ABSTRACT Gulliver’s Travels, now three hundred years old, remains a masterpiece of satirical fiction. As Gulliver recounts his voyages, he relates how various fantastical people govern themselves and each other, and also their reactions to his tales of England’s constitution and government. In this, Jonathan Swift holds up a mirror to the English constitution, showing satirical refractions of many of its follies in these peoples, and having England’s practices critiqued by outsiders with different views and experiences. Swift prefigured here a core idea of comparative constitutional law: that comparison unsituates us from the assumptions that undergird our legal systems, so that we can see their merits and faults in more starkly. Swift was also an early pioneer of law and literature, showing how fiction gives us imaginative examples which explore parts of our law that real comparison cannot reach, and demonstrating the power of narrative to critique our legal systems.

This article challenges the Constitutional Court's rigid formalist doctrine of legal standing by critically analysing the position of the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) in judicial reviews of the Papua Special Autonomy Law. Currently, the Court's strict taxonomy of applicants paradoxically disenfranchises the MRP, creating a dogmatic tension between the asymmetric constitutional guarantees of indigenous rights (Article 18B of the 1945 Constitution) and actual access to constitutional justice. This study aims to expand existing standing doctrines by proposing a theoretical reconstruction of the MRP. Using normative legal research with statutory, conceptual, and case approaches, the study demonstrates that the MRP cannot be treated as a mere product of ordinary legislation. The analysis reveals that the MRP operates as a "functionally constitutional state institution" and a "hybrid constitutional proxy." Its authority is not merely delegated statutory power, but constitutionalised authority essential for protecting the collective rights of Indigenous Papuans (OAP). Restricting its access based on structural formalism constitutes a direct impairment of these constitutional rights. The study concludes with specific policy implications: de lege lata, the Constitutional Court must progressively reinterpret Article 51 of the Constitutional Court Law to accommodate hybrid cultural organs; de lege ferenda, targeted amendments to the Constitutional Court and Special Autonomy Laws are required, alongside the introduction of a limited constitutional complaint mechanism, to permanently secure the MRP's standing and institutionalize a constitutional pathway for indigenous peoples' defense

ABSTRACT This article examines how evolving United States legal doctrine, particularly the rise of the Unitary Executive Theory and a series of recent Supreme Court rulings handed down by a conservative supermajority, have created conditions for the consolidation of strongman presidential power. Focusing on Donald Trump’s political trajectory and evolving use of executive power and political persona, the article explores how sport has been co-opted both symbolically and instrumentally to advance exclusionary nationalism, affirm hypermasculine identity, and normalise illiberal government across cultural, institutional, and legal arenas. Drawing on interdisciplinary literature from strongman politics, sport, gender studies, and US constitutional law, the article shows how Trump has strategically deployed sport to legitimise power through grievance politics. It also analyzes key legal decisions, to illustrate how judicial erosion of constitutional checks and balances, and expanded executive authority have enabled the institutionalisation of authoritarian politics through federal policymaking and administrative enforcement. Beyond charting the symbolic appropriation of sport, this article identifies how sport has become a functional policy arena for enacting strongman authoritarian goals under the guise of legal normalcy. It traces the convergence of executive directives, agency rulemaking, and constitutional reinterpretation that now facilitate cultural enforcement. The analysis situates these developments within the broader stakes facing sport organisations in the current political climate, with high-profile global events on the horizon as likely flashpoints for intensified state involvement and ideological contestation.

ABSTRACT Legislation should be appraised before and after adoption to test it against its intended objectives. Various actors should take part in these processes to ensure an inclusive and transparent assessment. This article focuses on national human rights institutions (NHRIs). Contrary to the role of NHRIs in conducting ex post or post-legislative scrutiny, which has received some attention from scholars, the so-called legislative advice of NHRIs and their actorness in ex ante review remain notably under-researched. This article demonstrates that applicable international standards provide solid grounds for NHRIs’ active involvement in conducting ex ante review. It further shows that NHRIs invest efforts to contribute to it, even though these activities are not usually labelled as an ex ante review. By discussing the role of NHRIs in pre-legislative and legislative scrutiny, this article contributes to bringing closer together the literature on legislative studies, public policy, human rights and constitutional law.

