Abstract Carbon markets promote nature‐based solutions (NbS) as a means of advancing climate mitigation and biodiversity objectives. Credits from these activities frequently claim benefits beyond carbon. Yet, legal frameworks remain largely structured around carbon accounting, raising questions about how broader environmental outcomes are addressed in practice. Environmental integrity encompasses both harm avoidance through safeguards and the proactive generation of environmental co‐benefits, but their legal treatment remains uneven. This article examines whether, how and with what legal effects environmental co‐benefits are integrated into carbon market governance. It undertakes a comparative, multi‐level analysis of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the European Union Carbon Removal Certification Framework (EU CRCF) and leading voluntary carbon market (VCM) standards. The comparison identifies two patterns. First, environmental safeguards are commonly embedded as procedural risk‐management mechanisms tied to monitoring, eligibility and certification requirements, whereas environmental co‐benefits are recognised but operationalised through flexible or incentive‐based mechanisms, such as disclosure tools, contractual arrangements and market incentives, primarily at the project level. Second, implementation varies across governance levels: UNFCCC mechanisms combine international rules with national implementation; the EU CRCF operates as a regional regulatory certification framework; and VCM standards rely on private certification and verification. These patterns reveal a fragmented governance landscape in which public regulation and private standards structure environmental outcomes while allocating responsibilities unevenly across market actors.

This paper offers a novel analysis of efforts to expand the ‘Women, Peace and Security’ (WPS) agenda by including climate change-related security threats, contextualising these developments against the broader and unsuccessful attempts to securitise climate change within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Using the distinctive lenses of international environmental law, the evolving field of international disaster law (IDL) and Global South perspectives, it examines Resolution 1325 and subsequent developments. The expansion of the WPS agenda offers an indirect pathway to reframe climate change as a security threat within the UNSC, although limited in scope to women’s security concerns. The paper identifies common dynamics linking the two processes and examines patterns in the responses from the Global South, with a particular focus on India. It argues that India has demonstrated a coherent position by rejecting the efforts to securitise climatic shifts and cautiously engaging with the WPS agenda. The paper contends that, because of their holistic and developmental-oriented approach, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) mechanisms and the evolving IDL offer a more appropriate forum to address women’s climate change-related security concerns. It recommends that India should actively promote these alternative forums to advance interests of the Global South.

Considering the larger crisis of climate change that the world is currently facing, the Conference of the Parties meets under the framework of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)’s Paris Agreement. This economic research focuses on a critical aspect of climate finance in India. Beginning with the evaluation of project funding, which can be referred to as climate finance, a concept that remains evolving and without an exact definition, this study tracks major projects that form part of climate finance flows in India. Specifically, this is examined in the context of tracking the USD 100 billion goal. This goal refers to the commitment by developed countries to mobilise USD 100 billion annually by 2020, which was later extended to 2025 and has now transitioned into the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG). In the context of climate finance, data availability remains a major challenge due to its highly fragmented nature. There is no single platform that provides a comprehensive record of all internationally funded climate projects in India, including both the number of projects and the total financial disbursements. Therefore, the methodology adopted in this study follows a mixed-method quantitative approach based on project-level data compilation. Within the limits of the available data and analysis, the aggregate climate finance received by India over the period 2010 to 2024 is estimated at approximately USD 1.5 billion. When considered as a proportion of the USD 100 billion annual global target, this accounts for roughly 1.51 percent over the study period, with an average annual inflow of about USD 100.4 million. While this appears limited in proportional terms, this comparison must be interpreted cautiously, as the USD 100 billion goal applies collectively to more than 150 developing countries and was not consistently achieved until 2022.

