Conscientious Refusal Research Articles

Show and slow codes: A historical analysis of clinicians' adaptations to ethical overreach.

After briefly reviewing the historical development and ethical regulation of resuscitative technologies, this study probes why clinicians engage in the morally problematic practice of show and slow coding and why hospitals tolerate it? Studies conducted in 1995 and 2020 indicate that conscientious clinicians engage in these practices to protect their patients from abusive or futile resuscitation. And hospitals' clinical cultures tolerate these practices to protect conscientious clinicians from censure, dismissal, delicensing, or legal prosecution for withholding or withdrawing abusive or futile resuscitative technologies without prior patient or surrogate consent. Show and slow coding evolved in American clinical cultures in the second half of the 20th century when closed-chest cardiac massage, defibrillators, ventilators, and other resuscitative technologies raised seemingly novel ethical questions. To address these questions, bioethics commissions, healthcare societies, lawmakers, and a Roman Catholic Pope developed ethics standards requiring clinicians to obtain patient or surrogate consent before withholding or withdrawing resuscitative technologies. They thus conferred on patients an implicit right of resuscitation even if it was abusive and/or futile. Conscientious clinicians circumvented this implicit right by show and slow coding to protect patients from abusive resuscitation. Recognizing clinicians' benign intent, hospitals' clinical cultures tolerate show and slow coding as acts of conscience, akin to civil disobedience. Thus, rescinding ethics standards and laws requiring prior patient/surrogate consent for non-resuscitation or for cessation of resuscitative technologies decisions should end show/slow coding. Such a reform should also recognize clinicians' right of conscientious refusal to perform CPR.

Assessing Public Reason Approaches to Conscientious Objection in Healthcare.

Sometimes healthcare professionals conscientiously refuse to treat patients despite the patient requesting legal, medically indicated treatments within the professionals' remit. Recently, there has been a proliferation of views using the concept of public reason to specify which conscientious refusals of treatment should be accommodated. Four such views are critically assessed, namely, those of Robert Card, Massimo Reichlin, David Scott, and Doug McConnell. This paper argues that McConnell's view has advantages over the other approaches because it combines the requirement that healthcare professionals publicly justify the grounds of their conscientious refusals of treatment with the requirement that those grounds align with minimally decent healthcare. This relatively restrictive approach accommodates conscientious refusals from minimally decent healthcare professionals while still protecting good healthcare, the independence of the healthcare professions, and the fiduciary relationships.

Conscientious refusal or conscientious provision: We can't have both.

Some authors argue that it is permissible for clinicians to conscientiously provide abortion services because clinicians are already allowed to conscientiously refuse to provide certain services. Call this the symmetry thesis. We argue that on either of the two main understandings of the aim of the medical profession-what we will call "pathocentric" and "interest-centric" views-conscientious refusal and conscientious provision are mutually exclusive. On pathocentric views, refusing to provide a service that takes away from a patient's health is professionally justified because there are compelling reasons, based on professional standards, to refuse to provide that service (e.g., it does not heal, and it is contrary to the goals of medicine). However, providing that same service is not professionally justified when providing that service would be contrary to the goals of medicine. Likewise, the thesis turns out false on interest-centric views. Refusing to provide a service is not professionally justified when that service helps the patient fulfill her autonomous preferences because there are compelling reasons, based on professional standards, to provide that service (e.g., it helps her achieve her autonomous preferences, and it would be contrary to the goals of medicine to deny her that service). However, refusing to provide that same service is not professionally justified when refusing to provide that service would be contrary to the goals of medicine. As a result, on either of the two most plausible views on the goals of medicine, the symmetry thesis turns out false.

