Container Security Initiative Research Articles

US CUSTOMS DIPLOMACY

The content and features of the concept of «customs diplomacy» are studied on the example of the foreign policy activities of the US Customs Administration, which conducts one of the best customs diplomacy in the world. For example, the US Customs Service plays an important role in ensuring not only national but also transnational economic security. The protection of American customs interests by the relevant services begins far from the actual borders of the United States. Therefore, the study of the experience of US customs diplomacy, of course, is relevant for Ukraine. The definition of «customs diplomacy» is given through a set of specific techniques and methods. The methods, techniques and principles of US customs diplomacy are considered, the main provisions of the CBP Global Engagement Strategy are analyzed. The structural units responsible for the implementation of American customs diplomacy are listed, and their competencies are determined. The officials of the US Customs and Border Protection who are responsible for the implementation of customs diplomacy are named. Particular attention is paid to US international cooperation with partner countries in the customs sector. An example of such cooperation is North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The practice of implementing international projects and initiatives by US customs attachés in other countries (for example, the Container Security Initiative) is analyzed. International training and support programs of methodological and organizational and technical nature, conducted for foreign partner customs services and agencies, are considered. The important role of harmonizing relations between customs services through the conclusion of international bilateral and multilateral agreements is noted. It is noted that international cooperation in the customs sphere is important for solving global problems of the world. Thus, strengthening the cooperation of the US Customs Administration with partner countries, agencies and trade groups contributes to transnational security, efficient trade, travel, dissemination of information etc.

Intermodal maritime supply chains: assessing factors for resiliency and security

Much of the value exchanged in international trade is transported as containerized freight. While this transport mode has become ubiquitous for manufactured goods, offering a fast and efficient service, it does pose security threats in the post-9/11 era. Even though containerization offers security from pilferage, it provides a means for obscuring contraband as well as opportunities to tamper with goods in shipment. Although the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-PAT) are high profile initiatives seeking to improve the security of global supply chains, vulnerability still remains from the port of origin and on the high seas to the port of discharge. This research is based on interviews from a wide range of supply chain participants that includes regulatory agencies, transportation providers, importers, exporters, and trade intermediaries. These provide the basis for a decomposition of the global maritime supply chain into those elements up to that point when goods are cleared by U.S. Customs. Analysis of the informational and physical flows suggests that the greatest vulnerabilities lie in those transportation segments between the origin of the goods and that point when they await shipment at a foreign port.

The Multiplicity of Actors Involved in Securing America's Food Imports

The paper attempts to accentuate the significance of multiple players’ (both public and private) involvement for safeguarding U.S. food imports, particularly at maritime prots of entry.The task of ensuring food import safety is a responsibility shared by a multitude of actors in the food industry, encompassing everyone from farmers, producers, and retailers to federal and state regulatory agencies. If America’s food supply is to remain secure, it is critical that everyone involved in this process remain vigilant and knowledgeable about the requirements of food safety, particularly within the context of international trade involving multiple players. The manuscript talks about the various multiple actor programs like Container Security Initiative (CSI), the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), Free and Secure Trade (FAST), the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA 2002), Bio-terrorism Act, the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS, adopted in 2002 as an international counterpart for the MTSA), the 24-hour Rule, Automated Targeting System (ATS), Operation Safe Commerce (OSC), and the Smart and Secure Tradelanes (SST) initiative. Port security encompasses numerous issues ranging from the security of actual port facilities to the verification of passenger identities and the investigation of threats posed by cargo container shipments. The paper highlights that greater linkage of resources, expertise, and initiatives are needed at all levels of government and in the private sector in order to achieve the shared objectives of security and emergency preparedness. It is important to note that preventing problems that can arise outside the United States is a more effective approach than merely attempting to identify and catch problems when products arrive at our borders. The paper concludes by reiterating that public-private partnership must become stronger in order to improve the quality and safety networks upon which the U.S. relies to supply the food we eat and the products we use.