The global climate crisis has elevated the role of multilateral institutions, particularly the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in conducting collective international responses to climate change. While the UNFCCC has facilitated landmark agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, its effectiveness in closing the persistent gap between climate ambition and implementation remains contested. This study assesses the efficacy of the UNFCCC in advancing global climate objectives amid increasing institutional complexity and persistent political inertia. Drawing on a systematic review of literature published between 2000 and 2025, combined with a structured cause-andeffect analytical framework, the research examines the institutional, political, and procedural factors shaping outcomes of the UNFCCC. The findings reveal five key results: first, increasing procedural complexity within UNFCCC negotiations reduces the capacity for timely and decisive outcomes; second, domestic political incentives influence compliance with climate commitments more strongly than formal institutional obligations; third, climate diplomacy within the COP process increasingly prioritizes symbolic consensus over binding operational decisions; fourth, expanded participation in negotiations has not resulted in more inclusive or balanced decision-making structures; and fifth, fragmentation within the global climate governance system has produced parallel initiatives and institutional experimentation beyond the UNFCCC framework. The study concludes that reforming procedures and decision-making structures is necessary to narrow the ambition–implementation gap and strengthen the effectiveness of global climate governance.

ABSTRACT This article advances the third generation of expertise scholarship by exploring how expertise is produced through socio-material practices within global climate governance. The Paris Agreement commits international climate policy to be grounded in the ‘best available science,’ yet the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) lacks a formal mechanism for scientific uptake. Focusing on the expert groups established under the UNFCCC’s Warsaw International Mechanism for Climate Change Loss and Damage, the study shows that expertise is the outcome of intertwined material arrangements and social relations. Through interviews and ethnographic observations, the analysis shows how terms of reference and expert rosters formally structure who may participate, while informal relational practices enable the loss and damage Committee to selectively recruit and socialise experts. These dynamics stabilise and legitimise a contested policy area, shaping what becomes recognised as ‘global loss and damage expertise’. However, these practices also create exclusions, privileging actors aligned with UN working cultures, those perceived as politically acceptable and those able to self-fund participation. Such practices risk limiting representational diversity and constrain expert’s autonomy in shaping their work. The findings highlight the need for greater transparency and resourcing of expert groups to broaden participation and address knowledge gaps.

Current features and trends in North-South international assistance aimed at enhancing societal adaptation to the impacts of climate change and reducing the risks of devastating natural disasters in vulnerable developing and small island states are analyzed. The study focuses on the challenges and issues of adaptation. A new dynamic in North-South interaction is found, along with the growing role of developing countries in multilateral diplomacy within the existing international regime of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN FCCC), including issues of responsibility, compensation for loss and damage, and the reduction of vulnerability. These may be regarded as key drivers of the started restructuring of the global system of multilateral climate assistance. The findings indicate signifi cant recent quantitative changes, with projected tripling of its flows over the next decade, accompanied by qualitative shifts in structure, tendencies, drivers, institutions, and instruments. These changes imply a diversification of traditional official development assistance tools through the involvement of new South-South participants, the use of additional sources, including combining public and private flows, bilateral assistance, carbon markets, as well as simplified and accelerated access to assistance for recipients aff ected by natural disasters. New international mechanisms for reducing loss and damage from emergencies are examined, including the recently established multilateral Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage, as well as the growing trend toward combining fi nancial flows with the transfer of technologies and competencies, which may serve as an eff ective mechanism for building endogenous adaptive capacity in vulnerable countries and promoting sustainable development. The research methodology is based on a combination of theoretical and empirical analysis within a systemic interdisciplinary framework. It was applied to study the trends, characteristics, factors, linkages, and instruments of polycentric North-South cooperation for adaptation and implementation of the international climate regime provisions in the context of ongoing transformations in the global economics. Documents from the UN FCCC database and national country reports were used for the study.

Abstract The dual challenges of blue food security and ocean acidification (OA) have become increasingly urgent concerns for global sustainability. Blue foods, which provide key nutrients, are threatened by OA, posing risks to biodiversity, fisheries, and the livelihoods of communities that depend on them. The pressure of OA highlights the urgency of addressing blue food security through the lens of OA. Understanding the governance landscape that shapes responses is crucial, yet existing literature has largely considered the OA and blue food security regimes separately.

