Constant Conjunction Research Articles

What Kind of ‘God’ do Hindu Arguments for the Divine Show? Five Novel Divine Attributes of Brahman

This article describes the ultimate ground of reality, Brahman, as a single power unfolding in concert in all things. It uses counterfactual argumentation to imply that a cosmos must consist of telic causal orders or manifested ‘powers’ as its most granular building block – and that they must be unified into a single whole. It is based on an argument for a single causally-conditioning substrate of all things recorded in India’s classical Sāṃkhya Kārikā and Brahma Sūtras; this was used by scholastic Vedāntic thinkers including the non-dualist Śaṃkara and the ‘transformationist’ Bhedābheda thinker Śrīnivāsa. It takes up arguments for satkārya, the pre-existence of a thing’s various transformations in potentio within its substrate, and employs them to paint a picture of reality as an ordered yet entangled pattern of causal trajectories. These manifest as the changing world we know. While Vedānta’s main motivation for making the arguments was to prove monism, this conception of an ‘immanent cause’ of all was also seen as divine. We see how this accords with moves in contemporary analytic philosophy to shift away from a broadly Humean model of constant conjunctions (reminiscent of key Buddhist approaches) toward a Neo-Aristotelian ‘metaphysics of powers’. But we also indicate how it may go further than most modern powers-metaphysicians in proposing a deeper connection between powers and what it is for there to be a cosmos at all.

«МОНАСТЫРЬ В МИРУ» КАК ОБРАЗ ВСЕОБЩЕГО ОБЪЕДИНЕНИЯ В РОМАНЕ БРАТЬЯ КАРАМАЗОВЫ THE LAY MONASTERY AS AN IMAGE OF UNIVERSAL UNIFICATION IN THE NOVEL THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV

The article deals with the theme of a "lay monastery" (“монастырь в миру“), which became one of the important milestones of spiritual life and the life of the Сhurch in the late 19th and 20th centuries and which was reflected in the later works of Dostoevsky. According to Russian thinkers, there was an obvious need to overcome the spiritual isolation of the Church, which should show a desire to merge with the world and manifest heartfelt and vital work on this path. However, the new form and way of salvation are seen as an impulse of humanity to overcome the gap and strengthen connections with the Church. Dostoevsky thought that in the fluid and already different spiritual and historical reality, it was of the utmost importance to find or create new ways of salvation and unification. The Brothers Karamazov tells of the increasing social influence of hermits’ (подвижник). Dostoevsky suggested that their influence was utilitarian in nature and could be associated with the upper limit of Russian medieval culture in the 17th century, when the cult of saints was significantly strengthened as they were revered primarily as real helpers in secular affairs. Sanctity in Russia was often achieved by following the paths of martyrdom, passion-bearing, asceticism in its extreme forms, hermitry, mysticism and foolishness (юродство) rather than through constant, consistent, and purposeful self-discipline and abstention. However, the unifying factor is "Labor with Christ", where both joy about the world and spiritual ennobling are revealed, as Dostoevsky illustrates a path on which there is the possibility of expedient union between the laity and the Church. In the last chapter, in which Alyosha gathers the children and makes a speech, the mission of the "lay monastery" is carried out, because he manages to unite people in the name of Ilyushechka and his expected resurrection, thus, in the name of Christ. Each thing, having an absolute meaning, exists not only in a passive correlation to the other, but also takes action, fills it up and is being filled up. Only in a universal synthesis of this type, does the true miracle of universal interconnection live. Here, we are witnessing the mysterious communion of the boys and their entry into the mystical Church. One can use Lurie's successful comparison of two ways of life, secular and monastic, with Law and Grace (159). The lay monastery corresponds to the meeting of the Old Testament law and evangelical freedom, as two Christian paths that should exist in constant conjunction. Dostoevsky's thesis once again confirms the idea of Solovyov: "The Church is there where the people are, united by mutual brotherly love and free unanimity, who become a receptacle of God's grace, which is the true essence and vital principle of the Church, that forms one spiritual organism" (1914, 4: 658).

