the distinction between logical and non-logical constants.

The descriptive content of names as predicate modifiers

In this paper I argue that descriptive content associated with a proper name can serve as a truth-conditionally relevant adjunct and be an additional contribution of the name to the truth-conditions. Definite descriptions the so-and-so associated by speakers with a proper name can be used as qualifying prepositional phrases as so-and-so, so sentences containing a proper name NN is doing something could be understood as NN is doing something as NN (which means as so-and-so). Used as an adjunct, the descriptive content of a proper name expresses the additional circumstances of an action (a manner, reason, goal, time or purpose) and constitute a part of a predicate. I argue that qualifying prepositional phrases should be analyzed as predicate modifiers and propose a formal representation of modified predicates. The additional truth-conditional relevance of the descriptive content of a proper name helps to explain the phenomenon of the substitution failure of coreferential names in simple sentences.

Berg’s Answer to Frege’s Puzzle

Berg seeks to defend the theory that the meaning of a proper name in a belief report is its reference against Frege’s puzzle by hypothesizing that when substituting coreferential names in belief reports results in reports that seem to have different truth values, the appearance is due to the fact that the reports have different metalinguistic implicatures. I review evidence that implicatures cannot be calculated in the way Grice or Berg imagine, and give reasons to believe that belief reports do not have the implicatures Berg attributes to them. I also argue that even if belief reports did have such implicatures, they would not explain why the belief reports in Frege’s puzzle seem to have different truth values. I point out that Berg has no reason to believe that Lois Lane believes Clark Kent is a reporter and Lois Lane believes Superman is a reporter are both true rather than both false, and that Leibniz’s Law cannot be used to defend substitutivity in belief reports because belief reports are not relational in the requisite way. Finally, I observe that some of the linguistic data Berg uses to argue for substitutivity in belief reports concerns the transparent interpretation of belief reports, whereas Frege’s puzzle concerns the opaque interpretation.

From Giorgione-sentences to simple sentences

As Quine (1953) taught us, from (1) and (2) we cannot infer (3): (1) Giorgione was so-called because of his size (2) Giorgione was Barbarelli (3) Barbarelli was so-called because of his size. Why? In this paper I discuss and dismiss two possible answers. The first answer (section 1) rests on the view that in a sentence like (1)—a Giorgione-sentence—the name ‘Giorgione’ plays a dual role, i.e. it is both used and mentioned, and, since it is mentioned, it cannot be substituted salva veritate by the coreferential name ‘Barbarelli’. The second answer (section 2) dismisses the dual role of the name. It proposes the view that the name ‘Giorgione’ is picked out by the pronoun ‘so’ working like a demonstrative. In section 3 I present a plausible Perry-inspired account—i.e. I take on board Perry's distinction between an utterance's referential truth conditions and its reflexive truth conditions—which enables us to solve Frege-inspired puzzles concerning cognitive significance. Finally, in section 4, I discuss and defend the view that in a Giorgione-sentence ‘so’ works as an anaphoric pronoun coindexed with the name ‘Giorgione’. This anaphoric link and coindexation, though, appears at a reflexive level. This solution rests on the view that at the surface level the name is merely used while at the reflexive level, it is mentioned. 1 1 The picture I propose is neutral vis-à-vis any particular theory of quotation. For my argument to work, it is sufficient that the NPs appear within quotation marks at the cognitive level. I also show how the account proposed elegantly deals with so-called simple sentences of the form “Clark Kent, unlike Superman, can’t fly”, “Superman is stronger/more successful/…than Clark Kent”. In these sentences, codesignative NPs do not seem to be substitutable salva veritate. As in Giorgione-sentences, it is shown that their apparent non-substitutability is best dealt with at the reflexive level. The picture I’ll end up proposing endorses the welcome consequence that in Giorgione-sentences, unlike in simple sentences, codesignative names cannot be replaced salva veritate. Yet in simple sentences the intuitions concerning their alleged non-substitutivity are dealt with at the reflexive level. Thus, these intuitions force us neither to invoke special modes of presentation entering the proposition expressed nor to enrich our ontology and claim that coreferential names can refer to different entities in various contexts.