This paper analyzes whether and how the international governance of OA and blue food security intersect by mapping their regime complexes. The central research question investigates how international regimes interact in governing this nexus. The analysis finds that the two regime complexes overlap in many areas, including fisheries/marine resources and climate change. Although many actors and instruments mention both topics, significant governance fragmentation persists.

Case studies on the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) reveal that neither institution provides a comprehensive framework for governing the nexus of OA and blue food security resilience. The FAO lacks an explicit mandate for OA governance. If mentioned, OA is relegated to a list of stressors. The UNFCCC addresses OA only indirectly through CO2 mitigation efforts, and its instruments, while referencing food production, generally do not link it explicitly to OA. This results in fragmented authority, unclear responsibility, and limited integration across policy domains. Furthermore, a discrepancy exists where blue food security is recognized as a topic of legal and political urgency, while OA often only gains scientific attention. We conclude that further joint integration of OA and blue food security in legal and policy frameworks is necessary to enhance coherence and coordination across these regimes.

To identify explicit reference to the interdependence between antimicrobial resistance (AMR) and climate change (CC) within global policy for AMR and CC. This review uses the principles of systematic searching, qualitative evidence synthesis and framework analysis. Two searches were conducted: (1) explicit AMR policy searching was conducted via searching country AMR National Action Plans (NAPs) on the World Health Organisation Website; and (2) CC policy searching was conducted by reviewing United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) National Communication (NC) documents. Search and coding processes were conducted independently by two sets of researchers and discussions were held to resolve any discrepancies between findings. 155NCs and 81 NAPs were included in the review. 10 (12%) NAPs and 19 (12%) NCs demonstrated reference to a relationship between CC and AMR. In most cases, these were limited to a single mention. The most common connection made was to "shared solutions" to the issues and to "CC driving AMR". The depth of the interconnection described is largely commentarial, lacking sufficient detail of modalities of interaction. Most CC and AMR global policy documents do not reference interdependence between CC and AMR. Where references occur, these are simplistic and do not detail pathways of interactions. Most references are within descriptive text and lack targeted action. This review highlights inadequate focus within policy on this important intersection. This review should inform future global policy development that focuses on integrated approaches to CC and AMR across the One Health system.

Youth in global environmental negotiations: The YouthEarth dataset.

This study examines the paradox of the Global South’s numerical dominance in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) alongside its limited influence in securing meaningful climate commitments and finance from developed countries. It contends that collective bargaining power is weakened by internal fragmentation which is fuelled by divergent economic interests, unequal climate exposure, geopolitical struggles, institutional limits and external forces. Through the prism of Realist, Liberal Institutional, and Postcolonial theories, the paper examines the main Southern alliances, such as Group of 77 + China, BASIC, and SIDS. The study, based on case studies of COP27, Nationally Determined Contributions by the Paris Agreement and floods in Pakistan in 2022, demonstrates inconsistent approaches and results. It concludes that fragmentation undermines the ability to negotiate and perpetuates Northern dominance pointing to practical, issue-focused coalitions as a viable way to go.

Abstract Climate change represents an existential threat to current and future generations alike, spanning every aspect of our economic and social activity. The international community acknowledged the gravity of the climate emergency at least as far back as the Stockholm Conference in 1972 and later at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro when the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ( UNFCCC ) was adopted and the associated negotiating process was launched. While significant progress has been made in identifying the main elements of the issue and addressing them through multilateral negotiations, few would contest that much more is needed if we are to effectively address the climate challenge. As is the case with most multilateral processes, the UNFCCC has suffered from sharply divergent views reflecting the conflicting interests of parties, which has led, for the most part, to an overly antagonistic rather than a cooperative spirit. While acrimony is by no means unique to climate negotiations, its impact is more consequential in this process simply because – more than any other multilateral process – addressing climate change relies on the full participation and meaningful contributions of all parties that truly leaves no country behind. This article sheds light on some of the progress made within the UNFCCC process, especially at CoP27, with a view to highlighting the extent to which the outcomes of this process contribute to effectively addressing the climate challenge in an equitable and just manner.