More than a Feeling

AbstractI argue for an interpretation of Hume on which our confused notions of causal necessity find their model in Hume's notion of logical necessity: our minds react in similar ways to constant conjunctions, on the one hand, and genuine cases of inseparability between ideas, on the other, in light of which we mistakenly place relations of necessitation between objects we call cause and effect. I argue that my account provides a more satisfying explanation of the mismatch between the feeling that provides our true idea of necessary connection and the confused notions of necessary connection held by philosophers and the vulgar.

The Anomaly of Anomaly of Anomaly

The Anomaly of Anomaly of Anomaly

Critical Realism and Institutionalism in Economics: A New Perspective on an Old Debate

:Richard Langlois supports the contribution of New Institutional Economics (NIE) to Economics, contrasting the following assertions: (i) Original Institutional Economics (OIE) wanted institutions but without theory; (ii) Neoclassical Economics (NE) wants an economic theory without institutions; and (iii) NIE wants both institutions and theory. This article uses the approach of Critical Realism with the aim of counteracting the suggestions of Langlois, who considers the advances of institutionalist schools by contrasting the theoretical (scientific) and anti-theoretical (naive empiricism) institutionalism. Instead of sustaining a criterion of scientificity founded on the assumption of a world composed of isolated and atomized events, Critical Realism treats the real unity of human activity and social structure as a condition of knowledge in the social domain. This implies the adoption of a structured ontology that deals with the opening of social systems, the existence of emerging phenomena, and the rejection of the notion of cause as a constant conjunction of events.

On the Very Idea of Distant Correlations

Contemporary debate over laws of nature centers around Humean supervenience, the thesis that everything supervenes on the distribution of non-nomic facts. The key ingredient of this thesis is the idea that nomic-like concepts—law, chance, causation, etc.—are expressible in terms of the regularities of non-nomic facts. Inherent to this idea is the tacit conviction that regularities, “constant conjunctions” of non-nomic facts do supervene on the distribution of non-nomic facts. This paper raises a challenge for this conviction. It will be pointed out that the notion of regularity, understood as statistical correlation, has a necessary conceptual component not clearly identified before—I shall call this the “conjunctive relation” of the correlated events. On the other hand, it will be argued that there exists no unambiguous, non-circular way in which this relation could be determined. In this regard, the notion of correlation is similar to that of distant simultaneity where the necessary conceptual component is the one-way speed of light, whose value doesn’t seem to be determined by matters of (non-nomic) facts.