Border Bargains and the “New” Sovereignty: Canada-US Border Policies from 2001 to 2005 in Perspective

From 2001 to 2005 Canada and the US dramatically altered the way each country views its border. In response to the attacks on New York City and Washington DC, Canada and the US entered into three important partnerships: the Smart Borders Agreement (SBA), the Container Security Initiative (CSI), and the Security Prosperity Partnership (SPP). These arrangements will be conceptualised here as “tacit bargains” whereby Canada provided the US with security in hope of renewed trust and economic accessibility. These “tacit bargains” required a concession of traditional state sovereignty so that stable and predictable relations between both countries could continue. While this process is ostensibly a violation of state sovereignty, the argument presented here is that these three “tacit bargains” represent a transition of “old” sovereignty to “new” sovereignty.

On Cargo Security Measures and Trade Costs

Can tighter cargo security measures lead to higher trade costs and increased trade frictions? This paper examines the impact of the Container Security Initiative (CSI), implemented by the United States in several foreign ports after the September 11 terrorist attacks. It analyzes monthly data for all containerized U.S. imports from 1999 to 2006, by foreign port and country of origin. The analysis exploits these longitudinal data at the port-level and the varying starting dates across CSI ports to identify the causal effect of the initiative. While higher import charges over time are observed, the results find no significant evidence of a “CSI effect” on either import costs or import flows.

Impact of the container security initiative on Taiwan's shipping industry

This paper evaluates the impact of risk factors from the container security initiative on Taiwan's shipping industry by employing a risk management matrix to identify the severity and frequency of CSI risk factors, and discovers some appropriate risk management alternatives. This paper's findings are as follows: (1) The majority of risk factors have a moderate-risk level, and possible alternative risk management measures include risk prevention, self-retention and insurance. (2) Ensuring a balance between the efficiency of maritime logistics and supply chain security is of vital importance to any trading countries dealing with security risk issues. (3) The government should encourage the private sector to design and market security hardware and software, which will promote the growth of the domestic security industry and generate employment opportunities.

Rhetoric, rationality and reality in post-9/11 maritime security

The post-9/11 maritime security scenario was characterized by intense rhetoric in the first few years, during which security measures such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) code were adopted. This rhetoric resulted in a hasty implementation that precluded a detailed examination of security measures. Findings show that while rhetoric was useful for facilitating quicker adoption of security measures, it nonetheless prevented a fuller examination of security threats and responses, resulting in security gaps. This paper examines the effectiveness of the security responses and identifies some gaps in security coverage and other inefficiencies. Recommendations are also made to overcome these limitations.

Risk management of Taiwan’s maritime supply chain security

This paper attempts to evaluate the impact of risk factors from the container security initiative (CSI) on the maritime supply chain in Taiwan, employs a loss exposure matrix to identify the severity and frequency of security risk, and uses a bowtie diagram to investigate appropriate risk management strategies to deal with maritime security risks. This paper’s findings consist of the following: (1) the leading categories of CSI risk factors are operational risk, physical risk and financial risk; (2) apart from two security risks comprising high-risk level, the majority of risk exposure is at the medium level; risk management strategies include loss prevention, loss reduction, avoidance, and non-insurance transfer; and (3) all maritime security regulations and measures should consider the balance among cost, time, security, efficiency and competition; failure to do so may lead to additional burdens for maritime supply chain service providers.

The WCO SAFE Framework of Standards: Avoiding Excess in Global Supply Chain Security Policy

Prior to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, customs controls related to national security threats did not feature highly on the policy priorities of the World Customs Organization’s (WCO). After 9/11 and implementation of several US Customs programs such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), and regulations such as the 24-Hour Rule, the WCO began to focus much more of its work on supply chain security. This transition culminated in 2005 with the adoption of the WCO SAFE Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade (SAFE Framework), a non-binding instrument comprised of technical customs standards aimed at securing without impeding international trade. This article will discuss the intricacies of the SAFE Framework including its history, political context, and technical elements (especially risk management and the Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) concept) and antecedents. This article will also consider the 2007 US legislation mandating 100% scanning of US-bound cargo containers at foreign ports that clouds and constrains the SAFE Framework’s future. The article concludes that policymakers should seek to avoid excess in formulating supply chain security policies.