The development of modern constitutional law has primarily focused on guaranteeing and institutionalizing human and civil rights. Throughout the evolution of international human rights standards and national constitutions, the scope of rights protection has expanded considerably, and legal mechanisms designed to protect individuals from excessive state interference have become increasingly sophisticated. However, this process has also contributed to the relative neglect of the concept of civic duties and their legal and institutional status. As a result, scholars have increasingly pointed to the emergence of an imbalance between rights and duties within contemporary societies. From a theoretical perspective, rights and duties are inherently interdependent and inseparable. In practice, however, the prevailing tendency has been to expand the scope of rights while limiting or overlooking civic obligations. Such an approach may create an imbalance of responsibility in the relationship between the state and citizens, potentially undermining the foundations of constitutional governance and social cohesion. Civic duties should not be understood as the antithesis of rights; rather, they constitute an essential element that conditions, supports, and guarantees the effective realization of rights. Duties provide the normative and institutional framework within which rights can be exercised and protected. Consequently, the study of civic duties from theoretical, legal, and practical perspectives is of particular importance for ensuring social stability, the effective implementation of the rule of law, and the sustainability of democratic governance. A comprehensive understanding of civic duties therefore contributes not only to constitutional theory but also to the strengthening of responsible citizenship and the preservation of a balanced relationship between rights and obligations in a democratic society.

ABSTRACT As part of the theme ‘Constitutional case law on the use of languages in parliaments sharing the French language’ of the 2025 Spring School in Parliamentary Studies, devoted to The use of languages in parliaments in the French-speaking world, this contribution proposes the notion of ‘deliberative space’ as a guideline for analysing the case law of the Belgian Constitutional Court on the relationship between ‘languages’ and ‘parliaments’. We will first present the constitutional framework relating to the use of languages in Belgium, combining the principle of linguistic freedom and the principle of territoriality, which govern the regulation of the use of languages in a Belgian territory divided into linguistic regions (I). We will then examine, through the prism of constitutional case law, two themes: the language of the law (II), and the language of deliberation in the municipal councils of peripheral municipalities (III). In the course of our analysis, we will look at various topics such as the use of languages in legislative matters and the possible divergence of language versions, the language groups within the legislative chambers for the adoption of so-called ‘special’ laws, the translation of texts into German, the status of the six communes in the Brussels periphery benefiting from linguistic ‘facilities’, and the constitutional case law relating to the use of languages in the councils of these communes.

ABSTRACT This paper explores how post-socialist and post-Marxist states in Central Europe and Africa have used constitutional law to interpret, confront, or silence their socialist pasts. It builds on the theoretical framework of constitutional legitimation and the role of constitutions as both legal and narrative instruments of state identity. Through a comparative analysis, the study identifies four possible constitutional approaches to the former socialist order: continuity, which acknowledges positive legacies of the past; progressive separation, maintaining legal continuity while discarding ideological remnants; radical break, which openly denounces and delegitimizes the prior regime; and silence, where the constitution refrains entirely from referencing past systems. These findings show that the constitutional treatment of the past is not only a matter of political transition but also a deliberate act of collective memory-making.

Untangling indigenous land rights: Compensating cultural and spiritual losses caused by mining activities in South Africa

Revisiting the constitutional and human rights law mandates for fair elections in Bangladesh: A quest for democratization

The author examines various aspects of the digitalization of the constitutional system in the Republic of Belarus, and, based on the scientific works of predecessors, substantiates the need to recognize the idea of digital constitutionalism as a consequence of the introduction of digital technologies into various social relations. The author examines specific aspects of the impact of digital technologies, particularly artificial intelligence, on constitutional law institutions. To bridge the digital gap between constitutional law and reality, amendments and additions to current legislation are proposed. In particular, amendments and additions to the Law of the Republic of Belarus «On Regulatory Legal Acts» were proposed in terms of clarifying the content of the principle of humanism in law-making activities, which will ensure the implementation of the constitutional principle of the priority of individual rights and freedoms.

This article examines the changes in the position, functions, and role of the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat/MPR) following the amendments to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. This study employs a literature review method by analyzing constitutional law textbooks, academic journals, official MPR documents, and historical records of the reform era. Prior to the amendments, the MPR functioned as the highest state institution with extensive authority, including electing the President and Vice President and formulating the Broad Outlines of State Policy (GBHN) as national development guidelines. After the constitutional amendments, the MPR was transformed into a high state institution with a position equal to other state institutions, and its authority became more limited and focused, particularly on amending and enacting the Constitution, inaugurating the President and Vice President, and deciding on presidential dismissal under specific conditions based on decisions of the Constitutional Court. These changes represent not merely a reduction of authority but an effort to establish a more democratic and accountable constitutional system through the strengthening of the checks and balances principle. The findings indicate that despite its reduced authority, the MPR continues to play a crucial role in safeguarding constitutional continuity and symbolizing popular deliberation within Indonesia’s constitutional framework.