Character and Causation: Hume's Philosophy of Action by Constantine Sandis

Reviewed by: Character and Causation: Hume's Philosophy of Action by Constantine Sandis David Landy Constantine Sandis. Character and Causation: Hume's Philosophy of Action. London and New York: Routledge, 2019. Pp. xiii +148. Cloth, $140.00. Constantine Sandis's suggestive new book consists of a series of discrete studies of aspects of Hume's philosophical system that culminate in an argument for the conclusion that "on Hume's view . . . we are only morally responsible for that subset of actions that have been motivated by our character traits" (90). That final conclusion is the end of a wide-ranging and systematic argument that feels too compressed in the scant one-hundred and twenty-three pages in which it is presented, especially since the philosophical and exegetical theses that Sandis presents along the way are intriguing and receive just enough support to make the reader long for a more robust consideration of them. Sandis's grand argument begins with the familiar approach of understanding Hume's Copy Principle as placing strict limits on the possible contents of our mental representations, thereby requiring Hume to revise our understanding of our own ideas. Sandis dubs this "soft conceptual revisionism" (2). In the early chapters of the book, the most important result that this approach yields is Hume's revision of our concept of necessary connection [End Page 406] to comprise only constant conjunction and temporal priority. The upshot of Sandis's discussion is to earn Hume a sense of 'necessity' and 'causation' that meets his criterion of meaningfulness and grounds the aforementioned account of action. Actions turn out to be those bodily movements with certain causes, properly construed, as either acts of will or character traits. Another important piece of Sandis's argument is his provocative claim that "a belief just is the feeling or sentiment accompanying an idea" (23), which "firm conception consists in feeling that something is the case" (24). At first blush, Sandis appears to make the radically heterodox claim that Hume holds that there is a distinct impression that is annexed to, accompanies, all believed ideas, despite the fact that Hume explicitly argues against that thesis (App 3–9/SBN 624–27). Upon closer inspection, however, Sandis denies the radical heterodoxy (24), and his actual claim is more anodyne. Despite his continued reference to belief as a sentiment or feeling, which terms Hume uses to denote distinct impressions (e.g. T 2.1.11.7/SBN 318–19 and T 1.1.1.1/SBN 1–2.), Sandis's actual claim appears to be that we should understand Hume's use of 'belief' to refer to the liveliness of these enlivened ideas, rather than the ideas themselves. What Sandis takes that nominalization to earn him is that beliefs, including moral beliefs, can produce action alone because they "are all sentiments" (99), and Hume is free to hold that we can be motivated directly by at least some of our beliefs, without the need for an additional conative perception. (In this sense, Sandis takes Hume to be non-Humean about motivation.) That is, Sandis holds that the liveliness of some of our ideas can itself be the cause (in the proper Humean sense) of some of our actions. That thesis is significant for Sandis insofar as discovering the cause of our actions brings to bear the question of the disappearing agent (78): if our actions have causes outside of our control, even if these causes are literally parts of us, then in what sense are we responsible for those actions? Sandis's answer on Hume's behalf is that while some actions are bodily movements caused by particular volitional perceptions (acts of will), we are only responsible for those actions that are also caused by manifestations of the long-term dispositions that constitute a person's character. In support of this answer, Sandis also advocates for a revisionist understanding of Hume's account of the self as a bundle of perceptions (chapter 4), an interpretation of Hume's notion of character as long-term behavioral dispositions (chapter 5), a rejection on Hume's behalf of what Sandis calls the Conflating View of Motivating Reasons—the thesis that the reasons for...

Financial Crisis: Time to Manage Earnings?

Previous research on how financial crisis affects managers’ earnings management behavior has resulted in different scenarios with inconclusive results. To address the ambiguity in the findings in the literature, the present study presents critical realism as an alternative to the positivist mainstream approach. The study argues against the existence of a causal law based on a constant conjunction model (i.e., whenever a financial crisis happens, earnings management happens) and concludes that financial crisis cannot be seen as the cause of earnings management. Finally, it suggests exploring other structures at work that might be responsible for earnings management.

Why Humean Causation Is Extrinsic

According to a view that goes by “Humeanism,” causal facts supervene on patterns of worldly entities.The simplest form of Humeanism is the constant conjunction theory: a particular type-F thing causes a particular type-G thing iff (i) that type-F is conjoined with that type-G thing and (ii) all F’s are conjoined with G’s. The constant conjunction theory implies that all causation is extrinsic, in the following sense: for all positive causal facts pertaining to each possible region, it’s extrinsic to that region that those causal facts pertain to it. Actual Humeans don’t accept the constant conjunction theory; they accept more sophisticated versions of Humeanism. But I argue that they, too, are committed to the thesis that all causation is extrinsic. In arguing for this claim, I use a discussion from Brian Weatherson as a springboard. Weatherson argues that on a plausible Humean view, some regions are such that all of their possible duplicates have the same or similar natural laws. I show that this is false. If Humeanism is true, then for every possible region, there are possible duplicates of that region with utterly alien natural laws. As a consequence, no causal facts pertain intrinsically to any region.