Abstract In 1991, Vanuatu presented a proposal to address climate change-related loss and damage, particularly sea-level rise, in response to widespread adverse impacts and related losses and damages to nature and people. For more than thirty years since then, the international community has failed in its attempts to adequately cut greenhouse gas emissions to prevent and respond to climate change under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ( UNFCCC ) and offer effective channels for redressing related harms. During the 27th meeting of the Conference of the Parties in 2022, UNFCCC parties finally agreed to set up financial resources, including an international fund, to respond to loss and damage and recognized the substantial gaps that remain in responding to associated economic and non-economic losses. The UN climate regime does not define ‘loss and damage,’ and to date there is no internationally agreed upon definition of the concept. To understand loss and damage, it is imperative to consider the correlations amongst mitigation, adaptability, and loss and damage. This article specifically investigates the international legal dimension of climate change-related loss and damage claims and addresses the central role of a human rights-based approach to climate action.

ABSTRACT The growing significance of informal intergovernmental organisations (IIGOs) in global politics necessitates a re‐evaluation of leadership dynamics. We develop a theory framework that enables us to explain why countries take on leadership roles in IIGOs, with a specific focus on climate politics. Governments do not assume leadership in IIGOs because they want to shape bargaining processes within traditional and formal organisations, such as the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC); rather, they do this for reasons particular to informal international cooperation. For instance, when governments take on leadership roles because they want to bolster their national green industry transition or help national corporate actors learn from green industrialisation elsewhere, then green industry transition is driving leadership. In contrast, informal diplomacy drives leadership when governments assume leadership roles to help them bolster their international presence and strengthen their diplomatic ties. A comparative case study of the leadership of three Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden) within the Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM) concludes that both approaches contribute to explaining leadership patterns in the CEM. We argue that these dynamics probably also play out in other IIGOs, particularly in those relating to climate politics.

The study conducted a detailed carbon footprint assessment of the Gandhi Krishi Vignana Kendra (GKVK) campus, University of Agricultural Sciences, Bangalore, using internationally recognised standards such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Guidelines and the greenhouse gas (GHG) Protocol. As institutions are increasingly recognised for their contribution to GHG emissions through energy use, transport, waste and food services, this research quantified emissions across scope 1 (direct), scope 2 (indirect from purchased electricity) and scope 3 (other indirect emissions). Activity data were collected from institutional records, surveys and field assessments, while emission factors were sourced from IPCC (6th assessment report) AR6, the united nations framework convention on climate change (UNFCCC) GHG calculator v2.6 and Central Electricity Authority (CEA) guidelines. The total GHG emissions from the GKVK campus were estimated at 7606.545 tonnes CO₂e/yr, with scope 1 contributing 42.08 %, scope 2 contributing 20.46 % and scope 3 contributing 37.46 %. Major sources included liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) usage (1334884 kg CO₂e), grid electricity (1556180 kg CO₂e), food waste (1622855 kg CO₂e), refrigerant leakage (982430 kg CO₂e) and student commuting (879466 kg CO₂e). While the study provides a comprehensive institutional GHG baseline, it is limited to one academic year and excludes embodied emissions from infrastructure. The findings establish a replicable framework for Indian educational institutions to measure, manage and mitigate emissions. Future research should extend this model to multi-campus assessments and long-term carbon management planning, strengthening the roadmap toward carbon-neutral academic ecosystems and supporting India’s broader net-zero commitments.