The Moral Asymmetry of Conscientious Provision and Conscientious Refusal: Insights from Oppression and Allyship

Conscientious refusal involves decisions by healthcare workers, on grounds of their conscience, to refuse to provide legal, professionally permissible and safe health interventions to patients. Conscientious provision involves decisions by healthcare workers, also on grounds of conscience, to provide safe and beneficial healthcare to patients that is prohibited by law or policy. Some bioethicists believe that the moral issues governing both are identical, and that if one permits conscientious refusals, one should also permit conscientious provisions. This article argues that this assumption of symmetry is incorrect. To demonstrate this, it does the following: first, it establishes why it matters that we understand the difference between them; second, it describes three recent cases of conscientious provision in Canadian healthcare to help characterize its nature and scope; third, it situates these cases in a socio-economically nuanced analysis of the role of the conscientious provider under conditions or privilege and oppression; finally, it applies insights from the cases and the intersectional analysis to common criticisms of conscientious refusal to reinforce the fundamental asymmetries between conscientious refusal and conscientious provision.

Democratizing Conscientious Refusal in Healthcare.

Settling the debate over conscientious refusal (CR) in liberal democracies requires us to develop a conception of the healthcare provider's moral role. Because CR claims and resulting policy changes take place in specific sociopolitical contexts with unique histories and diverse polities, the method we use for deriving the healthcare norms should itself be a democratic, context-dependent inquiry. To this end, I begin by describing some prerequisites-which I call publicity conditions-for any democratic account of healthcare norms that conflict or jibe with CR. Next, drawing on Ronald Dworkin's jurisprudence and Tom Beauchamp & James Childress's approach to bioethical reasoning, I briefly introduce one method for generating healthcare norms that is faithful to the publicity conditions and has potential to constructively, and democratically, derive important boundaries for CR. Finally, I argue that many critics of CR fail to similarly ground their accounts of healthcare norms in healthcare professionals' sociopolitical contexts, often relying instead on their own interpretation of a generally stateable healthcare norm. This leads to their misconstruing both the value judgments on which their own approaches rest and the public, political values that are often invoked in favor of CR.

Understanding Conscientious Objection and the Acceptability of its Practice in Primary Care

Ethically challenging or controversial medical procedures have prompted increasing requests for the exercise of conscientious objection, and caused concerns about how and when it should be practised. This paper clarifies definitions, especially with regard to discrimination, and explores the restrictions, duties, and practical limitations, in order to suggest criteria for its practice. It also argues that a conscientious refusal to treat, where there is therapeutic doubt, is a valid form of conscientious objection. An email survey sent to General Practitioners (GPs), explored the adherence to the suggested criteria, and assessed the outcomes, in terms of acceptability, impact, and difficulties experienced by the GPs, their colleagues and their patients. The results demonstrate high acceptability of conscientious objection, and better outcomes when the suggested criteria are adhered to. The GPs would support education to improve the practice of conscientious objection to a professional level, which could further improve outcomes and acceptability.

Conscientious Objection Based on Patient Identity

Conscientious Objection Based on Patient Identity

Respect for conscientious judgement in health care.

Respect for conscientious judgement in health care.

Why the Post-Roe Era Requires Protecting Conscientious Provision as We Protect Conscientious Refusal in Health Care.

The US Supreme Court overturned Roe v Wade in June 2022, and now each state's legislature will decide if and when its citizens will have legal access to abortion care and if and when its physicians will be criminalized for providing what is considered to be the standard of care by multiple health-related organizations. This extraordinary change in the medico-legal landscape requires reevaluation of health profession codes of ethics related to clinician conscience. This article argues that these codes must now be expanded to address 2 newly critical areas: physician advocacy to make abortion illegal and affirmative protection for "conscientious provision" in hostile environments on par with protection of conscientious refusal.

Objection or Obstacle: Applying Amartya Sen's Capability Approach to the Conscientious Refusal of Emergency Contraception.

The conscientious refusal to dispense emergency contraception (EC) is legally protected in fourteen states. While the ethical dimensions of these objections have been explored within moral and feminist philosophy, conscientious refusal to the over-the-counter sale of EC has not been significantly studied through an egalitarian lens, especially with attention to the existing reproductive healthcare landscape in which these refusals occur. This article argues, through Amartya Sen's capability approach, that conscientious refusal to EC creates a burdensome inequality for people wishing to prevent pregnancy that manifests within a background of historical injustices, elevating its importance in our weighing of capabilities.