Factors for Evaluating Presumptions and Presumptive Inferences

Lilian Bermejo-Luque has posed these questions: Cohen’s method of relevant variables, Toulmin’s model, and Rescher’s theory of plausibility suggest answers. An inference is presumptive just in case its warrant transfers presumption from its premises to its conclusion. A warrant licencing an inference from the claim that an empirical property φ holds to the claim that some other property ψ holds is backed by observation of a constant conjunction of those properties. The stronger the backing, the stronger the warrant. Warrants may be defeated by instances of φ holding in conjunction with some property χ and ψ not holding. The method of relevant variables directs us to organize such defeating properties into relevant variables. We then test the strength of a warrant by seeing how many variables fail to have a value which defeats the warrant. The more variables with no defeater, the stronger the warrant. We may construct a canonical ordering of the relevant variables by ranking them according to the plausibility of their including defeating values. We may evaluate the strength not only of empirically backed warrants, but warrants backed by institutional rules, such as a branch of law, or by a priori intuited connections between properties. An inference rule will be presumptive just in case the plausibility of its warrant being defeated is below some specified level.

Why things happen – Developing the critical realist view of causal mechanisms

Events happen within the organizational world not by chance but for reasons. It is surely the task of management research to try to explain why these events occur. This requires us to understand the nature of causality but, in general, this is seldom discussed in the management or IS literature. The standard, positivist view underlying statistical analysis is the Humean one of constant conjunctions of events leading to universal laws. Against this, many constructivists find the whole idea of external causality implausible. In this paper we explore a third alternative that is developing strongly within the philosophy of science, social theory and critical realism – the mechanisms view. This proposes that events are generated through the interaction of specific mechanisms endowed with causal powers that may or may not be triggered, and may or may not be countervailed. In particular, the paper develops some of the fundamental concepts such as the nature of events, emergent properties, the difference between properties and powers, casual interactions between levels, absences as causes, event causality and generative causality, and abstracting causal regularities. The paper concludes by illustrating these ideas with a series of empirical case studies.

'Growth in a Time of Debt' as an example of the logical-positivist science

The paper addresses the question whether the now- infamous piece of econometric research conducted by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) that set the threshold hypothesis in the relation between public debt and economic growth was conducted in accordance with the neopositivist doctrine. The article consists of two parts. First, the epistemic advice given by logical positivism is reconstructed and operationalized. Second, the cliometric method employed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) is analyzed. The answer to the research question is affirmative. ‘Growth in a Time of Debt’ is a piece of logical-positivist science because (1) the research is data-based and aimed at confirming the results, (2) its authors are committed to the neopositivist theory-observation distinction, (3) its goal is describing an empirical generalization and the result’s interpretations suggest that (4) Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) understand causality in a reductionist way, as a constant conjunction.

Interpretation, judgement and dialogue: a hermeneutical recollection of causal analysis in critical terrorism studies

ABSTRACTThis article problematises Critical Terrorism Studies’s (CTS) seeming reluctance to engage in causal explanation. An analysis of the meta-theoretical assumptions on causation in both orthodox and critical terrorism studies reveals that the latter’s refusal to incorporate causal analysis in its broader research agenda reproduces – despite its commitment to epistemological pluralism – the former’s understanding of causation as the only sustainable one. Elemental to this understanding is the idea that causation refers to the regular observation of constant conjunction. Due to the positivist leanings of such a conception, CTS is quick to dismiss it as consolidating Orthodox Terrorism Studies’s lack of critical self-reflexivity, responsibility of the researcher, and dedication towards informing state-led policies of counterterrorism. Drawing on recent work in the philosophy of science and International Relations, this article advances an alternative understanding of causation that emphasises its interpretative, normative and dialogical fabric. It is therefore argued that CTS should reclaim causal analysis as an essential element of its research agenda. This not only facilitates a more robust challenge against Orthodox Terrorism Studies’ conventional understanding of causation but also consolidates CTS’s endeavour of deepening and broadening our understanding that (re)embeds terrorist violence in its historical and social context.