Continental and Homeland Security

Surrounded by oceans and friendly neighbours, and faced throughout the Cold War with a direct threat to its territory against which there was no effective defence (nuclear armed ballistic missiles), the United States has historically looked mainly overseas to guarantee its security. To many outside observers, the obvious American response to the terrorist attacks of n September 2001 might have been to focus less on measures abroad and more on those at home. After all, the strikes themselves shattered the notion that oceans and friendly borders made the United States less vulnerable to direct threats to its territory than countries not so fortunate in their geography. And terrorism is arguably a type of threat against which it may be possible to develop some effective defences. Yet the Bush administration's overwhelming response to the 9/11 attacks was to concentrate on the away game, whether it was direct American intervention in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, or assistance to other governments in combating terrorism in places like the Philippines and Africa.Despite its overseas orientation, the Bush administration arguably - and not surprisingly, given the terrorist attacks - devoted more attention to continental and homeland security than previous US administrations. It is this portion of America's overall security and defence activity that is the focus of this article. It begins by highlighting key developments in continental and homeland security during the Bush administration. It then examines the degree to which such issues figured in the 2008 presidential election and makes a projection as to how they may progress under the Obama administration. Finally, the article puts forward some thoughts about the implications for Canada of future developments in continental and homeland security.THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S HERITAGE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENCEThe Bush administration launched a number of measures in the civilian-led (homeland security) and military-led (homeland defence) arenas. On the civilian side it at first resisted significant institutional change, choosing instead to set up an Office of Homeland Security within the White House to coordinate America's homeland security efforts. Under congressional pressure, the administration eventually consented to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in March 2003 to bring together many ofthe dozens of agencies involved in some aspect of homeland security in the United States, including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Coast Guard, the Secret Service, Customs and Border Patrol and the Transportation Security Administration, which had been created after 9 /11 to ensure the security of America's airports, railways, and subways.Since that time, Homeland Security has taken initiatives in all ofthe sea, land, and air dimensions of homeland security. A significant portion of its effort has been in the area of port security, with the primary concern being that a weapon of mass destruction could be smuggled into the United States in one ofthe thousands of containers unloaded on US docks each day. Under the container security initiative, ships leaving for the United States must transmit their manifest to the US destination port before leaving the foreign port. Once they arrive on US soil, close to 100 percent of all containers are scanned for radiation, up dramatically from a small percentage just a few years ago. Initiatives pertaining to the land dimension of homeland security include the smart border accord negotiated between Canada and the United States soon after the 9 /11 attacks to ensure the continued smooth flow of trade, and the follow-on security and prosperity partnership among Canada, the United States, and Mexico, signed in 2005. Beyond these initiatives, DHS has deployed numerous unmanned aerial vehicles to patrol both borders, especially the southern one, and dramatically increased the number of border patrol agents. …

Conflict resolution in supply chain security

Right after the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, the US government defined and implemented several security-oriented initiatives to prevent another terror attack. Two of the most known are the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terror (C-TPAT). The World Customs Organization (WCO) and the United Nations (UN) have implemented collaborative, multination initiatives to promote security awareness worldwide and increase the resilience of supply chains to terror attacks. The results achieved to date in the international crusade against terrorism suggest that supply chain security is a global, multidisciplinary issue that must be addressed through collaboration and partnerships. Collaboration, however, involves conflict situations, which result naturally from the interaction of cooperating parties. These conflicts must be timely resolved through cost-effective and well-synchronised actions. This paper introduces a mathematical tool for conflict resolution based on conflict modelling and analysis.

The Implications of U.S. CSI(Container Security Initiative) Program and an Application to Korean Ports

The Implications of U.S. CSI(Container Security Initiative) Program and an Application to Korean Ports

A Survey of Cross-Border Trade at a Time of Heightened Security: The Case of the Niagara Bi-National Region