McLeod’s Conscience in Reproductive Health Care: Fiduciary Duties Beyond Reproductive Care, the Role of the Pharmacist, and the Harms and Wrongs of Conscientious Refusals

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Professionalism, stigma, and willingness to provide patient-centered safe abortion counseling and care: a mixed methods study of Ethiopian midwives

BackgroundMidwives are a large proportion of Ethiopia’s health care workforce, and their attitudes and practices shape the quality of reproductive health care, including safe abortion care (SAC) services. This study examines how midwives’ conceptions of their professional roles and views on women who have abortions relate to their willingness to provide respectful SAC.MethodsThis study uses a cross-sectional, mixed methods design to conduct a regionally representative survey of midwives in Ethiopia’s five largest regions (Oromia; Amhara; Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples [SNNP]; Tigray; and Addis Ababa) with a multistage, cluster sampling design (n = 944). The study reports survey-weighted population estimates and the results of multivariate logistic regression analyzing factors associated with midwives’ willingness to provide SAC. Survey data were triangulated with results from seven focus group discussions (FGDs) held with midwives in the five study regions. Deductive and inductive codes were used to thematically analyze these data.ResultsThe study surveyed 960 respondents. An estimated half of midwives believed that providing SAC was a professional duty. Slightly more than half were willing to provide SAC. A belief in right of refusal was common: two-thirds of respondents said that midwives should be able to refuse SAC provision on moral or religious grounds. Modifiable factors positively associated with willingness to provide SAC were SAC training (AOR 4.02; 95% CI 2.60, 6.20), agreeing that SAC refusal risked women’s lives (AOR 1.69; 95% CI 1.20, 2.37), and viewing SAC provision as a professional duty (AOR 1.72; 95% CI 1.23, 2.39). In line with survey findings, a substantial number of FGD participants stated they had the right to refuse SAC. Responses to client scenarios revealed “directive counseling” to be common: many midwives indicated that they would actively attempt to persuade clients to act as they (the midwives) thought was best, rather than support clients in making their own decisions.ConclusionFindings suggest a need for new guidelines to clarify procedures surrounding conscientious objection and refusal to provide SAC, as well as initiatives to equip midwives to provide rights-based, patient-centered counseling and avoid directive counseling.

Bioethical Boundaries, Critiques of Current Paradigms, and the Importance of Transparency

Abstract This issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy is dedicated to topics in clinical ethics with essays addressing clinician participation in state sponsored execution, duties to decrease ecological footprints in medicine, the concept of caring and its relationship to conscientious refusal, the dilemmas involved in dual use research, a philosophical and practical critique of principlism, conundrums that arise when applying surrogate decision-making models to patients with moderate intellectual disabilities, the phenomenology of chronic disease, and ethical concerns surrounding the use of artificial intelligence in medicine. Throughout the issue, the themes of conceptual and moral boundaries in bioethics, critiques of current clinical ethics paradigms, and the importance of transparency are prominent.

Reproductive Services and Conscience-Based Refusals in Obstetrics and Gynecology Training.