Character and Causation: Hume's Philosophy of Action by Constantine Sandis

Reviewed by: Character and Causation: Hume's Philosophy of Action by Constantine Sandis Elizabeth S. Radcliffe Constantine Sandis. Character and Causation: Hume's Philosophy of Action. New York and Abingdon: Routledge, 2019. Pp. 148. Cloth ISBN 9781138283787, $140. In Character and Causation: Hume's Philosophy of Action, Constantine Sandis takes Hume's empiricist tenet that all meaningful ideas copy impressions as the key to understanding his general philosophy. Sandis then applies "the Copy Principle" to Hume's view of persons and their actions. Portraying Hume's approach (at least in the Treatise) as one of conceptual revision, the result, Sandis says, is that our ideas of persons, reasons, causality, agency, free will, and other related concepts have ordinary meanings (not the abstruse philosophical ones) without ontological implications. The author describes his book as a series of connected essays. The chapters work together to present an anti-metaphysical, naturalistic, and nonskeptical picture of Hume's action theory. Each chapter is readable and trim, but the book covers a great deal of territory in a short space. At times, I craved more detailed arguments and help understanding the views in Sandis's original portrait of Hume. However, both Hume scholars and action theorists will surely find this book thought-provoking and worth grappling with. A brief epilogue discusses how Hume's "soft revisionism" bears on contemporary discussions of agency and action. Sandis takes Hume's project to be one of establishing what we ordinarily mean in using the terms that stand for problematic concepts like necessity and self. It is not a project of determining what we can properly mean, since expressions just have meanings; they are neither correct nor incorrect. (There are echoes of Wittgenstein throughout the book, and Sandis invokes him explicitly in Hume's [End Page 139] defense in chapter 3, "Necessity, Power, and Freedom.") Furthermore, Hume's is not a project of investigating the ontology of causation, agency, and so on. Consequently, Sandis suggests, debates, such as the "new Hume" debate, which revolve around questions like whether Hume was a realist, anti-realist, quasi-realist, or skeptical realist, are misguided. Causation involves the idea of necessary connection, of which we have no impression. So, Sandis argues, since we cannot meaningfully say anything about necessary connection, we have no idea to project onto the world and nothing to affrm or to deny. "Hume's conceptual revisionism about necessity thus tempers both skepticism and metaphysical realism in a move made routinely [by Hume] in relation to every major philosophical controversy of his day" (47). In much of the book, Sandis applies this revisionist interpretation of Hume to topics of free will, substance, self, identity, and motivation and morality. At the heart of Sandis's reading of Hume's action theory is the notion of agency, which is rarely emphasized in analyses of Hume. Sandis develops this conception of agency, first, via discussion of necessity and freedom. Necessitation of action and liberty are easily compatible because of the way Hume defines each within his practice of conceptual reform. He describes cause in terms of constant conjunction of experiences, and necessity in terms of human expectation. Liberty, in his terms, is the ability to do as we will (desire), not the capacity to do anything regardless of the will. Thus, I am free when my motives are regularly conjoined with actions such that observers can predict certain behaviors on my part. Second, agency is tied to the self (mind) and personal identity. In the case of self (and substance), we have no idea of it apart from the ideas of varying qualities; the notion of an uninterrupted self or substance over time is a fiction. However, Sandis argues, Hume offers revised ideas of the self, of substance, and of identity, which follow from Hume's own "theory of meaning" (69). I cannot trace all the twists Hume's discussion of personal identity takes, but in the end, Sandis thinks it "allows us to talk of 'self' and 'identity' in a way that requires nothing beyond the sort of casual observations that he allows for across all his works" (69)—simply as qualities we suppose are tightly connected by relations of contiguity and...

The Empty Symbol and Its Relation to the Psychoanalytic Process

ABSTRACTAnalysts need to be aware that each word used by a patient is composed of a constant conjunction of a person’s intimate emotional and historical referents, conscious and unconscious affects, memories, and conceptions and fantasies. If this conjunction does not correspond to that of the analyst, a gap develops between them. This gap in meaning is a non-understanding that emerges outside consciousness and beyond words. The author conceptualizes this relational phenomenon as the Empty Symbol.

