Conference On Security And Cooperation In Europe Research Articles

The Helsinski Declaration: Brobdingnag or Lilliput?

On August 1, 1975 the Chiefs of State and other high representatives of 33 European countries, the United States, and Canada signed the Final Act of The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki. This event, described as the largest meeting of European leaders since the Congress of Vienna or by the more enthusiastic as the largest such meeting in history, had been little discussed in the North American press and caught the American public largely unprepared. Logic dictated that such an impressive gathering had to have an equally impressive purpose, and editorial writers struggled to explain the significance of the occasion. The general conclusion was that the President had demeaned himself by recognizing Soviet postwar hegemony in Eastern Europe without any substantial quid pro quo. George Ball called it “a defeat for the West.” Much of this comment in the media was without benefit of the complex document actually signed at Helsinki, covering sixty printed pages, which was made available to the public only one week prior to the signing. The Department of State, concerned that euphoria over this event might lead to increased pressure for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe and for other forms of unilateral disarmament, played down the Conference as an exercsie which was primarily of interest to the allies of the United States and which in any case had not produced documents of a legally binding character. For those determined to oppose the Conference, this appeared to be some form of coverup, whereas to those who saw merit in the texts, this seemed to depreciate the usefulness of some important steps in the right direction. Confusion over a document as carefully drawn, as vague and full of interrelationships and loopholes as is the Final Act is natural, and the results of the Conference should provide many a scholar a rich harvest of material for study for years to come.

Conspiracy, Bargaining, Transformation: Three Views of Soviet Intentions in Europe

This fall and winter promise to be among the most significant periods in the history of European diplomacy. The divided halves of Europe have locked horns in two sets of negotiations— mutual force reductions (MFR) and the conference on security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE). They may transform European and world politics in fundamental ways.

The Member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE): Current Preoccupations and Expectations

This article (a revised version of a paper presented at an IISS conference on East- West relations) is an interim report on one aspect of a study on multilateral East-West negotiations. The author attempts to assess the special preoccupations of WTO states in connection with CSCE and the differences between the Soviet Union and Rumania that surfaced in the course of the multilateral consultations and negotiations during 1973. He concludes that the impact of CSCE on intra-alliance relations in the East is likely to be marginal and long-term and that Soviet attitudes so far suggest confidence that the repercussions will remain manageable.