Introduction In a recent article on the new border security environment facing North America, Ackleson (2003) notes that much work remains to be conducted to evaluate the complex dynamics of post-9/11 tri-national commercial relationships under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Although his article is primarily focused upon the U.S.-Mexico border security environment, his call for more empirical research that includes normative components and expanded coverage of emergent theoretical and policy issues is equally relevant for studies of Canada-U.S. cross-border business transactions. Similarly, Cutter et al. (2003) argue that at a time of increased concern over terrorism, regional and international research priorities must be directed to understanding ... how borders function, especially flows of goods and people, and how borders constrain or enhance trans-jurisdictional responses to issues such as immigration, disaster response, refugee movements, weapons proliferation, narco-terrorism, or environmental degradation (225). Unfortunately, very little research has focused upon the potential impacts of terrorism upon cross-border commerce. This is a surprising neglect, because the short--and long-term impacts of new border security regulations have potentially profound implications for foreign commerce, international direct investments, the location of production, and the growth and development of local and regional economies. It is within the context of this call for more empirical work on the impacts of the post-9/11 security regulations that the following questions are posed. First, are the new anti-terrorism policies for cross-border commerce that have been put in place by the U.S. government since 9/11 serving, in effect, as non-tariff trade barriers and therefore trumping the long-standing objective of maintaining a relatively open international border between the U.S. and Canada? Second, what are the principal costs to those North American companies that must comply with the new security mandates in order to engage in cross-border commerce? Third, what are the likely strategic responses of U.S. and Canadian companies to these new security regulations when it comes to decisions related to supply chain logistics (e.g., shipping routes, transportation modes), direct foreign investments, and the location of production? Finally, and equally important, what are the possible long-term implications of these business decisions for North American patterns of production, direct investments, and regional economic growth and development? Background and Study Area Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the U.S. government introduced a number of anti-terrorist regulations that pertain specifically to the flow of goods and services through U.S. seaports and across the nation's international land borders. At least 15 security-based initiatives have been introduced and/or strengthened since 9/11 (see Table 1), and several more are in the pipeline (mentioned later). Most of these new regulations are aimed at reducing the vulnerability of the nation's trade and transportation infrastructure, which facilitates the movement of more than 16 million cargo containers and other shipments that enter the U.S. annually by ocean vessel, truck, rail, and air. For example, the Container Security Initiative (CSI) involves a partnership arrangement between the U.S. and more than 20 countries to place U.S. Customs agents within the gateways of those countries to inspect U.S.-bound cargo. Some of these initiatives are also designed to combine greater security measures with procedures for expediting commerce. Thus, for example, the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program allows for the pre-approval of truckers for pass-through clearance at the U.S.-Canada border. In this case, however, both the companies and drivers must also qualify for the C-TPAT voluntary program (Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism), which means that U. …

Electronic cargo seal for safe and secure supply chain traceability

Recently, the United Statesgovernment plans to introduce electronic container seals on all imported containers as a mandatory requirement. Further, containers without electronic seals may be prohibited or restricted for import based on this planned regulation. An electronic seal is a tamper-free seal with radio frequency identification (RFID) chips embedded in it. It could provide additional security information such as the tamper evidence and the history of tampering status. In this paper, a brief review of the types of container seals, the characteristics of electronic seals, and their system components are presented. International efforts for securing cargo security are also reviewed including Container Security Initiative (CSI), Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), and International Standards Organization (ISO) requirements. Finally, the current issues and the status of technology development are discussed with future directions as a final word

Electronic cargo seal for safe and secure supply chain traceability

Recently, the United Statesgovernment plans to introduce electronic container seals on all imported containers as a mandatory requirement. Further, containers without electronic seals may be prohibited or restricted for import based on this planned regulation. An electronic seal is a tamper-free seal with radio frequency identification (RFID) chips embedded in it. It could provide additional security information such as the tamper evidence and the history of tampering status. In this paper, a brief review of the types of container seals, the characteristics of electronic seals, and their system components are presented. International efforts for securing cargo security are also reviewed including Container Security Initiative (CSI), Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), and International Standards Organization (ISO) requirements. Finally, the current issues and the status of technology development are discussed with future directions as a final word

A Sensitivity Risk Analysis for Additional Truck Turnaround Time (ATTT) by Container Inspection Stations Derived from C-TPAT and CSI.