Optimism and the Global Health Growth Curve.

David Hume, the brilliant and skeptical Scottish philosopher, was known for criticizing the human tendency to extrapolate—to assume that things would continue to motor along at the same speed on the same trajectory. He encouraged us to not make assumptions or predictions based merely on the “constant conjunction” (correlation) of past events, but to carefully examine apparent relationships for a causal link. Much of what happens in our world is linear and predictable, like clockwork in some cases. In other cases, nonlinear and startling trajectories best describe the behavior of economies, political movements, or the various factors in what we might call “global health.” Global health progress has been dramatic in some areas, but discouraging and slow in others. What trends should we anticipate in the coming decades? Is there reason for optimism? Simon Kuznets was a Nobel laureate economist who charted social inequality against national per capita income in a classic article in 1955. He used data from a variety of countries to plot a parabolic “inverted U” curve, predicting that inequality might increase as farmers moved to cities and industry, but would later shrink as prosperity reached broadly into a society. Kuznets understood the fragility of his data and some of its limitations, but others have extrapolated from his outcome to dubious conclusions. Will the trajectory of global health programs follow a Kuznets’ curve? Climate change or another major disruption could affect improvements in global health indices, and even turn back some successes. The growth of global health might follow the nonlinear shape of Kuznets’ curve, but I doubt it. The growth curve for global health might also take a “J” shape. Author and political scientist Ian Bremmer writes a compelling narrative for this trajectory in his 2006 book, The J Curve: A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall. He describes a nonlinear relationship of stability to progress in social freedoms, in which stability decreases initially as social freedoms increase; when freedom continues to increase, the brief dip in stability is followed by a long upward linear improvement. We see this behavior in the prevalence of polio immunity, i.e., when violence or deceitful propaganda are allowed to intrude on immunization campaigns. But I do not believe the “J” curve will be the most common trajectory for global health programs in the coming decades. Many physical processes, like chemistry “saturation” curves, the growth curve of populations, and improvements in longevity over time, follow a sigmoid (S shaped) curve. Input in the early stages may not show much response or return on investment, until reaching the cusp of an exponential rise, when return vastly outruns input. Later, the output stabilizes and reaches a plateau, where “saturation” or “carrying capacity” is achieved, and additional input produces diminishing returns. Even the exponential improvement in computing capability predicted by Gordon Moore in 1965 may finally be approaching a plateau, and showing a sigmoid shape. I believe that future growth in most global health indices will describe a sigmoid curve. Samuel Preston first demonstrated this behavior in his description of the relationship of longevity to gross national product (GNP) per capita. At relatively low GNP per capita values ($2,000), average national longevity rises dramatically with each small increase in economic activity. Many of the developing world nations are poised at the base of the steep upsloping part of Preston’s curve. At about $5,000 GNP per capita, the spectacular longevity gains flatten out, and only inch up as GNP increases to about $20,000 per capita. (There are few data points beyond this, including the United States, and longevity remains stable or may even decrease slightly as GNP continues to rise. Other developed countries, struggling to reach the same economic level, may not want to go there!) Preston’s curve does not demonstrate the sigmoid shape at low GNP value. A truly sigmoid function should have a flat “tail” at low values, before beginning the exponential rise. I suspect most human societies have been on that part of the curve throughout history, only in recent centuries reaching the upslope as a group. Some of the poorest nations may still be mired in this phase today, when investments in Department of Preventive Medicine and Biometrics, Uniformed Services University, 4301 Jones Bridge Road, Bethesda, MD 20814. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. doi: 10.7205/MILMED-D-16-00020