Purpose: Professional bodies such as the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology recognize the impact of conscience-based decisions. The first time such decisions affect patients and providers is in residency. Our study sought to determine the attitudes of program directors towards various conscience-based refusals in potential applicants to obstetrics and gynecology programs. Method: An eight-question survey was sent to 279 directors of U.S. obstetrics and gynecology residencies in 2019. The survey proposed hypothetical conscientious refusals of common aspects of obstetric and gynecology practice. The survey asked respondents to categorize their reaction to these choices and choose from a list of factors which could modify their reaction. Univariate analysis and multivariate logistic regression were performed. Results: 97 program directors (35%) responded. A majority of PDs reported that the inability to prescribe or counsel on birth control, to provide methotrexate, to counsel on abortion, or to clearly enumerate refusals was impossible to work around, likely to lower an applicant's rank, not compatible with training, or not good for patients; collectively, these responses were grouped as "negative reactions" (73-99%). Female program directors had more negative reactions to applicants who refused to prescribe birth control (aOR 15.8, 95% CI 1.7-99.5) and counsel on abortion (aOR 3.6, 95% CI 1.2-10.8). Directors from different locations and program types did not have significantly different responses. A few program directors identified that academic strength could mitigate otherwise negatively-viewed choices. Illustrative comments of directors' attitudes are provided. Conclusions: Program directors agree that conscientious refusal to participate in certain activities is problematic for obstetrics and gynecology residency. There are very few subjective or regional differences on this stance, and few aspects of an application modify directors' reactions.

Voluntarily chosen roles and conscientious objection in health care

The longstanding dominant view is that health care practitioners should be permitted to refrain from participating in medical interventions when they have a conscientious objection to doing so in a...

Conscientious Objection, Not Refusal: The Power of a Word.

How something is presented matters. Objection emphasizes the thought behind the action while refusal gives the impression that medical care is not given.

Unjustified Asymmetry: Positive Claims of Conscience and Heartbeat Bills

In 2019, several US states passed “heartbeat” bills. Should such bills go into effect, they would outlaw abortion once an embryonic heartbeat can be detected, thereby severely limiting an individual’s access to abortion. Many states allow health care professionals to refuse to provide an abortion for reasons of conscience. Yet heartbeat bills do not include a positive conscience clause that would allow health care professionals to provide an abortion for reasons of conscience. I argue that this asymmetry is unjustified. The same criteria that justify protecting conscientious refusals to provide abortion also justify protecting positive conscientious appeals regarding abortion. Thus, if the law provides legal exemptions for health care professionals who, as a matter of conscience, refuse to provide abortions where it is legal, it should also provide exemptions for health care professionals who, as a matter of conscience, feel obligated to provide abortions where it is illegal.

Conscientious refusals to provide reproductive health care

Conscientious refusals to provide reproductive health care

Ought Conscientious Refusals to Implement Reverse Triage Decisions be Accommodated?

Although one can argue that they do not represent a radical departure from existing practices, protocols for reverse triage certainly step beyond what is ordinarily done in medicine and healthcare. Nevertheless, there seems to be some degree of moral concern regarding the ethical legitimacy of practicing reverse triage in the context of a pandemic. Such concern can be taken as a reflection of the moral antipathy some exhibit towards current practices of withdrawing treatment—that is, when withdrawal of treatment is arguably in the best interests of patients—and a rejection of the purported normative insignificance of withholding and withdrawing. Given that the relevance of the psychological attitudes of some healthcare professionals to the moral assessment of withdrawing and withholding treatment continues to be debated, it would seem that some thought should be given to the introduction and implementation of reverse triage decisions in response to a pandemic. This brief paper will consider if provision should be made for healthcare professionals to conscientiously refuse to participate in reverse triage.

Conscientious refusal to provide medically assisted dying

Medical assistance in dying (MAiD) became legal in Canada in June 2016. Since that time, many health-care practitioners and health-care institutions have undertaken to provide it, and thousands of Canadians have taken advantage of it. At the same time, a significant number of both practitioners and institutions have refused provision of MAiD for various reasons, including conscience-based objections to it. In this article, I argue that refusal by practitioners could, and should, be tolerated but only where it could be accommodated in practice groups without unduly burdening willing providers or adversely affecting patient access. My conclusion about refusal by institutions is less compromising. In this case, the cost to vulnerable patients of MAiD being delayed or denied is much greater and the burdens of conscience (if we may call them that) to institutions are insignificant. Since it cannot be accommodated without seriously impairing both patient access and patient well-being, refusal by publicly funded health-care institutions to offer MAiD must be completely disallowed.