Conversational Implicature, Thought, and Communication

Abstract: Some linguistic phenomena can occur in uses of language in thought, whereas others only occur in uses of language in communication. I argue that this distinction can be used as a test for whether a linguistic phenomenon can be explained via Grice’s theory of conversational implicature (or any theory similarly based on principles governing conversation). I argue further, on the basis of this test, that conversational implicature cannot be used to explain quantifier domain restriction or apparent substitution failures involving coreferential names, but that it must be used to explain the phenomenon of referential uses of definite descriptions. I conclude with a brief discussion of the relevance of this point to the semantics/pragmatics distinction.

The One and Only Argument for Radical Millianism

AbstractRadical Millianism agrees with less radical varieties in claiming that ordinary proper names lack “descriptive senses” and that the semantic content of such a name is just its referent but differs from less radical varieties of Millianism in claiming that any pair of sentences differing only in the exchange of coreferential names cannot differ in truth‐value. This is what makes Radical Millianism radical. The view is surprisingly popular these days, and it is popular despite the fact that, until very recently, there was not a single argument for it. Theodore Sider and David Braun (2006) have tried to provide the missing argument, but, I argue, their attempt fails. I conclude that we (still) have no reason to be Radical Millians.

What's in two names?

As first pointed out by Saul (1997a), the co-referential names in sentences like (1) and (2) defy substitution salva veritate: (1) 'Clark Kent went into the phone booth, and Superman came out' ; (2) 'I never made it to Karl-Marx-Stadt, but I visited Chemnitz last year'. This paper elaborates and compares two solutions to Saul's substitution problem, both of which turn on an asymmetry between names that share their bearers. According to the first solution there is a semantic distinction between neutral names (like 'Superman' and 'Karl-Marx-Stadt') and restricted names (like 'Clark Kent' and 'Chemnlitz'). According to the second solution, only neutral names are properly used, whereas the use of (what would be) restricted names involves code-switching and pragmatic re-interpretation. As it turns out, the semantic approach deals more easily with changing names as in (2), whereas the pragmatic account is more adequate in explaining hidden identity cases like (1).

Reply to Ezcurdia and Gómez-Torrente

Contra Ezcurdia, it is argued that my thesis —that substitution of coreferential names or indexicals in attitude ascriptions preserves truth values of propositions semantically expressed, although it often changes truth values of propositions asserted— is compatible with the fact that belief ascriptions play important explanatory roles. Contra Gómez-Torrente, it is argued that although single-word natural kind terms are rigid in Kripke's original sense, natural kind predicates containing them are neither rigid nor obstinately essential —in the sense of applying to the same individuals in every possible world-state, whether those individuals exist at the world-state or not.

The Price of Innocent Millianism

According to the view I call `innocent Millianism', that-clauses differing only for occurrences of co-referential names provide the same contribution to the intensional profile of a belief report. It is widely believed by friends and foes of innocent Millianism alike that this approach entails either the denial of what I label a `naive' account ofbelief reports, or a dismissive attitude towards our semantic intuitions. In this essay, I counter that the conjunction of innocent Millianism and the naive view of belief reports is compatible with our intuitions of truth-conditions. In order to defend this conclusion, I defend an independently motivated approach, in which utterances endowed of the same intension may nevertheless differ in truth-conditions.

Justification and Ways of Believing

One of the issues that has been hotly discussed in connection with the direct designation theory is whether or not coreferential names can be substituted salva veritate in epistemic contexts. Some direct designation theorists believe that they can be so substituted. Some direct designation theorists and all Fregeans and neo-Fregeans believe that they cannot be so substituted. Fregeans of various stripes have used their intuition against free substitution to argue against the direct designation theory. Some direct designation theorists have used the same intuitions to argue against the view that belief reports of simple declarative sentences can be accounted for with singular propositions. 1 This paper has two main goals; first, to show that the discussion of the issue has tended to treat all epistemic contexts equally, and second, to argue that we should not treat substitutions in contexts that involve justification (and hence knowledge) in the same way as we treat substitution in simple belief contexts, i.e., contexts that just involve the belief relation. I.