Climate diplomacy within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is a unique negotiation arena due to the practical‎ and far-reaching implications of climate action, the broadest possible national ‎representation, and the unprecedented time horizon of the Convention’s operation.‎ Therefore, assessing the current status and prospects of climate leadership ‎requires analyzing climate negotiations from the perspective of “small ‎steps” and those aspects of international climate cooperation on issues which ‎demand deep expertise and synchronized work at the technical level. At the‎ annual Climate Conferences of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COPs), there is a‎ growing tension with regard to raising the ambition of Nationally Determined‎ Contributions (NDCs) and conducting the Global Stocktake (GST). A source ‎of this tension is the increasing activity of developing countries. Their interests‎– overcoming the consequences of climate change, financing the energy‎ transition, and the risks of relocating carbon-intensive industries – align with‎ common interests. However, the search for compromise positions slows down ‎the negotiation process. As a result, a false impression of a lack of leadership ‎in international climate negotiations is formed. ‎The article aims to identify the direction of transformation and the features ‎of EU climate leadership based on classical typologies of political leadership,‎ examine the EU’s role in the UNFCCC process, and characterize the ‎prospects for the united Europe’s leadership in climate diplomacy. Therefore, ‎the article examines the participation of the EU as a party to the UNFCCC at‎ COPs to consider the prospects of climate leadership. It reviews the main negotiating ‎positions of the EU and the outcomes of conferences that influenced ‎the initial dynamics of climate diplomacy (in 1997, 2009, 2011, and 2015) as ‎well as the four most recent conferences that demonstrate current trends and‎ the EU’s role as an active participant in negotiations (2021–2025). The results ‎show that the EU’s climate diplomacy exhibits characteristics of all four ‎types of leadership. Ideational leadership is evident in its consistent promotion ‎of scientifically grounded climate targets in international negotiations;‎ directional leadership in the EU’s pioneering implementation of UNFCCC‎ mechanisms for energy transition in its internal policy; structural leadership in ‎its aspiration to create a transparent and effective climate infrastructure; and‎ instrumental leadership in combining financial, regulatory, and diplomatic levers ‎to accelerate the global climate transition.‎

Representation of the world’s Indigenous Peoples’ cultural, political, environmental, and social issues continues to be marginalized within and across the seven sociocultural regions designated by the UNPFII (Africa, the Arctic, Asia, Central and South America and the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, the Russian Federation, Central Asia and Transcaucasia, North America, and the Pacific). This marginalization is characteristic of the global Indigenous political identity recognized by international law and treaties. This perspective study proposes and advocates for the right of people to have their own media, a stance informed by and grounded in field research by Indigenous policy negotiation teams at the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the UN Media Caucus Board since 2018. This study makes a case for the urgent need for Indigenous media ownership as essential to discussions of how global policy development could support this media. This includes, for example, curating specialized content provided directly by Indigenous Peoples’ newsrooms, as well as the development of special programming that links into the United Nations streaming system in parallel to negotiations through mainstream global media platforms. At present, decisive negotiations between nation-states, stakeholders, and Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities are taking place across complementary treaties, which address the case of enhancing the visibility of Indigenous Peoples through their own global media networks, a historical shift in the terms of representation between Indigenous Peoples and the rest of the world.

Recently, international judicial forums have issued landmark advisory opinions on the subject of the ocean–climate nexus. The opinions are based on the recognition of the interconnection between the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). All judicial forums stated that Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are a distinct focus due to their disproportionate vulnerability to climate change, as reported by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). According to the opinions, SIDS could become uninhabitable in the coming years, necessitating urgent global climate action. The United Nations (UN) has acknowledged the unique challenges of SIDS through various resolutions, which emphasise the need for climate justice and adherence to the 1.5 C climate target. Sustainable Development Goal 14 (SDG 14) brought attention to the direct impacts of climate change on oceans and the issues faced by SIDS. This paper reviews the historical and legal developments necessary for the sustainable development of SIDS, emphasising the nexus between climate change, ocean governance, and human rights. It highlights the potential for further advocacy and the interconnected nature of SDG 14 with judicial opinions.