After World Trade Center's Terror in 2001 and promulgating Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA, 2002) and Security and Accountability For Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act, 2006) in the United States, most of the attention on security of international transportation including marine carrier and facility has focused increasingly. Inspection stations in foreign seaport terminal including Busan, South Korea, have been installed by Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT). The inspection station, however, may directly and indirectly affect delay of truck turnaround time in the seaport, especially high and severe level of security. This paper was analysed a risk for the additional average delay of truck turnaround time incurring by the inspection station under the all level of security, C-TPAT and CSI. As a result of this risk analysis, the higher weighted inspection time based on raising security level, the less number of trucks to be inspected, which will derive high delay in the inspection station.

The Container Security Initiative and Ocean Container Threats

Following September 11, 2001, U.S. policymakers created programs to protect the maritime supply chain. This paper analyzes one program, the Container Security Initiative, which inspects high-risk U.S.-bound containers at foreign ports. Although covering a small proportion of all ports that ship imports to the United States, the CSI has expanded rapidly and as of early 2006 covered two-thirds of U.S. containerized imports. However, CSI coverage of imports from potential terrorism source countries was lower than the overall U.S. average. Security planners can strengthen container-related maritime security by focusing on dangerous source regions and likely terrorist shipping routes.

The container security initiative costs, implications and relevance to developing countries

Following 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security established the Container Security Initiative (CSI) programme in 2002 in response to the threat from terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass destruction transported by cargo containers. This project establishes the tracking and targeting of ‘high risk’ containers and their subsequent scanning with X-ray machines before loading onto the U.S. bound ships. To date, 44 of the world's largest ports have agreed to become CSI-compliant, the majority of which are located in industrialised countries, while developing and least developed countries are under-represented. CSI-eligibility requires that ports represent a considerable volume of U.S. bound container traffic and invest in container scanning devices. Every non-intrusive inspecting device (NII) costs several million dollars while investments in IT and existing infrastructure often triple the compliance costs. Containers originating in a CSI port are expedited through U.S. customs, representing a comparative trade barrier for exporters from non-CSI ports. Thus, CSI acts as a tool for the U.S. to improve security, while representing a challenge to exporting countries' market access. This article provides an evaluation of the impacts this plan will have on the export competitiveness of developing countries. It reviews the potential benefits this programme offers in terms of improved trade facilitation, as well as proposing recommendations for its expansion to include developing countries. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

DETERRENCE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM WITH MOBILE RADIATION DETECTORS

The United States has multiple nuclear detection initiatives to secure against a terrorist nuclear attack, including the Container Security Initiative, installation of radiation detectors at U.S. border points of entry, and establishment of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). The current nuclear detection system architecture falls short of being able to reliably catch fissile nuclear material in transit, specifically shielded Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and Plutonium (Pu), both within the US and abroad. Checkpoints at border crossings can be circumvented, and no adequate system is under development to deter the transport of fissile materials. Using nuclear link-budget calculations, we show why a network relying primarily on handhelds, fixed detectors, and portals is not sufficient. We examine the technical, economic, and operational feasibility of a comprehensive national network incorporating in-vehicle detectors to reliably detect and deter the transport of fissile material inside the vehicle itself.

Assurance of security in maritime supply chains: Conceptual issues of vulnerability and crisis management

Abstract Security assurance across maritime trading systems is a critical factor for international business managers and in the evolution of international trade generally. A number of initiatives are underway focusing on security issues in ports and ships (International Ship & Port Security Code), customs inspections in international ports (Container Security Initiative) and whole-of-supply chain outcomes (Customs & Trade Partnership against Terrorism). The main purpose of the above initiatives is to reduce the likelihood of maritime-vectored terrorism; however inappropriate implementation of these programs could affect competitiveness. This paper suggests that the complexity of interaction between ports, maritime operations and supply chains create vulnerabilities that require analysis that extends beyond the structured requirements of these initiatives and creates significant management challenges. Also the paper highlights the need for enhanced crisis management capabilities within ports as part of a standard management repertoire and suggests a new classification scheme for mapping vulnerability within ports and across supply networks. The paper concludes that there is a need to examine the goodness-of-fit of these security initiatives against business efficiency and competitiveness, and to consider the training needs for crisis management capabilities that will allow private and public sector groups involved in global trade to effectively mitigate the threat of maritime terrorism and loss of competitiveness.