The Simple Sentence Puzzle and Ambiguous Co-referential Names

The Simple Sentence Puzzle and Ambiguous Co-referential Names

Disquotation and consistency: a reply to Frances

Two increasingly entrenched positions have evolved in the debate about the semantic role of proper names. The Millian holds that the sole semantic function of a proper name is to refer to its bearer. This view entails Substitutivity-that is, that truth-value is preserved if we intersubstitute coreferential proper names in otherwise identical sentences, even sentences that report beliefs and other propositional attitudes. Because of this the Millian is committed to the possibility that a perfectly rational subject in a traditional Frege-case might be saddled with beliefs that are, at least superficially, contradictory. Thus, Lois believes that Superman can fly and, since she believes that Clark Kent cannot fly, she thereby also believes that Superman cannot fly. Or so says the Millian. This violation of Consistency-the claim that we should attribute contradictory beliefs only to irrational agents-seems counter-intuitive at first. However, Millians have shown how this sting might be partially relieved through pragmatics: it would be misleading, although strictly speaking true, to say that Lois believes that Superman cannot fly. Alternatively (or in addition), the Millian might hold that the oddity we feel about the violation of Consistency may just be the surprise of philosophical enlightenment. It turns out that we attribute contradictory beliefs to a subject not only when she suffers some internal failure of rationality (faulty inference, insufficient attention, untidy cognitive house-keeping and so on), but also when external circumstances conspire in just the right wayas when, unbeknownst to the agent, distinct names (perhaps with distinct causal and associational histories) pick out the same individual. On this view, the attribution of contradictory beliefs is a sign that things are cognitively sub-optimal (and should be changed, other things being equal) for either internal or external reasons. It can, of course, be just as important to expose an external conspiracy (e.g., to discover that Superman is none other than Clark Kent) as it is to clear up some internal failure. The Millian's opponent holds that names play a richer semantic role, particularly in the attribution of beliefs and other propositional attitudes. In such attributions, names can be used to report on the different ways that a subject represents to herself some individual to which the names corefer. The anti-Millian is moved by a desire to honour more closely what she takes to be our actual belief-reporting practice (particularly our de

Justification and Relative Apriority

There is obviously tension between any view which claims that the object denoted is all that names and simple referring terms contribute to propositions expressed by sentences in which they appear and the apparent a posteriority of identity statements containing different but codesignative names. Frege solved the tension by adopting a description theory of names. The direct designation theorist cannot do the same, for that would amount to abandoning the theory. Instead, she has to provide one of two solutions; (a) argue that although Hesperus is Hesperus and Hesperus is Phosphorus express the same proposition their epistemic status differs such that one's justification of the proposition expressed by the former but not the latter is a priori, or (b) argue that both Hesperus is Hesperus and Hesperus is Phosphorus express a priori truths. I will argue for a version of option (a), and that while coreferential names can be freely substituted in simple belief contexts, they cannot be freely substituted in contexts involving justification.

Misdisquotation and substitutivity: when not to infer belief from assent

In A Puzzle about Belief Saul Kripke appeals to a principle of disquotation that allows us to infer a person's beliefs from the sentences to which she assents (in certain conditions). Kripke relies on this principle in constructing some famous puzzle cases, which he uses to defend the Millian view that the sole semantic function of a proper name is to refer to its bearer. The examples are meant to undermine the anti-Millian objection, grounded in traditional Frege-cases, that truth-value is not always maintained when coreferential names are intersubstituted in belief reports. I argue here that our disquotational practice is sensitive to certain shifts in conversational context, and it is only if we overlook these shifts-if we misdisquote-that we can draw the conclusions Kripke wants to draw from his examples. In the wake of this conclusion, I provide a contextualist treatment of Kripke's puzzle cases. I show how this treatment is motivated by certain nonns of rationality, and I defend these norms against an intriguing anti-Cartesian theory of mind. Throughout the paper, I develop the larger implications that my treatment of Kripke's argument has for the semantic theory of names and belief reports, and, more generally, for our picture of the relation between linguistic behaviour and our states of mind.