Introduction. The paper examines the legal phenomenon of de-risking in Ukraine’s banking sector as a structurally conditioned problem arising at the intersection of financial, administrative, and constitutional law. The purpose of the paper is to analyse de-risking legally; to identify legislative gaps enabling systemic financial exclusion; and to propose amendments restoring the balance between AML compliance and the protection of clients’ rights. Results. It is established that despite the formal legislative consolidation of a risk-based approach under Law No. 361-IX and NBU Regulation No. 65, banks systematically substitute risk management with risk avoidance, applying blanket refusals rather than individualised client assessments. The paper demonstrates that this practice is driven by an asymmetric sanctions regime that penalises formal procedural violations regardless of actual money laundering risk, creating rational incentives for hyperconservatism in compliance. It is proven that the absence of an effective pre-trial complaint mechanism contradicts both the updated 2023 FATF Guidance and general principles of the rule of law. The lifelong application of enhanced PEP supervision without proportionate review is identified as a further source of systemic financial exclusion. Conclusions. Addressing systemic de-risking requires introducing a mandatory NBU complaint procedure with binding review powers, conditioning sanctions on actual AML risk, establishing a statutory maximum period of enhanced PEP supervision not exceeding 36 months, and imposing a duty on banks to provide written individualised reasoning before any service refusal on AML grounds.

This article examines social boycott as a contemporary form of caste power in rural Telangana society and economy, focusing on the role of Village Development Committees (VDCs) originating from the informal caste councils. Drawing on qualitative interviews with 20 respondents (8 women and 12 men; 8 from Scheduled Castes and 12 from Other Backward Classes) and autoethnographic reflections, the study reveals how social boycott operates through economic exclusion, control of commons, religious coercion, and gendered surveillance. The article argues that social boycott represents a form of informal sovereignty that thrives in the gap between constitutional law and everyday governance. By situating boycott within broader debates on decentralization, caste capture, and rural democracy, the study highlights the limitations of existing legal frameworks and the failure of state institutions to protect marginalized communities. The article concludes by proposing sociologically-grounded policy interventions aimed at criminalizing social boycott, regulating informal caste bodies, protecting livelihoods, and re-democratizing village governance.

In recent times, several claims have been made before Indian courts to seek the change of one’s first name or surname. Such claims are being made for many different reasons out of which one reason stands out which is to hide one’s caste identity, namely to hide one’s untouchable or Dalit identity. While much has been written about concealing caste in autobiographical literature, and socio-political theories have engaged with the question of identity and recognition, the legal framework governing these practices remains under- examined. The Indian courts have interpreted the right to change one’s name as an aspect of the right to determine one’s identity or the right of self-determination, drawing from existing constitutional law principles and jurisprudence. This jurisprudence on the right to determine one’s identity has evolved through constitutional questions on gender identity, sexual expression, and privacy. However, in this article, I argue that the liberal interpretation of the right to change one’s name as framed through the prism of the individual right to identity under-assumes the pervasive and structural nature of caste and consequentially severely undermines the metric of dignity. I argue that in effect, the judicial recognition of the right to alter one’s name amounts to endorsing a limited right to conceal caste or the right to pass rather than facilitating a genuine right to assert or change one’s caste identity.

The study deals with an important figure of 19th-century Hungarian legal science, who also had Czech roots. Professor Anton Virozsil (1792–1868) was born into a simple family in Banská Štiavnica. He originally prepared for a career in the Catholic priesthood, but ultimately chose to pursue legal studies. After obtaining his degree, he first taught at the Law Academy in Pozsony (Present-day Bratislava), and then for several decades in Pest at the local university. His activities coincided with the years when the reform program of the Hungarian liberal opposition was taking shape, with which the professor, who did not speak Hungarian well, could not identify, particularly due to its linguistic assimilation efforts. At the same time, he was critical of the constitutional views of the Hungarian noble opposition. He saw the possibility of the emergence of a modern constitutional and bureaucratic state primarily in Austria (after liberal reforms). During the revolutionary year of 1848, he was one of the last university lectures in Pest to teach in Latin before he retired. After the victory of Austrian neoabsolutism that suppressed the revolution, the Austrian government reactivated him, and in the following decade, he became the rector. During this time he leaded the unpopular educational reforms of Hungarian university education. After colaps of neoabsolutistic regime he removed to Vienna, where teached the Hungarian public law for university students. He was author of many important publications (in Latin, German and Hungarin) about the traditional Hungarian constitutional law, legal encyclopedy and methodology.

Custodial violence, which includes physical tortures, mental harassment, and sexual abuse used against people under the care of the states, is one of the significant breaches of the human rights and the guarantees of the constitution. Such practices continue to be practiced in India even with legal protections in place wherein it denotes more than structural inadequacies in the criminal justice system. It is not a problem of isolated incidences but is telltale of organizational flaws like poor police training, political interventions, dependency on coercive mechanisms of interrogation, and poor accountability processes. The present study is also expected to critically explore the problem of custodial violence in India and investigate the structural gaps that help promote the persistence of the issue. The research has a doctrinal and analytical research approach which is based on the constitutional laws, statutory laws and pronouncements on the constitutional courts to examine the efficiency of the current legal systems. It also examines institutions and enforcing authorities and the contribution these two activities make in discouraging or encouraging such violations. The research results indicate that there exists a plethora of shortcomings in implementation such as ineffective investigation, slow courts and infrequency of convictions in cases of custodial abuse. These elements lead to impunity culture and affect the general trust of the society in the justice system. The article concludes that remedying the issue of custodial violence should entail wide-ranging reforms that should include tougher accountability measures, institutionalization of the welfare, and in line with the international human rights regulations. The security of personal dignity and the basic rights should continue to be a principle of the criminal justice system.