Dispositions: An Integrational Analysis

AbstractWhereas the Humean accounts of causality in terms of contiguity, temporal priority, constant conjunction, and contingency face difficulties of one sort, the dispositional explanations of causality in terms of reciprocity, simultaneity, ubiquity, and holism seem to meet difficulties of another sort. But the difficulties which dispositionalism faces may be dissipated if one can appeal consistently to the logic of naturalism, rather than to the grammar of an implicit dualism, for example, as it is illustrated when G. Molnar tried to advance the analogy between the mental intentionality and the physical intentionality.The notion of integration is taken to allow a conceptual space for naturalism of one kind. It may be expressed in the thesis that there is integrationality in any entity like dispositions, such that the integrationality is a power to realize the embedded objective of it in the context where it interacts with all others. The thesis would help to see how dispositions can be intentional, how the notion of information may be read integrationally from any object, and how the notion of fitting plays a role in the metaphysics of integrationality.

Causal Mechanisms, Job Search and the Labour Market Spatial Mismatch

Many studies of the labour market spatial mismatch rely on the deductivenomological model of causation to test the theory that low-skilled, inner-city residents have been isolated from the knowledge of job opportunities by the suburbanization of jobs. The logic of this approach follows the deductivenomological model of explanation which establishes causation by measuring the constant conjunctions between ‘causes’ and ‘effects’. As an alternative, I have used a realist approach to the study of the labour market spatial mismatch that uses a ‘causal-explanatory’ method. This approach entails the qualitative description of the causal mechanism in order to discover and conceptualize its causal properties. The results suggest that the spatial mismatch theory could be refined in order to accommodate the finding that workers in excluded ghettos do not necessarily rely solely on local social networks to find out about job vacancies. Instead, workers with employment experience have strong workplace-based social networks. Since employers recruit workers by relying on referrals from trusted workers, these workplacebased social networks can put job seekers at the front of the hiring queue, regardless of where they live.

Critical Realist versus Mainstream Interdisciplinarity

In this paper I argue for the superiority of a critical realist understanding of interdisciplinarity over a mainstream understanding of it. I begin by exploring the reasons for the failure of mainstream researchers to achieve interdisciplinarity. My main argument is that mainstream interdisciplinary researchers tend to hypostatize facts, fetishize constant conjunctions of events and apply to open systems an epistemology designed for closed systems. I also explain how mainstream interdisciplinarity supports oppression and gross inequality. I argue that mainstream interdisciplinarity is not true interdisciplinarity and refer to it accordingly as ‘condisciplinarity’. By way of example, I examine the condisciplinarity of the World Health Organization’s ecological model applied to the issue of men’s violence against women. Specifically, I argue that critical realist interdisciplinarity is preferable because it acknowledges inter alia the empirical, actual and real layers of reality, which allows it to develop depth-explanations of phenomena. In practice, this means that critical realist interdisciplinarity can potentially provide explanations that, compared to condisciplinarity, are broader (include more of the human and non-human context) and deeper (include for example individuals’ conscious and unconscious psychological motivations). In the World Health Organization’s example of the causes of men’s violence against women, condisciplinarity resulted in the absence of historical, global and unconscious aspects of the problem. It is also restricted the analysis to reductive, constant-conjunction based theories of the causes of the problem, specifically ‘risk factors’, thereby providing a relatively shallow explanation for the problem.

A New Humean Criticism of Our Inductive Practice

Hume’s familiar sceptical argument against induction brands as irrational our practice of generalising from observed regularities because of its reliance on the assumption that nature is uniform, an assumption which is unjustifiable. The argument which I wish to consider focuses instead on the observed regularities that are required if we are legitimately to extrapolate from experience. According to Hume, the paradigm type of inductive reasoning involves a constant conjunction. But in fact we do not encounter such invariable uniformities: our experience is, almost invariably, irregular. So setting aside Hume’s sceptical qualms about the very attempt to form expectations about the hitherto unobserved, how can we justify our ignoring such irregularities? My conclusion is that, even if the principle of uniformity can be justified, our practice is irrational by Hume’s lights. This is a new Humean critique of our “causal reasoning,” for, although Hume does not present it, the ingredients are all his.