This paper explores the pivotal role of the "Common but Differentiated Responsibilities" principle in global climate governance, examining its historical evolution, scientific basis, practical dilemmas, and China's response strategies. Since its formal establishment in the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), this principle has served as the cornerstone of global climate governance . It acknowledges the shared responsibility of all nations in addressing climate change while fully recognizing the differences between developed and developing countries in historical emissions, development stages, and capabilities . However, in recent years, this principle has confronted numerous challenges. Some developed countries have attempted to obscure or distort it to evade responsibility, such as failing to deliver on mitigation actions and unfulfilled climate finance commitments. China has consistently upheld and implemented this principle, actively fulfilling its emission reduction obligations. It has proposed the "carbon peak and carbon neutrality" goals, promoted energy transition and green development, and contributed Chinese wisdom to advancing global climate governance. This paper analyzes the principle's essence, scientific basis, and international practices, emphasizing its importance for fairness and sustainable development, while outlining future pathways to strengthen it. Research indicates that upholding the CBDR principle is crucial for addressing climate change, requiring enhanced international cooperation, financial mechanisms, and capacity building.

Global biomass and carbon datasets derived from Earth Observation (EO) are rapidly increasing. Here we assess how these datasets can be used to compile carbon accounts aligned with the Systems of Environmental Economic Accounting (SEEA). Five carbon pools are considered: above-ground, below-ground, deadwood, litter and soil organic carbon (SOC) using EO datasets that include CCI Biomass and CCI Land Cover - both subjected to independent map validation. We compiled carbon accounts across multiple accounting periods, from annual to decadal intervals, spanning 2010-2021 for six countries: Brazil, Mozambique, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Sweden and USA. Next, we compared the SEEA-aligned EO-derived carbon accounts with the national greenhouse gas (GHG) inventories submitted to United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) after considering the areas covered by managed forests and emissions from forest degradation for better comparability of the two frameworks. The compiled SEEA carbon accounts indicate that the above-ground component is the dominant carbon pool in Brazil while SOC outweighs other carbon pools in Netherlands, Sweden, Philippines and Mozambique. Results show substantial inter-annual variation in carbon fluxes, exhibiting a strong inverse relationship with accounting period (|r|=0.57-0.85). Such variability is notably higher than the values reported by countries to the UNFCCC. While UNFCCC and SEEA fluxes show moderate overall agreement (r=0.47, 58% agreement whether fluxes are sequestration or emission), there were differences across countries and flux categories. Our compiled accounts showed lower SOC emissions than UNFCCC reports potentially underestimating peatland emission; and minimal carbon emissions from forest degradation. Other sources of disagreement could be influenced by country definitions of managed forests which can be inconsistent with EO-based forest management maps, and the dependency of countries on national forest inventories which are rarely updated annually. The findings and outputs from this study echo the potential and flexibility of EO datasets for carbon accounting and inter-comparison exercises.

The issue of climate change continues to be a hot topic of discussion in all circles today. This issue received an extraordinary response, because the impact it had could affect the order of life on earth and humans in particular. Indonesia is United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC). Line with tis commitment implement it the ground, including in national park areas. Rawa Bunder is part of the Way Kambas National Park (WKNP) management area lowland tropical forest ecosystem which can support the achievements of Indonesia’s Nationally Determined Contriibutions (NDCs). A forest ecosystem dominated by trees is a biodiversity system to prevent an increase in carbon concentrations in the atmosphere. The aim of this research is to analyze vegetation diversity and its aboveground carbon stock in Rawa Bunder. 5 sample plots (nested plot) measuring 50m x 20m (tree more then 20 cm of diameter at breast geight/dbh), 10m x 10m (poles with 5 cm to 20 cm of dbh), 5m x5m (saplings with less of 5 cm of dbh) were taken randomly. The species found was dominated by Sonokeling (Dalbergia latifolia) and Puspa (Schima wallichii), accounted for 13.41 tonnes/ha aboveground carbon stock in the study area. It is proven that the less diversity of vegetation does not guarantee the amount of carbon in a plot. Trees in forests are the largest component capable of absorbing and storing carbon.