Saul, Salmon, and Superman

Journal Article Saul, Salmon, and Superman Get access Stefano Predelli Stefano Predelli Filosofisk instituttUniversitetet i Oslo Boks 1020, Blindern 0315 Oslo, Norwaystefano.predelli@filosofi.uio.no Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 59, Issue 2, April 1999, Pages 113–116, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/59.2.113 Published: 01 April 1999

Substitution and Simple Sentences

A great deal of attention has been devoted to propositional attitude contexts. Why? A key reason is that the substitution of co-referential names in otherwise identical sentences which ascribe propositional attitudes does not seem to preserve truth conditions. Little attention, however, has been paid to substitution of co-referential names in sentences which do not report propositional attitudes. Why? Because such substitutions are taken to be unproblematic. I will argue, however, that this is not right. There are simple sentences1 which evoke anti-substitution intuitions quite similar to those evoked by attitude-reporting sentences. Imagine that (1) is a truthful description of what happened on a Metropolis street:

Three Problems for Richard's Theory of Belief Ascription

Some contemporary Russellians, defenders of the view that the semantic content of a proper name, demonstrative, or indexical is simply its referent, are prepared to accept that view's most infamous apparent consequence: that coreferential names, demonstratives, indexicals, etc. are intersubstitutable salva veritate, even in intentional contexts. Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames argue that our recalcitrant intuitions with respect to the famous apparent counterexamples are not semantic intuitions, but rather pragmatic intuitions. Strictly and literally speaking, Lois Lane believes, and even knows that Clark Kent is identical to Superman, since she believes and knows that Superman is identical to Superman. Salmon and Soames attempt to soften our reaction to this shocker by allowing that it is typically misleading to utter the sentence ‘Lois Lane knows that Clark Kent is identical to Superman,’ since it pragmatically implicates, without semantically entailing, that Lois Lane would accept the sentence ‘Clark Kent is identical to Superman.’ Our compulsive tendency to claim that ‘Lois Lane knows that Clark Kent is Superman’ is false, rather than merely misleading, is due to a confusion between semantics and pragmatics, between truth conditions and conditions of appropriateness of utterance.

A Semantic Solution to Frege's Puzzle

Gottlob Frege observed that a sentence of the form 'a = b' has a different cognitive value (Erkenntniswert) from a sentence of the form 'a = a,' where 'a' and 'b' are co-referential proper names; 'a = b' is informative, one might say, and 'a = a' is not. From this he inferred that (proper) names have senses (Sinne) and that the sense of a name may be different from the sense of another co-referential name.1 It follows from this that the sense of a name is not determined by its referent. Frege thought that the sense of a name is analogous to the sense of a definite description on three counts: (i) it is the descriptive content of the term; (ii) it determines the reference of the term; and (iii) it contributes to the cognitive value of any expression in which the term occurs. Although the exact nature of Fregean senses might be open to endless debate, it is clear that the postulation for each name of a sense satisfying (i), (ii), and especially (iii) would provide an explanation of the informativeness of 'a = b.' This is the strength of a Fregean theory of names. However, Saul A. Kripke has convinced many philosophers that names do not have Fregean senses, or any descriptive contents, in terms of which their reference is determined.2 Kripke resurrected John Stuart Mill's idea that names are connotationless tags. Kripke's arguments were novel and ingenious. He taught us a great deal about names and modality. And yet, Kripke has not completely dispelled the Fregean reason for postulating descriptive contents for names. Or so it appears. If, as Kripke has us believe, names are thoroughly nondescriptive, then we seem to have a problem; the informativeness of 'a = b' seems to defy explanation. If names have no descriptive contents, co-referential names seem not to differ from each other in any way semantic. But if so, it

Substitution and the explanation of action

This paper examines a potential problem area for theories of direct reference: that of the substitution of co-referential names within the belief context of a belief attribution used to explain an action. Of particular interest are action explanations which involve cases of repetition — wherein beliefs are held which, though about one (other) individual, are mistakenly thought to concern two different people. It is argued that, despite the commonly held view to the contrary, no problem is posed by substitution in such circumstances to theories of direct reference.