This study examines how Jimly Asshiddiqie’s Introduction to Law Volume I illuminates the conceptual complexity of Constitutional Law and transforms it into a more applicable framework for beginner readers. Using content analysis and a descriptive–critical approach, this research explores how the book’s conceptual structure, argumentation, and terminology function as a bridge between abstract theory and practical understanding. The findings reveal that Asshiddiqie successfully constructs a solid foundational framework concerning the state, power, and the constitution, although the density of technical terms continues to pose challenges for novice readers. The study concludes that while the book is highly reliable as a primary reference, it becomes significantly more accessible when accompanied by a staged comprehension strategy. This research also offers constructive critiques and practical recommendations to make Asshiddiqie’s ideas more approachable for law students and the general public.

“The Uniform Civil Code (UCC) is still one of the most talked-about issues in India's discussions about the Constitution and social law. The idea comes from Article 44 of the Directive Principles of State Policy.” Moreover, it also includes components such as “contracts, compensation, and such other laws that do not provide penal provisions”. It wants to replace the many personal laws that govern marriage, divorce, inheritance, and adoption with a single set of civil rules that apply to everyone, regardless of their faith or community. This research paper looks at the UCC's constitutional basis, how it has changed over time, and how it fits into India's many different legal systems. It also talks about how courts have interpreted the law, what lawmakers have tried to do, and how trying to make personal laws work in a community with a lot of different cultures can change people's lives. The research investigates the congruence of a “Uniform Civil Code (UCC)” with India's commitment to cultural and religious liberty through a critical evaluation of constitutional provisions and seminal rulings. The report concludes that while the UCC guarantees legal equality and gender justice, it must be put into action in a way that carefully balances uniformity with protecting India's cultural diversity. KEYWORDS: “Uniform, Civil, Code, Common, Art. 44 of the Constitution, Personal Laws, Secularism, Gender Justice and Indian Constitution,.”

The development of constitutional law in India cannot be fully understood in isolation from international legal principles. In an increasingly interconnected world, constitutional courts frequently engage with global human rights standards to interpret domestic laws. The Supreme Court of India has consistently acknowledged the importance of international norms in shaping constitutional values, particularly in areas relating to human dignity, equality, and freedom.¹ Although India follows a dualist approach—where international treaties are not automatically enforceable unless incorporated into domestic law—the judiciary has often relied on international instruments to fill legislative gaps and strengthen the interpretation of fundamental rights. This approach reflects the Court’s recognition that constitutional values must align with universally accepted human rights principles. While reliance on international law enhances rights protection, it also raises concerns regarding judicial overreach and the potential dilution of parliamentary sovereignty.

The relationship between freedom of speech and the authority of the State has long remained a contested issue within Indian constitutional law. From the colonial period to the present day, laws regulating speech have reflected a continuous struggle between preserving public order and safeguarding individual liberty. The offence of sedition, originally embodied in Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, represented one of the most prominent examples of this tension. Introduced during British rule, it was primarily used as a mechanism to suppress political dissent rather than to address genuine threats to public order. Following independence, the expectation was that such colonial-era provisions would be reconsidered in light of constitutional guarantees. Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution firmly establishes freedom of speech and expression as a fundamental right, central to democratic participation and accountability. However, the continued existence and application of sedition law created an uneasy coexistence between constitutional ideals and statutory provisions. Judicial intervention, particularly in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, attempted to reconcile this conflict by limiting the scope of sedition to cases involving incitement to violence or public disorder. In recent years, the debate surrounding sedition has intensified, particularly in light of its perceived misuse against journalists, activists, and students. Concerns regarding vague terminology, low conviction rates, and the broader deterrent effect on free expression have led to increasing calls for reform. The introduction of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 marks a significant legislative shift in this context. By omitting the term “sedition” and replacing it with a provision aimed at protecting the sovereignty, unity, and integrity of India, the legislature has sought to present the reform as a step towards decolonizing criminal law. However, the transition raises important questions regarding continuity and change. While the language of the law has been modified, it remains necessary to examine whether the underlying approach towards regulating dissent has undergone a substantive transformation. The introduction of Section 152 necessitates a careful analysis of its doctrinal structure, constitutional validity, and practical implications.